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ABSTRACT
In New Zealand,'the Crown' is frequently
relating to the Treaty of Waitangi. This thesis
as a Eeaty partner with MIori.
referred to in contemporary discourse
investigates the identity of 'the Crown'
There are major problems in identifying the Crown, and these problems have serious
implications for the 'Mf,ori' treaty partner. First, there is a problem of consistency in
the identiry of the Crown. Analysis shows that a range of institutions and individuals
involved in the negotiation of treaty issues in contemporary New Z*atandsociety is
identified as 'the Crown'. The application of theoretical analysis of the role of
symbols in politics shows that the Crown symbol is frequently used and widely
applied in treaty debate. This is, it is argued, because use of ,the crown, brings
Iegitimacy and authority to the actions and policies of those entities it identifies. The
flexibility and popularity of 'the crown' symbol creates a problem for Mdori,
however, because 'the crown' is not consistently naming the same thing.
There is a second major and intenelating problem: the evolution of the Crown. In
1840, 'the Crown' title was used in relation to the Queen, and Iater was used to
describe settler goverTrment. Most recently 'the Crown' has come to incorporate local
and regional as well as central government. This evolution in the identity of the
Crown has frustrated attempts by Mdori to identify and negotiate with their treaty
partner' In particular, case studies of local government and resource management law
refbrms in New Zealand demonstrate that Mdori themselves have attempted to resist
the evolution of the Crown and
identity for their treaty partner.
assert their own interpretation of the appropriate
Having demonstrated the problems of 'the Crown' as well as the frequency of its use,
there is the question of the broader constitutional relationship between Mdori and the
Crown to consider. A cliscussion of the role of the Crown in Canada illustrates some
of the points made earlier in the thesis and demonstrates the unique position of the
Crown in New Zealand' In addition, it is argued with regard to constitutional reforms
facing New Zealand in the 1990s, that the future clevelopment of New Zealand,s
rapidly evolving constitufion must consider the particular relationship between M6ori
and the Crown.
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INTRODACTION
As a consequence of the signing of the Treaty of waitangi in 1g40, and following a
renaissance of the Treaty in the 1970s, there has been much discussion and debate in
New Zealand, both within government and in society in general, about the place of the
Treaty in contemporary New Tnaland,society. Fundamental to this debate is a common
conception that the contemporary treaty partners are 'Maori' and ,the Crown,. This
thesis iugues that, despite the frequency with which 'the Crown' appears in treaty
discourse, there are significant problems in identifying exactly who or what the
'Crown' partner is in contemporary New Zealand society. Furthermore, the problems
relating to the symbol of the Crown have had serious implications for the MEori reaty
partner attempting to negotiate and resolve teaty grievances.
Although there have been occasions in the past where the identity of the Crown has
been called into question, no comprehensive examination of the nature and scope of
the problem has, to my knowledge, been attempted. At the same time, the need for
such an investigation has been widely apparent. For example in l9gg, it was noted
that:
[t]he question arises within the context of constitutional recognition of the Treaty as to
a precise definition of Crown and Maori. In 1840 these parties were distinct 
- 
l4g
years later the boundaries of each are somewhat bluned. The Crown can operate at a
number of diff'erent levels from the Governor-General to government ministers to
otficials in government departments. I
ln accepting the challenge to produce a better understanding of and definition for .the
Crown' this thesis also redresses a certain imbalance. Previously, attention has
I centre for Resource Management in Association with the Centre for Maaori Studies and Research,Resource Management Inw Reform. The Treatlt uJ Waitungi arul its Significunce 
.for the ResourceManagement lzrw.r. Working Paper No. 8. Minist y ro, the Environment, August l9gg, p. 22. Otherexarnples of attempts to define the crown or highiight th; compl;;ities of the identity are includedin Chapter One of this thesis.
2tbcused on the Maori treaty partner, and questions have been asked such as: .who is
Maori'? How will 'M6ori' organise themselves politically? Who are the appropriate
representatives for Mdori under the Treaty? In sum, as one newspaper heading stated,
the question has typically been, 'who is the crown's Treaty of waitangi partner?,2
While these problems relating to the identify of 'Mdori' in contemporary society must
be addressed and resolved in the interests of future treaty relations, this thesis is
concerned with directing these questions at 'the Crown' treaty partner. In particular, it
asks, who or what is 'the Crown'? How does 'the Crown' organise itself as a treary
partner and who are its representatives? Most importantly, why is the crown so
iiequently used in featy discourse? Finally, what are the implications of this identity
for Mdori?
This thesis is based on two assumptions which should be recognised. The first
assumption is that the Treaty of Waitangi is a fundamental constitutional document in
New Zealand because it allowed for the settlement of New T*alandby pdkehd and the
establishment of legitimate government by cession (as opposed to by military
conquest). Therefore, while it is not officially recognised within constitutional law,3
the Treaty is assumed to provide an important framework in contemporary society
through which the development of this country should be viewed. It is also assumed
that grievances which arise out of the Treaty require immediate and appropriate
resolution.
The second assumption upon which this thesis is based is that a relationship exists
between the public's conception of events and the language used to describe and
explain events which, in turn, influence the nature of future events. Therefore, the
identity of the crown is examined in this thesis, for the most part, though the
2 'who is the crown's Treaty of waitangi partner?', The press,20 February 1993, p. 3.
3-Margaret Wilson, 'Constiturional Recognition of the Treaty of waitangi,, in M. wilson and A.Yeatrnan (eds.), Justice antl ldentity. Aniipodean Practices,bridget williams Books, Wellington,1995. pp. l-18.
3Ianguage of public discourse in New Z,ealand,,in particular the language of the mass
media and members of the political Executive. In this thesis, the Crown is perceived
as a symbolic identity which is legitimately interpreted in a number of ways by
different groups in New Zealand,,including lawyers, bureaucrats, politicians, Mdori
and the general public. Therefore, while 'the Crown' is a legal concept, definable and
understandable through the legal lens as the Queen, the Governor-General and the
Executive, this is not the only interpretation of the Crown. Furthermore, regardless of
the definition of 'the Crown' according to the law, it is argued here that government
ofticials' the public and Mlori interpret and apply the Crown identity in significantly
diflbrent ways. This thesis is interested in determining which interpretation dominates
and why' Also it is concerned with understanding the implications of this for those
(such as Mdori) who support less popular conceptions of the Crown.
Also, in intoducing this research, something should be said briefly regarcling the place
of Mdori in contemporary New Zealand society. By the mid-1990s, and prior to the
first election using the mixed member proportional (MMP) system, M[ori constitute a
political minority in New Zealand, which is signiticantly under-represented in
Parliament' Despite the four Maori seats which effectively guarantee Mdori permanent
representation, and the imminent increase to five M6ori seats with the introduction of
MMP' there is widespread debate amongst Mdori and the wider public regarding the
lack of acknowledgment and representation of Mdori interests in government
generally' Also, increasingly in the 1990s, MEori have staged protests against alleged
breaches of the Treaty of Waitangi, most commonly through occupation of buildings
and land over which they claim ownership. Such protests aside, Mdori grievances
continue to be heard in the courts while the Waitangi Tribunal (established to
investigate and make recommendations to government on Mdori grievances under the
Treaty) as the main avenue of redress for Maori has an overwhelming backlog of
claims still to be heard. ln recognising this, some Maori have chosen to deal directlv
4with the government in negotiating their claims under the Treaty of Waitangi, some
with considerable success.4
However, the identity of the crown has proven problematic fbr Maori in a
contemporary political setting. The issues under negotiation such as resource
ownership and distribution, the development of the constitution and economic
development, are significant, and discourse to resolve these issues will require clarity
and consistency if they are to be successfully, appropriately and irrevocably resolved.
This can only be achieved if the Crown partner is appropriately identified and
represented from the perspective of Maori in particular.
Having recognised the assumptions and background of this research, attention can nrn
to its content. This work is divided into three sections. The frst two sections identify
two major problerns with the identity of the Crown and consider the implications of
these problems for Maori. The first section argues that there is a problem of
consistency in the identity of 'the Crown'. Chapter one introduces the many faces of
the Crown: the Queen, the Governor-General and the Ministers of the Crown as well
as legal interpretations for the Crown. It poses the question, which of these ,Crown,
identities represents the Crown as the treaty partner in contemporary New Zealand.
society? The second chapter answers this question in part with an empirical
investigation of the Crown as it was used in newspapers in New Zealandfrom l9g7 to
1993' on the basis of the findings in this chapter it is argued that, while .the Crown,
4 Further discussion of the waitangi Tribunal and rhe courts in dealing with rreaty grievances can belbund.in chapters Six andSeven iespe_ctively. Direct negotiation,,iitt, tt" governmen!, which arenot discussed in detail in this thesis, have increased in number since the release of the NationalGovernment's 'tlscal envelope'^policy in 1994, which proposed a full and final settlement of alloutstanding grievances with a $1 biliion lirnit to the financial compensation available to Maori.Dcspite being soundly rejected by Mdori. the National Govemment continued with its policy whichhas been largely responsible for the increase in the number of iwi (triueg willing to negotiate directlywith the Government. For further cliscussion ol the place oi Maori in contemporary politicsgenerally, see Andrew Sharp, Justice ancl the Maori:'Maori Cluims in New Zealand potiticatArSument in the j,980s.9:3t9 University Press, Auckland, 1990. and Andrew Shurp, .The problemof Maori Affairs. 1984-1989, in M. Holland and J. Boston (eds,),The Fourth Inhour Governrnent:Politics and Policy itt New Zealund,2nd edn., oxforcl University press, Auckland, 1990, pp.25l-
5was most often used as a metonym for government, it was also applied to a wide range
of individuals and institutions involved in treaty negotiations. Chapter Three then
reviews the theory about the function and use of symbols (such as the Crown) in
political discourse. This reveals, amongst other things, that political symbolism is
mclst often about legitimating authority and action. This theory is then tested against
ministerial statements made in New Zealandbetween 1987 and 1993 and, on the basis
of these findings, it is further argued that the Crown symbol is applied to a variety of
identities in an attempt to legitimate their actions and authority with regard to the Treaty
of Waitangi' Throughout these four chapters, the problem of inconsistency in the
Crown's identity is seen to create serious implications for those Mdori trying to
identify and negotiate with an appropriate authority under the Treaty of Waitangi. The
urgency with which the negotiation process is proceeding from the perspective of
government and M5ori serves to highlight the importance in clearly identifying the
appropriate parties for negotiation of treaty claims.
In order to comprehencl fully the problem of the contemporary identity of the Crown,
the evolution of the Crown in New Zealand,since 1840 must be closely examined. In
doing so, the second section of the thesis argues that there is also a problem with the
evolution of the Crown and again demonstrates the implications of this problem for the
Maori treaty partner. Chapter Five discusses the events surrounding the signing the
Treaty of Waitangi. It argues that, at that time, Maori were encouraged to conceive of
their treaty partner as the Queen. Subsequent to the signing of the Treaty, the authority
vested in the Queen was transferred to the settler government and the Crown heaty
partner became obsolete. Both this transfer of power and the subsequent
disappearance of the Crown were resisted by Mdori and are seen to have created
significant problems tbr them. Chapter Six goes on to iugue that the dormant Crown
identity was revived by the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the work of the Waitangi
Tribunal (established under the Act). Both the Act and rhe Tribunal identified a
contemporary treaty partner as 'the Crown'. However, the lg75 Act (and subsequenr
6amendments to the Act) provided no interpretation of the Crown. A case study in
Chapter Seven reveals that the identity of the Crown in the Act, complicated by the
evolution of the Crown, was examined in a Tribunal ruling. Chapter Eight extends the
argument that the evolution of the Crown is problematic by demonstrating that the
local government reforms of the late 1980s and the Resource Management Act l99l
have recently reinterpreted the Crown in a way considered inappropriate by those
Mflori who resisted the reforms. once again, it is demonstrated that the evolving
identity of the Crown, from 1840 to the mid 1990s, has frustrated Maori attemprs to
identify and address their treaty partner.
Having identitied the two major problems of the Crown and the implications of these
problems for Maori' the final section of this thesis places these argumensin the context
of New Zealand's developing constitution. Chapter Nine compares the New Zealand
experience with Canada's use of the Crown symbol. The comparison serves to help
substantiate the arguments presented in the first two sections of this thesis and,
moreover, emphasises the importance of the relationship between Mdori and the
Crown in New Zealand within the constitution. The final chapter then invesrigates the
constitutional refbrms facing New Zealand in the mid 1990s which impact on the
identity of the Crown. In particular, it examines the new Mixed Member proportional
system of electoral representation, republicanism, the future of the privy Council in
New Zealand' and the possibility of including the Treaty of Waitangi in a written
constitution in New Zealland.In keeping with the overall objectives on the thesis, this
chapter considers whether emy of these reforms might resolve the problem of the
Crown, impact on its popularity as a political symbol, or have implications for Mdori
in negotiation with their treaty partner.
There is an urgent neecl for rigorous public debate of the use and
crown' symbol in treaty discourse and in more general political
meaning of 'the
debate. Passive
acceptance of 'the Crown' symbol, which has meant that this issue has not been
7addressed in the past, should be avoided in ttre futtre. In particutar, the a;plication of,
a bettor undorstanding of the Crown to constitutional refurrus facing New Zealand in
the mid 1990s can help New'Zealand avoid a recurr.enc€ of problems which havo
hittorically complicatod the relationshiup between Masri au-d the Croffii treaty parher,
at the expense of the ability of Mdori to iden6q/ and negotiate with their fteaty partn€r.
As F.W Martland once observed:
There is one t€rln againsr whichf qdsh !o warn you, and that terrn is .the crownn. you
wfl Cq.ftainty rsad that the crq$E doos this and rhe crow! dqes that. ,A,s,a matter of
fact we know that the crown does nothing but lie in the Tower of l.ondon to be gazed
at by-sig51-*6ors, No' the crown is a coror for ignoranco: ir saves us from asking
difficull guestions- 
-.. I do not de-ny ttrat it is a conveniqnt term, and you may have to
use iE bur I do say that you should never be c.ontent with it, If yor arc told that the
crotvn has flds power or that poww, do not be content until you know who legaly bas
thepower...5
1f.y, Mai{and" lFltc lonsuitlttionat Hit4rt of Engl:antl: A Csurse oj, Le:ctura,,rcprintod e.tn.,Cambridge Univ.ers;ity hess, Cambri.dgeo teea,f. +tA.
SECTION ONE
The Problem of the ldentity of the Crown:
Symbolism and the Crown
ONE
INTRODUCING THE CROWN: BI]T WHICH oNE?
As F'W' Maitland observed, there is nothing complicated about the crown, which sits
in the tower of London to be gazed upon by sightseers.l It is, however, an appropriate
introduction to this chapter to note that the crown on display is a replica of the real
crown which is safely locked away. It seems that even at its most fundamental level.
the crown is a representation of something else. As a prolitic and time honoured
symbol, 'the Crown' (original or replica) represents a complex web of historical,
political and legal institutions, people and ideas. As rhe political theorist, Murray
Edelman explains, a symbol such as the Crown is created and used in order to explain
an overall, often complex, political picture in a simplified and manageable form.2
The purpose of this chapter is to begin to investigate the symbolic role of the Crown
and in doing so to introduce a general problem of consistency in the identity of the
Crown' It is first demonstrated that the Crown has historically been a popular symbol
in Britain, the Commonwealth and New Zealand also. However, it is argued that
despite (or perhaps as a result of) its popularity, the crown can be problematic both in
tenns of the breadth of its identity and its variety of meanings. In short, there is a
problem of consistency in the identity of the Crown. It is also observed that the
Crown, while a central and important constitutional legal identity, poses problems for
the law in determining the exact identity of the Crown, particularly as the process of
governing becomes increasingly complex.
I F'w' Maitland' The Conr^tilutittrutl Histot'y of England: A course ctf Lectures,reprinted edn.,Cambridge University press, Cambridgc, 196i, p. 418.
2 Mutray &lelman, Politics as Symholic Action: Ma:;s Arrtusal anr! euiescence,Marl.,henpubtishingConrpany, Chicago, 197 I. p. 2.
9
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Later in the chapter, and having established the general problem of consistency in the
identity of the Crown, focus turns specifically to the problem of the Crown in New
Zealand with regard to the Treaty of Waitangi. Here it is explained that M6ori signed a
Treaty with the British Queen (otherwise identified as the crown) whose authority in
New Zealand was subsequently exercised by British and then settler government in
New Zealand. The problem this creates with regard to the treaty partner is also
established. Second, the Queen's authority under the Treaty is vested in contemporary
New Zealand society in 'the crown'; usually said to encompass the eueen, the
Governor-General and Ministers of the Crown. There is also, therefore, a problem in
determining the Crown's parameters and in maintaining consistency in the identity of
the Crown' The Crown' as it appears (undefined) in treaty related statutes, is seen to
introduce the potential for confusion and disagreement over the identity of the Crown.
Finally, having established the problem of consistency in the identity of the Crown in
relation to the Treaty, this chapter ends with a brief review of ideas from individuals
and institutions in New Zealand regarding their own interpretations of 'the Crown, and
(where appropriate) solutions to the problem the Crown identity presents. This
literature review demonstrates first and foremost the need for a comprehensive
investigation into the problem of 'who or what is the Crown' such as is undertaken in
this thesis. It also raises a concomitant question; does (or indeed can) the
contemporary Crown identity constitute an appropriate expression of the original
function of the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi?
The Birth of a Symbot: The British Origins of ,The Crown,
The history of the British monarchy is, in many respects, distinct from the
development of the symbol of the Crown. The notion of 'the Crown' did not emerge
until the monarchy was well established in Britain and, it might also be argued, did not
flourish as a political symbol until the actual power of the monarchy was declining.
However, this is not to underestimate the important relationship between Crown and
11
monarchy' The survival of the monarchy through centuries of treacherous
constitutional change has often been attributed to its relationship with the flexible and
enduring notion of the crown. As King George vI once acknowledged, the crown
is:
the historical symbot that unites this great family of nations and races [of Great
Britain]. The complex forms and balanced spirit of our constitution were not the
discovery of a single era, still less of a single party or a single person. They are the
slow accretion of centuries, the outcome of patience, tradition and experience.3
Indeed' as the history of the British monarchy reveals, when kingsa were most
popular, the Crown symbolised the king. When a king failed and the monarch,s
popularity was low, the Crown could be distanced from the person of the king, thereby
ensuring the stability of the institution. Then, when representative govemment finally
prevailed, the monarch became the head of state and the Crown became a constitutional
identity deeply embedded in modern British society. Ironically, however, the very
qualities which have made the Crown a robust and accommodating symbol have also
posed the greatest threat to its continued survival. This discussion reveals that the
Crown has' down through the ages, come under attack as an unnecessarily ambiguous
and troublesome British symbol which could and should be removed.
Understanding the contemporary significance of the Crown symbol requires an
appreciation of both its earliest origins and its extensive history. prior to the Crown
there was only the king. From as early as 400 AD the notion of kingship was
developing in Britain through a patchwork of kingdoms. However, by the tenth
3 John Cannon and Ralptr p-1!fitrrs, The oxfbrd lllustrated History of the British Monarchy,oxfordUniversity Press, Oxford, l9gg, p. 600.
4 
'King' is used here in recognition of the fact that, until Mary I's rule in the late 1500s, themonarchy was male' Discussion of the period following Ma.y t *ili r"rer to the .monarchy..
t2
century a single permanent kingdom had developed.s With it came a concenftation of
power in the authority of the king which allowed (in fact required) the king to retain
possession of the kingdom's territories while conquering new lands and protecting the
'security of his people'6 The entire kingdom was under royal control.T From its
earliest beginnings the monarch also became inextricably linked with Christianity. The
king was exalted by the Church in return for his patronage, and the position of the king
was upheld as being akin to that of a priest. In addition, the religious consecration of
the king furthered heightened his early profile in the kingdom 
- 
the king was believed
to serve God's purpose as well as his own.8
A succession of kings ruled in England between the fifth and eleventh centuries. This
was a time of great uncertainty and turmoil for any monarch. As succession to the
throne was not yet an accepted birthright, leadership was fraught with arguments,
competition and tragedy. In order to compensate for the tenuous nature of the
monarch's rule, kings and their supporters promulgated pomp and ceremony which
promoted the stability, stafus and reputation of the monarchy and protected its future.
In short, they created 'a myth of order, continuity and antiquity' which would
surround the monarchy down through the ages and from which the symbol of ,the
Crown' would later arise.g
From 1000 to 1200 AD, an extended struggle between England and France for power
over both countries stressed the limitations of the king's authority and an increasing
]-o"t Alfred of Wessex won his title as earliest recognised king in England when he threw back theViking invasion in the-tenth century and allowed forl single fr.-*"nt kingdom in England. SeeCannon and Griffiths , History ofthi Briti.rh Monarchy,pp.iZ_tf 
.
6 Cannon and Griffiths , History oJ the British Monarchy,p.65.
7 Cannon and Griffiths , Histrtry of'the British Mrtnarchy,p.61.
E Cannon and Griffiths , Hi,rtory rf the British Morrurt'hy,pp. 30-32. Associarion with the Churchalso extended the king's powers and rights in a more proCticul manner, enabling him to appointjudges and impose fines.
9 Cannon and Griffiths 
, History of the British Monrtrchy,p.Tg.
l3
need for him to co-operate and communicate with royal subjects.l0 The absolute rule
of the monarch was under increasing pressure from within the kingdom which made
kings more dependent on their nobility to justify royal power and authority. In
response to this prsssure and in an attempt to secure the king's position and authority,
the act of crowning the king became a highly spiritualised and symbolic act of
'coronation'. As one writer notes, '[r]egardless of when it took place [sometimes
months after his succession to the thronel the king was not fully or lawfully king until
he was crowned.'ll This focus on the king's coronation was accompanied by
increasing attention to the regalia associated with the person and institution of the
monarchy, including the crown, the sceptre and the rod which represented the glory,
virtue, equality and justice of an anointed king.l2 Even up until the fifteenth @ntury,
crown wearing occasions and ceremonies were a popular way for a king to confront
challenges to his authority and assert the importance of his coronation and rule.l3 And
behold, a symbol is born,
During the eleventh and twelfth centuries the Crown provided the basis for a new
ideology which enhanced the status and dignity of the monarchy's special powers or
'royal prerogatives'.I4 The royal prerogatives (some of which are still in existence
today) are powers allowed only the king which traditionally allowed him to hold and
acquire territory while protecting the welfare of his subjects. The king enjoyed
'ordinary' prerogative powers which he executed through the courts and other
intermediary bodies, and 'extraordinary' or 'absolute' prerogative powers which the
king executed personally at his own discretion such as pardoning a criminal or
granting a peerage. As the absolute powers of the monarchy increased, a clistinction
began to appear between the office of the king and the person of the king. This
f 0 Cannon and Griffiths , History o.f the British Motnrchy,p. l0l.
I I Cannon and Griffirhs , History rf the British Monart:hy,pp. I 13 - l 14.
l2 Cannon and Grifl'iths , Hi,rtory of the Briti.rh M<tnurchy,p. I lg.
l3 Cannon and Griffiths , Histctry oJ'the Briti:th Monarchy,p. l2I.
l4 Cannon and Griffiths , History rl the Briti.rlt Monarchy, pp. lZ3 _ 124.
L4
distinction has been described as 'the king's two bodies'.15 It meant that the king's
identity as private person became almost a shadow to a second persona ficlz through
which the king was perceived to be immortal and incapable of thinking or doing wrong
(as the source of all justice). It has been argued that the development of the king's two
bodies' while seemingly ludicrous and awkward in many respects, provided an
important fiction at a critical time which allowed lawyers to 'harmonise modern with
ancient law', or to put it differently, to bring into agreement the personal authority of
the king with the new and more impersonal concept of government.l6 'The Crown,
subsequently came to symbolise the office of the monarchy rather than the king
himself and it became possible to distinguish between the Crown and the king.tT
Between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries parliament continued to be
predominantly a royal creation. However, there were notable attempts by various
parliaments to criticise the king (at its own risk) in order to modify his management of
govemment and wrest some control from the monarchy.rs 5u"n endeavours met with
some measure of success in the mid-I340s, afler which time government extended its
independence, forcing the king to rely further on the advice of his councillors in order
to legitimise his authority. With the king's real power diminishing, the king,s two
bodies became more clearly distinguishable as royal authority became less personal to
the monarch himself. However, govemment continued to be conducted in the name of
the king.le Furthermore, as government became increasingly representative, the
Crown provided an essential bridge between the old and emerging orders of
government' It did so by extending its mantle to include both the monarchv and the
rJ Ernst H' Kantorowicz,-The King't Twu Bodies: A Stutly in Mediaevil potiticut Theology,Princeton University press, New JersJy, 1957.
l6 Kantorowi cz,Tlze King's Two Bodies,pp. 4-5.
17 Cannon and Griffiths , Histrtry oJ'the British Monarchy,p. 125.
tl 
.o:" such attempt to wrest control from the king was with the Provisions of oxford in 125g,yhi$ sguqlt to place the king's power in the handsif the council. The proposal, not surprisingly,had limited success. See, Cannon and Griffiths , History of the British uoiariny,pp. zgo-zbS.
l9 Cannon and Griffiths , History rtJ'the British Mttnarchy,pp. 2l I _ 213.
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developing constitutional government which was exercised in the name of the Crown.
Ironically, it was when the king's real power began to decline (although this was not
altogether a pennanent loss of authority) that the Crown symbol flourished and in
doing so, protected the monarchy from criticism within the emerging political order.zl
For example, during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries the Crown was used to
separate an unsatisfactory king from the crown he wore. This meant that, while the
Crown was inviolable, the king himself could be corrected and even removed. With
this further evolution of the Crown symbol, the king himself became custodian and
servant to the crown.2l Appropriately worn above a king's head, his crown now
represented perfect, incomrptible and perpetual leadership, far superior to the notion of
govemment or the fallible person of the king.
By the early 1500s the royal court was still very much the centre of political and social
Iife. Ceremonies associated with royalty were also a focal point. During this period
the sovereign retained, potentially at least, the right to make all fundamental political
decisions, and parliament existed at the king's pleasure. However, by the sixteenth
and seventeenth centuries, parliament was secure enough to limit the sovereignty of the
absolute monarch. The monarchy's new role allowed him or her the power of law-
making but at the same time required that the monarchy ruled by consent.22
From 1688, the monarchy was required to summon parliament annually and, despite
the monarch's continued centrality, parliament was accepted as a permanent
constitutional feature in Britain.23 Furthermore, political parties began to develop
2() Cannon and Griffiths ,Hi;ttory of'the British Mtnrurchy.p.Zl3.
2l Cannon and Griffiths , History oJ the Briti,rh Mrnttrchy,p.2l7.
22 Cannon and Grilfiths , History o!'the Briti.uh Monarchy,pp.299 
- 300. In retrospecr, it is difficultto gauge-llow much power the monarchy had at this timi. Parliament often attempied io oppose the
royal policy, which was a treacherous business as r.he monarch retained and often used his powers ofdissolution, and his limitations of free speech. Also, parliament was not blessed with the routine offrequent sessions. These were callecl at the king's discretion. See Cannon and Griffiths , History ofthe Britil;h Monurchy,pp. 303-304.
23 Cannon and Griffiths 
. History tt'the Briti.th Mtnwrclty,p. 433.
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along with the notion of popular elections, which further challenged the real power of
the monarchy.24 Once again, despite such substantial constitutional reform, the
Crown's significance as a central political construct endured. Some writers have
suggested that individual monarchs (pruticularly queens) were critical in maintaining
and even promoting the place of royalty and the Crown in the developing political
order' For example, Elizabeth I (1558-1603) was renowned for expounding her lofty
powe1525 and Queen Victoria (1337-1901) has also been noted for her considerable
success in preserving and promoting the little power the monarchy still enjoyed.26
The other suggestion has been that the monarchy remained popular because it appealed
to the public in ways that the government could not. For example, Walter Bagehot
reviewed the place of the Crown in Britain in 1867 and argued that the success of .the
Crown' down through the ages, and particularly its success in surviving the threat of
representative government, was due to the fact that parliament and cabinet constituted
the 'efficient' part of government, while the monarchy represented the 'dignified, part.
He said that people could understand leadership by a single person, such as .the
Crown', whereas leadership by an assembly andpolitical parties was not so easily
conceived of by the 'ignorant masses'. He described the monarchy as 'intelligible
government where other forms are not well understood'. The Crown, accordrng to
Bagehot, was a necessary channel fbr popular support and was useful to government
because it deflected attention from the true cental power of govemment. He said, .[the
Crown] enables our real rulers to change without needless people knowing it. The
masses of Englishmen are not fit for an elective government; if they knew how near
they were to it, they would be surprised, and almost tremble',27 adding that .men are
24 cannon and Grirfiths , Hititnry r2r'trte Brititrt M.trttrchv,pp. 435-436.
2-5 Cannon and Griffiths , Hi,rktry o.f rhe Britit-h Mrntarthy,p. 351.
26 crumon and GritTiths 
, LIisktry o.f the Briti.rh Morrurchy,p. 
-553. Dcspire eueen vicroria,s efforts,
'the Crown' was destinecl to become more of a chairlierson or negotiator in politics than asuperintending authority. a position it had enjoyed in the past.
27 Walter Bagehot. Tlrc English Constirutitnt,Oxlbrcl Univcrsity press, Londo n. 1942.
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ruled by the weakness of their imagination.'28 Bagehot concluded, .so long as the
hurnan heart is strong and the human reason weak, royalty will be strong because it
appeals to diffused feeling, and republics weak because they appeal to the
understanding''ze His comments retlect the views of many contemporary theorists
who also identify the power of a symbol such as 'the Crown' which can represent, in a
mamageable form, the complexities of modern government.30
From around 1820, the monarchy was reduced in function and authority to that of a
popular monarch in Britain, a role it still enjoyed by the end of the twentieth century.
In the capacity of popular monarch, the king or queen compensates for the loss of
formal political power by distancing themselves from government politics and
concerning themselves with promoting a public image to a much wider range of
subjects'31 By the end of the nineteenth century the Crown played a less expansive,
although not altogether less significant, role as a symbol of British unity, the
unchallenged head of state and the head of the moral order.32 However, while the
political role of themonarchhad declined by the twentieth centur], the Crownwas set
to rise in its popularity and significance, this time within the British Commonwealrh.
Increasing demands from Commonwealth member countries for independence from
Britain were qualified by an equally strong desire to retain Commonwealth
membership and a common association with the Crown. Achieving this request
presented a dilemma to constitutional lawyers: how to divide the previously ind.ivisible
crown in order to accommodate independent, equal commonwealth nations.
28 Bagehot. The Engtish Cortstittttirtn,p.?l 
.
29 Bagehot, The Engtifi Constitutiort,p.S5.
30 A similar statement by Murray Edelman will be recalled from the beginning of this chapter. Referto tbotnote No. l. Also see chapter Three of this thesis 1br further discussion.
3l Cannon and Griftlths , Hisnry of the British Morwrchy,p. 530. For example eueen Victoria, as apopular monarch' took a keen interest in her most recentiy icquired subjectsin Australia and later inNew Zealand and insisted on maintaining Crown control of colonial affairs. See Cannon andGriffiths, H is rory of the B riti sh Monarchy,i. 56g.
32 Cannon and Griffiths . Hi.rutry o.f rhe Briti.rh Morrctrchy,p.577.
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Accommodating the commonwearth: The Divisible crown.
By the twentieth century British imperialism had resulted in a Commonwealth of
nations established under British rule. In particular, Australia, New Zealand and
Canada (as the focus of later discussion) underwent the process of demanding
legislative independence from Britain. However, in doing so, these countries and other
Commonwealth nations expressed a desire to exercise parliamentary sovereignty
within the security of the Commonwealth of British Nations and to retain their link
with the British Monarch as the sovereign of their own independent nation.
These nations' desires to retain their attachment to the Crown are indications that it had
been a popular and important symbol amongst most nations within the
Commonwealth. This popularity is well documented. For example, in the preamble to
the Statute of Westminster 1931 it was declared that, 'the Crown is a symbol of the
free association of the Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations' (which at
that time included the united Kingdom, canada, Australia, New Zealand, south
Africa, Newfoundland, and the Irish Free State).j3 Similarly in 1949,a communiqud
by Commonwealth Prime Ministers read, '[t]he Governments of the United Kingdom
owe common allegiance to the Crown, which is also the symbol of their free
association.'34 Later still in 1960, and fbllowing the independence of Commonwealth
nations from Britain, it was observed that '[i]n the Commonwealth as it is organised at
present, the members have decided that there shall be a symbol of their association and
that symbol should be what they either describe as ,the crown' or .the eueen,.,3s
Despite the popularity of the Crown, its usefulness was challenged by the developing
Commonwealth' As Geoffrey Marshall, British constitutional theorist, has explained,
11 ,ry C. Wheare, The Constitutiotral Structure t|l' tlrc Cctnurutruvealtlt,Clarendon press, Oxford,1960, p. 150.
34 wheare, The constitutirnar structure tf'the conm.nweurth,p. rsl.
35 wheare, The constitutktnar s*ucture rtf'the Crtntmo,wearth,p. r5o.
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the Crown raised awkward conceptual queries in relation to the future of the
Commonwealth in the early twentieth century because the Crown, which was .one
and indivisible' in England, had to become a multiple 'divisible' Crown in order to
accommodate the independent Commonwealth states.36 In order for Commonwealth
states to retain their link with Queen Elizabeth II, and at the same time achieve
independence from Britain, the Queen would have to become the eueen of Australia
and of Canada and of New Zealand, thereby creating an equality between Britain and
the other member countries under the Crown. As challenging as this problem was, the
Crown once again proved itself a symbol capable of accommodating even the most
significant of constitutional changes proving that it was as flexible outside the United
Kingdom as it had been inside it.3?
The process by which the Crown was divided unfolded as follows. In 1927,prior to
the division of 'the Crown', the monarch was identified by all Commonwealth nations
as being, 'by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, Ireland, and the British Dominions
beyond the seas, '.. Defender of the Faith.' In the Royal Titles Act 1947 (passed by
the British Parliament), changes were made to reflect India and pakistan's new identity
as republics within the Commonwealth, with their own presidents as the head of state.
In 1953, the Royal ritles Act 1947 was repealed following agreement by
Commonwealth rnember countries that the Crown's title should better reflect the
independence of the Commonwealth nations from each other and, more importantly,
from Britain. Accordingly, following the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953,
Commonwealth Nations were able to adopt their own royal title. In doing so, New
Zealand and Australia elected to retain the phrase 'Head of the Commonwealth,,
making New Zealand's Crown, 'Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God of the
United Kingdom, New Zealand and Her other Realms and Territories eueen, Head of
36 Geoffrey Marshall, Con;rt.itutiortal Thertry,Clarendon Press, Oxford ,lg7 l,p. 20. Also see philip
'Ioseph, Ctn:stitutiottcrl urul Atlministrative Liu, in New Zettlantl, The Law gook Co., Syaney, tflf ,p.492.
37 sir Ivor Jennings, The eueen's Gttverttntettf ,penguin Books, London, 1952,p.37.
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the Commonwealth, Defender of the Faith...' In lgT4,the Act was amended again to
describe the Queen as, 'Elizabeth the Second, by the Grace of God, eueen of New
Zealand' and Her other Realms and Territories.'38 Canada, on the other hand, chose to
immediately assert a greater degree of independence from Britain and the Crown after
1953, by not acknowledging the eueen as the Head of the commonwealth.3e
However, New Zealand, Canada and Australia commonly acknowledged their
Commonwealth connection by identifying their queen as the eueen of the United
Kingdom.a0 Once each Commonwealth nation had established its own appropriate
title for the Crown, including the United Kingdom, they were effectively under the rule
of an equal, but separate .Crown'.
This process, as New Zealand's constitutional lawyer Philip Joseph explains, is the
notion of the 'divisible Crown' by which the Crown became a legally divisible entity
throughout the Commonwealth, thereby ensuring the survival of the Crown in most
Commonwealth nations well into the late twentieth century.4l In New Zealand, the
Constitution Act 1986 most recently reaffirmed the existence of the Crown in New
Zealand by stating that '[t]he sovereign in right of New Zealand is the Head of State of
New Zealand, and shall be known by the royal style and titles proclaimed from time to
time.'42
Flowever, while an established tradition in both Britain and the Commonwealth, the
Crown has not escaped criticism from contemporiuy writers. Most fiequently .the
Crown' has been charged with having become an 'unnecessarily ambiguous and
troublesome identity' which can and should be replacecl by a more appropriate symbol
38 Further discussion of the reasons for and implications of this amenclment are discussed in ChapterSix.
39 wheare, The consrirutknal strucrtrre ttf'trte cttntnr'rtwe,rtrt,pp.l64-165.
4(l whezue, The Constitutirttul structure ,f'the contntonweattlt,p. 167.
4f Joseph, ccnu\itutirnar und Adtttittistrntive ktw in n-ew zearatur,p.492.
42 The Constitutictn Act lgg6,Section 2 (1).
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or word, such as 'the State'.a3 In 1952, Sir lvor Jennings considered this suggestion
and defended the Crown by arguing that the concept was useful specifically because it
is personal and flexible, real and tangible.44 Similarly, Geoffrey Marshall, British
constitutional theorist, argued that 'the state' and .the crown, have important
distinctions in use and meaning.as In looking to clarify what those distinctions might
be, New Zealand political commentator, John Martin, has provided some insights.
Martin advised that the debate between 'state' and 'Crown' has also reached New
Zealand's shores, where 'the Crown' is the preferred term in both politics and law,
making it symbolically and practically of greater significance than the state.46 Martin
supported Marshall and Jennings in arguing that 'the state' is different from .the
Crown' in that the fbrmer refers to more than one government institution or
government as a whole. He argued that when considering the relative popularity of the
terms Crown and state in constitutional and administrative discourse in New Zealand,
the preference for the Crown coulcl be explained by the fact that there is .perhaps
something vaguely alien and threatening about 'the State'.'a7 While this may be true,
the Crown's popularity in New Zealanddraws attention to the problem of the Crown
and makes clarity in respect of the identity of the Crown all the rnore essential.
Having identified the flexibility and complexity of the Crown in Britain and the
commonwealth, historically and in a contemporary sense, it should come as no
surprise to learn that similar complexities and problems can be identified in the
meaning and uses of the Crown in New Zealand,where the symbol poses not only a
conceptual, but also a more practical,legal dilemma.
43 Marshall. Conrtitutiotrul Thettry,p. 24.
4 Jennings, The eueen'.r Grnernnrcnt,p.35.
4-5 Marshall, Cortstitutiortul Tlwory, pp. 24-25.
46 John Martin' 'The Role of the Stare in Administration', in Andrew Sharp (ed.), Leap inut thelurl rlte Changing Role o.f the state in New Zectltmcl Since I984,Auckland University press,Auckland, 1994,p.42.
47 Martin, 'The Role of the State in Administration,, p. 42.
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The Crown(s) in New Zealand
In New Zealand in the 1990s, the Crown is most often identified as a concepr
incorporating the Sovereign, the Governor-General and the Ministers of the Crown.
The 'Crown' originally arrived in New Zealandin the form of Her Majesty the eueen
of England, as identified in the Treaty of Waitangi, 1840. However, following the
signing of the Treaty the Queen's authority was exercised by British and subsequently
colonial Ministers of the Crown. Furthermore, as the activities of government in New
Zealand became more complex,'the Crown'has incorporated increasing numbers of
government departments and other bodies contracted by the Crown to carry out
specific functions. Consequently, the question 'who or what is the Crown, has also
become a matter of considerable legal significance.
At its most fundamental level, the Crown represents the Queen in contemporary New
Zealand society as the source from which govemment authority originates. The eueen
is a flgure who has traditionally attracted tremendous support from the New Zealand
Public'4s As the Head of State, the Queen also occupies a pivotal political position in
New Zealand. While the role is largely symbolic (as the Queen would only act 
- 
if at
all 
- 
on the advice of her Governor-General in New Zealand) her role is an important
one which is supported by the majority of New Zealanders who wish to retain the
constitutional monarchy.ag However, the eueen, as the Head of state, has long since
abdicated her responsibilities in New 7-eatand. For practical purposes, the functions of
the Queen iue now executed by her representative in New Zealand, the Governor-
General.
48 For further discttssion on the.contemporary relationship between the crown and the people in NewZealand, see D'L. Stevens, The Crcin, the Governir-General arul the Cottstitution, A thesis
strbnritted for the completion of Master of Arts, Victoria University oi W"llingto n, 1974.,p. f:A.
49 In 1993, a so]"{ by the Ncttional Bwsines:t' Review revealed rhat 56vo of New Zealanders were
opposed to New Zearand becoming a repubric, with 270/o supporting the idea.
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As the Queen's representative, the Governor-General is the second layer of the identity
of the Crown in New Zealand. The Governor-General has 'central symbolic, uniffing,
and representative roles' as well as 'important legal powers' in New Zealand.5o While
originally acting on the advice of the British Government, the office of the Governor-
General has, through time, become accountable to government in New Zealand. This
transfer of power began almost as soon as the Office of the Governor-General was
established in the colony's early years under the Letters patent. From 1g56, a
representative legislature in New Zealand gave the Governor-General's function a clear
'dualism' as both the constitutional head of the local colonial government and an
intermediary between the New Zealandgovernment and the imperial authorities who
appointed the Governor-General.sl At this time the Governor-General was essentially
a British position' From 1910, New Zealand Ministers were able to choose the
Queen's representative from a list of British candidates.52 The Governor-General,s
actions at this time were still subject to direction from the British government.53
However, at an imperial conference in L926,it was declared that the Governor-General
should no longer be considered an agent or representative of the British government,
and that Great Britain and the Dominions should be equal under the monarchy.s+
(This ruling was a further result of those refbrms which created a divisible Crown
within the Commonwealth.) Subsequently, as explained earlier, New Zealand became
a member of the Commonwealth of equal status to Britain under the Crown.
Throughout the 1960s, the Governor-General was more frequently a New Zealand,
ttppointment made according to Ministerial advice.ss Anthony Wood has observed
that between 1972 and 1983 it became the convention that the Governor-General be a
t')!!'" Cabinet ofttce [vlanual, New ZealandCabinet office, Governmenr printer, Wellington,1991. pp. 3-4.
f 1O't Stevens, Tlte Crown,T'lte Govertmr-General urul the Constitution.Thesis Submitted forMasters in Law, Vicrolia University of Wellington, 1974.p.7.
52 stevens, The Crown, The covern,r-Getrerar and the c,n,\itutirn,p.29.
t] O O Wood, 'New Zealand's Patriated Governor-General' in Potiticat Science,Vol.3g, No.2,1986. p. 127 .
54 st"'rnen*, The crown,The Governor-Generar atur the c<tnstitutitttt,p.zg.
55 stevens, The Cntwn,Trre Goverrnr-Generctr turd trte crn,^tituti,n,p.33.
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New Zealander, chosen by the New Zealand cabinet, and that cabinet also determined
the Governor-General's f'unctions.56 With this development the New Zealand
Governor-General, once a British appointment, had effectively been .patriated, or
'brought home'-57 The Governor-General was no longer 'on loan' from Britain. As
Wood pointed out, '[p]atriation, in short, completes New Zealand's formal transition
from colonial dependency.'58 Wood explained:
[p]atriation has macle the office of Governor-General a genuinely and completely New
zealand office. The effect, simply, has been a symbolic change for the people, and a
real gain of power for the governnrent 
... . [I]n effect the patriated executive power in
New Zealand is self-created, self-detined and self_perpetuating.sg
Particularly once the office was patriated, the Governor-General, (much as was
expected of the monarch the previous century) was expected to distance itself from
politics. On this mafter, Wood noted:
More visible, and more clearly required of a Governor-General is his [her] social role.
He [she] expresses the levelling, unifying position of the Crown ... [d]ivorcing head of
state from head of government, New Zealand like Great Britain enhances the former by
distancing it from politics. Distancing requires that in his [her] social activities the
Governor-General is clearly not Lhe servant of ministers 
- 
in direcr contrast to
performance of governmental and political acts when he [she] should be.fl
The patriation of the Governor-General meant that the authority originally ceded to the
office by the Queen eventually came to rest on the Ministers of the Crown in New
ZeaIand, on whose advice (by convention) the Governor-General acts. While the title
'Ministers of the Crown' acknowledges the original source of ministerial authority, the
-56 Wood,
-57 wood,
58 Wood,
59 wood,
60 Wood,
'New Zealand's Patriatecl Govemor General', pp. I l3_135.
'New Zcaland's Patriated Governor General', p. I13.
'Nerv Zealand's Patriated Governor-General'. p. I 13.
'New Zealand's Patriated Govemor-General', p. I 19.
'New Zealand's Palriated Governor-General', p.127 
.
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Cabinet office Manual clearly dispels any notion of ministerial accountability to Her
Majesty' In acknowledging the symbolic significance of the eueen's status as Head
of State, the manual emphasises that the British Crown is no longer an active part of
New Zealand politics. It stipulates that the Queen reigns; meaning that as a matter of
Iaw the monarchy (or the Governor-General as her representative) may appoint and
dismiss officials' summon and clissolve parliament and assent or decline Bills and
Orders. However, by convention this is done only on the advice of the hime Minister
or Ministers, with the support of the House of Representatives. parliarnent is in fact
supreme'61 It is important, for the sake of later discussion, to note that with the
transfer of power from Queen, to Governor-General and finally to the Executive, New
7'ealand lost a layer of accountability which, as Wood observed earlier, divorces Head
of State from head of government. This point is particulady important in light of later
discussion of the Crown in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi, and again in relation to
the Crown in Canada.
In a practical sense, therefore, the Executive, the Sovereign and the Governor-General
combined represent 'the Crown' in contemporary New Zealand society. However,
this description is not entirely satisfactory in the scope it allows in interpretation and in
the potential it creates for inconsistency in the identity of the Crown. The Crown may
represent any one element in the trinity (Queen, Governor-General, Executive) or some
combination of the three. Furthermore, the Ministers of the Crown have been merely
the core of an ever expeurding system of government supported by departments and
parliament. Also, as the business of government extends itself into all aspects of
society and increasingly contracts groups or individuals to perform what were once
governmental functions, the identity of the Crown is called into question and clarity
becomes a matter of immediate and practical importance. This matter has greatly
preoccupied the law in New 7_ealand.
6t The Cctbinet Olfice Munual, p.3.
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The Crown is a significant and central construct in constitutional law. Much of
Westminster constitutional government is bound up in the notion of the Crown.62
'The Crownn has appeared in statutes because the Crown's servants and advisers in
parliament assembled are known to the law, while 'the government' and 'the state' are
not.63 As Marshall observed, the term 'Crown' is preferred in modern statutes and
judicial usage when the Queen's servants, or ministers, iue obviously or primarily
involved.ff Indeed, while the Crown is trequently used in constitutional law in New
Zealand,it has also been criticised fbr not being a 'caref'ully worked legal creation'.65
While it would be neither appropriate nor possible to review the legal debate over the
Crown in any detail here, it is important to outline some key factors which contribute
to the complexity of the Crown under the law. In particular, it is important to
recognise the work in progress by the Law Commission in New Zealand to lay out in
statute the identity of the Crown in New Zealand according to common law (that is,
that part of the Crown identity not already defined by statute). This action is prompted
by widespread concern that, as mentioned earlier, the government is increasingly
contracting out government functions and, as a result, serious legal problems are raised
regarding who the Crown (as the contracting party) actually is. In addition to this
concern, two other related legal questions raised by constitutional lawyer Philip Joseph
should also be acknowledged. The first question is whether the Crown obtains the
necessary characteristics to be considered a legal entiry.66 The details of this technical
legal debate will not recounted here, but readers are directed to Joseph's discussion of
this matter. The second question Joseph has raised and debated which is more
62.Toseph, Constitutiotrttl urttl Atlministrcttive kw in New kulantl.p.49O.
63 Marshall, Cottstitutionut Theory,p. 15.
64 Marshall, Constittttional Theory,p.21 .
65 
.Ioseph, Constitutional urul Administrutive lttw in New Zettlantl, p. 490.
(t6 por furlher cliscussion see Philip Joseph.'The Crown as a Legal Concept', New kaland ltw
Jrrurnal, April, 1993. pp.126-129. Also, in a sinflar debate in Canada in the mid 1980s, the legal
community observed some unnecessary problens with the term 'Crown' in statutes and suggested
replacing the term with that of 'administration'. See; Law Reform Commission of Canada,'The
Lcgal Status of the Federal Administration'. Working Paper No. 40, 1985.
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immediately relevant to this thesis, is 'who or what is the Crown' according to the law
in New zealand- His response to this question will be briefly outlined.
Joseph found that 'the Crown can be anything (or anyone) parliament chooses,. He
explained that 'Australian ancl New Zealand Courts ... have held that persons or
bodies discharging public or quasi-public functions, though not in a generic sense .the
Crown', may grasp at the Crown's mantle for escaping some statutory liability or
detriment.'67 Joseph explained that while the Crown in New T*alandis now generally
accepted and understood as an embodirnent of Executive government, the Crown
actually has two distinct personae 
- 
one which is identifiable and a second which is
much less so. In this sense, the Crown can be either the person of the eueen, or some
other (much more elusive) entity. As a result, it is not always possible, according to
Joseph, to determine legally exactly who or what the crown is.6s
Moreover, statutes are far from consistent in who or what they identify as the Crown.
First, the Crown can, in law ancl in fact, be a personification of the monarch.6g For
example, in the Crown Proceedings Act 1950, the Crown means 'Her Majesty in right
of Her Government in New 7*aland' . Also, in the State Owned Entelprises Act 19g6,
the Crown is defined as 'Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand',and in the
Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries Act 1990, the terms .the Crown, and .Her
Majesty' are used interchangeably. However, it would not be correct to assume that
the Crown is simply the monarch in the law as it can also be an 'indeterminate
entity'.ztt According to Joseph, '[i]n theory, anyone may be the Crown qua servant or
agent when the Crown's interests are affected or threatened, as may any public body
administering a service within the 'province of government'.' For example, when the
Crown is not meaning 'Her Majesty the Queen of New Zaal:and' ,it can encompass not
67 
.Toseph, constitutional tutl Administr(fiive hm in New zeararur, p. 503.
68 Joseph, con#itutitttt<tl antl Atrntinistrativ,e lttw itt New zealttner,p.490.
69 Joseph, ctnstitutktnal and Aclministative lttw in New zealand, pp.490-491
70.Toseph, cut,'titutionar unrr Adnini;strative law in New zearand.p.49r.
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only the Sovereign as the Head of State, the Governor-General as her representative
and the Ministers of the Crown in New Zealand, but also central government
departments.Tl For example, in the Public Finance Act 1989 the Crown was defined
as 'Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand', as well as Ministers of the
Crown and government departrnents. In addition to this, the Sovereign is the Head of
State, which means that 'the Crown' has come to embody the state itself.
Consequently, the Crown has also been interpreted as broadly as being .the state, in
New Zealandlaw.T2
Even from this brief discussion of the Crown under the law, the problem of finding
consistency in the Crown's identity is further substantiated. Not only has the symbol
challenged British and Commonwealth lawyers abroad, it has also captured the
attention of lawyers here in New Zealand. However, despite its complexity, the
Crown is central to New Zealand's entire constitutional system as the essential source
of all law in this country. It must therefore be borne in mind throughout this thesis that
the Crown symbol has a legitimate and highly significant place in New Zealand within
the constitution, while also remembering the problematic nature of the Crown under
the law.73
In reviewing the problem(s) of the Crown in New Z,ealand,it is evident that the term
exhibits the full complexity of an age old symbol which has represented a range of
authorities on a number of levels down through the ages in Great Britain, the
Commonwealth and now also in New Zealand. 'The Crown in right of New Zealand,
can equally legitimately be interpreted as the Queen, the Governor General. and/or the
7f Joseph' constitutknurr urrcr Admiri.rtrtttive kw in New ze,rund, p.494.
72 Joseph. constitutiortur Lmtl Atrministrative Ltw irt New zealund,p.492.
73 In chapter Seven it is noted that the High court and the waitangi rribunal were forced rointerpret.the meaning of the Crown in the Treity of waitangi Act l97j 
- 
a decision which generatedmuch debate and criticism and further emphasisid the problin of the Crown in that particular statute.
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ExecutiveT4 or any combination of this trinity. Furthermore, the law appears limited in
its ability to untangle the mystery of the Crown as it struggles with its own conundrum
about the meaning and identity of the Crown in a constitutional and legal sense.
Yet despite the complexity of this symbol, later research in this thesis will reveal that
the Crown enjoyed unprecedented currency in New Zealand,in the later 19g0s and
early 1990s and its popularity showed no signs of abating. Most often, it will also be
revealed, the Crown appeared in relation to matters relating to the Treaty of Waitangi.
In the interests of treaty negotiations it is critical that the treaty partners, as Crown and
M6ori, are established with clarity ancl certainty. However, the breadth of the Crown's
contemporary identity, it is argued in the next section, creates a problem of
inconsistency in the identity of the Crown which has serious implications with regard
to the Treaty of Waitangi.
The Treaty of waitangi andthe problem of the Inconsistent crown
The problem of the Crown from a treaty perspective can be attributed to the three
qualities of the Crown previously identified; its history in Britain and the
Ctrmmonwealthl its diffuse meaning in contemporary New Zealand,society; and the
constitutionaUlegal challenges posed by the Crown. Before applying these ideas, it is
important to introduce the Treaty of Waitangi and to consider its terms of the
agreement as well as the relationship it proposed between various groups in the new
settler colony.
The Treaty of Waitangi was an agreement between Her Majesty the eueen of England
tutd Mdori rangatira (chiefs) in New Zealand,in 1840. While the Treaty is discussed in
more detail in subsequent chapters. here it is important to note that the Treaty
gueranteed the protection of Maori rights to maintain control of their resources and
74 Note that the term 'Executive' is fairly elastic. It incorporates the 'political executive, (Cabinet)and the public service. 
- 
Unless otherwise specified, the term 'Executive ' in this thesis refersspecilically to the political executjve. while acknowledging the complexity of its identity.
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culture, while allowing the British to establish legitimate govemment in New Zealand,
and in doing so to introduce the necessary laws and institutions in New Zealand
required to maintain peace and protect rights and property. In addition to recognising
the Treaty's intentions, it is important to understand the relationship the Treaty
proposed between the M6ori people and British settlers. According to the letter of the
Treaty, (both English and MEori versions) the Queen herself would prevail as the
treaty partner for Mlori, and would personally provide an avenue of redress for M6ori
should conditions in New Zealand threaten the exercise of their treaty rights. With
regard to protecting Mdori rights it was critical (as later discussion also reveals) that
the beaty partner was something other than settler govemment. In signing the Treary,
Mdori chiefs expected the Queen to extend her protection to M[ori should the need
arise. With this expectation in mind, the problem of the Crown treaty partner
(particularly from the perspective of Mdori) can be better understood.
The first characteristic of the Crown which creates the problem of inconsistency relates
to the identity of 'the Queen' in the Treaty and the reality of her position in Britain at
the time. As earlier discussion of the monarchy indicatecl, by 1840 the eueen was
removed from the major functions of government in Britain. However, it was still the
monarch's prerogative (as opposed to the government's) to treat with indigenous
peoples in order to acquire new territories. The Queen consequently is identified in the
Treaty when, in fact, the British government would largely control the colony in its
earliest years. As discussion in Chapter Five reveals, this state of affairs was not
entirely satisfactory for Maori who understood the Queen to be an active political
leader, a British rangatira.
However, as is discussed in rnore detail in Chapter Five, settler government in New
Zealand was gradually awarded authority over New Zealand's affairs. Having attained
complete sovereignty fiom Britain, New Zealand was governed by the Executive, with
the symbolic support of the Governor-General as the Queen's representative in New
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Zealand- The most immediate and serious implication of this transfer of authority from
the perspective of Mdori rights was that the hierarchy established under the Treaty
collapsed,leaving Mlori with the New Zealand government as its treaty partner. For
reasons also later discussed, this was far from a satisfactory arrangement for Mdori.
In addition to causing problems for Mf,ori in the past, the inconsistency of the
Crown's identity has proven equally complex in a contemporary sense as the trinity of
Queen, Governor-General and Executive. Furthermore, as the next chapter
demonstrates, the Crown title has been applied to a range of individuals and
institutions involved in the treaty negotiation process.
Finally, with regard to the Crown in the law, the uncertainty surrounding the Crown's
Iegal identity (particularly where this is not clarified by statute) is also cause tbr
concern. The Crown identity has been used in legislation relating to the Treaty of
Waitangi (namely the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, as discussed in Chapter Six)
without specification as to the meaning or identity of the Crown. Once again, the
inconsistency of the Crown has created legal problems for M6ori (in particular see
Chapter Seven).
While there has not, to rny knowledge, been a comprehensive discussion of the identity
of 'the Crown' such as this thesis provides, various problems with the Crown/l\4dori
relationship under the Treaty have occasionally been identified and discussed by
individuals and institutions in New Zealand. The purpose now is to bring together the
disparate ideas about the identity of the Crown with regard to the Treaty which have
arisen within a variety of contexts. The commentary used to link these ideas should in
no way imply that the authors were engaged in an extended or organised debate about
the Treaty and the identity of the Crown. Rather, it should emphasise the fact that the
ideas are united by a common acknowledgment of the problem of the Crown treaty
pantner in contemporary New Zealand, society and, on some occasions, represent an
attempt to solve this problem.
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The first observations considered here came from the Parliamentary Commissioner for
the Environment in a report on the adequacy of the Treaty settlement process.Ts In the
report, the Commission asked the question 'What is the Crown?' and subsequently
identified it at the tbrmal level as the Queen or her representative, the Governor-
General, acting on advice of the Ministers of the Crown. At the pmctical level,
however, the Commission advised that the Crown was the ministers who form the
Cabinet or, if appropriate, individual ministers or officials with delegated
responsibilities.T6 While the Commission did not examine the issue in great depth, the
comments in the report demonstrate the problem of consistency with regard to the
Crown also poses significant problems for environmental policy concerning the Treaty
of Waitangi.
A second cornmentary on the problem of the Crown came from Robert Mahuta, from
the Centre for Maaori Studies and Research at Waikato University. In 19g9, Mahuta
similarly posed the question, 'who is the Crown?' He said, 'the belief that Crown and
Government were synonymous underpinned the several deputations our lMaori]
ancestors made to England.' However, he warned, the buck has been passed
backwards and forwarcls between the two Crowns 
- Queen and Government
throughout New Zealand's history. It remains little wonder, Mahuta said, .that
[Maori] people continue to be confirsed over who they deal with' as the Crown.77 He
contended that there should be clarification of the use of the term 'the Crown' which
Maori understood to mean 'the Queen' at the signing of the Treaty, and called the
Crown a 'slippery entity in New Zealand more abstract than real.'78 Mahuta's
tt 
T1? Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment is an independent 'watchdog, organisationestablished under l'he Environment Act 1986. charged with the iesponsibiliry of reviewing thegovernment's institutions, policies and statutes relating to environmental policy. -
76 Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environm ent, Environntental InJrtrntatiott and the Adequacyttf' Treaty Settlement Procedures,september 1994,p. 14.
77 Robert T. Mahuta, 'Race Relations in New Zealand, 150 Years After the Treaty', aCommemorative Synopsis in association with the Centre tbr Maaori Studies and Research,University of Waikato, Hamilton, New Zealand, 30 Novemb". f 98q, p. Z.
78 Mahuta, 'Race Relations in New Zealand,. n. 7.
comments demonstrate concern
the Crown's identity can have
negotiation with the Crown.
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amongst Mdori in particular that the inconsistency in
serious implications for the M6ori treaty partner in
Third' a sociologist, Peter Cleave, addressed the issue he described as the .shifting
Crown' within the context of questions regarding taxation. Cleave acknowledged that
through the process of colonisation in Aotearoa after 1840, the eueen ceded, in some
sense, the notion of 'the Crown' to the new settler state. Cleave said, .[t]he Crown, in
this sense, becomes the administrative and executive apparatus of the Monarch of New
7'e'aland as opposed to the Monarch of Great Britain.' According to Cleave, the seftler
state consequently took the concept of the Crown to itself. 'The Crown became a
symbol of unity and a legal fiction in whose name executive power was exercised.,79
Cleave added that constitutional language continues to draw on notions of the Crown
although the Crown has ceased to be a major element in the real use of power.s0 He
also observed that devolution, a popular government policy in New Zealandover the
last decade, has decreased direct central (or Crown) authority and increased the role of
regional authorities' Thus the Crown had 'shifted' once again, this time from the
nation's capital to the regions. In light of this finding, cleave asked, .[w]hat is
acceptable evolution' of the Crown?8l Cleave's ideas draw attention to the various
interpretations for the Crown, as well as the idea that the Crown has evolved through
time, which is investigated in more detail in the second section of this thesis.
Despite the difficulties he identified with the contemporary Crown, Cleave was
adamant that the contractual partners remain crown on one hand ancl Maori iwi (tribes)
on the other despite the temptation to 'modernise' them. It would be a mistake ro try
and resolve the problem of the Crown, according to Cleave, by reinterpreting the
79 Peter Cleave, The Sovereilgttty Gume: Pctwer, Knowledge and Reading tlte Treuty,VictoriaUniversity Press, Wellington, iedl, p. S t.
E() Cleave, The Sctvereignty Gam.e,p.5t.
8 I Clearre, The Sovereignty Gunte 
, p. 52.
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partners as Maori and Pdkehd, as has been suggested.82 other writers appeared not to
agree with Cleave on this point. Kaye Turner, for example, considered the question,
'Who are the Treaty Partners?' and displayed none of Cleave's hesitancy in renaming
the partners'83 She referred to the Report of the Royal Commission on Social policy,
and observed that 'Mdori' and 'Crown' as Treaty partners create a problematic tension
because the Crown includes Maori as it represents the legal entity of the state. She
asserted that this problem of identity 'blurs, even collapses the 'p4keh6' part of the
Treaty compact into some distanced nominalised concept, the Crown'.8a In contrast to
Cleave, Turner argued that the treaty partners should be rebuilt as Mdori and pdkehd,
while recognising the need for these identities to be contestable and flexible.ss
The Royal Commission's report to which Turner referred, had earlier investigated the
identity of the Treaty partners and found that, while they were clearly definable in
1840, they were much less distinctive by 1988 (the time the reporr was released). The
report described 'Maori' as 'all Maori as represented by all tribes and all individual
Maori" and acknowledged some difficulty in determining appropriate M6ori
representatives for matters of national interest.s6 With regard to the 'Crown' partner,
the report accepted that the Crown has many levels of identity, including the eueen,
the British government, william Hobson (signatory to the Treaty on the eueen,s
behalf) and the New Zealand government, all of whom have acted as the Crown at
some point in New Zealand's history. According to the report, the contemporary
Crown is 'the New Zealand Government, representing all settlers andn ironically,
Maori people as well" The report also observed, as Cleave had done, that devolution
82 Cleave, The Sovereignry Came,p.53.
t' Kry" Turner. 'The April 
.Repo^rt of the Royal Commission on Social policy: Treaty partnershipas a Franrework for a Politics of Differenc"t' in M. Wilson and A. yeatmin (eds.), Justice anclIclentity. Atttipttdeem Practice.r,Bridget william Books, wellington, 1995, p. g0.-
84 Turner, 'The April Reporr of the Royal commission on social policy', p. g0.
85 Turner,'The April Report of the Royal commission on Sociar poricy,, p. gr.
1u ryo:I:t the Royal commission on Social Policy, Ttw Aprit Report,Vol. II .Future Direcrions,,April, 1988, pp. 50-51.
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(in the 1980s) had significantly changed the Crown's identity and warned that it was
not well established whether local bodies operating under statute and receiving public
funds could legally be regarded as the Crown.87 The devolution of government
authority to sub-national bodies identified by Cleave and by the Royal Commission
was evidently an issue of considerable controversy in relation to the identity of the
contemporary Crown treaty partner. This issue is considered more fully in Chapter
Eight.
A fifth investigation of the Crown was undertaken by Treasury (the government,s
financial advisers) in a brief to the incoming Government in l9g7. In the brief,
Treasury acknowledged that it did not have expertise in history, law or Mhori culture,
but felt that it had a contribution to make to the treaty debate from the vantage point of
central government policy.88 Treasury accepted that both parties to the Treaty have
changed enormously since 1840. According to Treasury, the Treaty was a partnership
between its signatories as the Crown and certain Mdori chiefs.se Treasury
consequently questioned the most appropriate form of partnership between the
contemporary parties, but did not indicate exactly who those parties 1rys1s.9t)
Following some discussion of partnership under the Treaty, which made frequent
unqualified ref-erence to the Crown, Treasury argued that the Crown and the Mdori
people seem to be more precise treaty partners in a legal sense than does an
interpretation of the Treaty being between two peoples (whereby the Crown represents
British subjects or Pdkehd). According to Treasury, the difference between p6keh6
and Crown was significant enough to alter the nature of the partnership although the
authors of the report did not speciry what this meant.
87 Royal Commission on Social policy, April Report, p.51.
8tl The Treasury, Gtnernment Marngement. Brief to the Inutming Gctvernment I9E7,yol.I,p.320.
89 Th" Treasury, Goverwnen t Mana geme nt, p. 326.
9() 16" Treasury, Gove ntm ent Managente til. p1>. 323-326.
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Finally a political scientist, Richard Mulgan, has considered the question of partnership
- 
'between who?'91 He asserted that 'the crown' partner creates more practical
difficulties in identity than does the Mdori party to the Treaty. Mulgan explained that
in 1840 Mdori made an agreement with 'the Queen' as the Crown, and maintained for
many years that the Queen was the only appropriate partner. Through constitutional
developments, however, the Crown identity has changed. Today, Mulgan aclvised, the
Crown is the government of New Zealand. He noted also that 'pakehd, has been
suggested as an appropriate partner fbr Mdori instead of 'the Crown'. In response to
this, Mulgan argued that Crown and Pdkehd are not interchangeable terms. In
Mulgan's words:
The non-MEori people are by no means the same as the Crown. The Crown cannot be
identical to a section of its citizens. ... The Treaty can be seen as a partnership between
the Mdori authorities representing their people, on the one hand, and the British
authorities and their people on the other. ... But in this case, the crown is no longer
one of the partners. Rather the partners are the two indigenous peoples of Aotearoa-
New Zealand, each of which accepts the sovereignty of the crown. ... In this sense of
partnership all citizens, non-Mdori as well as Maori, may be said to be partners with
the crown; rhat is, alr citizens obey the raw and pay their taxes in return for
government protection of their rights and welfare.92
However, Mulgan also explained that while the Crown/lVlaori partnership was
appropriate immediately following 1840, it is less appropriate in contemporary society
where Maori and Pdkeha live under the same government and the Crown has
responsibilities to both groups. The true treaty partnership, he argued, was now
between two peoples, not between one people and government. His comment returns
us to the suggestion that the partners could be identified as Maori and pdkeha.
However, in repeating his earlier message, Mulgan warned that to translate the
partnership in this way implies that the Crown/government is solely the agent of the
llSqft Mulgan, Muori, Pdkehti tutd Democrucv, Oxtbrd University press, Auckland, 1989, pp.l l0-l 12.
92 Mulgan. Mtkri, pdkehd urul Dentocrucy, p. l l l
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Pakeha'e3 This is clearly not in keeping with the original relationship established
under the Treaty' Mulgan's comments emphasise most clearly perhaps the need to
establish the identity of the Crown in a manner appropriate in terms of the intentions of
the Treaty.
The commentaries on the Crown presented here, in combination with the earlier
discussion of the many interpretations for the Crown, demonstrate that the Crown is
problematic in that there is scope for inconsistency in its identity. As a result of its
history' the Crown is now subject to a wide range of interpretations and uses in New
Zealand' While a central and prominent constitutional identity, the Crown also poses
problems of inconsistency within the law. Those New Zealand commentators who
have observed the inconsistency of the Crown have emphasised the need to
comprehensively address this issue with a view to better unclerstanding the identity of
the Crown and resolving the problems it creates with regard to the Treaty of Waitangi.
Their comments also highlight a need to identify the contemporary Crown partner in a
manner which is consistent with the original pupose and function of the eueen within
the Treaty of Waitangi. However, suggestions to rename the Crown treaty partner
should not be entertained, it is argued here, until a befter understanding of the Crown,s
iclentity and function is obtained.
Recognising that there are a number of possible identities for the Crown, the next
chapter investigates how the Crown is identified and interpreted in public
communication in New Zealand. It is the first of three chapters which investigate in
some detail the role and identity of the Crown as a political symbol in treaty discourse
and further substantiate the problem of consistency with regard to the crown.
93 Mulgan, Maori, pdkelw cutd Dcntocrcrcy,p. llL.
TWO
WHO OR WHAT IS 'THE CROWN' /NMASS COTIMANICATION?
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate who or what is the Crown in
contemporary New Zealand society, given the potential for inconsistency in the
identity of the Crown raised in the previous chapter. It does so through an empirical
investigation of how the Crown was identified in mass communication in New
zealand from 1987 to 1993. on the basis of the finclings presented in this chapter it is
argued that the Crown identity is inconsistenr in two ways. First, it is used to identify
a number of institutions and individuals in New Zealand and second, there is
considerable inconsistency in the language of the mass media regarding whether the
Crown is the siune as, or different from, the notion of government in New Zealand.
The implications of both these inconsistencies are finally considered with regard to the
relationship between Mlori and the crown under the Treaty of waitangi.
Mass communication, or the mass media, is a fundamental source of information for
the New Zealand public. It is also, therefore, a reservoir of information about the
meaning and uses of words such as 'the Crown' in public communication and debate
in New Zealand' However, in order to be a useful tool in language analysis, the
characteristics, strengths and weaknesses of mass communication must be understood.
First' 'mass communication' is the process of communicating information to a large
audience, most commonly through television, radio or newspapers. Allan Bell, media
language analyst in New Zealand,,has further characterised mass communication as
having multiple originators (as the individuals involved with the organisation,
production and presentation of news infonnation), a mass simultaneous audience (in
this case the New 7,ealand, public), an absence of feedback (the information flows in
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one direction only) while at the same time being generally accessible to the public.l
Second, the process of mass communication, according to other theorists, satisfies
many of contemporary society's functions and needs. Perhaps most importantly it
provides a critical communication link between the public (or various publics) and the
government.2 In performing this function, mass communication is believed to have a
tremendous impact on policy making and the nature and content of public
deliberation'3 As one Member of Parliament in New Zealand has explained,
'[p]oliticians, and those who seek to influence their decisions, have identified the
media as central to political debates and their outcome.'4 Finally, the implications of
mass communication are important. It has been suggested that written or spoken
words generated at the level of mass communication, are assimilated and used by the
public regardless of their accuracy, thereby creating 'political truth'.5 Also, Bell has
argued that mass communication, whether reliable or accurate, is pervasive in modern
society and is believed to play a part in affecting the meanings and uses of words in
the wider society.6 In choosing to focus on the mass media, this chapter therefore
seeks to identity those meanings and uses of the Crown which have been presented to
the New kalandpublic by the media.
Because of the critical and often controversial role it plays, mass communication has
been heavily criticised, particularly in its political function. Claus Mueller, a political
language analyst, has described the mass media as a chain of connections whose links
are highly susceptible to distortion.T In doing so, Mueller drew attention to the wavs
I Allan Bell,The Language of the New.r Metria,Blackwelr Inc, oxford, l9gl, p.2.
2 Claus Mueller, The Politics of Communication,OxfordUniversity press, New york, 1973, p. 95.
] .t*y f--insky, 'The Media and Public Dehberarion" in Robert Reich (ed.), The power of publicIdeas,Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, l9gg, pp. 205-206.
4 Steve--MahareY, 'Politicians, the News Media, and Democracy', in M. Comrie and J. McGregor,(eds.),Whose News?, Dunnrore press, palmerston North, IggZ,;.gi.
I 1t U9-n Mike Moore' 'The Reporting of New ZealandPolirics', in M. Comrie and J. McGregor,(eds.), Wftosz New.s? , Dunmore press, Falmerston North, f fZ, p. b3.
6 Bell, The Innguage oJ'the News Mediu,p.3.
7 Mueller, The Politic.r of Communicarkur,p.g6.
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infonnation can be changed or ignored in mass communication thereby impacting on
public perception of political issues. The mass media in New Zealandhas similarly
been criticised as having biased interpretations of the political news, particularly in
emphasising PEkehd perspectives and values at the expense of Maori interpretations of
political issues and events.s It has often been suggested that a general lack of
understanding of Mdori issues and tikanga Maori (Maori protocol) in the media circuit
has encouraged, or failed to correct, an inaccurate portrayal of cultural issues in New
Zealand' Some critics have even suggested that the media can never be an effective
tool for Mdori to express their views and ideas because it only attracts those M6ori
already influenced by Pdkehd values. Rather the media, it has been suggested, is
destined to present an inaccurate and generalised picture of Mdori thoughts, feelings
and Mdori themselves, on any issue.e Criticisms such as these draw attention to the
fact that the language of mass communication, while persuasive and significant in
public debate is not representative of the attitudes of all groups in society. In
particular, it must be remembered that the use and meaning of the Crown in New
Zealand's mass communication, may not be shared with other Mdori or non-Mdori
groups in New Zealand. The relevance of this point in particular stretches beyond this
chapter to the general argument of the thesis and is returned to in later discussion.
In addition to failing to represent all views, mass communication has been described,
most often critically, as a process which summarises, condenses and simplifies vast
amounts of political information 'leaving only vague outlines and symbolic
representations of complex political events'.10 The previous chapter argued that a
symbol such as the Crown conveys complex ideas in a manageable form. This is a
particularly usefrrl device in mass communication, a fact which may in part explain the
8 Derek Fox' 'The Maori Perspective of the News', in M. Comrie and J. McGregor (eds.) WltoseNews?, Dunmore Press, palmeiston North, 1992, p. l7O.
9 Stephen Levine and Raj Yasil' Maori Politicul Perspectives. Hutchison Group, Auckland, 19g5,pp.66-67.
It) g.p Elder and R.W Cobb, The political l\.yes tt Synhols,Longman press, New york andLondon, 1993,p. 12.
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Popularity of symbols in mass communication. Michael Parenti, outspoken critic of
American media, has argued that, as a result of the media's ability to process and
produce neatly packaged information, people no longer undertake the important
process of sifting through that infonnation for themselves.ll While this criticism, and
others like it' are discussed in more detail in the next chapter, it is important to note
here that the Crown may be used in mass communication in a symbolic capacity to
simplifu the communication process. In other words, referring to .the Crown, may
allow commentators to avoid conveying the complex details of certain identities in
political events.
The primary methodological question is how best to conduct an investigation of the
use and meaning of 'the Crown' in mass communication. While recognising that there
is a variety of forms of mass communication, the more substantive part of this study
concentrates on written media, more specifically newspapers or press communication.
As an easily accessed and abundant resource, newspapers have been widely identified
as an excellent resource for language analysis.l2 There are two levels to this
investigation- The first is a survey of one million words drawn fiom various written
sources of New Zealand language in 1986 including sources other than the media.
The Wellington Corpus of Written New Zealand English, which provides the database
tbr this survey, was created to allow direct comparisons with similar databases of
American, Australian and British English.r3 The data come from material published
between the years of 1986 and 1990.|a For the purposes of this research, the database
provided an excellent introduction to the uses and meanings of 'the Crown, in New
il Michael Parenti. Inventing reulity. The Politics o.f the Mass Metlia,St Marrin,s press, NewYork, 1986, p. 51.
I 2 Bell , The Innguuge of the News Mediu , p. 3 .
l3 Laura Bauer, Mcmuul of htfurmation to Accontpany The Wellington Corpus pf written Newfuulund English, Department oi Linguistics, Victoria Universiry of weltington,'Wellington , tggz.
1o 
"* 
year 1986 was the only year available for the sorr of analysis which suited the purposes ofthis investigation because it allowed a 'snapshot' of the year i**"olut"ty prior to the su|suntialinvestigation which begins with the year 19g7.
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Zealand' Further information on the Corpus database is provided later in the
chapter.l5
The second part of the discussion presents further empirical evidence drawn from an
investigation of the uses and meanings of 'the Crown' in the New Zealand press from
l9tl8 to 1993- In this case the database was Index New Zealand (INNZ), one of the
databases compiled by the National Library of New zealand.t6 The database can be
accessed in a number of ways. For the purposes of this study it was most appropriate
to conduct a 'key word' search using the key word 'Crown' to obtain detailed
bibliographical information for primary sources. Unfortunately, INNZ provides
limited information about how the key words and related information are selected.
However, the scope and quantity of information relating to 'the Crown' using the key
word search was sufficient enough to make such concerns largely immaterial.
The avenues available for analysis of political language on a substantial scale were
(often frustratingly) limited at the time of writing. However, the combination of the
corpus database and the INNZ resources used here complement each other well in this
study' The more detailed analysis with the Corpus data is a good introduction to the
breadth of uses of 'the Crown' in sources which extend beyond the media. Also, the
'snapshot' is for the year immediately prior to the time frame for the substantial study,
which also introduces the second part of the study and allows for analysis of the
development of Crown symbolism through time.
15 The software used to take aparf the Corpus data base was; Susan Hockey and Jeremy Martin,oxtitrd Concordance Program-lJsers' Manial Versiorr ll, oxtbro University Compudnj Service,Oxtbrd. 1988.
tu,t*rytis.a bibliographical database which began in 1985. The informarion held in INNZ isupdated-nightly 
- 
over 2000 documents are added each month. The database draws material from
lroqnd 300 journals and newspapers as well as other Iiterary sources pubtished in or about NewZealand and the South pacific.
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The Cotpus Database: A Snapshot of the Crown
The Corpus database draws its information from ten sources of written New Zealand
English: press reports, editorials, book reviews, religious writings, skills and hobbies,
popular lore, biographies, government documents, academic sources, and imaginative
literature. A search for references to 'Crown' in this database revealed some
interesting preliminary results about the contexts in which the word appeared, as well
as the frequency of use and variety of meanings for 'the Crown'. The word appeared
in nine of the ten categories of use (absent only from religious writings) thus
demonstrating the breadth of its use. Also, .crown' appeared on eighty-five
occasions in thirty-two sources of written text (indicating the frequency of its use)
most commonly in press reports, editorials and government documents. From this
evidence it was found that in 1986 'the Crown' was used in a wide range of contexts,
presumably with a variety of meanings, but was most popular in mass communication
and political writings. Analysis of these thirty-two references revealed that three
references were to the British Crown, such as a comment about, 'the failure of the
British Crown and the New Zealand Government to honour te tiriti'.rz Eight other
references were made to the crown in a legal capacity, for example, ,the court,s
disapproval of the manner in which a Crown witness had been briefed by the
poliss.'ts A further fbur references to 'Crowno were in titles such as,Crownlands,
and'Crown minerals', as in a comment about 'the sensitive design and management
overall on crown land.'19 Furthermore, on eight occasions ,crown, appeared in
imaginative literature, indicating that it also had uses and appeal outside of law and
politics. A typical example was this extract '[tJhis crown,flickering dully in the light
is made of real pewter...'20 Finally, there were ten references to 'Crown' as a political
entity, particularly in government documents discussing the use and management of
| 7 Reference line: 55269 ,G60 097.
l8 Reference line: 76608. J49 005.
l9 Reference line: 63693, HZZZ0Z.
2o Reference line: 88287, KZL 157.
(Source: Biography)
(Source: Academic)
(Source : Government Document)
(Source: Imaginative literature)
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New Zealand's nafural resources. For example, one govemment document stated that
'a simple title reserves mineral ownership to the Crown'2| while another spoke of
'tussock grassland landscapes under Crown ownership.,22 The .Crown, also
appeared as a political entity in reference to the Treaty, as in the example, ,the Treaty
simply referred to giving the crownthe 'hokonga' (buying, selling and trade)...,23
This preliminary 'snapshot' indicates the range of contexts in which the Crown
symbol was used in New Zealand written English in 1986. It suggests that.the
Crown' was used in historical, political, legal and literary contexts and was not
consistently naming the same thing. The variations on its use and meaning in these
contexts will be further examined later. In the meantime it is important to note not only
the range of its application outside of the media but also the relative frequency with
which it appeared in press reports and government documents, in particular those
relating to the Treaty of Waitangi and the use and management of natural resources.
Keeping these preliminary observations and arguments in mind, the discussion now
moves on to examine the meanings and uses of 'the Crown' specifically in mass
communication.
Index New Zealnnd: A eualita:tive study af the Crown
The second, more detailed, aspect of this inquiry, which builds on the information
gathered above, is a qualitative survey of the uses of the term 'Crown, in New Znaland
press from 1987 to 1993 inclusively. The methodology chosen for this survey was as
fbllows. Using 'crown' as the key word, a search was made through Index New
Zealand for the years indicated above. Just over two hundred and fifty articles were
identified as relating to the 'Crown' subject. The majority of these came from the
leading metropolitan newspape$ in New Zealand, including The New Zdland Herald.
2l Reference line : 63861, rn3 r4z. (source: Government Document)
22 Reference line: 63702, H2Z ZIl .(Source: Government Document)
23 Reference line: 78077, J56 02g. (Source: Academic wrirings)
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(Auckland), The Dominion and rhe Evening posr (wellington), The press
(Christshurch) and the otago Daily Times (Dunedin). The Examiner andthe National
Business Review,two national publications, were also often cited. These articles were
then analysed and categorised according to the function and identity of the Crown in
each case.
The discussion is divided into two sections based upon the two primary uses for the
Crown evident within the analysis. In the first section, 'Crown' is used in titles for
individuals or resources such as 'Crown Prosecutor' and 'Crown land,. In the second
section, the 'Crown' appears as a 'personified' political entity, capable of thought and
action' For example, comments were made in reports that, 'the Crown stated,, .the
Crown decided' or 'according to the Crown'. The argument arising from this analysis
is that the Crown demonstrates inconsistency in the ways it is used and what it is
naming in newspaper reports. More importantly it highlights an inconsistency in
whether the Crown is the same as or dilTerent from government. While the Crown is
often used as a metonym for government, other uses for the Crown indicate that there
is a philosophical distinction between the Crown and government in contemporary
New Zealand society. The implications of these findings with regard to the
relationship between MEori and the crown require consideration.
The'Crown' Title : Tradition and Trend
On many occasions, 'Crown' appeared in newspaper reports as a traditional title
relating to the law in New Zealand, for example, Crown Prosecutor, Crown witness or
Crown law' The meaning of the Crown in these contexts would have been interpreted
by the public (whether they are conscious of this or not) according to their
understanding that 'the Crown' is the legal person which acts on behalf of society in
criminal proceedings. For example, when the headline 'Crown loses in Tricorp Trial,
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led the report that, '[t]he Crown lost another white collar crime hial ...,24 this ,Crown,
was not likely to have been interpreted by the public as the eueen, the Governor-
General or the Ministers of the crown. However, it was also noted that the crown
symbol was not used to identify two different entities within the context of one report.
For example, one article advised readers that, '[{llaws in the Companies Act leave the
Sovernmenr without the means to legally define standards of behaviour for company
directors, according to the Crown Law office'.2s It is possible, as this example
indicates, to draw distinctions between the various 'Crowns', thereby avoiding
confusion.
In addition to legal titles, 'Crown' also appeared in resource titles such as .crown
land','Crown forests'and'Crown minerals'. These titles were traditionally used to
identifu land, and other resources, which were not in private ownership. Historically,
Crown lands, for examplen wete the demesne lands or lands reserved for the
sovereign in Britain. In a contemporary context, these .crown, resources are
commonly understood to be held in public trust by the Crown.26 An important aspecr
of this notion of public trust is the assumption that 'the Crown' in this context is
something other than government, which in turn implies that government is not at
liberty to dispose of Crown lands without public consent because it does not actually
own the resource. The newspaper reports often used this conceptual difference
between 'Crown' and 'government' in relation to resources in order to play on the
ditrerence between long term national interest, represented as ,crown,, as opposed to
the decisions made by government cluring its short term in office. For example one
article noted that, '[a] delay in payment for Crown forests would mean that the
24 'Crown loses in Tricorp tiral,,The Dontiniott,4 July 1991, p. 1.
25 'Acts del'ects leave Palmerpowerless', Nati,nul Bur-irtets Review,29 April l9gg,p. l.
26 The matter of whether 'Crown' implies public access is one under debate. For example, it hasbeen suggested that 'pastoral leases may b" 'c.o*n' land but not .public' land and that, in anyp_rocess of negotiation of lantl uses and piop"rtl' rights. public input should be restricted..., See: J.H.Holmes, 'Land Tenures., Property rights^anrt vtittifte land use: tsrues to, em"d"an and egtlpoo"anRange lands' in Peter Haggeit eiar. (eas.), Dillusiig ceogruphy,Blackwer, oxford, r99s,p.zg4.
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Sovernment would be charging interest on the delay.,zt Similarly, another reporr
stated '[t]he Government may avoid claims over Crown landby selling it directly
rather than through state corporations.'28 Another article more specifically identified
govemment departments who had purchased .Crown'land.29
The use of traditional 'Crown' titles in the mass media introduces the argument which
is substantiated later in the discussion that there are conceptual differences between the
notions of Crown and government which can be used to emphasise the difference
between short and long term considerations. This distinction, often used in relation to
resource use' has been conveyed through the words government and Crown, the
former implying the short term nature of government rule as well as the limitations to
government authority' while the latter emphasised the long term implications of
political decisions and the need to protect future public rights (with regard to the
management and use of resources) against government.
ln addition to traditional Crown titles,less naditional 'Crown' titles 
- 
Crown research
institutes and Crown health enterprises 
- 
also featured highly in the newspapers from
1987 to 1993. Part of the reason for their frequent appearance in the media was the
fact that both these institutions (remodelled from existing organisations) were
established in the early 1990s. These titles, it is argued, represent a new tend in the
naming of public institutions, made popular by the associations brought to the notion
of the Crown by rhe public.
The establishment of Crown research institutes tCRIsl was first mooted in early l99l.
In May 1991, The Dominr:on confirmed that cRIs, funded by the government and the
27 
'carte, debt on forest 'most expensive", Trrc Donri,iua,6 April 1991,p. rz.
28 
'Loophole avoids land craims', The Evenirtg po,tt, 17 october r9gg, p. l.
29 
'Irnportant Crown land still being floggcd off, , Domittion Sunday Time.s ,23 September 1990, p.
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pnvate sector, were to replace the haditional government scientific research agencies.30
In a report on the history of DSIR (Department of Scientific and Industrial Research),
one newspaper commented that DSIR had supported 'public good' research, which
was a 'vague description for research that has been done historically in New
Zealand.'3l It is argued here that the name Crown Research Institute indicated a similar
focus on public good research because of the associations the public had with Crown
entities as a result of the tradition of crown resources in New znaland,.
However, the newspapers were soon questioning the government's commitnent to the
public interest with regard to CRls as it was revealed that financial objectives appeared
to have dominated the reforms. For example, under the headline 'Cautious reception
for science reshuffle', it was explained that the'proposed institutes would be
completely new organisations with a company structure' and a 'Board of Directors
appointed by Cabinet .'32 It was also reported that 'betwe en 60Vo and 70Vo of ICRII
funding will be through the foundation for Research, Science and Technology on a
competitive bidding basis, while the remainder is said to come from selling ICRII
output to the private sector.' It appeared that, despite the 'Crown' title, CRls were
intended to function as stand alone companies. 'They will have a commercial freedom
never before available to the DSIR or MAF-Tech.'33
When the staffing policy for the new institutes was released by the newspapers, the
unpopularity of the restructuring was increasingly evident. One report stated that the
proposed changes were 'causing deep mistrust arnong the scientific cornmunity.,s+
Further criticisms were 'that scientists [wereJ being excluded from consideration in
3t) 
'9111r in force', The Dominknr, I July 1992,p. Il.
3f 'science on the thresholcr of change' ,The D,mini,t, 15 January r99z,p.6.
32 'cautious reception for science reshuffle', The Dontiniott, 12 Jury r99r,p.2.
].'-.qt"', unlikely to support R&D wirh r.ax incenrive s"The Examiner,l8 April 19g1, pp. 20-21.(MAF stands for Minisrry of Agriculture and Fisheries.)
34 
'scientists miss out on jobs, says federatio n, , Tlte Dominion,30 September 1991, p. I .
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Iieu of business enterprise.'35 The CRI proposal was evidently moving research
further from the public interest, rather than closer to it as the Crown title (which has
traditionally represented the public interest) might suggest. Those supporting the
reforms reinforced this view by advocating that, 'anything with a commercial flavour
about it needs to be freed from the structues of bureaucratic control and parliament.,36
Also, the loss of jobs, particularly science and research based positions, caused
outrage' According to one report, up to 700 positions were at risk under the new
regime'37 The proposed reforms were generally seen to cause outrage and alarm.
CRIs appeared to be threatening those values the DSIR had maintained in the past, in
particular, the naditional focus on the public interest. Interestingly, the significance of
the institution's name was not lost on those who opposed the restructuring. Defenders
of the old DSIR were reported as saying that 'even the name, ;DSIRI etched in the
minds of the community and of important 
.. . partners overseas 
. .. was crucial.,38
Crown health enterprises on the other hand, as a further example of a new .Crown,
entity, came into being in July 1993 amidst tremendous media coverage and
nationwide debate. Earlier, in 7992, it was reported that National prime Minister,
James Bolger, had rejecte<l the State-ownecl enterprise model for health reforms,
recognising the 'social responsibilities of the Crown health enterprises [CHEs].' He
advised, '[i]t was initially envisaged that the Crown health enterprises 
- 
the new name
tor public hospitals 
- would be driven by commercial objectives.' However, according
to Bolger, this policy was under revision. He explained that '[tJhe prospect of public
hospitals with clear commercial objectives and no social responsibilities is
terrifying.'3e In accepting the Prime Minster's position, the title ,Crown, Health
35 
'crown Institute convenors named', The Dttminirt'.31 october 1991,p.r5.
36 
'Power to the people, ,Tlrc New Ze,lund Heruld,2l March 1992,p.2:1.
37 'up to 700 research jobs at risk' , Trte Dttnrinion ,29 April 1992, p. | .
38 
'CRIs in force,, The Dominion, I July 1992,p.lL,
39'Health reforms', The Otttgo DctilyTinws,l August 1992,p.g.
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Enterprises appropriately emphasised the objective to provide healthcare to all New
Zealanders in the interests of public welfare.4
However, newspaper reports soon revealed that, as with the crown research institutes,
the goal of each CHE would be to operate as a successful business.4t It became
apparent that government policy was once again to came head-to-head with the notion
of public interest. The cynicism surrounding the reforms was well demonsftated. as in
this report which advised readers that under the new reforms:
[h]ospitals become Crown health enterprises, cloctors and nurses are health providers,
and patients consumers in a system riddled with corporate jargon and market
philosophies...- The system has been reprofiled to approach healrh care in a fiscal
nanner of affordibility and user-pays. 
... The public at present owns 155 hospitals.
under the new system, initially there will be between 20 anrt 25 cHEs throughout
New Zealand . - ' run as profit-making businesses with profits invested in health care.4Z
According to the press reports, the public's reaction to the government,s scheme was
sceptical at best. Ministers were quick to defend the government,s policy. one
minister commented that 'imposing business like principles on the public health
system 
" ' does not mean 
- 
as some have suggested 
- 
that the profit motive is now
more important than a patient's health.'a3 A similar sentiment was echoed in a report
which advised that 'CHEs 
. .. will be allowed to go bust if they get in financial strife,,
but which also emphasised that the risks were 'more apparent than real,.& The public
was assured that the new system would 'ensure all New Zealanders have affordable
access to core health services.'4s However, the unhappy marriage between affordable
4t) 11 6x5 also been suggested that 'state owned Hospitals' was an unpopular name because itsacronym 'SHEs' would attract unwanted attention and criticism.
4l 'PM rejects SOE model for health', The Dominion,T Apnl1992,p.l.
42 
'Operation health reforms', The Otago Daity Times,2May 1992,p.21.
1l .^ry"t at effective and quality health care', The Otago Daily Times,3 October 1992,p.g, also,'A healthy process of reform' , Thi Dominion, 20 octobei'rgg2,;.7 
.
4 'Operation healrh reforms', The Otago Daily Tintes,2 May 1992,p.21.
45 
'Operation health reforms,, The Ota14o Daity Times,ZMay 1992,p.2I.
5l
and reliable public services and efficiency <lriven private sector management was also
widely reported. For example, one article noted that 'CFIEs and community trusts ...
will be autonomous, perfbrmance based and fiscally accountable.'46 The public was
warned that, '[i]f hospitals are going to have to compete with the private sector for
business, they will have to be run like the private sector'. The same report reassured
the public that 'Cabinet wanted reassurance on how hospitals' social objectives could
be maintain?A-'47 It was often predicted that Crown research institutes would result in
the full privatisation of New Zealand's hospitals.ar
As with CRIs, the title of the new hospitals did not escape public attention. The
Associate Health Minister, Maurice Williamson, admitted on National Radio that he
was constantly being asked 'why are you calling them Crown health enterprises, why
don't you just call them hospitals?' williamson explained that there was:
a very good reason lbr that' they're more than just hospitals ... they're an enterprise,
their business is health and they're owned by the crown. ... tclall them any thing you
like, sick corp, or whatever you want to use. but they are a business owned bv the
Crown and their business will be the delivery of health.49
The fact that the health enterprises were ownecl by 'the Crown' does not, in fact make
their name a forgone conclusion as implied by the Minister. According to this logic,
the enterprises might have also been callecl government, or state enterprises, as with
the 'State-owned enterprises' established in the r9g0s. why then was there a
preference to name these government institutions 'Crown' instead of .state,
enterprises?5O 11t" evidence from the newspaper reports indicated that the Crown title
46 
'Private hospitals to benetit most', Nari,rrctl Busine's;t Review,l5 May 1992,p.29.
47 'In pursuit of a healthy profit', The Evertirry post,20May 1992, p. 5.
4E 'In pursuit of a healthy profir', The EteninS3 posr.20May 1992, p. 5.
iil*ll from a Newztel transcript of Radjo New Zealand ,,Midday Reporr,, wednesday lg May
]ll :"",owned Erterprises were established under thc Acr by the same name in 19g6, from rhetracling elemenrs of government depaflrnents which were chargei with-the responsibility of operatingas a successful business' For more detail, see, Judy Whitcolmbe, 'The Changing face of tie New
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was an attempt to emphasise the new institutions' social objectives over their financial
and other objectives. David Bradshaw, of the State Services Commission, has
similarly explained that the new title flowed out a the general shift from the business
oriented objectives of state owned enterprises to the social objectives of .Crown,
entities'sl His explanation implies that the word 'Crown' connotes a notion of social
responsibility not conveyed in the concept of the state. On this matter, John Martin
has suggested (it will be recalled from the previous chapter) that the difference
between state and crown is that,'[t]here is perhaps something vaguely alien and
threatening about "the state".'52 Taking a clifferent approach to the question of state
and Crown, former Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, expressed the opinion that:
the current fad in rightwing circles of referring to the gov€rnment as the .Crown, sets
up agencies of government as somehow'remote, alien, and untouchable instead of
being public property, the instruments of collective effort, answerable politically for
their activitics.'53
When combined, these comments substantiate the argument developing here that
Crown entities, be they land or hospitals, convey a notion of public interest and create
a distance between the Crown entity and the govemment's authority. In establishing
Crown hospitals ancl research institutes the government was able to promote public
interest while at the same time distancing itself from responsibility for the entities,
actions and management. Therefore, whether the result of tradition or trend the
'crown' title implies that the crown is not the same thing as government.
Zealand Public Service.'. in H11m Gold (cd.), New zeakutd Politics itt perspectiye, 3rd edn.,Longnran Paul Ltd, Auckland, t-SeZ, pp. 2Ii-232.
5l Interview, David Bradshaw, state Services commission, wellington,2l June, 1993.
-s2 John Martin, 'The Role of the State in Admiuistration', in Anclrew Sharp (ed.), I-eap into theDurk; The state in the r990.v,Auckland university press, Auckland. 1995, p.42.
-s3 David Lange. 'Let Thern Eat Cake ', Bnttul;;idet, 1992,p. llg.
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The Crown, the Government and perpetaal Succession
A distinction between Crown and government was also evident when the Crown
played a more active role than that of a title. The Crown was ,personified, and
therefbre able to act, decide, admit and so on. However, in being personified, the
Crown also became something other than government in that it represented the idea of
perpetual succession of government. Two variations on the relationship between
government and Crown as perpetual succession were observed. The Crown either
represented the notion of perpetual succession in the past in contrast to the actions of
the government of the day (particularly in identifying the Crown as the original treaty
partner) or the Crown represented perpetual succession of government in the future, in
contrast to the rule of a single government. In this respect, the philosophical d^ifference
between Crown and government could be used to distinguish between actions of the
government of the day as opposecl to the broader principles of the purpose and
limitations of government authority (the Crown).
First, newspaper reports often used 'the Crown' to describe the responsibilities of
government inherited from the past, or more precisely, particularly with regard to the
Crown and the Treaty of waitangi. For example, a report on Mdori claims to
broadcasting rights drew a distinction between government and Crown when it stated
that, 'access rights [for broadcast frequencies] were not among resources transferred
lrom Mdori to the Crown under section two of the Treaty' and consequently advised
that, 'urgent discussions with the Government [would] prevent the issues being
addressed in an adversarial situation in court.'54 Without delving into the details of the
case, the language of the report, it is argued, implies that government and Crown were
distinguishable with respect to their identity and function in that it was the Crown that
had the authority to sign the Treaty and establish government, and the government
54 'Maorj. Council lays claim to radio waves' , The Domirtion, 30 May 1989, p. 2. Italics have beenadded to the words 'govemment' and 'crown' in quotations from newipaper reports in rhis chapter inorder to enrphasisc the use of these words.
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now exercises its authority as a result of the Crown's actions. Similarly, a report on
fishing quotas pointed out that, '[a]n agreement had been made with the government to
have the [fishing] quotas returned.'5' However, it was .the crown, which was
subsequently identified as the owner and guardian of the resource in keeping with the
Crown/government distinction suggested earlier in relation to natural resources.
The distinction between 'Crown' and 'government' was also used in press reports to
draw a philosophical distinction between the actions of the government of the day and
the ongoing authority of government, the latter being represented by the Crown. once
again, this meaning and use for the Crown most often appeared in the context of
reports discussing the management and use of natural resources. For instance, one
report stated, '[l]ast year losses from selling synthetic gasoline and the government,s
debt servicing commitments on the synfuers plant cost the crown $329 million.,56
The implicit message of this report was that the government's actions would be
inherited by subsequent governments. This was simply conveyed to the public
through the use of the words 'government' in the short term, and .Crown, as the
notion of perpetual succession. In particular, the foresbry industry was often discussed
using the ideas of Crown and government in this way. For example, in a forestry
report, it was advised that 'the Crown's plantation forests ... were the result of a
Sovernmenr decision to nurture an 'infant' forestry industry over several decades.'57
Similarly, in a report on forest sales, the 'government' was identified as being
responsible for the sale of trees in the short term while the long term contract was said
to be with 'the Crown'.58 It was described as 'a contract which binds the crown ro
supply timber to Tasman forestry for the next forty years.'se
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'$ t.5- in fish quotas given up after convict ion' , The Dctminktn,4 october 1990, p. I .
56 
'crown seeks to reduce loses from syntuels', in Natiorrul Busittess Review,22 November l9gg, p.14.
-s7 'Forestry report backs sales plan,. The Dtntittio,, l0 May 1990, p. 13.
58 'NZ Post tests Crown's rights,, The Drmi,irn,24 May 19g9, p. 21.
59 "'J"*.lr" in Forest corp crown held out of sale ,, Tlte Dctntinion, lg April 1990, p. 2.
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Despite the usefulness of the Crown in indicating perpetual succession and therefore
being something other than government, there were obvious difficulties in maintaining
a Crown/government distinction, particularly in restricting the meaning of the .Crown,
to a notion of perpetual government. Most often in the context of treaty debate, the
Crown would appear in a new role as a metonym for 'government'. For instance, in
em article entitled 'The Case for Ngai Tahu',6{.lthe iwi were reported to claim that ,the
Crown [had historically] railed to allocate lands ro the tribe after it had promised to set
them aside' and to have subsequently stated that 'the governmenr had [in the past]
failed to fulfil its Treaty promise of protecting the Tribe's interest.,6l Unlike the
previous examples, the terms Crown and government were used here as though they
were synonymous. This is evident again in a later comment in the same article about a
'misunderstanding over the nature of the relationship between the Crown and the
Tribe' The Ngai Tahu clearly expected the Government totake an active role in its
development and maintenance.'62 The following section discusses similar examples
of the Crown as a metonym for government which, it is argued, demonstrates further
inconsistency in the identity of the Crown, with serious implications for M6ori.
'Crownt as a Metonymfor rGovemtnent'
This final category of uses and meaning for 'the Crown' in mass communication
discusses instances in which 'the Crown' was used in newspapers as a metonym for
'government of the day'. This most often occurred, it should be noted, in the context
of treaty debate.63 Where the Crown was used in this manner, it had the effect of
collapsing the ideas of Crown and government together which demonstrates further
u1' 'tn" case for Ngai Tahu'. The Pre.r;t,4 November 1989, p. 4. Ngai rahu (or Kai Tahu) are an iwi
situated over a great part of the South Islancl. Sce appendix C.
6l '11" case for Ngai Tahu', The pres,t,4 November 19g9, p.4.
62 'The case for Ngai Tahu', The pres:s,4 November 19g9, p. 4.
3 q"t:were.excePtions to Lhis generalisation. Forexample in an article entitled.the Crown noPseudo Parent', a Minister advised, with regard to fte role br tr," lou"*ment in social policy, that
'the crown is very poor at gdng' and 'it is not ttre role of the cro-wn to decide wbat is right.' See
'Crown no pseudo parent'. The Dominion, 27 November 1990, p. 10.
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inconsistency in the identity and meaning of the Crown in contemporary heaty debate.
The implications of this for Mdori are discussed at the end of this chapter.
There were many examples of articles where 'the Crown' was used as a metonym for
government. First, this was frequently done without any reference to government at
all' For example, one report stated, 'the Crown failed in its statutory obligation to
obtain the Maori Land Board's consent' saying that 'the Crown clearly had
information in its possession which contradicted representations made to the Hauai
trustee.' It stated also that Mdori felt they had been cheated by a party with whom they
felt they had a special relationship, 'yet when they sought relief, the Crownproved
steadfastly unsympathetic.'64 As these references to the Crown were left unclarifled,
and as the Crown was acting in the present as opposed to the future or the past in
previous examples, the reader (or public) could only assume that 'the Crown, was
somehow related to, if not the same thing as, 'the government of the day'. Similarly, a
report about the northern Tainui tribe and its land claims said 'the Crownbelieved the
extended process had been worth while.'65 An earlier report about the tribe,s relations
with its treaty partner had been headecl 'Crownrejects Tainui's bicl to negotiate, and
had contended that 'the Crown' had rejected an offer to negotiate with Tainui saying
that 'the Crown would be abrogating its responsibilities to the public if it agreed to the
proposal'' It also reported that 'the Crownbelieved it had the responsibility on behalf
of all New Zealanders of making the ultimate decision as to whether or not the
recommendations on the claims ... should be adopted.'66 Once again, in the absence
of clarification it could only be assumed that the Crown was the same thing as
government' in some fbrm or other. In relation to resources, another article reported,
'the recently passed Crown Minerals Act says access [to Crown minerals] is not the
Crown's to sell.'67 If the earlier pattern of use were in effect, the report would have
64 
'14ae6 trust rnislecl in dear with crown', The New Zeularul Herald,2 June l9g9,p. l:9.
65 
'Tainui claim', The Dominion, 12 September 19g9. p.7.
66 
'crown rejects Tainui's bid to negotiate',Trze D,ntirtitm,29 August r9g9,p.2.
67 
'Commerce Commission studies how to sell the unsaleable', The Examiner, lg July, l99l,p.4.
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advised that the Crown minerals were not the government's to sell. Here again
however, the inconsistency of the Crown is evident. Yet another article advised that,
'the [petroleum] company's immediate objective is to [acquire] the Crown's interests
assuming that agreement can be reached with the Crown on satisfactory terms.'68
Once again, in contrast to the pattern established whereby the Crown is something
different from government, in these instances the Crown is a metonym for the
government of the day. The question emerging which will shortly be examined is,
what are the implications of this inconsistency regarding the meaning of the Crown in
relation to govemment for Mlori?
The newspaper coverage of the 'Principles tbr Crown Action' announced in 1989
provides an excellent case study of the use of Crown as a metonym for government
and introduces a new argument, explored in the next two chapters, that the
inconsistency in the Crown's identity is the result of a conscious decision by some
speakers to identify the government of the day as the Crown. The Principles were
released in November 1989 by the Labour Government as a part of its policy
reganding Treaty issues. These 'Principles for Crown Action' were created by the
Labour Government as a guide for future governments' treaty policies. The principles,
which were clearly the Labour Government's policy, were nevertheless identified as
'Crown' rather than 'government' principles. In announcing their release Geoffrey
Palmer, as the Minister of Justice, engaged in using the symbolism of the Crown by
stating, '[t]he duty of the Crotvn is not merely passive but extends to active protection
of Maori people.' He said also that 'the Treaty is regarded by the Crown as
establishing a fair basis for two people in one country.' He refened to the Crown's
commitment and the Crown's position.69 In sum, Palmer clearly presented his
government's policy as that of the Crown's.
68 'southern not likely to rnatch $22.8m profit', The Dttminion.5 November 1991, p. 11.
69 Rt Hon Geoffrey Palmer, 'The Treaty of Waitangi 
- 
Principles for Crown action', National
Business Review,.luly 1989. p. 23:6.
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The reply to this policy announcement from the National Party directly highlighted the
use of Crown symbcllism in Labour's policy. The spokesperson for National
identified 'the Crown' as the original treaty signatory only and went on to refer to the
oontemporary partner specifically as the Labour Government. The Minister argued,
for example,'[i]f we are truly to be one nation [the] key issue must be addressed ...
and the government must respond.'70
As mentioned previously, the language of these two speakers introduces a question
about the function of the Crown as a symbol in treaty debate which will be examined
in the next two chapters. In the meantime, it also demonstrates the use of the Crown
as a metonym for govemment in treaty discourse. The implications for Mdori of the
inconsistent use of the Crown as, on the one hand a metonym for government and on
the other hand a term for something other than government, will now be considered.
Crown andGovernment: The Significance of Difference
The evidence presentecl in this chapter has substantiated the argument introduced in the
previous chapter that there are serious problems of consistency with regard to the
identity of the Crown in the mass media in New Zealand. In particular, it has been
argued here that there is inconsistency in the relationship between government and
Crown in New Zealand. On the one hand, the Crown symbol is used in such as way
as to distinguish the Crown tiom the government in much the same way as the Crown
traditionally was perceived to sit above government in Britain and limit government
authority and protect the public interest. In other words, the Crown was the guardian
of the constitution. However, on other occasions the mass media also used the term
'Crown' as a metonym for government. The difference between government and
Crown, as argued here, is particularly significant within the context of the Treatv of
Waitrngi.
il) Winston Peters, 'Principles for crown action on the Treaty of waitangi, , National BwinessReview, July 1989, p 23:7.
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other countries use similar icons and concepts to express the notion of perpetual
succession' The United States of America, for example, refers to a single government
as an 'administration' and reserves the word government to identify the ongoing
process of governing. Also, the United States upholds the American flag as the
timeless foundation of American society. The flag, in this respect (and more generally
the constitution), is America's 'crown'. In interprefing the Crown as the same thing as
govemment, as seems to have happened in New znaland,,this important and useful
diffierences between the two are lost.
In general, the difference between Crown and government in New Zealand is
important in maintaining the image of an authority which will, among other functions,
protect the rights of its citizens from the actions of government. In other countries this
function is fulfilled by an entrenched bill of rights or a written constitution. In New
Zealand' which has neither of these, the Crown has historically been considered a
guardian of the nation's constitution and therefore also the liberty of its subjects.Tl In
the Crown's traditional capacity as 'the Queen', the Crown was separate from and
higher than government, in the sense that it was considered the duty of the Crown to
ensure that her people were not subjected to unconstitutional government.T2 However,
as the previous chapter demonstrated, neither the Queen nor the Governor-General
have real political power in New Zealand,. Their power has been transferred to the
Executive, or Ministers of the Crown. The implications of this shift in power are most
evident when seen in relation to the Crown and government under the Treaty of
Waitangi.
The distinction between Crown and government is a significant, if not essential, one to
make in relation to the Treaty. Under the Treaty, the Crown agreed to protect M6.ori
tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) and taonga (treasures) from the influx of British
]1 o t-' Stevens, The Crown, the Governttr General and the constitutitttt,Masters thesis in Law,Victoria University of Wellington, 1974, p. xx.
T2stevens, The Crcwn, the Governor General and the Constirution,p.43,
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settlers arriving in New Zealand,. It was also the duty of the Crown to protect M6ori
interests against the actions of settler government. The fact that the Crown has come
to be synonymous with government is a reflection of the fact that New Zealanders in
general (and Mdori in particular) do not have that layer of authority which can provide
protection from government actions and authority in New 7-eaLand. However, perhaps
the most significant injustice is that the government, in assuming the position of the
Crown, is playing two roles at once as both protector and accused subjugator of Mdori
rights under the Treatv.
The Chief Judge of the Waitangi Tribunal, Eddie Durie, has explained that the
government's alter ego as the Crown has created concern amongst Mdori themselves,
some of whom oppose the Crown being used as a metonym for government. He tells
of an incident at a hui in Rotorua in 1990 when he was approached by a group of
Mdori who were concerned by the fact that the Crown was being used to identify the
actions of governments which had contravened the Treaty. Their message was that the
honourable Crown (with whom M6ori had signed the Treaty in 1840) should not be
implicated in contemporary discussion of treaty breaches perpetrated by govemment.T3
If this concern is an indication of a wider opinion within Mioridom (and possibly
non-Mdori groups) then not only is the newspapersn use of the Crown as a metonym
for government not representative of other interpretations of the crown but also it is
more seriously creating a new ancl inappropriate interpretation of the Crown reaty
pafiner ftom the perspective of Mdori.
Finally, in the process of substantiating the problem of consistency with regard to the
identity of the Crown treaty partner, this chapter has demonstrated that the Crown
symbol is often used as a metonyn fbr government and suggested that this is a device
by which the speaker gains some kind of political advantage. The next chapter more
73 Interview, Chief Judge E.T.J. Durie, Wellingron, 2l August, 1995.
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thoroughly investigates the role and function of political cliscourse in order to
understand more about the role of the Crown symbol in treaty debate.
THREE
SYMBOLS IN POLITICS: A THEhRETICAL ovERvIEw
The question who or what is 'the Crown' in mass communication in New Zealand was
answered in part in the previous chapter with the discovery that'the Crown, was often
used as a metonym fbr government, although there was inconsistency in its use in this
way. This raised the question of why the crown was used as a metonym for
government, particularly when accepting the diff'erence between Crown and
govemment in contemporary society. In an attempt to answer this question, Chapter
Three will discuss some theoretical perspectives on the nature and function of symbols
in politics. It addresses fbur issues: the signiticance of symbols for politics; the
receptiveness of publics to political symbolism; governments' use of symbolic
language;and some of the imprications of using symbols, such as .the crown,, in
political discourse. From this investigation, hypotheses are drawn which will then be
tested against evidence of the use of the Crown in ministerial statements relating to the
Treaty of Waitangi (see Chapter Four). These hypotheses include: that the public
derives reassurance and a sense of identity fiom the Crown symbol; that a symbol
such as the Crown can be applied to a variety of individuals and institutions as long as
the context in which it appears is appropriate; and that the government can use the
Crown symbol to legitimise actions and authority under the Treaty of Waitangi.
The conbibutions of a variety of theorists me included in this chapter. In particular, the
views of Murray Edehnanl, who has written extensively on political symbolism and
C'D' Elder and R.W. Cobb who have also investigated the role of symbols in politics,
are discussed.2 Other authors such as Seymour Lipset, William Connolly and John
I Mutray Edelman, The Synrholic [Jse;t of Politic,r, University of Illinois press, Urban a. 1964.
2 c'o' Elder and R.W. Cobb, Tlte Politic'ttl llses rqf'Symbol.r, Longuran press, New york, 19g3.
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Schaar provide valuable discussion of the function of symbols in legitimising
government action and authority.: It proved difficult to find New Zealand material
specifically relating to symbolism in politics, although Les Cleveland,s work which
also includes useful discussion of political culture in New Zealand provided some
interesting ideas.a While the combination of these authors provides an interesting and
diverse debate, it should be remembered that the nature and impact of political
symbolism will vary between states. The experience of American theorists, such as
these writers predominantly are, should not be assumed to be relevant to the New
Zealand experience' As a result, the theorists' ideas have often been modified to make
them appropriate to 'the Crown, in New Zealand.
The Significance of the Symbotfor politics
Symbols are found everywhere in modern society. From the stop sign on the street to
the national flag, from a handshake to the word 'democracy', individuals and groups
of people communicate with each other through the use of symbols. To a certain
degree language itself is a string of words or symbols which evoke meaning.
However, 'symbols' as identified here are distinguished from language per se as signs,
objects, or acts which represent emotions, thoughts and facts.5 While all these kinds
of symbols are considered in the discussion it is the function of objects (such as the
Crown) which is of particular interest.
According to Dorothy Lee, the word 'symbol' was originally the Greek name for a
part of a coin broken from the whole as a gift to a departing friend. This 'symbol, was
to remind the friend of the hospitality and friendship of the giver. The .symbol, was
3. See: Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Mun: The Social Buses of politic:t, John HopkinsUniversity Press, Baltimore, 1981; W.E. Connolly,The Terms of political Discourse, (2ndEdn.),D'C' Heath and Co', Massachusetts, 1983; .Iohn ii. Schaar, 'L"giii*u"y in the Modern State,, inConnolly (ed.), Legitimctcy and the Stttte.Basil Blackwell puUtisnlr itA., tSS+.
4 Les cleveland,The Politics of lJtopia. New Zealurul and its Government,Methuen publicationsLtd, Wellington, 1979, p. 23.
5 Edelman, The symbolic lJses ttJ Potitic.r.p. 6 and Elder and Cobb,The potiticauJses of symbols,p.29.
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not creating or evoking meaning so much as conveying it. Similarly the modern
symbol, Lee argues' must be seen not just as a representation of ideas and meanings
but as a real part of a whole.6 Lee explains that a symbol is not arbitrarily given
meaning but rather, 'it contains the meaning of the concrete situations in which it
participates and has participated and which it has helped create.'? In other words, a
symbol evolves from a specific context much as 'the Crown' came to symbolise the
monarchy from around 1100 AD (see Chapter One) because it was the headdress of
the king and a part of the royal context. Just as Lee's broken coin assumed meaning
fiom its context, so 'the Crown' has come to represent those institutions from which it
evolved' A more recent example of an object gaining symbolic meaning nationwide
occurred in New Z'e,aland in 1994, when a Member of Parliament tabled documents in
the House of Representatives relating to a major tax scandal. The Minister carried the
documents in a wine box. As a result of the media's attention to this fact, the wine box
drew symbolic significance from its context and as a result, the scandal has since been
ref'erred to as 'the wine box affair'.
In order for an object such as a crown or a wine box to become a significant symbol,
groups of people must relate common meaning to it. These 'meanings' must have both
a cognitive and an emotional component in that they incorporate both what individuals
'know' to be true ancl what they feel.s However, as the example of the broken coin
has already demonstrated, the meanings and emotions people bring to a symbol do not
need to be inherent in the symbol itself.g Rather, individuals 'learn' through their own
experience to associate common meanings, thoughts and emotions with symbolic
objects, actions and words. In this respect, a symbol's meanings tend to be
1 P:ttlnt P.*L"", 'syrnbolisation and Value'. in L. Bryson er at. (eds.), symhotr- qnd values: AnInirial Study, Cooper Square publisbers Inc., New york, i9O+, pp.li_l+.
7 Lee,'symbolisation ancl Value' ,p.74.
u Elder and cobb. The.Political [J.res rl synthots, p.37. Also see chapter Two .SymbolicAttachments' in The Polir.icul ltses tf svntblrl.r', for a thloretical framework concerning varieties ofsymbols and discussion of how symbots acquire their meaning for individuats, pp. 33_56.
9 Elder and Cobb, Ttre potitical lJset- of.Synhols,p.Zg.
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associational rather than substanliys.lt) For example, a broken coin would only evoke
thoughts and feelings about friendship to a citizen from ancient Greece, while at the
same time, a crown would mean little to a culture which did not 'crown' its leaders. In
addition to further demonstrating the significance of the context from which symbols
develop, these examples also highlight the importance of socialisation in the creation
and promotion of society's symbols.
Socialisation is the process by which members of society learn the rules and norns
required to live in and be accepted by a particular society. Socialisation also plays a
key role in developing and encouraging symbolic communication because it is through
this process that individuals learn the common and prevailing ideas about their society
and its symbols and through whioh they hand that information down through the
generations.ll For example, generations of people born after World War II have
'learnt' to associate the swastika with facts about Hitler's dictatorship as well as
feelings of fear, anger or despair. Similarly, the act of shaking hands is in some
cultures a symbolic gestue which internationally represents peace or agreement and
which is learnt by subsequent generations. The term 'Watergate' on the other hand,
immediately brings to mind notions of governrnent comrption in the western world for
people at the time of the political scandal in the USA, and for years afterwards. As
socialisation is an ongoing process the information individuals relate to particular
symbols will be gradually accrued throughout their lifetime. Furthermore, new
symbols are constantly being generated within society, as the example of the 'wine box
afl'air' demonstrates. Some symbols, such as the Crown, endure the test of time, while
others do not. The question is, what makes an effective and enduring symbol?
Theorists have argued that the key to objects, actions and words becoming effective
and popular symbols is that large groups of people, often entire nations, must attribute
l() Elder and Cobb, Zhe
I I Elder ancl Cobb, Zhe
Political Uses of Symbol.r, p. 50.
Political Uses o.f Symbols,p.47 .
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them with courmon meaning, value and significance.12 For example, .t1e Crown, is a
useful and meaningful concept in Commonwealth nations because of a common
history of association with the monarchy by all nations. However, it is also important
to note that the profile of a symbol, as well as its associations and meanings, will differ
between states, or between groups within states. For example, while some British-
Canadian writers argue that 'the Crown' is central to Canada's unique political
structure,l3 French-Canadians consider it a symbol of oppression, as do the Irish who
regard the Crown as a reminder of years of oppression under British rule. On the
other hand, the crown enjoyed unprecedented currency in New zealandin the lggOs
while Australia in the early 1990s was debating the possibility of removing the symbol
ftom its constitution altogether and replacing it with a new republican charter.r4
Indigenous groups within these two countries in particular have been diametrically
opposed in their attitude to the Crown. Many M[ori have historically upheld a
partnership with the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi, while Aboriginal and Torres
Strait Island people in Australia have a history of resistance against the Crown.t5
However' while nations or groups within states use symbols differently, according to
some theorists, all societies have 'political mysticisms' and 'irrational strings, which
exist on another plane as a result of their unique historical roots. It is only the myths
and emotionally charged symbols of others that we find perplexing, while our own
seem 'natural'. In fact, symbols can be so deeply rooted in a nation's mental landscape
that they are scarcely paid any special attention.l6 According to this logic, the Crown
could be a prolific symbolic identity in New Zealand'spublic discourse whilst its
function and implications may be barely recognised by either speaker or audience.
I2 Elder and Cobb, The prilitical lJse.r of Symhots,p.29.
I3 See Chapter Nine of this thesis for a further djscussion.
l4 see-Chapters Nine and Ten for more discussion of the comparative role and profile of .the Crown,symbol in Canada and Australia.
l-5 see chapters Five and ren respectivcry for t'urther discussion.
f 6 Slephen Levine and Raj Yasil, Mactri Political Perspectives. Hutchison Group, Auckland, 19g5,p. 152.
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While useful and popular tools in society generally, symbols are a particularly popular
and effective device in political discourse. They are said to make powerful political
tools because their common or universal 'meanings' can be used to convey
information and emotion to large numbers of people with relative ease. They are also
useful tools in the language of persuasion which is central to political communication
because of their ability to convey both factual and emotional associations. According
to Edelman, for example, words in the hands of political speakers are .political
weapons' used to muster support for certain causes.lT Connolly agrees that the
language of politics is 'an institutionalised structure of meanings that channels political
thought and actions in certain directions.'ls In particular, it is those symbols which
span generations and have an emotional impact of their audience which make powerful
political tools.
In addition to contributing to the persuasive nature of potitical language, symbols are
thought to facilitate and 'simplify'political communication by reducing complex and
ambiguous messages to a more manageable size, thereby making them more easily
accepted and 'understood'by the public.re However, in reducing politics to a
symbolic level, symbols are also accused of 'changing' politics. Lyman Bryson
explains tlat, because symbols appeal to individuals' emotions more than their rational
mind, the public may understand that words are not a substitute for action, and that
symbols are not a replacement for actual events, but on a more emotional level the
public can be 'uplifted into higher courage by the sight of a flag, and stiffened by the
strength of words.'20 As a result, Bryson warns, where symbols impact emotionally
ll t 
'. 
Edelman, Constructing the Politic'al Spectucle,Universiry of Chicago press, Chicago,1988, pp. 108-109.
l8 Connolly, The Terms of'political Discourse,p. l.
19 Edelman, Potitics as Syntholic Action.p.34.
2{).Lyman 
!rl,son, 'The Quest for symbols', in Lyman Bryson et al. (eds.) symbols anel values: AnIttitiul Study, Cooper Square publishirs, New yori<, 196a. pp. 7_g. '
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upon publics or individuals, they can distort political facts, and in a sense create their
own reality.2l This point is discussed in more detail later in the chapter.
In anempting to understand the implications of symbols in politics, some theorists have
ofl'ered categories for symbols based on their nature and function. Edelman, for
example, distinguishes between condensational and referential symbols. He explains
that referential symbols, such as statistics or graphs, economically represent
information and facts- They encourage logical or manageable thinking about complex
or sizeable issues. For example, the state of M6ori health compared with non-MEori
health in New Znaland, can be easily conveyed to an audience in a graph or list of
statistics which visually reveals the difference between the two groups. Condensation
symbols' on the other hand, condense emotions into a single event, act or objec1.22
'The Crown' is an example of a condensational symbol because (as established in the
first chapter) it has developed through the centuries to represent thoughts, facts and
emotions about a range of political individuals and institutions.
It is useful at this point to think more about the symbolic 'baggage' the Crown carries
in New Zeiland. New Zealand political scientist, Les Cleveland, writing in the late
1970s, gave considerable thought to the'symbolic existence of New Zealanders, and
argued that 'the Crown' signifies the history and tradition of the British monarchy and
is a symbol of 'justice, the authority of the state and also the institution of the
monarchy''23 [n the previous chapter the Crown was also identified as representing a
notion of perpetual succession and stability in New Zealandgovemment, as well as
being the guardian of the constitution and public interest. It was thought to be popular
because it has more positive associations than does the alternative concept of .the
state" Cleveland also arguecl that the Crown is popular in New Zealandbecause it
2l Bryson, 'The euest for Symbols', p.g.
22 Edelman, The Symbolic lJ.res oJ'politics, p. 6.
23 cleveland ,The Poritic's ,J'Iltopia. New fuarund attd its Goverrtment,p.23.
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connects the country very strongly with a British heritage and a tradition of majesty.
According to Cleveland, early settlers in New Zealand had a very strong sense of
personal ambition which was (unusually) not coupled with any ambition to be an
independent or progressive political nation. This is most clearly demonstrated by New
Zealand's choice to establish the British style Westminster model for its political
institutions.za Cleveland concluded that historically New Zealand generated a .proud
association with the Crown'.25
While this is a generalised view of the facts and emotions the Crown represents in
New Zealand, later discussion demonstrates that groups within New Zealand have
their own particular associations which they bring to the Crown as a condensational
symbol' As Richard McKeon explains, the different symbolic conception of groups
within society creates another categorisation of symbols which can be seen as
instruments of internal cohesion ancl/or external communication. He explains that
symbols can express the intentions, attitudes and expectations of one group in relation
to another, or they may be used as a means of communication within a group.26 1n
relation to the Crown it will be interesting to determine, with the more detailed data of
the next chapter, whether'the Crown' symbol communicates an idea within one group
or between groups in New Zealand.
This discussion of the categories of symbols is based on the assumption that symbols
such as the Crown are readily accepted by the New Zealand public. It does nor,
however, explain how or why this acceptance should occur. What is it about certain
symbols, the Crown in particular, that makes them popular with the public? The next
section of this discussion addresses the nature of the relationship between publics and
symbols.
24 Cleveland ,The politics tf lJtrtpia, p.3.
25 Cleveland ,The potitics of utopia, p.27 
.
26 R-ichard McKeon. 'symbols, Myths and Arguments', in Bryson et al. (eds.) synbols antl Values,p.25.
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Public Response to Symbols in politics
Theorists have offered three possible explanations for the popularity of symbolic
communication amongst publics. First, they suggest that people naturally think and
reason symbolically and therefore respond well to information presented to them in
symbolic terms. Second, some theorists have argued that publics are drawn to
symbols which add to their own sense of identity.zT Finally, it has been said that
publics will accept political symbols which offer reassurances for collective political
fears and anxieties. In discussing each of these possibilities, the implications for the
Crown symbol are also investigated.
Many aspects of human life and society are communicated and understood through a
series of symbolic references. Some disciplines such as mathematics and science rely
heavily on 'referential' symbols which are universally understood and unambiguous,
such as '=','vo' and'zn'. However, while humans enjoy a general capacity for
symbolic thought, they are considered particularly susceptible to symbolism in their
political capacity. This is because 'politics' constitutes a complex web of ideas,
relationships and institutions, the meanings of which are most easily conceived of
through symbols. In the previous chapter it was said that the American flag plays a
central role in American politics. Here is it suggested that the flag is a successful
American icon because it is a simple representation of the very complex ideas it
represents. Similarly, Bagehot noted in the 1800s (as mentioned in Chapter One) that
the public more easily conceived of the notion of a single Crown ruler than the
complex relations of democratic government.2S More importantly, people relate to
symbols because, as also explained earlier, symbols are familiar to them because of
their socialisation- Political behaviour is in fact largely a 'symbolic process, through
27 In particular see: Edelman, Politics as Symbolic Action,p.53; and Elder and Cobb,The politicalUses o.f Symbols 
, p. 7 | .
28 See,.Walter Bagehot, Tfte English Con^rtitution,oxford University press, London, 1942. Also
see further discussion of Bagehot in chapter one of this thesis.
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which people try to understand and explain the overall political picture, however
accurately or inaccurately, to themselves and to others.29
Thus it appears that the Crown is a popular symbol in New Z,ealandbecause it is a
familiar icon which is universally understood and which simplifies the public,s
conception of the political process. For example, in the newspaper articles discussed
in the previous chapter, the Crown conveyed the appropriate impression of authority
without requiring a detailed explanation of the actual individuals or institutions
involved. In this respect, the process of communication becomes more manageable
through the aid of the Crown symbol.
However, the danger inherent in publics accepting, even preferring, symbolic
communication is that, once a symbol establishes itself within a group with a shared
meaning, individuals will rationalise situations and information in order to
accommodate the symbolic structure already in place. As Edelman explains:
Once accepted, a metaphorical view becomes the organising conception into which the
public thereafter alranges items of news that llt and in the light of which it interprets
the news' In this way a particular view is reinforced and repeatedly seems to be
validated for those whose attitudes it expresses. It becomes self-perpetuating.3O
To explain Edelman's point further, symbols are thought to create their own political
reality for those publics engaged in politics through symbolism. There is some
concern that political reality is created by forcing complex situations into more
manageable forms'31 Moreover, collectively, symbols are said to provide a structure
or hierarchy for public perceptions.32 When faced with new info'nation which
contradicts the established norm, inclividuals (or publics) are less likely to mod.ify their
29 Edelrnan, Politics ets Symholic Action.p.3.
30 Edelman, Potitics as Sl,nthtilic Actiort,p.I72.
3l Edelman, Politic,,- as Symbolic Action,p.66.
32 Fdelmatt, Politics as Symbolic Action,p.42.
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assumptions about established symbols and more likely to ignore or manipulate the
new information in order that it support the symbolic structure already in place. As
Elder and Cobb note, 'people tend to perceive and interpret political stimuli in such a
way as to make it consistent with their existing predispositions.'33
Applying this argument to the Crown symbol suggests that once 'the Crown, became
an established and accepted symbol in political discourse in New Zealand,,it became
part of a symbolic structure which would support and promote the role of the Crown
in political discourse. In addition, new events and information which might challenge
or contradict the role of the Crown will be ignored by the public or interpreted in such
a way as to maintain the symbolic structure in which the Crown identity resides.34
Aside from the implications of this with regard to the accuracy of the public
perceptions of the political structures, this argument also introduces the possibility that
symbols such as the Crown which shape present political realities will also help
determine the nature of possible future events. Most often society's prevailing
symbols are those which support the present regime and shut out alternatives.3s As
Mueller explains,'[p]olicies, explanations and data can be couched in a language
which itself contains pre-definitions and interpretations that serve the purpose of
maintaining an undisturbed exercise of power.'36 In this respect, there is a possibility
that 'the Crown' symbol seryes to protect and promote an undisturbed exercise of
power.
The second theoretical proposition to explain the popularity of certain symbols was
that publics respond well to political symbols which develop the individual, or public,
33 Elder and Cobb, The Politicctl lJse.r of symbols,p. ll,also see Edelman,politics as symbolicAction,p.42.
34 Howeve'., people's perceptions are also able to adapt and change. For example, there wouldpresumably be few New Zealanders who believe that thoCrown denJtes real authority and power inNew Zealand as opposed to symbolic authority.
35 Edelman, The Sytnbotit tJses o.l'polirrc.r, pp. 173-174.
36 Claus Mueller, The Politit:s o.f Conmunicnrinn, oxford University press, New york, 1973, p. g7.
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sense of identity. Symbols are apparently 'selected' by people according to a role and
identity they see for themselves.3T For example, a person who is patriotic may
respond positively to the national flag as an outward recognition of their own personal
politics' The result of this sort of response to symbols may be seemingly unqualified
attachment to a symbol (such as a flag) regardless of the context in which it is used.
The dangers inherent in this type of symbolic attachment are not overlookecl by
theorists who have observed it. For example, Elder and Cobb warn that the more
strongly e person associates himself or herself with a symbol, the more inclined that
person will be to accept and support its use in political discourse without constantly
reassessing the value and consequences of the symbol.38 A symbol may therefore be
used in subtly but significantly different ways without its new use being questioned or
even recognised by individuals or entire publics. on the basis of this theory it is
suggested that 'the Crown' symbol not only simplifies political communication for the
New Zealand public but also contributes to the public's sense of identity.
In considering the possibility that individuals attach themselves to symbols according
to their own sense of identity, it has also been suggested that '[t]he themes a society
emphasises and re-emphasises about its government may not accurately describe [that
government'sl politics.' Rather, they indicate what various publics want to believe
about themselves and their state.3e Les Cleveland similarly observed with regard to
New Zealand that a description of a country's political culture does not necessarily
amount to an exact account of the actual working of its political institutions and
processes' Rather, it deals principally with what people think about their political
circumstances rather that with what actually exists.a0 'The Crown' may therefore only
exist in the minds of the public because they want, for whatever reason, to believe that
it exists. While accepting that this would be an argument worth investigating further, it
37 Edelman, Potitits ut Symholic Actiotr,p.53.
38 Elder and Cobb, The political lJses o.f Synbols, p. 7 1 .
39 Edelman, The Synrbolic lJses of potitjc.r, p. 19t.
40 Cleveland,The politic,r of Iltopict,p.23.
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is equally important not to exaggerate the susceptibility of publics in general and the
New Zealand public in particular. People can be remarkably astute when
distinguishing political symbols from reality or context. Moreover, if symbol and
context become too widely dissonant, the contradiction will become apparent to some
people' In addition to this, in New Zealand,as evidenced in the first chapter, there is
some logic to the identity of the Crown which often appears in statutes and other
official documents and which finds expression as the Queen, Governor-General and/or
Executive (although the previous chapter demonstrated problems of consistency with
this)' There is, therefore, some logic to the Crown's presence in New Zealand,
although this only partly explains its frequent appearance in political discourse.
Finally, it has been proposed that publics respond well to symbols which appease
public concerns and offer reassurances. As Elder and Cobb explain, in addition to
pursuing a political identity, people will orientate themselves towards symbols as a
way of externalising their own personal hopes, anxieties and fears.at These feelings
make up a substantial part of the 'political world'. According to Edelman, these
feelings also provide a vital link between politics and symbolism, and are most often
the result of social division or tension.42 Edelman argues that, 'internal or external
conflicts and passions catalyse attachment to a selected range of myths and metaphors
which shape the perceptions of the political world.'43 He also notes that attachment to
popular symbols can allay public anxiety when the symbol creates the impression of a
collective cotuse of action which will resolve tensions.4 Furthermore, it is suggested
that, in situations where tension levels, anxiety or the perception of threat are the
gr€atest within society, symbolic cues and reassurances witl be most readily accepted
by publiss.as
4f Elder and Cobb, The politiceil IJses o.f Symhol.r, p. 50.
42 Edelman, Pol.itics tt:s S)tmbolic Action,p.2.
43 Edelman, Potitics as Symholic Actiort,p.67.
4 Edelman, Politics as Svmbolic Action,p.54.
45 Edelman, The Symholic tJses of politics,p. 177.
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This is a particularly interesting observation in relation to the Crown. In later chapters
it is demonstrated that the negotiation of treaty claims and issues has created high
Ievels of fear and anxiety within New Zealand society as well as creating division
between groups who support and reject treaty negotiations. It would follow, therefore,
in applying the theorists' argument, that the public will accept a symbol which appears
to appease concerns and unite divided groups. The Crown, it is later argued, has the
potential to unite goups otherwise divided on treaty issues because all groups respond
positively to the Crown symbol. As was discussed earlier, the Crown's traditional
British origins make it a representation of national unity, and the common good. The
Crown has also been described as the 'guardian of the constitution'. Therefore, when
faced with a constitutional challenge such as the Treaty has presented in New Znaland,
the Crown can appease public concerns by representing absolute Pdkeh6 sovereignty
in New Zealand.
In looking to investigate this possibility further, political scientist, Raj Vasil, has
considered the nature of political symbols in New Zealand and suggested that just as
the major features of New Zealand government are British influenced, so too are its
symbols which are based on British values.46 According to Vasil, MEori do not
envisage these symbols as their own. While this may generally be true, the Crown is
an interesting exception because Mdori also have a significant connection with the
Crown through the Treaty of Waitangi (discussed f'urther in Chapter Five). Despite its
'Britishness' therefore and its obvious association with PdkehA, the Crown also
appeases Mdori concerns because it represents the original treaty partner who can
honour its treaty obligations and who has the authority (and responsibility) to fulfil the
promises made to Mf,ori in 1840. Therefore, in being able to appease the concerns of
+0 Raj Vasil, Mrar Do Meori Wqtrt? New Moori Politica! Perspectlves, Random Century Press,
t99O, p. 42.
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both Mdori (or those who support the Treaty) and those who feel threatened by the
treaty process, the Crown symbol unites groups otherwise divided by treaty debate.
To summarise the ideas presented so far, publics are considered naturally responsive to
symbols in politics because people tend to think in symbolic terms, particularly in
order to make sense of the complexity of politics. Also, publics or individuals select
symbols in order to externalise personal political cognitions and reassure their
collective political fears and anxieties. Unfortunately it is beyond the scope of this
thesis to test all these theories against empirical evidence. However, subsequent
chapters will discuss the significance of the Crown symbol for M6ori in particular (see
Chapter Five) and, also, the Crown's symbolic function in appeasing public concerns
generated by the treaty negotiation process. Now, however, having established why
publics respond well to some political symbols, the next section turns its attention to
the matter of why governments use symbols in political discourse.
Govemment Use of Syrnbols
Having recognised that publics arc generally responsive to symbolism in politics, it
should come as no surprise to discover that governments frequently employ symbolic
actions, words and objects in communicating political messages to the public. Quite
apart from their public appeal there iue two closely related explanations for the
popularity of syrnbols in government language and action. First, symbols allow
goverlrments to create and control public cognitions. Language, in this respect,
becomes a controversial political 'tool'. Second, symbols are a significant and
eftective way for governments to legitimise their actions and policies and, most
importantly, their authority.
Befbre discussing these two explanations, it is important to note a point of tension
which arises amongst theorists over whether or not government speakers are
conscious of their use of symbolic language. While some theorists believe that
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govemments are able to use symbolism to their advantage in communicating with the
public, other theorists are quick to assert that this kind of symbolic language is not a
conscious plot or manipulation of cognitions but the product of very deep-rooted
socialisation on the part of political commentators.4T For example, Elder and Cobb
suggest that symbolism associated with power is not inconsequential, but neither is it
'a plot to manipulate the unwary masses'. They argue that in fact some amount of
symbolic thinking and communication is essential.as Other theorists reject the
simplicity of this argument. Mueller, for example, argues that symbolism in politics is
neither subconscious nor benevolent. He believes that private and governmental
groups are able to structure and limit public communications through symbolic
Ianguage and that they do so specifically to ensure that their own interests prevail. He
calls this 'distorted communication' and $uggests that in an ideal model of .open non-
distorted communication 
... [d]efinitions and interpretations of symbols inherited from
the past and emerging in the present would be independent of vested interests which
bias communication''ae Elizabeth Mcleay also warns, in relation to the rhetoric of
housing policy in Britain, that government and other prominent political speakers
'capture' political language and consequently set limits to the policy agenda.so Both
Mueller and Mcleay recognise a point made earlier in the chapter, that in controlling
the terms of discourse' governments and political commentators are also able to conhol
the possible outcomes of the policy process.st
To resolve this debate, it is suggested here that symbols can be used unconsciously or
with a conscious purpose by government. The Crown is a case in point. As Rodney
Barker has explained in reviewing the contemporary role of the Crown in politics, the
47 Edelman makes this observation in association with the use of metaphors in politics as SymboticAc'rion,p.79.
48 Elder and Cobb, The potiticat Uses rl Syntutls,p.2l.
49 Mueller, The politics of'Commuttication,p. 19.
t]]." Y, Mcleay, 'Yjg?grry,-rousing, cirizenship and poritical Argumenr', conference onCitizenship and social welfare, universifi of southampton, December, Ds'2. p. t t.
5l Mcleay, 'Property, Housing, Citizenship and political Argument,, p. I l.
78
Crown is 'a legal person who can act in the courts, to whom public servants may owe
and own allegiance, and who may act on all those exercises of authority, such as the
making of treaties or the declaration of war ...'52 Therefore, ,the Crown' is a
legitimate political identity which may appear in political discourse from time to time
with no conscious intention or manipulation on the part of the speaker. However, as
Barker further explains, the term was historically also used to provide legitimacy to the
governors because of 'a belief that the principal duty and justification of office is the
continuation of the Queen's governmenl.'53 Therefore, the Crown in Britain has
appeared to play a more active role as a political tool in the past. The question of intent
by political speakers can be more closely examined in the data of the next chapter.
In returning to the reasons fbr symbolism in government discourse, it has been
suggested that symbols are used to reassure public concerns and needs. One might
assume that government responds to the hopes, fears and needs which naturally
develop within the public' However, Murray Edelman challenges this assumption and
argues that public cognitions which governments appease may also have been created
by government'S4 Governments are able to 'create' public cognitions through the
frequency with which they use key symbols which encourage the public to think they
need and want those things governments are most willing and able to supply.55 It is
argued that prevalent symbols emotionally engage the public in a political issue making
it easier for the government to facilitate policy shifu.s6 Mcleay argues (as mentioned
earlier) that the British Conservative party's use of the phrase .property owning
democracy', 'should be understood as a political device that captures a set of linguistic
52 Rodney Barker. Pctlitic'at I'egitinwcy antl tlte srare, Clarendon press, oxford, 1990, pp. 143-144.
53 Barker, Political lzgitimac.y arul the State, p. 144.
-54 Edelnran, Prilitics u.r Syntfutlic Actiort,p.4l
-5-5 Edelman, Politit's ati St,,trlr()lic Action,p.4.
56 Edelman- The-symholic lJses of'Polirics,p. 15. This idea is further discussed by philip B.Heymann' 'How Government Exprcsses Puhlic-Icleas" in Robert Reich (ed.), The power of puhlicIdeus, Ballinger Publishing Company, Ciunbriclge, l9gg, pp. g5_g6.
79
advantages and builds on powerful historical associations.'s7 Similarly, Robert Reich
provides evidence that accomplished leaders in the United States have explicitly and
purposively crafted public visions of what is desirable and possible within society.
Speeches, interviews and press statements, Reich argues, are used to muster public
support for those things the government wants to achieve.s8 It is easiest for
governments to engage publics by using symbols which play on their hopes and fears.
As Edelman observes, political issues, particularly the perception and naming of
enemies, are ambiguous and tend to create public fear.59 By reinforcing these fears
with symbolic language, governments are able to create or enhance a perception of
threat in order that the govemment might then take authoritative cues which provide, or
ratther appear to provide, security from the perceived threat.60 Michael parenti
substantiates this theory with detailed discussion of the American government and
media's language regarding the perception of a Russian threat during the Cold War
Period.6l
The notion that governments use symbols to create needs and fears, is interesting and
persuasive, but its relevance in this discussion of 'the Crown' must be questioned.
There would seen to be little advantage in government creating or enhancing a
perception of threat in the alreacly volatile process of treaty negotiations. However,
this suggestion will be considered later in conjunction with empirical data. Of more
immediate relevance are two assumptions embedded within this argument; first, that
governments use symbols to represent remote or omnipresent threats or reassurances;
and second that symbols will often create an impression that aspects of government
authority are beyond the influence of the individual.62 Just as important is Elder and
57 Mcleay,'Property, Housing, Citizenship and political Argument,, p. l.
-s8 Robert Reich, 'Introduction', in Reich (ed.),Trrc prwe*f public ldeas,p.4.
59 Edelman, Politi<'s us Symbolic Action,p. Il.
60 Edelman, Politics os Syntholic Actiott,p.g.
6l 
,Michael Parenti, Inventing Reality: Tlw Politics ttf'the Masl Mecliu,St Martin press, New york,1986.
62 Edelman, Ttre Symhotic lJse.s of politi<:.r, p. 5.
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Cobb's extension of this second suggestion, that the more remote government power
is and the greater its scope in dealing with an issue, the greater the need and possibility
of using symbols to suggest and justify government authority.6: It will be interesting
to determine, with the benefit of empirical data in the next chapter, whether .the
Crown' symbol is usecl by government to justify the extent of its authority in treaty
negotiations while at the same time giving the public the impression that that authority
is beyond the reach of the individual.
In addition to reassuring public hopes and fears, it has been suggested that
governments use symbolism to legitimise government policy, action and authority.
According to some writers, most political language is about legitimising regimes6a
because legitimacy is essential to the maintenance of effective government.65 A
government must be seen to be legitimate in order to maintain the support of its public
and ensure its own stability. The legitimacy of government authority has become
increasingly significant as modern government has extended itself further into
economic and social life. The more extensive government intervention becomes the
more pressure there is for leaders to legitimise government power, rules and
authority.66 Barker suggests that states are active in their own legitimation, just as they
are active in other aspects of government. He suggests that the state actively promotes
its own legitimacy in three ways, through rituals, propaganda or language, and
education' He gives Bagehot's 'Crown' as an example of an effective ritual used by
government to protect and promote its own stability.6T The more effectively
govemment legitimacy is reinforced by either ritual, language, propaganda or education
63 Elder and Cobb, The political lJses oJ Symbol.r, p. tg.
64 Edelman, Con,rtructinl4 the political Spectucle,p. 106.
65 Lipset, Politicul Mun.-Tlte Sctcial Base.r rl.politic.r,p.64.
66william connolly,'Legitimacy and Modernity', p. 13 and J. Habermas, .Irgitimation problemsin Late capitalism', p. 145, both in william connolly (ed.),lzgiti:iiy ana the state.
67 Barker, Potiticat l*gitimacv euttl the State, p. 145.
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(or some combination of these tools), the less resistance there will be to government
authority.68
Legitimacy itself has been described as 'the capacity of the sysrem to engender and
maintain the belief that the existing political institutions are the most appropriate ones
fbr the society.'6e Legitimacy is for the most part measured, according to Lipset, by
the way in which key issues which divide societies are resolved. It is conflict,
naturally inherent in democracy, which invariably poses the greatest threat to the
legitimacy of a government. It is therefore the key purpose for democratic government
to try and moderate or resolve partisan battles before they 'solidify' if the government
is to maintain legitimate authority.T0 Symbolic language and actions can enhance
legitimacy by providing a unifying experience which transcends the limitations of
class, culture and personality.zt Mueller explains further that legitimacy is essential
for effective government because the individual's tolerance of the shortcomings of a
political order increases considerably if the individual considers the government,s
power or authority to be legitimate.T2
The issue of how publics gauge the legitimacy of their govemment is a point of debate
and concern amongst theorists. As previously mentioned, the necessary precondition
for a legitimate system of authority can be as simple as the public's belief that society,s
institutions are appropriate or morally proper.73 The implication of this, according to
Schaar, is that there is no independent means of assessing a system,s legitimacy
68 Mueller' The Politics of communiceftioty,p. l3l. Again I qualify this argumenr with rheobservation that there must be limits to the public''s acceptanle or sffuonc language. For example,if language and reality. become too disparate the public would seem likely to challenge thegovemment's questionable use of symbols.
69 Lipset, Political Man,pp.7O-7.
70 Lipset, Politicat Man, pp. 7O-7 l.
1' Yrygtg Lasswell, 'Key S^ymbors, signs and Icons', in Bryson er al. (eds.), symbors and varues:Art Initial Study, 1964, p. 201.
72 Mueller, The Potitics o.f' Communicution, p. 129.
73 Schaat, 'L,egitimacy in the Modern Stare,, p. l0g.
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outside of public opinion. Legitimacy becomes no more than the ability of a system to
persuade its members of its own appropriateness. Legitimacy, Schaar consequently
wiuns, when accepted as the belief of followers in their regime, may be little more than
the 'fruit of symboric bedazzlement'.74 He fuither states:
[l]eaders lay down rules, promulgate policies, and disseminate symbols which tell
followers how and what they shourd do and feer. ... The symbols become, in the
minds of the followers, condensations of the practices and intensions of the rulcrs.
Over time, if the rulers manipulate symbols skilfully, symbolic rewards alone may
suffice to maint'ain supportive attitudes. The symbols may acnrdly conceal rather than
reveal the real nature of the regime's policies and practices.Ts
Barker similarly observes:
For legitimacy is precisely the belief in the rightfulness of the state, in its authority to
issue commands, so that those commands are obeyed not simply out of fear or self-
interest, but because they are believed in some sense to have moral authority, because
subjects believe they ought to obey,76
Therefore, theorists argue, governments can maintain the support of their followers by
emphasising the legitimacy of govemment authority, even when the decisions made by
government favour the interests of particular individuals or $oups. With respect to the
policy process, for example, it is not uncommon for political commentators to use
language and symbols which seem to favour one party in negotiation while the
decision itself favours the other.77 In fact, 'system legitimating rationales, are most
often found, and most essential, when policies favour particular interests.TS Some
might call this 'paying lip-service' to the needs of some groups. whatever its title, the
74 Schaar, 'lrgitimacy in the Modern State,, p. l l0.
75 Schaar,'I-egitimacy in the Modern State,, pp. 109_l10.
76 Barker, Legitimacy antl the Stute,p. ll.
77 Edelman, The Symbotic lJ,ses of politrcs, p. 39.
78 Mueller. The Politic;r of Communication,p. 119.
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process itself means that govemment officials imply that all needs have been fully
considered and understood before a decision was made in an anempt to appease the
demands of unsuccessful lobby groups. In recognising the attachment of both groups
in the treaty debate to the Crown, it will be interesting to observe later whether the
symbol is used to 'pay lip service' to unsuccessful groups within the negotiation
process.
Most importantly, perhaps, symbols which are used to legitimate government (or
other) authority are usually emotional in their impact and therefore do not require detail
which might challenge or weaken their symbolic meaning.Tg The uses and contexts of
many symbols do not need to be consistent for a symbol to fulfil its public .meaning,
and provide legitimacy for government. A political speaker is simply required to make
the use of a symbol predictable by maintaining the context in which it appears. For
example, while it might not (according to the previous chapter) be appropriate to
associate 'tlle state' with public healthcare, neither would it be appropriate for ,the
Crown' to be used in the context of more business oriented institutions such as state
owned enterprises. It would, however, be appropriate for the crown to appear in the
context of beaty discourse, while 'the state' would not be an appropriate symbol in this
case. This is because a symbol, as was mentioned above, will always carry a range of
diverse and often conflicting meanings.s0 A symbol does not need to 'mean, the same
thing all the time' but the public must be familiar with rhe ways in which it might be
used.
On the other hand, it has also been suggested that the content, meaning and value of
symbols can change according to the contexts in which it appears and the frequency of
its use.8l Edelman believes that it is the public's estimation of the value of words and
79 Edelman, The Symholic. IJses oJ politics,p. g.
8() Edelman, Constructing the political Spectacle,p. g.
8f l.ee,'symbolisation ancl Values,, p. 74.
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actions, not their accuracy, which is essential to politics.sz In explaining this corlment,
we return to the earlier observation that publics create symbolic structures which allow
some flexibility in the way familiar and popular symbols are used. If a symbol is used
in a predictable and familiar way, regardless of how accurately it is used, it may satisS
the audience's needs. once again it is stressed that we should not exaggerate the
susceptibility of the public, but at the same time, not underestimate the way symbols
can be used in a variety of contexts to legitimate government action. This argument will
also be tested against empirical data in the next chapter.
The conditions under which theorists generalise about the use of legitimating symbols
are very similar to those found in New Zealand in relation to the Treaty of Waitangi.
Debate surrounding the Treaty, as mentioned previously, has created a great deal of
tension and division in New Zealand. This in itself would, according to Lipset and
Schaar, bring the legitimacy of the government into question, should that tension
remain unresolved. Attempts would consequently be made by government to
moderate or resolve this division before it 'solidifies'. However, in the case of New
Zealand, it was not solely social tension or division which challenged the
government's legitimacy but also the Treaty itself. Allegations have been made that
successive New Zealand governments have not upheld the promises made to Maori in
the Treaty and therefbre do not enjoy legitimate authority to govern. As a result, .the
Crown' may be an important symbol for government not only in resolving tension
between divided groups (thus also ensuring the legitimacy of stable govemment) but
also in enhancing the legitimacy the public associates with the actions and authority of
the public under the TreaW.
If it can be substantiated in the following chapter that the Crown is operating in a
symbolic capacity in legitimising government authority and action under the Treary,
there are some serious implications to consider. Some of these ideas have already been
82 Edelman, The Symholic lJses ctf'politrcs, p. I15.
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discussed, particularly with regard to the implications for public understanding of
political issues' However, some equally significant issues remain which ought to be
considered, particularly in relation to the implications of Crown symbolism in treaty
discourse for the Mdori heaty partner.
Some Implications of political Symbolism
Political symbols, it has been suggested here, make publics ,lazy, observers in a
political world. In addition, symbols have been seen to pervade politics to the point
that publics do not study the detail of political events, but rather respond to the political
symbols, objects or action which represent more complicated political issues.83
Edelman, for example' argues that publics respond to conspicuous political symbols,
gestures and speeches which make up the drama of the state rather than the facts of any
situation'84 For this reason, publics are not in touch with political sinrations first-hand
but rather 'know' the situation through the symbols that engage it.85 He warns that
through symbolism, abstract concepts are reified and become tangible to the public
accepting them.86
Furthermoro, once established, symbols become 'self-perpetuating, and are rarely
publicly challenged. Consequently their significance can become exaggerated,
especially the significance of symbols which appease public anxiety and fears. Under
these circumstances political language and symbolic structures (as opposed to political
facts) create their own reality fbr individuals. once a symbol is established as a
reassurance for a group, that symbol may begin to evoke emotion which is
disproportionate to its meaning. It may evoke everything about the situation while at
the same time abstracting, reifying and magnifying its actual meaning. As Edelman
83 Edelrnan, The Symholic tJses tg politics,p. 172.
84 Edelrnan, The Symbolic IJses tl politics,p. 172.
85 Edelman, The Symholic IJses of potitirs, p. l?3.
tt6 Edelman, The Symbolic lJset- of'politics,p. l17.
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warns, '[t]hat a term masquerades as a description while appraising and condensing
doubtless heightens its emotional impact.'87
It is also important to realise that popular symbols express and promote the prevaiting
ideology and protect it from criticism.8s Therefore, the popularity of prevalent
symbols creates an ongoing threat to political communication when publics develop
expectations for the future according to their understanding of present possibilities and
political alrangements which have, in turn, been shaped by political symbolism.
Political symbols, particularly those which do not accurately describe political
conditions, may create impediments or barriers to new political developments.8g
The suggestion that the Crown serves a symbolic function in treaty debate, when
viewed in the context of this theoretical chapter, emphasises the need to investigate and
establish the use of the Crown in treaty debate. The key concern is that governments
use the Crown at the expense of the public's understanding of the detail of treaty
negotiations and that the symbol protects the present power structure while also
determining future possibilities. These implications are particularly serious for M6ori,
many of whom, it has been suggested, have an alternative conception of the Crown
and whose progress in treaty negotiations may be inhibited by the prevailing
interpretations of the Crown and the obstacles to future development which these
interpretations create. The next chapter, in addition to discussing these ideas, tests
other propositions raised in this chapter, namely: whether 'the Crown, is used by
ministers to represent an omnipresent reasstuance which is beyond the influence of the
individual; and also whether 'the Crown' is used to justify the remote and expansive
authority of the government in dealing with treaty issues. Finally, and most
importantly, the next chapter makes use of empirical data to test the theory that .the
87 Edelman, The Symhoti<: I\ses ttf polirrcs, p. ll6.
88 Edelnran, The Symbolic ute.t oJ'politics,p.126.
89 Lasswell, 'Key Syrnbols, Signs and Icons., n.202.
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Crown' is used by rninisters to legitirnate goverrunent action and authority in the treaty
negotiation process.
FOUR
THE 'CROWN' SYMBOL IN TREATY DISCOARSE
The previous chapter provided a theoretical discussion of the function of symbols in
politics, from which a number of hypotheses were drawn. The purpose of this chapter
is to test the validity of these hypotheses against examples of the function and uses
'the Crown' as a symbol in treaty discourse. The data which provided the basis for
this discussion were ministerial statements made between lggg and lgg3. some
interesting findings are established here. Specifically, it is argued that the Crown
demonstrated many of the qualities of political symbols identified in the previous
chapter, including the role of legitimating government action and authority under the
Treaty of Waitangi' It is also demonstrated that the symbolic role of the Crown has
further entrenched the problem of inconsistency with the identity of the Crown, lrst
raised in Chapter One, because it was used by ministers to identify a variety of
institutions and individuals in adclition ro the constitutional triniry of sovereign,
Governor-General and Executive estabrished in chapter one.
This discussion is in four sections. The tirst section shows that ministers most often
use the Crown syrnbol in discourse about the Treaty of Waitangi. It also identifies
those ministers most likely to use 'the Crown' in this context and suggests possible
reasons for their use of the symbol. The second section discusses the possibility that
the Crown is used to legitimise action and authority under the Treaty of Waitangi. The
third section indicates that, because the Crown is a symbolic entity, it can be used by
ministers to identify a variety of identities. Finally, the implications of these findings
are considered' particularly in relation to Mdori, in order to introduce the issues
discussed in the second section of this thesis.
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The material gathered to test the theoretical principles established in the previous
chapter came from ministerial statements (which include press statements, speech
notes and press conferences) between the years 1987 and 1gg3. It was considered
appropriate to study the language of a political 'elite' such as Cabinet Ministers (note
that no non-Cabinet Ministers are included)l because of the widely reported and public
nature of their discourse. Also, ministerial statements were considered an appropriate
source of political language to be tested against the theorists' arguments because they
are examples of elite 'political' discourse: ministers were either announcing a policy
statement, defending a govemment initiative or reasserting government policy. The
ministers were most likely, therefore, to be using the language of persuasion in which,
according to theorists, symbols are most likely to appear. A second advantage in the
use of ministerial statements was the fact that their language has not been interpreted or
distorted by the chain of mass communication (see chapter Two;.2
As well as providing consistency with the time frame of Chapter Two, the time frame
for this research was chosen to include one term of a Labour Government (l9g7-
1990) and one of a National Government (1990-1993). This allowed for comparative
language analysis between the two parties while in power.3 More specifically, the
statements were drawn from the government departments of Mdori Affairs (now Te
Puni K6kiri), Justice, the Environment and the Prime Minister,s office (which
contains the Prime Minister's personal staff, political advisers and media staff.) These
departments were chosen as a focus for the research after an initial investigation of all
government departments for one year revealed that these offices were most concerned
t The distinction between Cabinet and non-Cabinet ministers was not an important one to make forthe purposes of this analysis, althougtr only statements by Cabinet Ministers provided the requiredmaterial with regard to the use of the crown in the contexiof treary debate.
2 The role of the speech wrjter for ministers should not be forgotten. while speech writers may havesome inJluence over the vocabulary and tone of a minister's sentiments, ultimately, tne minister isrcsponsible for his or her own words and, we would assume, can be held accountable for his or herstatements.
3 Note that a list of the n-amrcs and portfolio.s of all the Ministers in cabinet during this time areavailable in Appendix B of this thesii.
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with treaty issues and, perhaps not coincidentally, also the offices making greatest use
of the Crown symbol in their discourse.
The ministen' statements used in this research are housed in the United Nations,
Collection and official Publications Room at Victoria University in Wellington. This
collection has been created by government departments forwarding ministerial
statements to the Library. As a result, the information available in the collection is not
complete, although it was the most substantial source of ministerial statements
available at the time' More importantly, it provided more than enough material for the
purposes of this research. Over 1300 statements were surveyed in search of material
relevant to this investigation of the Crown in ministers' discourse. Around sixty
examples of Ministers referring to the Crown in the context of treaty discourse were
chosen from the surveyed material and have been used for the discussion below.
Before embarking on the textual analysis, some of the language used in this chapter
requires clarification. In Chapter Three, theorists discussed 'government' in symbolic
communication' In this chapter, the term 'government' is replaced by 'ministers, or
'Ministers of the Crown'. Also, the terms 'treaty debate' and 'treaty discourse, are
used interchangeably in this discussion. Both refer to the policy statements and to
more general discussion of treaty matters by government ministers. Furthermore, in
envisaging a teaty 'debate', this discussion frequently refers to the 'sides, of the treaty
issue as those who support and those who reject a place for the Treaty in
contemporary New Zealand society, Obviously this oversimplifies the complexity of
the treaty debate which is made up groups of opinion rather than two halves.
However' it is useful in clarifying the arguments presented here. Similarly, while it is
not appropriate to conceive of these groups as M[ori and Pdkehd, this is sometimes
done, also for the sake of analytical clariry.
9T
Who uses the Crown Symbol?
In order to adequately intoduce the use of the Crown in treaty debate, this discussion
begins by identifying those ministers who were most likely to engage in Crown
symbolism in the years of the study. As Chapter Two established earlier, .the Crown,
was widely used as a title in mass communication in Crown law, Crown resource
management, and Crown entities. However, in a more active capacity, the Crown was
identified as a political entity capable of thought and action specifically in the areas of
resource management and treaty negotiations. This chapter explores the possibility
that ministers directly involved in treaty negotiations made greatest use of the Crown
symbol between 1987 and 1993.
Former Minister of Justice and the Environment, as well as prime Minister for
Labour, Geoffrey Palmer, was distinctive in his extensive use of the Crown during his
time in office. Two pieces of information are significant in explaining palmer,s
fiequent reference to 'the Crown'. First, Palmer's government undertook probably the
most extensive policies in relation to Mdori rights under the Treaty of Waitangi of any
government in New Zealand' history. Labour was responsible, for example, for the
amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act I975 which allowed claims to extend back to
the signing of the Treaty in 1840.4 Second, it may also be significant to note that
Palmer, prior to his time in office, trained and practised in law, which might have
provided him with some clarity and consistency in his perception and use of .the
Crown' identity. Palmer's legal training and his support of the Treaty were evident in
his comment as Prime Minister in l9g9 that:
[t]he Crown has obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi. No government in the
history of New Zealand has done more to honour those obligations than the present
one ' '.' Further progress in these matters depends not only on cooperation between
Maori and the Crown but also on the maintenance of the balance between the three
4 For further discussion of rhe 1975 Act and its anrendment, as well as the policies of the LabourGovernment, see Chapter Six of this thesis.
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branches of government 
- 
parliament, the Executive, and the Courts. ... The crown,
represented through the Executive has obligations. Its actions must be scrutinised,
tested and finally agreed to by parliamenr.s
While Palmer was specific on this occasion as to the identity of the Crown, he was not
always as definite. For example, on another occasion palmer commented that:
[The Crown Task Force on Waitangi Issues] would be responsible for developing the
Crown'.r position in respect of Waitangi Tribunal hearings, direct negotiations and
Court proceedings. 
... It must be made clear that the roles of parliament, the
Govemment and the Courts are understood and made clear. ... [t must be made clear
that the government wilr make the final decisions on Treaty issues.6
In this instance, Palmer did not clarify the relationship between the Crown and the
other institutions he identified as he had done on other occasions. This fact highlights
an important dilemma also demonstrated by other ministers' use of the Crown. If
Palmer believed 'Crown' could be read as 'Executive', what was his purpose in using
the metonym of 'Crown' when 'Executive' would suffice? On the other hand, if there
is a significant difference between Crown and Executive, what is the nature of this
distinction? When questioned on his interpretation and use of the Crown as the treaty
partner, Palmer explained that he understands the Crown to embrace the eueen (the
sovereign) and the Executive. He also expressed the belief that the distinction between
Crown and Executive was not a significant one, although he acknowledged that in
New Zealand, the Mdori community sees the Crown as being politically neutral, while
the government (or Executive) is bound up in party politics. He said that while the
rhetorical and political significance of the Crown was marginal, it brings a legitimacy
and mystery to New Zealand's jurisprudence which it might otherwise lack.7
5 Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, Labour, Speech Notes, Te Awamahari Marae, port Waikato,Tuakau, 24 November 1989' p. 2. The itaiics have been added for emphasis as have all otheritalicised words in quotations in this chaptcr unress otherwise rpecinJ.
6 Geoffrey Palmer, Prime Minister, Labour, 'New systcm for Treaty of waitangi Claims, kessStatement, 14 December 1989, pp. 2-3.
7 Interview, hofessor Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Professor of Law, Victoria Universify of Wellington, 29June 1993.
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Therefore, on the basis of both Palmer's use of 'the Crown' and his comments, there
appears to be room lbr personal interpretation in determining the difference between
'Crown' and 'government' as well as when it is appropriate to use each of these terms.
Further investigation is required into the interpretations of the Crown by other
ministers in order to test these possibilities.
while the crown proved a popular symbol with palmer, the language of other
ministers indicated that his enthusiasm was not universal. For example, Koro W€tere,
former Minister of Mdori Affairs for Labour, demonstrated a clear preference for the
term 'government' in treaty discourse where Palmer might have used .Crown,. For
instance' Wetere said, 'the [Maori Affairs Restructuring] Bill provides for a true
partnership between Governmenr and Maori people',8 while Palmer had described the
treaty partnership as being between Crown and Maori. On another occasion, Wetere
ref'erred to the treaty partners by inrticatin g'Government's willingness to deal fairly
and justly with Maori on issues arising from the Treaty of Waitangi.'e In this case,
Wetere failed to mention the Crown once in a two-page statement on the treaty
settlement process.
There iue many possible explanations for the difference between palmer and W€tere,s
language which has only briefly been clemonstrated here. First, it could be suggested
that a cultural variable was at work here which distinguished palmer's conception of
the Crown' as a Pdkehd, from that of WEtere's, as a Mflori. The logic behind this
suggestion is that Pdkehd generally feel more comfortable interpreting contemporary
government as the Crown because it is an acceptable British legal tradition to do so.
Maori, on the other hand, resist drawing this parallel because .the crown, was
specifically 'the Queen' under the Treaty of Waitangi, which should not be confused
E Koro W€tere, Minister of MEori Aftairs, Labo_u-r, Speech Notes, Second Reading of the MaoriAfrairs Restrucruring Bill, parriament Buildings, weirington, s i"pil-o* 19g9, p. 4.
9 Wetere,'Minister Advocates decision of Ngati Paoa Land Claim,, press Statement, 13 March1989, pp. l-2.
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with government in identifying the treaty partner. More is said on this later in the
chapter (and again in Chapters Five and Seven).
However' the theory that cultural perpectives might play some part in determining
ministers' language is challenged by the observation that James Bolger, National,s
Prime Minister, is typical of many Pdkehh ministers from both National and Labour
who seldom referred to the Crown in the ministerial statements studied. For example,
in a speech made in honour of the M6ori Queen, Bolger made no reference to the
Crown at all, only the government in relation to the Treaty. His choice of words
would indicate that, while cultural factors may be of some influence, other variables
are also at work in determining a minister's language. A clue to the nature of this
variable is found in considering the different symbolic message conveyed within
Palmer and Bolger's statements. Palmer, as minister in a party which was advocating
support of treaty issues, appropriately couched his policy statements in terms of .the
Crown' which symbolically acknowledged the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in New
Zealand society. Bolger, on the other hand, as the leader of a party which has shown
significantly less support fbr Maori issues (and attracts Iess electoral support from
Maori) distanced himself from the Treaty by failing to engage in symbols such as .the
Crown' which surround it. The Crown, it is argued, symbolically signifies sympathy
fbr and commitment to the Treaty because 'the Crown' is the treaty partner with the
authority (and the obligation) to protect and uphold M6ori rights.
Further analysis of ministers' language supports the theory that ministers are able to
symbolically acknowledge the Treaty through reference to the Crown, but also forces
some modification of the argument. It was observed that Douglas Graham, National's
Minister of Justice and Minister in Charge of Treaty negotiations (also a trained
Iawyer), frequently used the Crown symbol in his political discourse relating to the
Treaty. He said at one time, for example, that a deal between the Crown and the M6ori
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Congress 'establishes a process for the resolution of longstanding Treaty grievances in
a way which is acceptable to the Crown and can offer hope to Maori.' He went on to
say, 'both the Crown and the Congress have approached the negotiating process in an
atmosphere of good will and today's signing is the result of understanding and co-
operation''ltl 41 a later date, Graham released a statement about South Island pastoral
leases, in which he advised that, 'the Crown has purchased ... two pastoral leases.,
He explained, '[the] Ngai Tahu negotiating team advised the Crown that it had an
interest in [the pastoral leases]. Ngai Tahu had asked the Crownto negotiate to buy the
leases .. . Accordingly, the Crown entered into negotiation. 
. .,l I
When questioned on his interpretation and use of the Crown in interview, Graham
advised that he regarded the Crown as the sovereign and the Ministers of the
Executive Council. However, he qualified this by saying that in matters M6ori, the
Iink is not to the government (which has inherited certain obligations under the Treaty)
but to the Crown. The Minister acknowledged that a conceptual difference between
Crown and government strongly influenced his choice of words in treaty debate. He
explained that where immediate action was required on treaty issues, he would identiff
'government' as the acting authority. However, he explained, when speaking of
contractual arrangements between his Government and Mdori he would refer to .the
Crown'' The Minister admitted that this was a difficult rule to maintain consistently
but he also stressed that it was important that he be as consistent as possible because it
would be inappropriate to belittle a significant development in treaty negotiations by
identifying the treaty partners as Maori and government. Graham gave the impression,
as Palmer had also done, that while the minister could see no significant difference
between government and crown, he was aware that the distinction was important to
Maori' It should also be noted (in relation to the question raised in the previous
x) Douglas Graham, Minister of Jttstice, National, 'Crown and Maori congress sign deal forRailcorp Land', Press Statement, l0 October I99l,pp.l_2.
ll Graham, 'Crown buys two South Island Pastoral Leases', Press Statement, T July 1992,p. L.
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chapter) that the Minister's comments indicate a conscious use of the Crown symbol
in statements relating to the Treaty.
Graham also identified other ministers from the National Government directly
involved in treaty negotiations who, he suggested, were equally aware of appropriate
contexts for the terms'Crown' and 'government'.12 One of these ministe\s was
Douglas Kidd, Minister of Maori Affairs for the National Government. When
investigated, Kidd's language in ministerial statements also demonstrated an
interesting and arguably conscious pattern of use of the Crown symbol. In a speech
he made in l992,Kidd said, 'I would like to begin by talking about the direction this
governm.enr is heading with its policies on Maori issues.' The Minister proceeded to
discuss his government's treaty policy by referring specifically to government and
emphasising that 'the Government makes the decisions.'13 However, Kidd's choice
of words changed with the statement, '[i]t is important to realise that the claims by
Maori people are against the Crown They seek redress from the Crown'I4 On
another occasion, Kidd similarly said, '[o]ver the next twelve months |he Goverwnent
will be working with Te Puni Kokiri [Ministry of Mdori Affairs] on the consolidation
of a sound working relationship between Maori and the Crown.'t5
Some important points emerge from this discussion. First, the difference between
ministers who refer to Crown and those who refer to government may be a result of
cultural and political variables. For instance, there is a possibility that Mdori and
Pikehd generally differ in their perception and use of Crown symbol; this being a
cultural variable. Also, political variation appears to influence ministers' choice of
l2 Interview, Douglas Graham, Minister of Justice and Minister in Charge of Treaty Negotiations,
Parliament Buildings. 10 August 1995.
13 Douglas Kidd, Minister of Maori Affairs, National,'speech to the National Party Dominion
Conference', delivered on 8 August 1992,p.5.
14 IfidO, Minister of Maori Affairs, National, National Party Dominion Conference, 8 August 1992,
p. 6.
l5 Te Puni K6kiri/Ministry of Mdori Development, Muori A.ft'airs Corporate Plan i,992-1993,
'Statement by the Minister', Douglas Kidd, Minister lbr M6ori Affairs, National, p. 4.
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words depending on each minister's relationship with or support of treaty
negotiations. In identifying these variables, it is argued that a combination of the two
produced a Mdori Labour Minister fbr M6ori Affairs (WEtere) who seldom spoke of
the Crown and, on the other hand, a Pdkeh[ Minister of Treaty negotiations for the
National Government (Graham) who actively engaged in Crown symbolism in rreaty
discourse. This discussion has helped to resolve a theoretical question raised in the
previous chapter by demonstrating that some ministers were conscious of their
language in treaty discourse. Graham in particular said in interview that he was
conscious of appropriate contexts for Crown and government in making policy
announcements. Moreover, the distinction he drew was very similar to the
philosophical distinction identified in Chapter Two between Crown and government.
Finally, while this discussion gave some indication of wfto uses the Crown it only
partly addressed the question of why the Crown is used in ministerial statements. This
matter is addressed in the next section of the discussion.
The Crown Symbol: Issues of Legitimacy
The previous chapter showed that there are a variety of functions for symbols in
political discourse, several of which related to the legitimation of government action
and authority. In particular it was suggested that governments can maintain legitimacy
in the eyes of their public by using symbols which allow them to pay 'lip-service, to
disadvantaged groups. Also, the argument was advanced that governments use
symbols to represent the abstract, remote and extensive power of government as a
tangible commodity. Finally, theorists suggesred that publics were more likely to
perceive their government as legitimate if the symbols the governments use reassured
their collective fears and anxieties and provided reassurances from perceived threats.
In this section of the chapter, the ministerial statements are surveyed for evidence that
'the crown' fultils some or any of these symbolic functions in freary debate.
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Theorists argue' as noted in the previous chapter, that symbolic language can be used
to pay lip-service to groups which are not favoured by the policy process, thereby
aiming to ensure the continued support of disadvantaged groups in a system which
they believe acknowledges and supports their needs. In reviewing ministerial
statements with this function in mind, it was observed that 'the crown, is unique in its
ability to reassure both sides of the treaty debate when used as a symbol for authority.
For example, when Bill Jeffries, former Labour Minister of Justice, announced the
settlement of a Mdori grievance, he stated, '[t]he Crown accepts that ... the Waitomo
claim is legitimate. 
.. ' However the Crown does not accept that all compulsory
acquisitions of land were improper.' Jeffries then went on to outline claims which he
said 'the Crown' will not entertain.16 While the Minister's statement was unfavourable
for supporters of the Treaty, the Minister's language implied that the crown,s
responsibilities and obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi had been acknowledged
and accepted and that the Minister was sympathetic towards Maori grievances. Taking
the opposite position, fbrmer Labour Prime Minister, David Lange, spoke in favour of
the resolution of treaty grievances but at the same time appeased broader public
concerns when he said, '[flirst, we want to deal in a practical way with grievances
between the crown and Maori people which arise from the Treaty. ... [w]e must
[also] ensure that this country's resources are managed in the interests of all New
Zealanders.'17 In this case, Lange was able to emphasise the crown,s role as
protector of the national interest in order to appease the wider public concern that the
resolution of treaty grievances would ultimately mean non-Maori New Zealanders
would lose access to the nation's resources. This 'ambiguity' or clual meaning of the
Crown as treaty partner and guardian of the national interest which was also identified
earlier in the discussion, is shown here to have allowed ministers to acknowledge and
l6 niu Jeffries, Minister of Justice, Labour, .waitomo settlemenrStatement, 17 June, 1990, p. 1. terms announced'. Press
lT.David Lange, Prime Minister, Labour, Address to the wellington District Law Society Seminar,
'The Treaty of Waitangi', 23 June 19g9, p. 5.
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appease both sides of the treaty debate, possibly without alienating or isolating either
faction.
It was also suggested in the previous chapter that symbols could be used by
government to legitimise its actions by identifying an omnipresent threat or
reassurance which was beyond the reach or influence of the public and to which the
govemment was obliged to respond. This device was thought to allow government to
avoid having its action or authority challenged. This abstact argument makes sense
when the crown is seen as an omnipresent reassurance. For example, in the
Principles for Crown Action (see also Chapter Two) announced by Labour prime
Minister' David Lange, the Crown appeared as an omnipresent reassurance identiffing
govemment action. Lange stated:
The governmenthas decided to set out the principles by which it will act when dealing
with issues that arise from the Treaty of Waitangi. ... These Crownprinciples are to
help the Sovernment make decisions about matters related to the Treaty. For instance,
when the Government is considering recommendations from the Waitangi Tribunal.
lsicl l8
It was explained in Chapter Two that the Labour Government creaFed principles which
would guide its treaty policy. Here, the question is raised; why were these called
'crown' and not 'government' principles. In applying the argument from chapter
Three, the Government chose to identify these as Crown rather than government
principles because the title 'Crown principles' creates the illusion that the principles
have been authorised by the remote and omnipresent Crown and therefore are beyond
the influence of the public. Also, the title Crown, as a reassuring symbol for the New
Zealand public collectively, (and one which denotes public interest as demonstrated
earlier with titles such as Crown land) distances the policy from the govemment (again
as demonstrated with Crown entities in Chapter Two). If the principles had been
f E Department of Justic-e, Principles Jir crown Actiort ott tlte Treaty of waitangi, GovemmentPrinter, Wellington, 1989, p. L
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called 'Government Principles' it would have emphasised the influence of pany
politics in establishing the principles. In addition, the Crown title implies that it is not
only the Labour Government, but the perpetual succession of governments thereafter,
which will be guided by these principles. Finally, as the theorists also predicted, in
using the popular Crown symbol, the 'Crown Principles' served to reinforce the starus
quo' For example, the first principle, 'the Principle of Government' stated that the
Government has the right to govern and make laws which immediately reaffirms
British sovereignty in New Zealand,
The final proposition raised in the previous chapter in relation to symbols and
legitimacy was the notion that publics will more readily accept symbols which will
emotionally engage them or play on their collective hopes and fears. once again, this
is an interesting suggestion in terms of the role of the Crown in ministers, statements.
First it should be remembered that the negotiation of heaty issues has generated fear
and tension amongst the New Zealand, public as the claims process has progressed.
However, as was suggested in the previous chapter, the crown can provide
reassurances for public feats, as for example in former Labour prime Minister
Palmer's assurance that there was 'clarity and certainty' about the criteria the Crown
will use in dealing with treaty issues, which he assured 'people can take comfort in.,le
The Crown also frequently appeared in emotive policy statements by ministers which
appeared to be providing reassurance forpublic hopes and fears. For instance, in an
official publication it was noted, '[t]he crown accepts a responsibility to provide a
process fbr the resolution of grievances arising from the Treaty. ... If the Crown
demonstrates commitment to this process of redress then it will expect reconciliation to
1gsul1''20 on another occasion a minister similarly spoke of 'the extent of Maori
interest which the Crown has promised to protect.'2|
p Geoffrey Pal'rer, prime Minister, Labour, Address to rhe weilingtonTreaty of Waitangi: Constitutional and procedural Issues,, Speech No"t"r,
2(l Principle.v Jnr Cnmn Ac:tictn on tlrc Trecrty rg Wttitunl4i, p. 15.
2l 
.Ieffries, 'Claims negotiation process,, press Statern ent,ZlJuly 1990.
District Law Society, 'The
14 December 1989, p.5.
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In addition to representing reassurances, the Crown symbol commonly appeared in
association with other emotive and reassuring concepts such as .power,,
'commitment', 'promise', and 'protection'. These added to a picture of a trustworthy,
responsible and moral Crown authority in control of treaty negotiations. The phrase
'the honour of the Crownn, was also fiequently used in the ministers' discourse as in
Wetere's statement that, '[t]he obligations of the Treaty are binding on the lnnour of
the Crown'.22 Both the symbol of the Crown and the words which surround it will,
according to the theorists, be responsible for emotionally engaging the public and
f'urther enhancing their acceptance of a 'Crown' symbol, particularly in times of
political or social instability. In requiring reassurance and in finding it in the symbol
of the Crown, the public, theorists argue, is unlikely to question the legitimacy of the
Crown's actions and authority because it appeases their concerns. Furthermore, the
government is less likely to encounter resistance to its policies and actions when they
are presented to the public in association with the crown.
In considering these uses for the Crown symbol in attempting to legitimate
government action under the Treaty, it is important not to underestimate the more
general significance of Iegitimacy fbr New Zealand government in dealing with rreaty
issues' In the previous chapter it was briefly suggested that, while division caused by
the Treaty could jeopardise a government's legitimacy in New Zealand,the Treaty
itself challenges the authority of government by questioning the means by which
authority was attained in New Zealand, in the colony's earlier years. To explain this
further, it should also be recalled that New Zealand has no written constitution
(although several important Acts are entrenched). Therefore, the actions of the
govemment in New Zealand will be judgecl not by their constitutionality as such, but
rather by their legitimacy. That legitimacy, as also mentioned earlier, is determined
22 WEtere, 'Address to the Annual Confeclerarion of Farmers on the Waitangi Tribunal,, SpeechNotes,30 June 1989, p. 15.
t02
largely by public perception.23 In particular, attempts by the govemment to undertake
constitutional reform will be predicatecl by a question of legitimacy which will require
public condonation of the government's actions. If the impetus for reform has nor
come from the will of the majority, as was the c;rse with treaty legislation introduced in
the 1970s in New Zealand, then the government must seek legitimacy for its action
elsewhere in convincing the public of its right to act. For reasons explained later, the
Treaty of Waitangi presented the New Zealand government with the need for
significant and urgent constitutional reform in the 1970s. The general public was not
well educated on treaty matters and generally displayed little sympathy and even less
support for calls to accommodate the Treaty in contemporary New Z-ealandsociety.24
Denied the option of undertaking constitutional reform in the name of public interest,
govemment was fbrced to look elsewhere tbr the legitimacy it needed to ensure its
own stability. The evidence in this section has suggested that 'the Crown' symbol
was an essential tool in the legitirnation of govemment actions and policies regarding
the Treaty from 1988 to 1993. 'The Crown' symbol, it is argued here, has allowed
government to recognise the Treaty, promote public interest, distance govemment from
the Treaty and aftempt to reassure collective fears.
Moreover, due to a curious ambiguity, the Crown's authority is commonly accepted
by groups otherwise divided by the treaty debate. Consequently, the symbol remains
popular and largely unchallenged in political discourse.2s As was also explained
briefly in the previous chapter, those who support the resolution of treaty grievances
identify with the Crown as the original treaty partner, while those who reject the place
of the Treaty in New Zealand. society relare to the Crown as a symbol of the
3] l*, Y.Sogtt' The Martri Magnu Carta: New Zettlcutcl Luw and the Treuty pf Waitangi,OxfordUniversity Press, Auckland, 199f, p. 13.
24 Statistics gathered as late as 1989, demonstrate a clear disapproval of treaty rights for Mdori in
lery Ze.aland by a substantial proportion of the population. See,'Hyam Gold fi efa" Webster, NewZe.alund values Toclay' The Popitar Report of tie November IgBb New Zealancl study of values,Afpha Publications, Palmersron Norrh, 1990, pp. Zg_34.
25 Here I am of course iglolng the argunents of republicans. Sec Chapter Ten of this thesis for
more discussion on the republican clebntc in Nerv Zealind.
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supremacy of British sovereignty in New zearand. In using .the Crown, symbol,
minsters were not only sending a message to Maori that the Treaty was acknowledged,
but at the same time were sending a message to others seeking reassurance that
absolute and indivisible sovereignty in New Zealand would continue to reside in the
Plkehd system of government. However, in lending legitimacy to govemment actions,
and as a result of its popularity, the Crown symbol is also argued to have created
significant problems of consistency in ministers' statements in relation to the identity
of the Crown.
The Crown Symbol: problems of Consistency
The Crown has been identified as the trinity of Queen, Governor-General and
Executive. In this section it is argued that, specitically because the Crown identity is
able to lend legitimacy to authority and action with regard to treaty issues, ministers
have applied the identity to a much greater range of individuals, groups and institutions
than the trinity previously identified. It was possible for ministers to do this because,
as established in the previous chapter, symbols do not require detail or consistency;
they need only satisfy the public's understanding of the context in which they should
appear' The many meanings of the Crown made possible by its symbolic t'unction
have, it is further argued here, served to extend and entrench the problem of
identifying a single and consistent Crown treaty partner fbr Mdori. In the ministerial
statements examined the Crown identity was used in relation to government generally,
individual ministers, individuals and groups outside of government, andn as in the
mass media, something other than government (although exactly what was not
specified).
ln some instances (as was also tbund in mass communication) the term .Crown, was
used in combination with the term 'govemment' irnplying that the two terms are names
fbr the same institution. For example, Bill Jetfties, fbrmer Labour Minister of Justice,
stated that a letter had been sent to Tainui iwi which 'identifies the areas where the
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Governmenl is prepared to advance negotiations. 
... Tainui have been told that funds
will be available to enable Tainui to turther negotiate with the crown.,z6 Similarly,
Graham said, 'the Governrnenr and the lMaori] congress have reached agreement on a
procedure by which surplus Crown land held by Railcorp, would be disposed of while
enabling Maori interests to be protected. 
... [The agreement] represents the most
comprehensive series of Treaty of Waitangi negotiations between Crownand Maori in
the history of this country.'27 In both these Ministers, statements, Crown and
Government were presented as different names for the same institution. Using the
Crown as a metonym for government in this manner also, it should be noted. lends
legitimacy to the Ministers' statements (for reasons discussed earlier).
However, the function of the Crown symbol is complicated by a second observation
that, in addition to using Crown as a metonym for government, other ministers,
statements created the impression that Crown and governmenr are two separate and
distinct institutions which simultaneously exist in contemporary politics. This second
use of the Crown also f'urther demonstrates the Crown's function in distancing both
the public and the government from the remote power of the Crown (as also
demonstrated in Chapter Two with the Crown health enterprises and Crown research
institutes.) For example, in a press statement about the return of Hopuhopu Camp in
the North Island to the Tainui iwi, Graham stated, ,[i]n Lgzz the church acquired
Hopuhopu fiom the Crown. ... Cabinet [has now] decided the Crownshould acquire
the property for return to Tainui.'2s Whereas in other cases the distinction between
Cabinet (or government) and the Crorvn was insignificant, here government and
crown were notably separate. Graham went on to say, .[]ust over six weeks ago the
Sovernment returned Hopuhopu rnilitary camp to Tainui as a gesture of goodwill on
26 Jeffries, 'Tainui Settlentent on Negotiations unexpectecl', pr-ess Statement, on 13 June 1990.
27 Graham, 'Governntent and Maori Congrcss historic agrcement'. press statement. l0 September1991, p. l.
28 Gtaham''Hopuhopu Camp to be retumed to Tainui', Press Statement,3l Aggust 1991.
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the crown's part.'29 once again, the use of the two terms here implies some
difference between Crown and government. on another occasion Graham said, .the
Crown has been exploring innovative and bold ways of resolving Treaty grievances in
line with this government's desire to resolve all rnajor Treaty issues by the end of the
century''30 Graham implied by this that the National Government was acting on the
recommendations of the Crown, as something other than government. Later he
commented , 'Cabinet has provided resources to reimburse Tainui fbr past expenditure
and to enable Tainui to continue to negotiate with the Crown.'3t Once again the
Minister has managed to distance the government per se from the role of ueaty
negotiations by creating the impression that the Crown was something other than
Cabinet. While it was earlier noted that Graham was conscious of the need to use
Crown instead of government at times, these examples of his language indicate that
this device gives the public the irnpression that a Crown identity, as something other
than government, acts in relation to the Treaty. This was also well illustrated by Bill
Jeffries comment that 'Cabinet had authorised the making of an offer to the Tainui
Maori Trust Board. .. . It was expected that representatives of Government and Tainui
would discuss the Crown's offer.,32
National's former Environment Minister, Simon Upton, similarly implied that Crown
and government were two separate identities when he said, '[t]he [National]
Governmenr felt that the reference to the special relationship between the Crownand te
iwi Maori might not be clearly enough expressed.'33 He went on say, [l]ocal
authorities and the Crown must consider whether the purpose could best be met
29 Graham,'Launch of "Claims to Lhe Waitangi Tribunal" by Prof. Bill Oliver,, Speech Notes, l5OcLober l99l.pp.2-4.
3() Graham, 'Government to negotiate with rainui,. press statem ent,27 october 1991.
3l Graham,'Government to negotiate with Tainui', Press Statem ent,2j October 1991.
32 
.Ieffries, 'Tainui Offer', press Statement, g August 1990.
il SimonUaton' Minister for the Environmen(, National, 'Address to the New Zealand,planningCouncil', 22May 1991, p. 5.
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through the use of economic instruments.'34 As Graham had done also, Upton
managed to distance the National Government from the Treaty by naming both
government and Crown in such as way as to distinguish them one from the other.
Prime Minister Bolger even more explicitly distinguished between Crown and
government when he said, '[treaty] grievances are matters between Maoridom and the
crown' and settlements must be reached between the appropriate representatives of
Maoridom and the Government, which acts fbr the Crown and all citizens of the
Nation''35 In noting his language on this occasion it will be recalled from earlier
discussion that Bolger seldom referred to the crown and when he did, he did so in
such a way as to present it as difference from the National Government.
On other occasions, a third variation in the use of the Crown was identified. In this
case, tlle Crown was left largely unqualified, and did not appear in reference to other
institutions. For example, Jeffries stated that an agreement had been reached .between
rhe Crown and the hapu of ... the Ngati Maniapoto' but the Minister provided no
explanation of what he meant by the Crown. According to Jeffries, representatives of
the crown and the tangata whenua were to attend a ceremony to acknowledge the
agreement.36 Not only did the Minister not clarify the Crown but he also kept some
distance between the government and the negotiations which were to be conducted
with 'the Ctown'. Later the Minister was able to deflect criticism that the government
lacked commitment to the claims process by responding that 'claims of tardiness on
the part of the Crown were totally unjustifled.'37
In another example of the Crown's identity being left unsubstantiated, former Labour
Prime Minister, David Lange, announced at a press conference that it was time to
34 Upton, 'Address to the New Zealancl planning Council,. p. g.
lt^lg"- Bolger, Prime Minister, National, 'waitangi Day Celebrarions,, Speech Nores,6 Februaryl99l, p. 4.
36 Jeffries, 'waitomo settlement reached', press statement, 1 June 1990.
37 
.Ieffiies, 'Tainui criticism rejected' press stateruent.3 August 1990.
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define how the crown would approach the resolution of treaty issues. He said, .it is
quite wrong fot Crown or Maori interests to be done on an ad hoc issue by issue
basis' It's perfectly plain that Maori have a clear view of where they,re headed. The
crown must have a clear view of where the Crown is headed.'3s palmer similarly
said, 'I believe that what the government is doing in its legislation and before the
Tribunal will provide us with a fair and equitable arrangement between the crown and,
Maori''3e In both cases, this elusive Crown identity allowed the Ministers ro
theoretically discuss the Treaty without immediately implicating the government in the
execution of those policies. In this case, the Crown fulfils, we assume from the
context, its traditional role as an authority which sits above government and protects
the public interest and in this case, carries out its obligations to Mdori under the Treatv
of Waitangi.
The function of the Crown in ministers' treaty discourse has been challenged in the
past' For example, Graham's references to 'ttte Crown' in a speech attracted the
attention of one critic who noted, 'the use of the term 'the Crown' emphasises the
extent of Pakeha responsibility without threatening the actual individuals who did the
dirty work.'a) This observation supports the earlier suggestion that vague symbolic
outlines such as the Crown are used by government to distance themselves from
certain actions and events. While Graham has denied that he uses .Crown, with this
intention,4l his and other ministers' use of the Crown did simplify complex issues,
therefore making them more accessible to the public. In doing so, the ministers further
complicated the Crown's identitv.
38 Lange. Press Confsrence, (post Cabinet),3 August 19g9, p.4.
39 Palmer, Prime Minister. Labour, prcss statement announced 19 september 19g9, p. 3.
1.' tit McCreanor, 'settling grievances to deny sovereignt),: Trade goods for the year 2000, in Sire,rNo. 27, Summer 1993,45-t3-, p. 55.
4l Interview, Rr Hon' Douglas Graham. Minister in charge of rreaty Negotiations and Minister of
.Iustice, The Beehive, g August I995.
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In addition to these uses tbr the Crown in ministers' statements, the symbol also
identified non-governmental representatives, which again can be seen to lend
legitimacy to those representatives' actions and authority. palmer has acknowledged
how important it was that only those individuals with the appropriate authority act on
treaty issues. He said, '[w]e want to move along in this [Treaty] process. So do most
people' However, they also want to have the confidence that people with the
appropriate political responsibility are making the decisions.'a2 The 'correct authority,
is easily demonstrated, it is argued here, by giving the individual or institution the
'Crown' title. For example, Palmer announced at one time that, 'Maori fishing
negotiators, fishing industry representatives and Crownrepresentatives met today to
discws a joint subrnission to the Parliamentary select committee which is considering
the Maori Fisheries Bill ...'43 These'Crown'representatives were in fact the
Chairman of the Human Rights Commission, the Executive Chairman of New T*aland,
Rail Corp, the Deputy Chairman of the Fishing Industry Board and the Associate
Secretary to Treasury. While not the sovereign, the Governor-General or members of
the Executive (as the traditional interpretation of the Crown), these representatives
appeared to have legitimate authority to make decisions and take action on treaty
matters because of their 'Crown' title. Palmer said that the process constituted the
'bringing together the of the Treaty partners to resolve a cofllmon problem to ensure
the interests of both are given weight.'44 In reality, the Crown had been reduced to
four individuals fiom government agencies. This was, in this instance. the Crown
treaty partner for Maori. If the public had been actively scrutinising the facts of the
issue people might ask who these Crown representatives wele. However, as a symbol
used in its appropriate context, the Crown title would presumably escape people's
attention,leaving only the impression that the appropriate authorities were acting.
az Geoffrev Palmer' Primc Minister, Labour, 'Address to ths Wellington District Law Society,..TheTreaty of waitangi, constir.ntional and procedural lssucs', 14 Deccm6er 19g9, p. 10.
43 Geoffrey Palmer' Deputy Prime Minister. 'Maori Fishing', Press Statem ent.Z'l February 19g9.
4 Geoffrey Palmer' Deputy Prjme Miuistcr, Labour, prcss Starem ent,2I December 19g7.
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A flnal identity for the crown according to ministerial use of the symbol was where
the Crown was used to identify the actions, authority or opinions of one minister, as
opposed to the Ministers of the Crclwn or the Executive collectively. For example, in a
statement on MEori fisheries, Palmer said that Bill Jetfries, Minister of Justice, would
'assume the responsibility for conducting discussions with Maori where Maori and
the Crown '.. enter negotiations.' Palmer also stated that, 'Mr Jeffries will speak for
the Crown on any outstanding issues related to the implementation of the Maori
Fisheries Act.' He concluded, 'I have always said that the crownprefers to negotiate
rather than litigate''45 similarly, Graham, announced in a press statement that he was
to meet with Ng[i Tahu. Speaking 'for the crownn, Mr Graham announced that the
two parties (Crown and Mdori) have agreed to negotiate. This 'Crown, negotiating
team was to comprise of the Minister of Justice, and the Chief Executives of the
Departments of Justice and conservation, the Treasury and Manatri Maori officials.6
Once again, Mr Graham spoke fbr the Crown indicating, in this instance that Mdori
ae negotiating with the Minister personally as their treaty partner.
This discussion of the Crown and the problem of consistency has demonstrated that
because the concept of the Crown is a powertul and useful tool in legitimating
authority in terms of the Treaty, it has been used in relation to a wide range of
individuals, including ministers and non-government actors and institutions, including
working parties, government, Cabinet and the Executive. In recalling the suggestion
from the previous chapter that symbols can create their own reality for those publics
which engage in them, the findings of this chapter suggest that the inconsistency in the
Crown identity might create obstacles for the Mdori in trying to negotiate with their
Crown treaty partner. This and other implications arising from this discussion will be
fuither considered.
6. Geoffrey 
-Palmer, Prime Minister, Labour, 'Maori Fisheries' press statement announced 2gFebruary 1990, pp. l-2.
46 Graham,'Ngai rahu and r.he crown to meer,, press statement, 17 September r99r,pp. r-2.
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The Crown Syrnbol and Implicationsfor Mdori
This discussion has demonstrated that the Crown symbol appeals to diverse groups.It
represents an omnipresent reassurance which attempts to appease public concerns
while emotionally engaging the public in the issues and distancing government from
the responsibilities and obligations of the Treaty. Furthermore, the Crown (as a result
of the aforementioned qualities) can enhance the legitimacy of action and authority
under the Treaty (when applied to a range of individuals and institutions) because it
creates the impression that the entity with the appropriate authority under the Treaty
(the Crown) is acting. It was also explained, in relation to legitimacy under the Treaty,
that legitimacy was particularly critical in treaty negotiations because the government
lacked popular mandate fbr its actions. As a result of both the popularity and wide
application of the Crown symbol, the problem for Mdori of finding a consistent
identity for the Crown is magnified.
on the basis of this investigation and its finclings some of the implications of symbolic
communication by government iclentified in the previous chapter must be
reemphasised. Theorists suggest that a symbol such as the Crown, when used often
enough, will be accepted as a political reality for the publics who engage in its use. It
is possible therefore, that the New Zealand public is failing to engage in active scrutiny
and debate about the identity of the Crown and instead is passively accepting its
appearance in the context of treaty discourse. Also, there is concern that the Crown, as
a prevalent political symbol, has created obstacles to, or perhaps determined the nature
of' future events. With these possibilities in mind, the second section of this thesis
addresses the relationship between Maori and the Crown in New Zealand.
Specifically, it fbcuses on the fbllowing themes. First, in contrast to the popular
conception of the Crown how have Maori interpreted the Crown through time?
Second, the effects upon Maorj as the other treaty partner of the flexibility and
ambiguity of the Crown symbol will be analysed. Third, it is considered whether the
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poPular intorprietation of the Crovrrr has created obstacles to the develolnreirt of trcagl
debate ftom a ['[aori porspeetive. 
-The investigation of these rind other issues in the
nex$ section 'sf the disctlssion reveals that the Crown poses n-o-t o-nl.y problems of
inc-o'sistenoy forMdori, but also aproblem of evolution.
SECTION TWO
The Problem of the Evoluti,on of the Crown:
Miiori and the Crown
FIVE
COLONISATION IN AOTEARLA: THE ARRNAL AND SUBSESaENT
,DISAPPEARANCE' OF THE CROWN
The purpose of this second section of the thesis is to investigate the relationship
between Mdori and 'the Crown' since the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1g40.
It is argued that, in addition to posing problems of consistency in a contemporary
setting, the identiry of the Crown has encountered problems of 'evolution, since lg40
which again have had serious implications for Mdori. This historical investigation of
the evolution of the Crown begins with the events surrounding the signing of the
Treaty of Waitangi.
The symbol of the Crown has a long and interesting history in Aotearoa/1.{ew Zealand.
Most notable is its ambiguity in the nineteenth century and its declining use in political
discourse until the 1970s. The concept of 'the Crown' (as was established in Chapter
One) was first ofticially introduced to Aotearoa on 6 February lg40 when the Treaty
of Waitangi was signed by representatives of the British Crown and some Maori
rangatira' In this chapter it is observed that the Crown had two possible interpretations
in 1840' Mdori interpreted 'the Crown' as the personal authority and manat of eueen
Victoria, while the British settlers understood 'the Crown' to be a symbol for the
authority of the British state or moreprecisely the govemment. From 1840, the British
interpretation of the Crown dominated New Zealand's constitutional development.
Furthermore, from the turn of the century, and following the transfer of authority from
the British Crown to responsible government in New Zealand, the Crown symbol
practically 'disappeared' from political discourse. By the late 1960s, despite the fact
I Loosely translated the yold 'mana' equates with the English concept of prestige. See the glossary
at the back of this thesis for further elaboration.
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that it had always been a part of New Zealand pubric law, ,the crown, was seldom
heard of in New Zealand's political discourse.
The Treafy of Waitangi: The Crown in 1g40.
The Treaty of Waitangi is a significant and controversial clocument in New 7*aland
history' While acknowledging the depth and breadth of the issues surrounding the
Treaty, discussion in this chapter is restricted to a description of its terms and a more
detailed account of the role ancl identity of 'the Crown' in relation to the Treatv of
Waitangi.z
Prior to 1840' Britain had made no official moves for territory or authority in
Aotearoa'3 In fact, it has been noted that Britain seemed less than willing to be .drawn
too deeply into New Zealand's affairs.'a However, some seventy years of contact
between British and Mdori in Aotearoas prior to the Treaty created responsibilities for
the British Government in New Zealand with regard to the British migrants there.6
Also, there is evidence of several direct appeals to the British Crown from M6ori
leaders requesting 'the King's protection' from hostile forces before the Treaty had
been drafted. For example on 3 october, 1831 a French naval vessel visited the
shores of New Zealand' and it was rumoured that it intended to annex the islands.
Prior to the incident, several Maori rangatira had discussed the possibility of sending
z while focusing on the role of the Crown in the_treaty process, it should be acknowledged that theidentity'Mdori'came into use after the 1840s. Prior-to tn" f.Luty-ite M6ori iwi did not atrributethemselves with a national identity and Europeans called Maori New Zealanders. claudia orange, anIllu$rated History of the Treuty- of'waitctngr, Allen and unwin, Port Nichotson press, Wellington1990, p. l.
3claudia^orange' rhe^rr17U oJ waitanlii,Allen and Unwin, port Nicholson press, Wellington,1987' p' 32' Also' J'B. Ringer, An Int)otluction to New Zealand Governmenr, Hazard press,Christchurch, 1991, p. 17.
4 Orange, The Treaty ctf Waitangi,p. 14
5 The name 'Aotearoa' as opposed to New Zealancl is used here to indicate relations between Britishand Mdori prior to the cession of governance to the British, *tt".*uy N"* Zealand,becarne a Britishcolony' For the rest of the thesis, the country is identified as 'New Zeaand, while still recognisingthe significance of the names Aotearoa and Te Wai Pounamu lnortrr and south islands respectively) incontemporary New Zealand society.
6 Orange, The Treaty oJ'Wuittutgi,p,g.
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an appeal to the British King for protection for the Mtori people. Even when the
threat of French invasion appeared inconsequential, thirteen rangatira signed a petition
to the King of England which acknowledged a special relationship between M6ori and
British in New zealand'and requested that the King become a 'triend and guardian of
these islands' and preserve the Mlori people from foreign threat.T
As fbreign settlement increasecl in Aotearoa, the British acknowledged that Miori
independence was diminishing.s Apart from British immigrants, other nations were
also represented in the settlers arriving in Aotearoa. For example, French settlement in
Akaroa and the arrival of French Catholic Missionaries aroused further interest in
New Zealand by the French. The United states also indicated an interest in New
zealand and its resources, and convicts escaping tiom Australia (at that time a penal
colony) were finding a safe haven in New Zealand. The result of this mixed settlemenr
was an increasing sense of 'lawlessness' in Aotearoa which lacked the control of a
national government.e However, despite competition from other nations, the British
dominated the settlement process anct British colonisation soon appeared inevitable. In
recognising this fact themselves, the British considered it imperative that British and
Miori interests in Aotearoa be reconciled.l0 Jn March 1839, British officials declared
that any action in Aotearoa should allow for the '[p]rotection of the Maori people and
the introduction of self-government tbr the settlers.'ll In August 1g39, the British
consul, Captain William Hobson, arrived in Aotearoa and became a critical figure in
drafting a treaty apparently intended to secure British authority in Aotearoa and protect
the needs and rights of the M6ori people.
' 9tgg"'-?e Treaty o.l!1ituyg|,p. I l. The kings ref'enecl ro here are King George IV (1g20-1830)
and King William IV (1830-1837).
8 Ringer, New Zeultmtl Covernmett.p. lg.
9 waitangi rribunal, Kuitunu River lreport, Departruent of .Iuslice, welrington, r9g4, p. 12.
I0 C)range, The Trectty of'Vlaiteutgi,p.27.
| | Orange, The Treuty of'Waitungi,p. Zg.
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Claudia Orange observes, the treaty Hobson drafted identified ,the Crown, as the
appropriate authority in Britain to treat with the indigenous people of Aotearoa. In
fact, the Treaty itself identified 'the Queen' as the appropriate authority with no
ref'erence to the crown as such. I{owever, the Treaty was presented to Mdori in a
manner which emphasised 'the Crown' as Queen Victoria (the newly crowned
monarch)' According to orange, this was intended to diminish the impersonal nature
of crown authority in New zealand.tz As Lindsay cox explains, Mdori understood
tiom the letter of the Treaty itself that the British Queen was a central, active figure in
British politics. In addition, cox contends, Mdori were more familiar with the concept
of the 'all-powerful sovereign' than with democratically elected parliament. It was
certainly unlikely, he argues, that Mdori appreciated that the actual .law making and
unmaking powers' which were to shape the colony's development rested with a group
of elected representatives in Britain.t3
The actual role of the British monarch in 1840 was in stark contrast to the myth created
by the rhetoric which surrounded the Treaty and the Treaty text itself. It will be
tecalled from chapter one that while the crown was still a popular and prevalent
symbol in post-seventeenth century Britain, politics itself was centred on parliament
and the notion of a representative system rather than the sovereign.ra The Crown was,
in short, an 'undevelopecl and lifeless abstraction' at this time.ls It was also explained
in Chapter one that during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the monarchy
survived because it become compatible with democratic government. It relinquished a
great deal of its real authority to government ancl the monarch retained a largely
symbolic role in Britain ancl the Commonwealth which was above party politics, as a
f 2 Orange. The Treuty tfi'Waitcut14i.p.46.
f 3 Linclsay Cox' Ktttahit(Itt[lu; Tlrc search.fir Mdori Political tJnity, oxford University press,Auckland, 1993,p.4.
14 K' Dyson, The State TrQdition irt we.rtern Ettrolte,Martin Robertson publications, Oxford, 19g0,p. 39.
f 5 Dyson, The Stttte Traditinn itt We.rtern Europe, p.43.
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figure to unite all British citizens in common loyalty to their country.16 From 1g30,
the Crown retained the prerogative power to conduct the foreign affairs of the realm, to
acquire new territory by way of conquest, usurpation, treaty or other means as an .act
of state' and to erect the institutions of government for newly acquired territory.tT
Therefore, while the Treaty was written and New Zealand,was colonised in the name
of Her Majesty the Queen of England, in reality, the British cabinet ruled Britain and
the colonies.ls
While Queen Victoria did much to restore the 'symbolic lustre' of the monarchy
during her reign which began in 1837, the political function and constitutional role of
the Crown had irrevocably changed by the time she gained the throne.le In addition to
this, while the British officials presenting the Treary to M[ori in lg40 may have been
genuine in their symbolic reference to the love and protection of the eueen of England,
they understood that the Crown's authority would, in all practical terms, be exercised
by the British Government. While there is little evidence that this complication in the
Crown's identity was conveyed to Mlori, this chapter discusses some of the attempts
by British officials to associate the Queen with the Treaty (see discussion later in the
chapter). As a result, Mdori accepted the British at their-word and chose to treat with
the noble Queen.
Had Mdori been aware of the involvement of government in the Treaty, there seems
every likelihood that they would have insisted that their agreement be made with the
Queen instead. The reason for this is that the Queen has certain qualities which
appealed to Mdori rangatira which other possible treaty partners, such as govemment,
did not exhibit. The first of these is the similarity between the British monarchy and
l6 Andre Mathiot, Tlte British Political Sy.rlem, The Hogath press, London, 195g, pp.262-263.
l] l*' Y$ugr'' The Mdttri Magnct Cctrtu: Neu, zecrlatrd Law ttrul the Treaty of Waitangi,OxfordUniversity Press, Auckland, 199i, p. 22.
ll.t"t"* 
c Black (ed'), British Poliric:; irr tlte Nineteenth century, Macmillan, London, l97o,p.
f 9 Black, British Politic.s irt the Nineteetttlt Cetttury,p.32.
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patterns of Mdori leadership at the time of rhe Treaty. As Api Mahuika explains,
traditional M5ori leadership was similar to the royal succession in Britain in that it was
often determined by primogeninrre (leadership passed on to the first born male in each
generation or to the first born female as a ,male_substitute,).20 For Maori however,
chieftainship was also a birthright expressecl through the f'unction of active leadership.
Even for hapii which demonstratecl variations on male centred leadership, the concepts
of chieftainship and leadership were inseparable. Maori would naturally have
assumed similar conditions for the rule of the British monarchy. Unfortunately, as we
have seen, this was not an accurate assumption because the British eueen, while a
'chief in many respects, was not an active authority in British politics.
In assuming active leadership, Mrori also anticipatect that the eueen would rule in
order to increase her personal prestige. Again, this expectation may be linked to the
fact that Mdori rangatira were 'imbued with the qualities of mana and tapu [personal
sanctity] by reason of their exalted birth.'21 while Mdori believed that a person,s
mana was largely inherited, it could also be increased by personal achievements in
leadership22 and presumably reduced by dishonourable conduct. Also,leadership for
MSori was a lifelong commitment based on personal integrity.23 Therefore, in signing
the Treaty with the Queen of England, Mdori may have been confident that Her
Majesty would honour the Treaty in orcler ro maintain and increase her .mana, in the
eyes of her people. As Anne Salmond notes, '[g]iven that the Treaty was presented to
the Chiefs as a personal transaction between themselves and the eueen of England, it
lnust have been difficult for them to irnagine that she woulcl allow her mana to be
compromised.'24
'l' ort Mahuika,'Leadership: Inhcrired ancl Achicved,. in M. King (ed.). Te Ao Hurihuri: TheWorld Move:; On. Hicks Smith ancl Sons. Wellington, 1975, p. g6. '
2I Mahr.rika,'Lcadership: lnherited and Achieved,. pp. gg_g9.
22 Mahuika,'Leadership: Inheritecl ancl Achieved,, p. 90.
z3 Raj Yasil' What Dtt Mtutri vlant? Ntvv Mtirtri Pttliticul per.tltectiye,r, Random Century press,Auckland, 1990,p.77.
24 Anne Salmoncl, 'Trcary Meanings., Wai 45.Doc. Fl9. p.9.
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Second, the Queen might also have appealed to Mdori as a treaty partner because of
certain political principles. As Professor James Ritchie explains, these include face-to-
face [kanohi ki te kanohi] discussion or confrontation, structured direct speaking,
(whai kdrero) and the oppofrunity for negotiation between equals until a matter is
resolved'25 A treaty with 'the Queen' would have appealed to M6ori rangatira
because they believed they were establishing a personal relationship with a leader of
equal status who had the mana to upholcl and protect the sacred nature of the
agreement being created. Furthermore, the Queen could be personally identified and
approached in times of crisis and met with face to face, on an equal footing, until the
matter could be resolved. Had MEori known that the Queen was not a rangatira as
Maori understood the concept, and that in practical terms the Treaty would be
dependent on the rule of representatives in Britain and eventually in New Zealand, the
Treaty might not have been agreed to on any rerrns.
At the meeting of Mhori and British at Waitangi on 6 February 1g40, Captain Hobson
explained that the purpose of the meeting was to infbrm rangatira of the .eueen,s,
intentions in New Zealand and to establish a treaty agreement between Mdori and the
Queen' He described the proposed treaty as an 'act of love towards [Maori] on the
part of the Queen''26 Hobson emphasised that the Queen was motivated by her
concern tbr M6ori and British welf'are in New Zealand,,and that the Treaty was an
acknowledgment of Maori requests for her protection. The Treaty of Waitangi was
signed on that day by the Queen's representatives and a significant number of
rangatira from iwi ancl hapii across New Zealand. It was then taken around the
country in an attempt to secure the signatures of those rangatira not present at
25 Interview, Professor Jarnes Ritchic, waikato u'iversiry,4 June r993.
26 O.ange, The Treary o.f V/uitangi, p. 45.
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Waitangi' During this process, according to orange, the image of the .personalised
caring Queen' was again predominanl.2T
The Treaty of Waitangi itself is a short and deceptively simple document.2s For the
purpose of later discussion it is irnportant to consider the rights and obligations
conferred to Mf,ori and Her Majesty, the eueen of England, under the Treaty. There
are also critical differences between the Mdori and English texts of the Treary which
ought to be recognised.
The preamble to the Treaty in the English text explains that Her Majesty eueen
Victoria wishes to establish a settled form of Civil Government in order to protect
Mdori 'Rights and Property.' The Maori text also spoke of .government,
(kflwanatanga) under Queen Victoria which would preserve M6ori 'chieftainship and
their land.' This notion of protection was to become crucial fbr Mdori throughout
New Zealand history as MEori sought reclress from the Queen tbr alleged grievances
by government. Even today, Maori speak of the need for protection from government
as a treaty right.
In the first Article of the Treaty (in English), Mfiori cede "absolutely and without
reservation all the rights ancl powers of sovereignty' to Her Majesry the eueen of
England' In the Maori version, this concept of 'sovereignty' is reduced to Mdori
ceding only 'kiwanatanga' or 'governance' to Her Majesty. The second Ar-ticle of the
Treaty states in English, that M6ori will retain 'f-ull, exclusive and undisturbed
possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries ancl other properties,, while
the Queen retains the exclusive right of pre-emption over these possessions. In Mdori,
this notion of *possession' was extended to one of chieftainship or .tino
rangatiratanga', indicating the essential elements of sovereignty and autonomy. It is
27 Orange, The Trettty o.f'Waitangi,p.56.
]8 see^ Appendix A. The versions of Lhe Treaty suppliecl in this Appendix and referred ro here arethose found in: Orange, The Treaty rtf Wuitungi,pp.Z5T-259.
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the relationship between these two articles of the Treaty which has been the basis of
the injustice suffered by Mdori as subsequent governments failed to protect Mdori
sovereignty and assumed control of Maori resources such as land. More detail is
provided on this process in the finar section of this chapter.
The significance of the third Article of the Treaty is often overlooked. In the English
version, 'Her Majesty extends to the Native of New Zealand.Her Royal protection,
and the rights and privileges of British citizens.' A similar idea is conveyed in the
Mdori text.Ze From the third Article it is unclerstood that Mdori and pdkehE settlers
would live as equal citizens under the Queen. However, many Mdori rangatira (as
later discussion demonstrates) saw themselves not under monarchical rule but equal to
it in a partnership of trust and gooclwill with the Queen. However, such a relationship
between Mdori and the Queen, as will shortly be revealed, was problematic for Mdori
from the outset.
Before moving on ti'orn cliscussion of the treaty text it should be recognised that,
through the passage of time, many aspects of the Treaty have proved highly
contentious. The questions of British intent in drafting the Treaty and M6ori
understanding of the Treaty are still clebated today. So too are appropriate
interpretations for the words 'tino rangatiratanga' and 'kdwanatanga, in the Mdori
texts which provide the basis for contemporary claims for Maori sovereignty in New
Zealand' However, despite these ancl so many other disputes, one tentative conclusion
can be made from which this discussion: that Mdori and Pakeha representatives who
signed the Treaty in 1840 agreed that with the Treaty of Waitangi, Her Majesty the
Queen of England could govern New Zealancl and extend her protection to the Mdori
l' F'T Durie explains that the Miori text guaranrced lvliorj rheir own tikanga (roughly translated as
'rules) as the English were guaranteecl rheirs. This ciur be seell as the legitimate basis for a separateIegal systern for Miiori,. 
.Sec, chief .Iudge E.'f. Duric, 'Justice, Biculturalism and the politics of3y..'h Wilsonet al. (eds.) Justice and"Itlenritt,. Antiltodeart Practices,Bridget Williams Books,Wellington, 1995, p. 34.
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people. In this respect the Treaty marks the beginning of ,crown, government in
Aotearoa.
Ahnost immediately fbllowing the signing of the Treaty it became apparent from a
Mxori perspective that the relationship between their people and the Crown was not
developing in accordance with M6ori expectations. In particular, the relationship
between Mdori and the Queen of Englancl was proving problematic. In hindsight it is
evident that the British intention in drafting the Treaty was that the authority of the
British Crown in New Zealandwould be transferred to the settler government as soon
as was practicable. Therefore, soon after the Treaty was signed, a gradual transition
away from rule by the British Crown towards responsible settler government in New
Zealand began. This transition was based on an entirely different interpretation of the
meaning of the Crown to that helcl by Mflori and was to have serious implications for
Maori in trying to maintain and encourage relations with the eueen as their treaty
partner. On a practical level the qualities of the Queen most attractive to Mdori could
not easily be translated on to the institution of government as it developed in New
Zealand. Also, it was problematic and offensive for Mf,ori to have to deal with an
institution in a constant state of flux when dealing with its treaty partner. on a more
philosophical level, the transition from Queen to settler government represented a
fundamental change in the treaty partner not agreed to by Mxori. Further
compounding this fact was the problem that increasingly powerful settler governments
(who were not treaty signatories) emphasised their right to govern in Aotearoa under
Article I without upholding the Queen's cluty to protect Mdori tino rangatiratanga
under Article tr of the Treaty. In short, this process demonstrates the first .evolution,
in the identity of the Crown.
The Evolving crown: The Deveropment of Responsible Government
The development of responsible government in New Zealand, after 1g40, which
marked this transition fi'om 'Queen' to settler government, happened in three srages.
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The first stage was direct British rule in Aotearoa through British representatives from
1840 to 1852. Second, from 1852, partly representative settler government was
established which was still accountable to British authority. Finally, after 1g56
'responsible' settler government was established which was independent from British
influence and, atter 1863, settler government was accountable to voters in New
Zealand on all matters including M[ori aftairs. At the same time as the independence
of the settler government was increasing, the authority of the British Crown (as either
Queen or government) in New Zealancl was being reduced. This was a time of great
confusion and anxiety for M5ori who were forced to adjust to a change in the identity
of their treaty partner. Most distressing tbr them with this fansition, was the apparent
lack of interest and dishonour of settler governments with regard to the eueen,s
Article tr obligations.
In May 1840, following the signing of the Treaty, New Zealand became a dependency
of the Crown Colony of New South Wales under its Lieutenant-Governor. en 24
May, 1840 the first session of the legislative council in New Zealand.was held and
British law was temporarily brought into operation while laws suitable to New
Zealand were prepared.30 on 16 November, 1840 New Zealand became a separate
Crown Colony from New South Wales by charter with a governor and a legislative
council nominated from Britain.3l At around the same time Captain William Hobson
fiamed 'The Constitution of 1840', a lengthy document of sixty-three clauses relating
to the establishment of the colony which provided guidance for the legislative
council'32 As J.B. Ringer says, 'Hobson and his successors administered the new
co'lony in the name of Queen Victoria, but in practice were responsible to the Colonial
office in London.'33 up until 1g52, the crown Colony of New Zealand was
f'l l. Higlt, The Cons,tirufiorrul Hi.t.trtr), tutd Lttu, rt' Neu, Zealunrl, Whitcomb and Tombs,Christchurch, l9l4.p. I 58.
3l Hight, The Conrtitutirttrul Hi*ory urtd Ln,, ot' New Zealand,p. 3gl.
32 Hight, The Conn-titutirtntil Hi.rt,rt, urtd Luw rqf.New Zeularul,p. 150.
33 Ringer, An Intntduc:tion trt New zettrund G.vernrttent.a. 19.
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governed by Hobson's Constitution of 1840. During this time there was an increasing
desire amongst the 12,000 colonists for representative government in New Zealand.3a
There was a strong feeling that the 'irksome constitution of the Crown Colony should
be replaced.'35
This desire fbr independent government was apparently not shared by Mdori, many of
whom insisted that they would have no clealings with either the governor or the
government and who would not acknowleclge their authority, as these representatives
had not signed the Treaty.36 In 1g45, the newly appointed Governor, George Grey,
managed in part to resolve this challenge to British authority in New Zealand, by
reiterating the promises of the Treaty in meetings with prominent rangatira. Despite
this, one Mdori leader from the north. Hone Heke, held fast to his conviction that the
British settlers intended to take Maori lancl despite the honour of the .eueen,s
Treaty'.lz In 1849, just befbre he diecl, Heke wrote directly to eueen Victoria
recalling the 'conversation' of the Treaty and appealing to her to leave New Zealand in
Mdori ownership' At around the sarne time another prominent leader, Te Wherowhero
from the Waikato, presented Grey with a letter for the eueen which requested
reassurance from Her Majesty that the actions and authority of the Governor were
legitimate.3s
As these incidents indicate, this was a time of unrest for Maori, who saw the authority
of government in Aotearoa as a threat to the status of the Treaty and the rights of the
Mlori people' There are numerous accounts of British officials reassuring Mdori that
the Treaty was a compact between the Queen ancl the M6ori people, which created a
3a Higtrt. The Con:itituriotrttr Hi';tttt'v atrd Lur, ttf'New zeareurd,p. r57.
35 Hight, The crrtstitutiturur Histrt'v turtr ktrv tqf'Nerv zearand,p. 195.
36 C)range, The Treaty of'Wuitangi,p. I10.
37 Orange, The Treay oJ'Wttitangi,p. 125.
38 Orange, Tlrc Treuty of'Wuitttn11i,p. l2g.
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special relationship with governors as opaternal figure5'.3e As Claudia orange notes,
this 'special relationship' and the unrealistic notion of benevolent government
presented to Mlori, effectively lefi them 'ill-equipped to cope with the impersonal and
rigorous nature of executive and legislative branches of government.,4o
Despite Maori resistance to the loss of British (essentially monarchical) authority in
Aotearoa, the Crown Colony was glanted a representative constitution by the British
Government under the 'New Zealand Constitution Act ISSZ'.41 This was a critical
step in New Zealand's emancipation fi'om the British colonial office. One writer has
recently gone so far as to argue that the 1852 Act'declared that Treaty rights
disappeared legislatively, because the Treary was signed between Britain and the chiefs
and was not now binding on the new settler governmsnl.'42 The British Crown,
however, retained substantial prerogative rights under the 1852 Act. For example, the
governor (a British Official) could assent to or refuse Acts for consideration by Her
Majesty and 'the Crown' (in Britain) retajned the right of pre-emption over native
lands.a3 Despite increasing concessions to the settler colony, the British still
considered it 'the duty of the Crown to upholcl those vague but powerful rights and
privileges of the Maori people as against the aspirations of the colonisers.,4
Under the Act of 1852' a two-tier parliament was created with a supreme legislature
and a series of six subordinate provincial councils.45 In 1853, elections were held for
the provincial councils and in 1854, the tirst national elections took place with the fust
3_9 Uart< Francis, Governttrs ttrtd Settlers: Iutai4e.t oJ.Autlutriry irt tlte British Cttlonies, lg20_60,Canterbury Universiry press. New Zedancl, I99i. pp. lg9 -2t3.
40 Orange, The Treuty tt'Waitcrngi ,p. 132.
4 | For detail on the structures establishcd by thc Act see: Cox, Kotahitanga , pp . 34-37 .
4.2 Hiwi Tauroa, Healing the Bretrch. A Mtktri Per,rltective ort the Treaty of Waitangi,Collins,Auckland, 1989, p.40.
43 Orange, Tlrc Treaty of Wuitangi,pp.26?-264.
*4 
" 
Mclintock, Crrtu'n Coktrry Gorenrrttenr itt New Zealemd,Government printer, Wellingron,1958, p. 53.
45 Cox, Koruhiturtga, p. 35.
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New Zealand parliament formaily opening on 27 May, lg54.a6 As B.c Gustafson
explains, in a representative (as opposed to responsible) government the legislature is
elected but has no control over the executive branch which actually governs the
country' According to Gustat'son, '[Executive] Ministers are appointed by and
answerable only to the Crown [as the Queen] or, in the case of early New T*aland,the
Crown's representative' the Governor.'a7 As a result there was otten conflict berween
the legislature, elected by the peopls4s and the executive, which was chosen by the
Crown and responsible only to it.ae For example under Henry sewell in 1g56, Mdori
policy was considered an 'imperial matter' outside the competence of the colonial
legislature. Accorcling to Margaret Wilson, the colonists continued to push Britain for
domestic control over native affails in order to get hold of Maorl 1*6.s0 Despite their
efforts, the govemor continued to decicle Mdori policies according to ministerial advice
fiom British representatives, a practice strongly resented by elected representatives in
New Zealand.5l
When Governor Grey endecl his first governorship in 1853, the Treaty was still being
pr<lmoted as a special link between Maori and the eueen.sz However, it was
becoming increasingly clifficult for Mlori themselves to reconcile government actions
with the Queen's obligations. Settler govemment seemed to be representing interests
which were opposed to those of the Mlori people and which could not be easilv
46 Ringer, An Introtluctiott ttt Nen, Zectlund Governmett,p.Z0.
o1 t t Gustafson, con,rtitutionttl chetn|4a.t'since lSTl,Heinemann Educational Books, Auckland,1969, p. l.
a8.In 185+, u^o^tt-tg was restricted to all Europcan males who could read and write with propertyv;rluing over f30' or Mdori with property valuing over f200. Reporr of the Royal Commission onth.e Electoral Systern. Towanls ,, Buitur-Derrutcrircy,Deccrnber tlsO, appendix A-10. Mdori wereetrectively disenfranchised.by these tcqnircuronts. Their land was communally owned so they couldneither vote nor stand rbr election. seqTauroa, Heuring the Breach,pt.40.
a9 Hight, Constitutional Hi.story and Laut r7f.New Zeukuul, p.274.
51) Margaret Wilson, 'Constitutional Rccognition of the Trcaty of Waitangi: Myth or Reality?, in
Yillgn and Yearman (eds.),,/a.rrice and lt\erttitv. Atttipodeati prucrices,Bridget Williams Books,Wellington, 1995, p. 8.
5l B' Bowden, Parliantertt und tlrc People: 7'lte New Zeulutttl Constitution aruI How it Developetl,Governmenr Printer, Wellington, 19g4. p. 32.
52 {)tange, The Treaty of'Waitangi,p. 136.
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rcconciled with the terrns of the Treaty. Consequently, throughout the lg50s, there
was 'an occasional Maori appeal to the Queen fbr redress of grievances - the first
trickle of what would later become a steady flow of Maori protest based on rreaty
rights"sl Mdori also moved to organise politically to protect themselves from this
change in the identity of their treaty pzu'tner. For example, through the Mdori King
Movement, founded in 1858, northern Mdori tribes selected a common king ancl
banded together to protect Mdori indepenclence and slow the loss of Mdori land.5a
Peter Cleave suggests that the movement developed partly as a rejection of the way the
term 'the Crown' was being usecl by the British in the 1850s, although he does not
elaborate on this statement.S5
In 1856, the Constitution Act was amen<led to allow for the establishment of
responsible government in New Zealand,again qualified by the continued right of the
British government to control native atl'airs, amongst other things.56 According to
Gustafson, 'responsible government' meant the king and/or governor became a
figurehead without any real political power who will conventionally act on the advice
of New Zealand ministers.5T The irnplications of the monarchy being a symbolic
figurehead were particularly serious for Mf,ori when coupled with the settler
governments' ongoing failure to uphold and protect Mdori rights under Article tr of
the Treaw.
From 1856 to 1876 there was vigorous expansion and growth of material prosperity in
New Zealand. By 1858 Mrori were numerically dominated by the increasing pdkeh6
53 Orange, The Treuty uf'Wuitan1ii,p. l4l.
54 Befich, 'The Governors and the Meori'. pp. g7-gg.
55 Peter Cleave, The Sovereignty Gunte; Prnver, Knowletlge untl Reudittg the Treaty,Institute ofPolicy Studies, Wellington. 19g9, p 51.
56 Leicester webb, Goverrrment itt Neut Zeuluncl,Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, 1940,p, 7.
57 Gustafson ,Constitutiottal Changet, Sitrce tg70,n.2.
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population.5s While 'the Queen's' sovereignty prevailed, there was still support from
the majority Pdkehd population tbr further separation of the colony from British
authority'se Once again, due to their own interpretations of the appropriate identity of
the Crown, many M[ori were expressing disapproval and confusion over the shift in
power which was taking place. In 1863, apparently due to the cost of the Land
Wars,6tt the independent New Zealancl legislature was granted responsibility for Mdori
affairs'61 Maori protests against government action and control of Mdori affairs
increased. For example, in 1865 ancl 1g66, wiremu Tamihana Tarapipipi of the
Waikato petitioned the New Zealand padiament and the Queen appealing that the
'Queen's mana' be reasserted ancl that Maori land, mana and chieftainship be
consequently restored.62 This and other similar appeals were to no avail. By lg70 the
British Crown had withdrawn completely tiom native affairs and land management in
New Zealand.63
From 1891 to 1912, described as the 'Liberal Era', the identity of the ruling authority
in New Zealandwas further complicatecl by the introduction of party politics. In lggl
the Liberals became the first party government under Premier John Ballance.tr For
Mf,ori, the possibility that power could be handed back and forth over the years
between competing political parties was completely contrary to the concept of the
constant authority and protection of the Queen initially envisaged and agreed to by
them under the terms of the Treaty. It was srnall compensation for Maori that Richard
ll Y o'f Sorrenson, 'Modern Miori: The Young Mdori party ro Mana Motuhake,, in KeithSinclair (ed') The oxJbrd lllustrated Hi.rrory oJ Nei zealatuJ, oxrora University press, oxford,1993,p.323.
59 Orange, The Treuty of'Wuitangi,p.2g6.
60 11't" Land Wus were lbught between norrhem Milori and the British. For further discussion see:Ringer, New Zealand Gttvirnment,p,3l. ancl Jamcs Belich,'The Governors and the Maori,, inSinclair (ed.) New haland Hi.rtory.pp. Sl-el.
6l Gustafson ,Constirutiontil Chnnges Sitr<:e |[t70.p.3.
62 Orunge, The Treuty of'Wuitangi,p. l g0.
63 Bowden, Parlicuttent uncl the people.p.32.
64 David Hamer, 'Centralization and Nationalism (1891- lgl|)'.in Sinclair (ed.), History of NewZeuland,p.125.
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Seddon, Premier from 1893 to 1906, encouraged a dominant role for central
govemment (as opposed to regional government) which was at least compatible with
the concept of central 'Crown' authoriw.65
According to Claudia orange, it was some time before Mdori fully comprehended the
irnplications of the transfer of power fiom the British Crown to the New Zealand
government. She comments that '[i]t was inconceivable to them [Maori] that both the
Queen and her parliarnent had washed their hands of the Waitangi covenant. But they
had''66 Despite the impossibility of the situation and ignoring the increasing authority
of the settler govemment, Mdori turned their energies in the 1880s towards appealing
directly to the Queen in England in orcler to test 'the Crown's' long-held promise of
protection and to secure MEori autonomy and future interests.6T Two Mdori
deputations, one from Ngdpuhi ancl another which included Tawhiao, the M6ori King
fiom the Waikato, made their way to England in the 1880s seeking audience with the
Monarch as their true treaty p4rtner.6E It appeared that some forty years after the
Treary had been signed, Maori had maintained an image of the eueen as the Crown
treaty partner.
While neither claim was successt'ul, they both attracted a great deal of public aftention.
The first petition maintained that the sole authority under with the Treaty of Waitangi
was vested in the Queen of England. The deputation requested that Her Majesty
appoint a 'Royal English Commission' to investigate and rectify the laws created by
the settler government which contaveneci the Treaty. The issue of land confiscations
65 David Hamer,'Centr:rlization ancl Nationalism (1891- tglz)',pp.126-12g. The Crown identiry
was to be redefined to incorporate local govemment after the late t'980s wlttr the Local GovernmentReforms and the Resourcc Management i-ggt. S"" Chapter Seven.
66 Orange, The Treary of'Waitangi,p. ltt4.
67 Orange. The Treaty ol' Waitangi, p.2{)4.
ff 
-o-11se, 
The Trettry tfi'wuirang!. p. 205: also see chapter l0 'The struggle for Autonomy' pp.205-225.
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and Mdori representation were also raised.6e However, the British official hearing the
deputation denied any responsibility on the part of the British Crown and pointed out
that the British Crown no longer had a right to interfere in New Zealand,s internal
affairs.To
The second deputation led by the Maori King asked the Queen to consider a separate
Mdori parliament under section 71 of the Constitution Act tgszlt (which allowed
Mdori districts to govern themselves). According to Cox, the Mdori King assumed
that Queen Victoria, his treaty partner woulcl meet with him 'kanohi ki te kanohi,. .[]t
was seen as appropriate that the two monarchs should meet face to face, to resolve the
difficulties between their peoples.'72 However, the Mdori delegates were refused
audience with Her Majesty. The cleputation was instead interviewed by the Secretary
of State for the Colonies who informecl them that Britain could play no part in colonial
affairs which were now the responsibility of the colonial government.?3
Appeals to 'the Crown' in England by Mlori leaders continued after the turn of the
century, but seemed to lack the support they had earlier enjoyed. In 1909, a petition
was drafted to be forwardecl to England by the Governor, but a new generation of
younger Mrori leaders seemed unwilling to back the appeal.Ta Evidence of appeals to
the British Crown is increasingly scarce frorn this time on, while government action
contravening the terms of the Treaty is increasingly apparent.
69 Orange, The Treatv of Waitangi,p.206.
7() Orange, The Treaty of Waitangi 
, p. 207 .
7l Cox, Kotahitangtt, p. 57.
72 Cox, Kotahitangct, p. 5g.
73 Cox, Kotahitunga, p. 58.
74 Orange, The Treaty oJ' Waitangi, pp. 227 -22g.
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On 25 September, lg07 New Zealand became a self-governing Dominion,T5 as a
clirnax to growing colonial nationalisrn evident in New Zealand,as in other British
colonies. According to Gustaf'son, at this point New Zealandwas still a long way
from being a sovereign state. Indeed, in 1914, when Britain declared war, the
Dominions were automatically irnplicated.T6 However, following the end of the flrst
world war, New Zealand enjoyed further diplomatic independence from Britain by
signing the peace treaty on its own behalf ]7 Later,the Statute of Westminster Act
1931 was passed by the British Parliament ancl gave those Dominion parliaments
which chose to adopt the Act indeperrclent control of their entire legislative process.
New Zealand was initially unwilling to adopt the Act due to defence and economic ties
with the 'mother' country. However, when it eventually did so in 1947,the New
Zealand government gained.ft/i legislative power fiom Britain. From this point, the
New Zealand Parliament was supreme.Ts Much later, the Constitution Act 19g6,
severed a last tie with Britain when it replaced the New Zealand,Constitution Act lg52
of the Parliament of the United Kingdorn.Te
It has been argued in this discussion that Mdori were encouraged to believe that the
Queen was a British rangatfua who would personally protect the taonga (neasures) and
tino rangatiratanga of the Maori people. In reality, the eueen's authority was
exercised by British and subsequently New Zealand governments. The symbol of the
Crown played a critical role in linking the transition of power between the eueen, the
British govertment and New Zealtncl,governments. As it had earlier done in Britain
when authority was transferred fiorn rnonarch to representative, the Crown created an
impression of an undisturbed exercise of power in New Zealand,and a natural and
75 Hight, Constitutirmul Histo4, uttd krv, o.l'New Zealantl,p. 3gl.
76 Gustafson 
, Constitutictnal Chcutget Sitrc,e lit70. p. 4.
77 Gustafson, Cctnstitutiorttil Chauges Sin(:e 1g70, p. 5.
78 Gustafson , Con.rtitutionul Clrunges Sirt<.r 1g70. p.7.
79 Paul Harris and Stephen Levine (eds.). Tlrc New Zealund
Dunmore Press, Palmerston North. 1994. p. 3g.
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Iegitimate transfer of authority from Queen, to British government to settler
government' While this may be true fiom the perspective of the British constitution,
fbr Maori, the shift from Queen to government created tremendous disruption by
forcing them to adjust to a change in the iclentity of their fteaty partner which was
neither explained in the Treaty or subsequently agreed to by Mdori.
In recounting the events fbllowing the signing of the Treaty, this discussion has
demonstrated also that the Crown syrnbol tlourished in New Zealand(again as it had
done in Britain) during a time of constitutional instability and transition. However, as
settler govemment in New Zealand became established the Treaty was further
marginalised, and the Crown symbol shifted into a state of 'hibernation' and remained
in this dormant state fbr around forty-live years. The next section provides evidence
of this 'disappearance' of the crown ancl considsrs the reasons for this.
The' Dormant C rown, : The political Age nda pre - I 975.
The purpose of the final section of this chapter, is to demonstrate that the Crown
symbol was not frequently used in political discourse prior to a renaissance of the
Treaty in the mid 1970s (discussed in Chapter Six). This is also an interesting
argument in relation to the frequent use of the symbol by the 1980s, demonstrated in
Chapter Two of this thesis. The investigation of the use of the Crown in the mass
media prior to 1975 which is summarised below, was not required to be as
comprehensive as the investigation of the mass media in the l9g0s, because its
purpose was to discover whether the Crown was absent or present in media texts,
rather than to analyse the symbol's use. The source was the newspaper collection at
Auckland University: more specifically rhe Mdori Affairs files from 1965, 1969 and
1975'80 As was previously the case with Index New Zealand, the content of
1] t* clippinos kept in the newspaper archives were predominantly from two Auckland newspapersThe Herald and the Aucktarul.stir. Idealll', thc kind of investigation carried out through the IndexNew Zealand database would have proviclci a better source for longitudinal analysis, however, INNZdoes not extend back prior to 1985. Therclbre 
. in the interests of tiire, certain years were selected for
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Auckland's files was subject to the discretion of the individuals selecting the material
over the years. However, the data available was certainly substantial enough for the
purposes of this inquiry.
The investigation demonstrated two things. First, the mass media reports indicate that
the political agenda was at this tirne dominated by assimilationist policies which
rejected the Treaty and second, such policies correlate with a noticeable absence of
references to 'the Crown'. In the mid sixties and early seventies, 'the Crown, was a
dormant political symbol. Before cliscussing this, some understanding of events
leading up to the changes in the 1970s is required.
Restrictions of time and space do not allow for detailed discussion of the process from
1840 to 1975 which underminecl the place of the Treaty in New Zealand,s developing
society' There are' however, some events which are often identified as significant
points in this process. Professor Gorclon On, for example, describes a combination of
events which included a ruling in I ti45 to allow the governor the power to extinguish
Maori claims to land, coupled with the tact that Mfrori were numerically outnumbered
by the 1850s when massive land conliscations occurrecl. He explains that a shift in the
judicial attitude towards the Treaty also undermined its significance, epitomised by the
1877 ruling by Judge Prendergasr thar the Treaty was a .simple nullity'.rr Lacking
both political and jucticial support, trcaty issues were further marginalised by attention
to more urgent matters raised during the two Worlcl Wars. Emerging from the 1930s
depression, New Zealand society was ushered into the era of the 'Welfare State, led by
the first Labour Government (1935-1949) which promoted meritocracy, equal
opportunity and the national interest, creating an atmosphere in which Mdori were to
be considered as equal citizens which at the same time denied their unique position
closer examination at around five year intcrvals prior to 1975 (the year of the Treaty of Waitangi Act,identified as a turning point in the next ch;rpter).
8f Gordon S' orr"The Treaty of 
-waitangi 1840: The New Zealand Experience', in LegislativeStudies, Vol. 9, no. 2, Aurumn, 1995. pp. f S_tZ.
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under the Treaty of Waitangi. The political agenda both reflected and promoted these
ideals, while the media and education reinforced the universality of 'the conformist
white, middle-class, two parent, consumption-oriented unit.'82 Assimilationist
policies which developed out of the 'welfare mentality' forced Maori to urbanise. As
one commentator explains:
[a]ctive assimilation demanded the Maori adopt the psyche and behaviour of the
Pakeha' whilst the sarne society continued to discriminate against them for being
Maori' Monocultural state education sanitised the history, suppressed the Ianguage and
radonalised Maori f ailure.83
From the mid-1940s, New Zealand's political agenda was dominated by
assimilationist attitudes and policies. Now commonly referred to as the .melting por
ideology' (originating in the USA), assimilation strove to reduce ethnic differences to
promote equality as 'sameness' between the races. In the 1950s and 1960s it was
generally accepted that M6ori woulcl be assimilated by the dominant European culture,
despite an increasing Mdori population. The Hunn Report of 1961, adopted and
implemented by the National Governmenr, reinfbrced the opinion that assimilation
(and integration) was not only inevitable, but aiso an appropriate rneans of preventing
racial tension in New Zealand.sa The Treaty of Waitangi was completely disregarded
by government at this time because it encouraged the acknowledgment of .difference,
between Mdori and Pakeha and appeared to complicate the simple principle of a
monocultural society. Accorcling to James Ritchie, 'until 1975, government policy and
public attitude [in New Zealand] fuellecl the fires under the melting pot.,85
L1 Ly" Kelse-y-'-A Questitttt of Hrtrutur? Luhttur and tlrc Treaty 1984-tg8g, Allen and Unwin,Wellington, t990, p. t7 .
83 Kelsey, A Questiort t1l'Honour.l , p. Ig.
84 Barry Gustafson, 'The National govcmmenrs ancl Social Chan ge (1949-1972)', in Sinclair,Hi'rtory oJ New Zealand, pp.2S8-2tl-9. Gustafson poinrs our tf,"t in the 1960s M5ori began to
^qy"tli.ol 
these policies and organised thcnrselves to express their concerns; p. 290. Also see ChapterSix (this thesis), for further discussion ol'Maori reaction to government policy in the 1960s and1970s.
85 
.Iames Ritchie, Beunning Biculturctr,H'ia pubrishers, wellington, 1992, p. 9.
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At a time when the Treaty was not a matter fbr public debate, the symbol of the Crown
as the treaty partner served little purpose or function in public or political discourse.
The language of mass communication at the time substantiates this argument and
demonstrates that the symbolic structure surrouncling Mdori issues was quite distinct
from that revealed in Chapter Two. For example, a report in 1965 clearly indicated no
sense of responsibility for Mdori lend under the Treaty with the comment the .[Maori]
Land Court should be ended' because, 'The [Whakatane County] Council feels the
present day Maori is capable of holcling his own, so far as dealings with land is
concerned.'86 In place of the notions of 'Crown' and 'resources' identified in mass
communication, the discourse of Maori atfairs in 1965 was preoccupied with the issue
of Mdori education. Without ref'erence to either the Treaty of Waitangi or ,the Crown,,
several reports acknowledged the 'government's'responsibility to provide equal
opportunity for Mdori sfudents. Lancl issues were only occasionally discussed.
However, when they were mentionetl 'Crown land' was a salient phrase (in keeping
with the earlier argument that this was a traditional 'Crown' title). Very occasionally,
'the Crown' was mentioned in a ntore active role. For example, in a discussion of the
Mf,ori Land Court, it was requirecl to 'remedy the invidious position of the Crown in
handling disputes over lands.'87
By 1969, the prevailing symbols sti.ll supported and promoted assimilationist policies
and perspectives. For example, one report stated that '[a]t the time of the Treaty of
Waitangi the Maori dicl not regarcl land trs an asset to be developed in value and
productivity much beyond its usefulness in providing the essentials of life. Such
ingrained viewpoints could scarcely be eradicated overnight.'88 Notions of equality
86 
'Land court should be ended', New zturttnd Herard, r0 May 1965, p. 14.
87'Hundred Years of Maori Land courr'. Auckrarulsrar, g March 1965,p.6.
88 
'DeveJopment of Maori Fishing', New, Zettlurrtl Heraltl,Eclitorial, 24 March, 1969, p. 6. Otherissues debated included the rejection of a Maori Parliament, the phasing out of Mdori Affairs and theabolition of MEori seats and the Mnori roll which are all indicative of an overarching and prevailing
assimilationist attitude. See 'Neecled: Proof of lntegration',The Atrcklancl Star,l0 November 1969,p. 7 . and New Zeulantl Herulcl,3 Decembcr I 969, [ 6.
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between the races also dominated cliscourse, as indicated by a statement that the aim of
the Maori Affairs Department was to make itself unnecessary and redundant, because
the department only exists to 'overcome tlre obstacles which hinder the Maori people
from achieving complete equality.'8u Lancl issues were sometimes discussed, but
were largely preoccupied with issues about forestry, land lease and subdivision,
although several references were made to Mdori land demands. The Crown symbol
appeared very occasionally in this context. For example, under a new lease policy .the
Crown' was reported to have reclaimed an area of land in orcler to manage the forests
and control the land use.eo Similarly, another report noted that Mdori land owners had
rejected a 'Crown' proposal on lancl ownership. However, these references to the
Crown were much more the exception than the norn.
By l9T5,assimilationist policies antl anitudes continued to dominate the mass media,s
interpretation of Mdori Affairs. Flowever, a significant increase in the discussion of
land management and ownership in New Zealand in relation to Mdori demands for
control of their resources was also eviclent. So too were references to the Crown in
relation to natural resources (although still relatively few and far between when
compared with discussion of the sarne in Chapter Two). One report, for example,
made reference to the Crown by stating, 'it would not be proper for the Crown to
nominate who might be given the lancl.'el Despite some exceptions, generally the
Crown was still not a popular symbol and the Treaty was not a matter for public
debate' This is perhaps best eviclenced by the fact that neither the Labour nor the
National Party showed serious recognition of Maori policy or the Treaty of Waitangi
in their 1975 election manit'estoes. National's policy issues included the economy,
superannuation, women's rights. inclustrial relations, agriculture, and a combined
policy for freedoms, sports and human lights, whjch stated that National would .repeal
li-y*n 
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the legislation that makes it possible for the state to literally steal productive land for
no better purpose than it wants more control. This applies to Mdori land, coastal land
and farmland alike.'e2 The choice of the tenn 'state' is interesting here, particularly
when compared to the Labour Party election promise to 'ensure the return to the M6ori
people where possible,lands which were doubtfully acquired by the Crown.,e3 This
was an early indication of a signiticant clifference between Labour and National parry
use of the crown symbol detected ancl explained earlier in chapter Four.
The purpose of demonstrating the dominance of assimilationist attitudes and the
noticeable absence of 'the Crown' in newspaper reports in the 1960s and 1970s has
been to emphasise the difference between the attitudes and language used at this time,
as opposed to the prolific use of 'tlre Crown' symbol tiom 1986 to 1993 as discussed
in Chapters Two and Four. The piece in this puzzlewhich remains unexplored is the
events which were responsible fbr the 'revival' of both the Treaty of Waitangi and the
Crown symbol in public discourse. This is the subject of the next chapter which
addresses the next stage in the evolution of the crown in New ze.a[and.
92 The Nationel party Mani.festu,1975.
93 lobou, Party ManiJe:ttct, 1975, p. 34.
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THE TREATY RENAISSANCE: REVTVING THE CRowN
The previous chapter argued that the Crown was an important symbolic identity during
and after the signing of the Treaty in 1840, but that by the 1960s it only infrequently
appeared in mass communication. This pattern was closely related to the Treaty,s
notable absence from New Zealancl's political agencla during most of the twentieth
century' A causal relationship between the currency of the Crown symbol and the
profile of the Treaty is further developed in this chapter where it is argued that a
renaissance of Treaty issues which began in the 1970s simultaneously revived the use
of the Crown symbol in public treaty cliscourse. In looking to explain how and why
this occurred and to understand more abclut the relationship between the Treaty and the
symbol of the Crown, this chapter begins with a discussion of another aspect of the
theory of political symbols, this time reguding the circumstances under which new
political symbols emerge. In then applying these theories to the events under which
the Crown re-emerged in New Zealand, after the 1970s, it is argued that the theory
helps to explain both why the government was in neecl of a reassuring symbol such as
the Crown' after the 1970s, as well as explaining how the Crown symbol naturally
emerged from the political events of the late 1970s and 1980s. Again, even in its
revived form, the popular conceptions of the Crown treaty partner proved problematic
for Mdori.
The Creation of New political Svmbols
The creation of new political syrnbols is one aspect of the general theory about
symbols in politics which was not discussed earlier in the thesis (Chapter Three) but
which is highly relevant here. A new political symbol, according to theorists, is a
word or object which is promoted, through political developments and frequent usage,
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to the status of a 'key wotd' in political communication. In other words, it is a
political concept which gains popularity amongst the public through frequent use by
govemment and other public commentators (such as the mass media, for example).
This discussion of some of the key ideas in the theory of new symbols builds upon the
general theory discussed in Chapter Three. In particular it enlarges upon ideas about
the role of symbols in providing public reassurance from perceived threats and
legitimacy for government actions ancl authority. Theorists suggest three features of
new political symbols which will later be tested against the nature and circumstances
of the Crown's revival in treaty discourse. First and foremost, theorists suggest that
social and political changes, especially those which are forced upon the public by
govemment, create the greatest need for symbols which are able to reassure the public
and therefore enhance the government's legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens. While
symbols which fulfil this function may be generated by government, theorists
secondly argue that the most effective symbols are those which arise spontaneously or
develop naturally from the facts and context of the situation (such as the ,wine box,
symbol in Chapter Two). Finally, theorists explain that the most effective reassuring
symbols will not only develop naturally but will also represent or indicate the
emergence of a new order intended to resolve the problems of the old order and at the
same time represent those things most valuable in the old order.l
First, theorists suggest that a change in the frequency of a key sign or symbol,s use in
political language indicates a social or political development.2 More specifically, new
political symbols arise as a result of dramatic events or major changes within a society
or changes outside the society which impact on it in some way. In addition, it is
suggested that a government which forces unwelcome change upon its citizens or
lIn particular, see: Murray. Edelman-,Ifte symbolic lJses ttf Politics,University of lllinois press,Urbana, 1964: and C.D. Elder and R.W. coat,rhe Political lJset of Symbols,Longman press, NewYork, 1983:
2 Edelman, The Symbtilit lJ,res of'politic.s,p.122.
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somehow outrages its public has the greatest need for reassuring symbols.3 This point
in particulal is most important for understanding the revival of the Crown in public
discourse in New Zealand and will be discussed later. In the meantime, it will be
recalled from Chapter Three that symbols can provide reassurance sought by the
public, particularly when the symbol provides the public with something they want to
believe about themselves or their environment. Particularly in a time of social or
political turmoil, symbols can affirm social identities and provide reassurance.4 As
was also explained in Chapter Three, it is the public perceptions of threat and tension
levels which are critical to their acceptance of any symbols, but particularly new ones.S
For example, citizens will react to a controversial political issue with either divided
opinions or multiple views. The public's reaction has a significant bearing on the
public's collective perception of threat and therefore its reaction to symbolic
assurances from government also. When a society's reaction is 'bimodal' (split into
two factions) perceptions of threat and security are maximised because the issue
becomes a question of right and wrong or good and bad. In this case, the public is
most likely to look for and accept symbolic reassurances from appropriate authorities
which appease anxieties and offer security by, presumably, offering a solution to the
problerp.6 The nature of this 'solution' is discussed later.
The suggestion that bimodal opinion enhances threat perception and the acceptance of
symbols by publics is interesting in light of the New Zealand public's reaction to
Maori protests and government action regarding the Treaty of waitangi in the mid
1970s. In earlier discussion it was noted that the New Zealand public has generally
been divided on its opinion of treaty issues; polarised between supporters and
opponents of the Treaty. Furthermore, as is soon revealed, the govefltment did not
enjoy general public support in taking action on the Treaty. ln this respect, the New
r Edelman, The Synhotic Uses of politrc..r, p. 9.
4 Elcler and Cobb, The potiticul lJrcs oJ'Svmbols, pp. 3l-32.
5 Edelman, The Symholic IJses of politic.r,p. 177.
6 E<lelman, The Symhotic ltses oJ politic.r, pp. I7S-l7g
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Zealand government was forcing unwelcomed change on a divided New Zealand
public' According to theorists, both the public's perception of threat and its need for
symbolic reassurances were maximised by these conditions. This possibility is given
more detailed examination later in the chapter.
Second, in considering the question of how new symbols emerge, theorists argue that
symbols are most likely to be generated when an advantaged group in society finds
itself or its status threatened.z The symbols generated by that group will serve to
preserve the group's authority and status and protect it from any perceived threat. An
example of this was earlier demonstrated with the 'Principles for Crown Action'
which protected the government's authority to govern against increasing pressure for
an acknowledgment of M60ri treaty rights. However, the question as to how
effectively even the most advantaged or powerful groups can generate symbols on the
basis of their own needs must be raised. It has been suggested that rather than being
planned or manut-actured, effective and lasting political symbols emerge more or less
spontaneously from the facts of the situation.s In other words, as was revealed in
discussing the development of the Crown symbol in British history, popular symbols
arise naturally from their context or environment. A second purpose for later
discussion will therefbre also be to cletermine whether the Crown symbol was
generated by an advantaged group in an attempt to protect its interests, or whether it
emerged more or less spontaneously from the context of the events aftet L975.
The final theoretical suggestion considered in this chapter is that symbols which
effectively resolve social and/or political tensions do so by indicating altered
possibilities for a new political/social order.e Here we are discussing the 'solution'
mentioned in the first theoretical suggestion which was thought to appease public
i Elder and Cobb, The Politicat tJses oJ'Symhols, p.32.
E Elder and Cobb, The political IJses of'Synfuols, p. 30.
9 Edelman, The Syntholic Ilse,r of politics.p.174.
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tension and anxiety. once again, looking in particular at governments who are
implementing unpopular change, it is suggested that they justify and maintain public
support by using symbols which lend credibility, stability and direction ro an emerging
political order. New symbols will also under these circumstances attempt to establish
new identities or meaning for an emerging political order.lO As one theorist notes,
'[n]ew words and concepts are created if changes in the environment come about
which require new symbolic interpretations.'l I Alternatively, a new symbolic structure
for government creates the impression that significant changes have taken place in the
structure of government.l2 For example, by creating a new agent in government
administration, such as the Crown health enterprises and Crown research institutes
discussed in Chapter Two, a change in the relationship between the government and
other groups is indicated, whether or not that change is real. The possibility, to be later
examined, is that the Crown symbol implied that significant change had taken place in
the management of treaty issues by suggesting that a new .crown, body had been
infroduced to the political structure to fulfilthe role of treaty parrner.
With these three theoretical arguments in mind, discussion now turns to the chain of
events which led to the revival of the Crown symbol in treaty debate. These events
began with a challenge to the political agenda in the early l9z0s.
C halle nging the P olitical Agendar s
The sort of social or political change which theorists suggest will trigger the creation
of a new political symbol, occurred in New Zealandin the mid 1970s when both the
National amd Labour Governments faced a potential constitutional crisis in the form of
Mdori rights and the Treaty of Waitangi. Prior to the 1970s, the dominant discourse of
l0 Elder and Cobb, The political llses of Symbols,p.32.
I I Claus Mueller, The Prtlitics of Communicution,oxfordUniversity press, New york, 1973, p. 15.
l2 Edelman, The Symbolic Ilses of politic.r, p.57.
13 In this discussion 'political agenda' means the political issues which dominate not only thegovernment's energies but also which attract public attention and are d.iscussed by the media.
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mass communication largely reflected the prevalent attitude that the Treaty of Waitangi
was irrelevant to New Zealand's social and political development. This attitude was
briefly demonstrated through examples of news reports in the previous chapter but has
been established more conclusively by other writers.l4 Equally well documented is
the fact that, despite these attitudes within mainstream PEkehE society and government
prior to the 1970s, Mflori maintained and nurtured demands that the Treaty of Waitangi
be recognised and honoured at all levels of society. However, it was not until the mid
1970s that Mdori protest action received the sort of publicity and recognition required
to make the Treaty a matter of national debate and concern.
The success of Mdori protests in forcing action from first the Labour Government
(1972-1975) and then National Government (1975-1984), despite the lack of public
support for the Treaty, has been attributed in part to the national and international
environment at that time which was increasingly conscious of indigenous peoples'
rights' As New Zealand historian, P.K. Sorrenson explains, changes in national
attitudes (particularly within govemment) towards the Treaty were encouraged by the
work of historians and lawyers who, from around 1970, 'resuscitated' the Treaty of
Waitangi and paved the way for new radical interpretations of the Treaty and its role in
New Zealand history' ts Raj Vasil adds that the election of the conservative National
Government in 1975 (which replaced Labour) created great anxiety for M6ori,
prompting unprecedented protest action.l6 In exploring the broader international
scene, James Ritchie describes an atmosphere in which other nations had already set
]o lol example: see; Barry Gustafson, 'The National Governments and Social Change (lg4g-lg7z), 
,in Keith Sinclair (ed'),The oxforct lllustruted History oJ'New Zealantl,oxford tlniversity press,Auckland, 1993j pP 267-294, and Andrew Sharp, 'ThL Problem of Maori Affairs 1984-1989' in MHolland and J. Boston (eds.),The Fourth Inbour Governmtnt: Politics and policy in New Zeatand,2nd edn., Oxford University Press, Auckland, p. 251, for discussion of issues which dominated thepolitical agenda. Also sce: Ranganui Walker, Ka Whawheti Tonu Matou: Struggle Without Encl,Penguin Books, Auckland, 1990, for discussion of the Mdori struggle to have their rights
acknowledged during this time.
ls nnff Sorrenson, 'Towards a Radical Intorpretation of New Zea:andHistory,, in IJI. Kawharu(9d),Waitangi: Mdori and, Pdkehd Perspectivei of the Treaty of Waitangi,Oroia'University press,Auckland, 1989, pp. 159-160.
l!,\aj Vasil' Whcu tlo Mttori Wctnt?, New Political Perspective.r, Random Century press, Auckland,1990, p. 28.
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about dealing with their 'colonial past' and the dispossession of their native people in
diff'erent ways.lT This international trend towards the recognition of native and
indigenous peoples' rights, fuelled nations' condemnation of conditions within South
Africa and placed pressure on other countries, such as New Zealand, to consider the
state of their own indigenous peoples.
However, while national and international circumstances were more favourable than
ever before for Maori, the most immediate challenge to New Zealand's political agenda
came from Mdori protest action which gathered force in the 1970s drawing attention to
issues of land ownership and to the Treaty itself.l8 According to Sorrenson, nnew
Maori organisations emerged to deal with ... specific grievances, especially in relation
to land.'le Amongst the protests identified as 'the most significant milestones'20 in
these critical years were the Land March in the summer of 1974fi5, the Bastion Point
land occupation of 1977 which lasted for 506 dayszt and the Raglan land dispute-
However, of all of these, the Land March perhaps best demonstrated that Mdori
protests were about finding a treaty partner who would address and resolve Maori
grievances and reinstate the Treaty of Waitangi to its rightful place in New Zealand's
social and political structure. The motivation for the Land March had occurred many
years before with the 1967 Maori Affairs Amendment Act (consequently dubbed 'the
l7 James Ritchie, Becuning Bicultural, Huia Publishers, Wellington, 1992, p. 10.
l8 Ritchie, Becoming Bicultural,p. 9. Ranginui Walker looks further back to the Waitangi Day Act
1960 when the government 'dusteb off' the long neglected Trsaty and declared 6 February a national
day of thanksgiving to commemorate the signing of the Treaty. According t9 Walkel'_the National
Government was considerably embarrassed-by u Vtaoti group which called Waitangi Day a day of
mourning for the loss of Maori land. The Government sought advice from the M6ori Council over
the issue, irnd was presented with a list of fourteen statutes which contravened Article tr of the Treaty.
As a result. 'monocultural land law' was modified for the first time when the Town and Country
Planning Act 1974 was changed to take account of the 'culture of the colonised.' See; Ranginui
Walker, Ka Wuwhai Tonu Matou,pp.2Il-212.
l9 M.p.K. Sorrenson,'Modern Maori: The Young Maori Party to Mana Motuhake', in Keith
Sinclair (ed.),The Ortbrd lllustatetl Hisnry cg Niw Zealund, Oxford University Press, Oxford,
1993, p. 348.
2{) pol Yasil,Whttt tlo Maori Want?, p.27 .
2l Sorrenson, 'Modern Maori', p.349.
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last land grab') which Mdori considered a breach of their treaty rights.zz The late
Dame Whina Cooper, leader of the March, described the protest as a call for Mdori
unity over land and 'a protest that might be heard where others had failed.' She said,
'Take no more land from us. That is our cry.'23 The March was widely reported by
the media, as the marchers walked from Cape Reinga, at the top of the North Island, to
Parliament Buildings in Wellington, where they established a 'tent assembly' and
refused to move until their concerns were registered and action was taken by
government.24
Widely publicised M1ori protests such as the Land March generated considerable
tension and anxiety within the greater New Zealand public and brought the previously
latent issue of race relations in New Zealand to the fore. With little knowledge and
even less of an understanding of the Treaty and its implications for New Zealand,
public opinion was both polarised and passionate. Under such circumstances,
according to theorists, the government's legitimacy was under considerable strain and
the public's perception of threat was maximised. In responding to the crisis in L975,
the newly elected National Government inherited policies developed by Labour which
would force unwelcomed change on the majority of New Zealanders who did not
support the Treaty or sympathise with Mdori grievances. This policy focused on the
Treary of Waitangi Act 1975, a provision which had been introduced by the Labour
Government.
The Crown and the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975
Amidst a background of M[ori insistence that the Treaty should be honoured and
grievances resolved, the Treaty of Waitangi Bill had been introduced to Parliament by
22 Walker, Ka Whawhui To,xu Matou,p.2l2.
23 'Unity Call on Maori Land' , New Zealand Herald,23 April 1975' p. 3.
24 'Rowling Greets Maoris outside Parliament' , New kaland Herald, 14 October 1975 ' p. I '
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Labour's Minister of Maori Affairs, Matiu Rata, on 8 November l9'14.2s The debate
of the readings of the Bill in the House of Representatives demonstrates both the
centrality of 'the Crown' in the Bill and the complexities of this identity as a
representation of one of the two contemporary treaty partners.
At the first reading of the Bill, Rata explained to the House that its purpose was to
'provide for the observation ancl confirmation of the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi and to determine claims about certain matters which are inconsistent with
those principles.'26 He also explained that the Bill was an integral part of Labour's
objective to find a practical means of legally acknowledging the principles set out in
the Treaty. Rata advised that the Bill would provide for the establishment of the
Waitangi Tribunal which would 'consider claims by persons prejudicially affected by
any Act, regulation, Order in Council, or policy or practice of the Crown which is
considered inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.' He said the
Waitangi Tribunal would also have the authority to make recommendations to the
Crown based on the Tribunal's findings on each claim.z7 The Bill and the 1975 Act
were cautious in that they only applied to the future and did not allow for inquiry into
the actions or policy of the Crown in the past (although the subsequent amendment in
1985 did as discussed later in the chapter).
The various possible interpretations for the Crown within the legislation were also
demonstrated at the readings of the Bill. For example Robert Muldoon, the Irader of
the Opposition, off'ered one possible interpretation for the Crown when he stated, 'the
tribunal simply has the power to recommend. That means that the final decision is in
the hands of the government of the day.' In denouncing the Bill's usefulness, he
25 New Zeularul Pttrliamentary Dehates, INZPDI Vol.395, l1 Oct-8 Nov 1974, pp.5725-5729'
26 Nzpo,Vol. 395, p.5725.
27 NZpO,Vol.395. p.5726. Note rhat the italics in this quote were added foremphasis as in all
other quotations from NZPD unless otherwise specified.
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advised that the Opposition would not delay the Bill's introduction.2s On the other
hand, at the third reading of the Bill, Rata indicated a significantly different
interpretation for 'the Crown' when he clarified that the Tribunal would 'inquire and
make recommendations to the governmenr and of course to Parliament itself..'zg The
Crownn it appeared, could be interpreted as both government and parliament, which are
significantly different entities. Despite these differences in interpretation, the meaning
of the Crown was not resolved or even discussed during the Bill's readings.
The Treaty of Waitangi Act was passed on 10 October 1975. In the preamble to the
Act it was stated that the Treaty had been entered into by 'her Late Majesty Queen
Victoria and the Maori people of New Zealand' and that it was now desirable to
establish a Tribunal to make recolnmendations on claims relating to the practical
application of the Treaty's principles. While acknowledging that the Treaty was
originally with the Queen, the Act identified 'the Crown' as the appropriate
contemporary paltner for Maori under the Treaty. Most importantly, while
interpretations were offered for 'Maori', 'Treaty' and 'Tribunal' within the Act, none
was offered for the equally significant (and arguably more complex) concept of 'the
Crown.'
In questioning the identity of the Crown in legislation in contemporary New T.ealand
society, it is prudent to note that the Crown had undergone significant change the
previous year in the amendment to the Royal Titles Act1974. According to Rata, the
1974 Act was a critical precursor to the 1975 legislation because it established the
identity of the Crown in New Zealandby shifting the emphasis away from the Queen
in Englancl in the Royal Titles while at the same time emphasising the role of the
Queen as Queen of New /svlvnd.3tt The circumstances surrounding the reading of the
28 t'tzpo,Vol. 395, pp.5726-5721.
2e NzPo, Vol. 402, 30 Sep - 10 Oct, 1975, p. 5406.
30 Pets. cornm., Matiu Rata,28 July 1995.
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Bill were fairly unique. All three readings of that Royal Titles Amendment Bill were
done at once in the presence of Her Majesfy the Queen of England who was on tour in
New Zealand at the time. In addressing the purpose of the Bill, the Prime Minister,
Right Honourable N.E. Kirk, stated that '[t]he [Royal Titles Amendment] Bill now
before Parliament lays a primary emphasis on Her Majesty's designation as Queen of
New Zealand rather than on her status as Queen of the United Kingdom.'3l He said'
'I hope and believe that the Bill does reflect more accurately the constiturtional position
of the Sovereign in relationship to New Zealand.'32 Another writer was more
conservative in his view of the significance of this legislation with regard to the
identity of the Crown in New Z,ealand,and commented:
[t]he Royal Titles Act 19?4 has emphasised the position of the Crown in the
sovereignty of New Zealand as being distinct from the LIK. ... The Crown in New
Zealand should not be seen as autochthonous [meaning indigenous]. This new status
necessitates an examination of the position of the Crown in the United Kingdom of
New Zealan{ and of the role of the Queen and Her Governor-General in the
contemporary government of the country.33
The centrality of the Crown in the 1975 legislation, in conjunction with its ambiguity
in the legislation (despite the Royal Titles Amendment Act 1974) leads us to question
the wisdom of the decision to use the term 'the Crown' in the 1975 Act. In wondering
why this phrase was chosen to identify the treaty partner (a point which becomes
critical in the next chapter) two points should be kept in mind. First, it will be
remembered from Chapter One that 'the Crown' is an identity known to the law, while
a term such as 'government' is not. Secondly, the Crown was an appropriate choice in
3t NzpD, Vol. 389. 4 February-March 4 1974,p.2.
32 NZpO, Vol 389, p.2. It is also interesting to note that the Queen, present in New Zealand for
the passage of the Blll, stated in her response to the Bill's reading that 'it w:rs on the sixth day of
FeUruary134 years ago that the link was established between the British Crown and my M6ori
people ind the first stJp in New Zealand's nationhood was taken ...' (See, NZPD, VoI. 389, p' 4)
tni Qu""n'u use of rhl word 'my' in this context is an indication of her awareness of a special
relatio-nship between her and th" i4aoti people which reciprocates the feelings conveyed by M6ori
aller the signing of the Treaty in 1840.
33 D.L. Stevens, The Crown, the Covernrsr-General and the Constitution, Thesis for Masters in
Law, Victoria University of Wellington,I9'14, p. xix.
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as much as it encapsulates the Queen, as the original partner, and the government as
the institution which now governs on her behalf. However, despite these appealing
qualities, the Crown is a complex symbol which poses problems of consistency and
evolution in its identity. Moreover, no obvious attempt was made to resolve these
complexities in the 1975 legislation (in fact there was no indication that the House was
aware of these complexities). Consequently, when the Waitangi Tribunal (established
under the Act) went on to attract public and government attention to the Treaty in the
1980s, the Crown symbol was used with increasing frequency and the problem of the
Crown increased, particularly for some M[ori in negotiation with 'the Crown'- In
short, after 1975, a new chapter in the history of 'the Crown' in New Zealand had
begun which would lead to further evolution of this most complex identity.
The Waitangi Tribunal: A Call for Crown Action
It was noted earlier that there is some degree of tension between theorists as to
whether new political symbols ate consciously generated by govemment, or whether
popular and enduring symbols arise naturally and spontaneously from the facts of a
situation. In this section of the chapter, it is argued that the Waitangi Tribunal, as a
direct result of its purpose set out in the 1975 Act, couched its findings and
recommendations in terms of 'the Crown'. This, in combination with the media's
attention to the Tribunal's early recommendations which wers also presented to the
public in terms of 'the Crown', meant that by and large the Crown symbol nahrrally
emerged in the 1980s.
Since its inception, and particularly after the early 1980s, the Waitangi Tribunal has
played an essential ancl pivotal role in the interpretation of the Treaty and in the
promotion of Maori rights. Whether attracting commendation or criticism from
government, political parties, pressure groups or public, the Tribunal has been
responsible, through its findings and recomlnendations, for raising the nation's
awareness on ffeaty issues. Also, where possible, the Tribunal has re-educated New
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Znaland society about the country's history and the options for its funre development.
In doing so, the Tribunal has methodically introduced new concepts and words into
the language of government policy and public debate relating to the Treaty of Waitangi.
In particular, the Tribunal has recognised and promoted a Treaty partnership between
M[ori and 'the Crown'.
Before discussing specific claims, some attention should be paid to the Tribunal's
development which partly explains its unpredicted success. Under the 1975 Act, the
Tribunal was given exclusive authority to determine the meaning and effect of the
Treaty according to the English and Mdori texts and to resolve issues arising from the
differences between these texts.3a The Tribunal was restricted to hearing claims
relating to events which occurred after 10 October lg75,when the Act was passed.3s
The first Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1977 andconsisted of three members;
the Chief Judge of the Mdori Land Court, a representative for the Ministry of Mlori
Affairs and an Auckland 1awyer.36 While the Tribunal was limited in its success at
this time (because of its limited jurisdiction and poor resources), three new members in
1980 introduced new enthusiasm for the Tribunal's role. Much of this enthusiasm and
the Tribunal's subsequent success has been credited to the appointment of Judge E.T.
Durie who is said to have transformed the procedure and philosophy of the Tribunal
and consequently raised the credibility and legitimacy of the Tribunal, most
importantly in the eyes of its Maori claimants.3T
The Tribunal's impact on New Zealand society increased dramatically in the 1980s.
Central to this developrnent was a decision by the Labour Government in 1985 to have
34 Sorrenson,'Towards a Radical Interpretation of New ZealandHistory',p. 160.
35 Sooenso.r, 'Towards a Radical Interpretation of New ZealandHistory', p. 160. Sorrenson.argues
that in reality there was no way of avoiding historical analysis when hearing claims despite this
limitation of the Act.
36 paul Temm, Waitangi Tribunal; The Conscience o.f the Ntttion, Random Century Press,
Auckland, 1990, p. 5
37 Sorrenson, 'Towards a Radical lnterpretation of New Tnaland History', p. 161.
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the Tribunal's jurisdiction extended to include Crown actions and policies claimed to
be inconsistent with the Treaty since the signing of the Treaty in 1840. Under the
same amendment the number of members on the Tribunal was increased to seven with
a provision for seven more members to be appointed as deputies.3s In 1988, the
Tribunal was further increased to sixteen members.39 In 1988, the National
Government amended the Act in order to restrict the Tribunal from investigating
claims to private land. Despite these increases and setbacks and the continued success
of the Tribunal in fulfilling its statutory function, the Tribunal was described as
recently as 1990 as 'essentially a part-time body doing a full time job.'4
The Tribunal's ability to increase its credibility and prestige despite the range of
impediments betore it has been largely attributed to four early decisions by the
Tribunal which added to the institution's mana and gave the Tribunal 'teeth'. Paul
Ternm, former member of the Tribunal, has described each of these decisions as 'a
foundation block or cornerstone ... lwhich] came to be linked, to lay the ultimate
foundation for the clevelopment of the Waitangi Tribunal.'al In each of the reports, the
concept of the Crown enjoyed a high profile. In addition, media coverage of two of
the reports, also included in this discussion, demonstrates that the Tribunal's
attachment to the Crown symbol was widely adopted by the mass media as the
Tribunal's findings and recommendations were announced to the public.
The Tribunal released its frst 'cornerstone decision', the Motonui /Waitara Report, in
1983.42 The report relared to a claim by Te Atiawa people of Taranaki that they were
prejudicially affected by the discharge of sewage and industrial waste onto or near
38 Temm, Wuiturtgj Trihurutl, pp. 12-14.
39 Temm, Waitctttl4i Tribunal,p. 14.
4t) 1"rnrn, Waitungi Tribunal, p. 15.
4l Temm, Waitang,i Tribunal,pp. 36-37. Also see Sorrenson, 'Towards a Radical Interpretation of
New Zealand History', pp.16I-172.
42 Waitangi Tribunal, Motortlri-Waitara Report,Department of Justice, Wellington' 1983.
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traditional fishing grounds and reefs. Te Atiawa asserted that this action was
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi. After hearing evidence, the
Tribunal found that the Treaty obliges the Crown (as opposed to government,
parliament, the Executive or the state) to protect M6ori people in the use of their
fishing grounds and from the consequences of settlement and development' In
response to the claim, the Tribunal cited section 6(3) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act
1975 which 'provicles that we [the Tribunal] may recommend to the Crown that action
be taken.'a3 Consequently, the Tribunal stated, '[w]e consider ... it would be helpful
for the Crown to give further weight to the interests of the local community and the
local Maori people.'44 On the basis of the evidence provided, the Tribunal
recofirmended that the outfall be discontinued and that 'the Crown seek an interim
agreement' with the appropriate parties involved. a5
Temm comments that the Tribunal's findings on this claim received wide publicity
which made people aware of the Tribunal, many for the first time.a6 As Temm
explains, '[t]he irnportance of the finding was not so much in the recommendations
that were ma{e. ... but in the fact that the terms of the Treaty had been brought to
life.'47 The newspapers generally responded to the finding by conveying, almost
verbatim, the Tribunal's findings and recommendations to the public. 'The Crown'
was frequently ref'errecl to in the reports. For example, one article stated that, '[the
Tribunall recommends that the Crown should forego the outfall', while also noting the
Tribunal's finding that'[t]he Treaty of Waitangi obliges the Crown to protect Maori
tishing grounds.'48 However, while the reports discussed the Tribunal's
references to 'Crown promises' and 'Crown obligations', the government (as opposed
43 Mototrui-Waitara Repurt, p. 33. The emphasis has been added to this and all other quotations
taken from reports in this chapter unless otherwise specified'
M Motonui-Waitara Report, p. 56.
45 Monnui-Waitara Report, p. 58.
46 Temm, Waitang,i Trihtrnul.p.37 .
47 Temm, Waitangi Tribunal,p.40.
a8'Outfail proposal fishery threat', The Evening Post,lg March 1983,p' 5'
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to the Crown) was identified when considering the government's response to the
Tribunal's findings.al It appeared that, while the Crown would later be used as a
metonym for government (as indicated in Chapter Two) at this point the symbol was
more limited in its application.
The second cornerstone claim was lodged on 30 January, 1978 by Sir Charles Bennett
and others on behalf of the Ngati Pikiao people. The claimants requested the Tribunal
use its powers under the 1975 Act to consider the Crown's policy to build a nutrient
pipeline to the Kaituna River. The claimants considered this policy to be inconsistent
with the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi, and requested the proposed pipeline to
the Kaituna River be discontinued.s0 ln 1984, having heard a great deal of technical
and historical evidence from numerous claimants, the Tribunal ruled that 'the policy of
the Crownby which a pipeline is to be constructed ... is contrary to the principles of
the Treaty of Waitangi.5l Accordingly, the Tribunal recommended to lhe Crownthat
the scheme be abandoned.S2
On 19 July, 1985 the Tribunal released its third major finding, the Manukau Harbour
report. The Manukau claimants had argued that their tribal kaimoana (seafood) had
been devastated by pollution. They also directed the Tribunal's attention to the issue
of land ownership through evidence of unjust land loss and confiscation of M6ori land
during the 1860s.53 The Tribunal's written recommendations were directed at specific
ministers. but were often made in relation to the Crown. For example, to the Minister
of Lands, the Tribunal recommended that the Crown negotiate ... for the acquisition of
49 For example see: 'Waitangi dccision significant', (Editorial) The Evening, Poy,z!Y*"l 1983, p'
3: 'Motonuiiiming tiecl to eifluent disposal', The Evening Post,23 March 1983; 'Tribunal upholds
Maoris' claim', Tie Dominknr, 19 March 1983, p. 3, and 'Fishing Ground fears backed',The New
Zeulutttl Herald,19 March 1983, p. 3.
50 Waitangi Tribunal, Ketituna River Report, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1984' p. l.
5l Kaituna River Reporr,p.33.
52 Kuiturrn River Report,p.5.
53 See' Sorrenson,'Towards a Radical Interpretation of New Znaland History', p. 166 for further
discussion.
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sites referred to.' Also it was recommended that 'the Crown should gazette areas as
wahi tapu' (sacred sites).s4 The Tribunal frequently made reference to 'the other party
to the Treaty, the Crown in right of New Zealand.'S5
While the Tribunal's recommendations on the Manukau Harbour claim have been
described as 'not particularly far reaching,56 ttre report has been likened to a bombshell
in its impact on the media. The contents of the Tribunal's report were widely relayed
to, in Temm's words, 'a profoundly shocked and amazed New Zealand public''57 The
impact of the report was perhaps further heightened by a comment by the Minister of
M6ori Affairs for the recently elected Labour Government, Koro WEtere, that the
Government would seriously consider the Tribunal's recommendations. One report in
the Wellington newspaper was typical of the media's response to the Tribunal's report.
It advised the public that the Tribunal had recommended a review of the laws relating
to the ownership and control of rivers, harbours, coastal and foreshore areas, in what
was described as the most comprehensive claim yet for the Tribunal and Mdori. The
report made frequent use of the Crown symbol, as the Tribunal had done, in advising
readers that 'the intention would be to restore the ownership of the Crown expressing
the Crown's fiduciary responsibilities to local tribes in terms of the Treaty of
Waitangi.'58 It was also noted that '[t]he omission of the Crown to provide a
protection against [treaty breaches] is contrary to the Treaty of Waitangi''5e Once
again however, the government was rarely identified as the Crown when discussing its
responses to the Tribunal's findings.
54 Waitangi Tribunal. Manukau Report.Department of Justice, Wellington, 1985, p. 98.
55 Manukuu Report, p. 99.
56 Temm, Weiltary1i Trihunal.p.50.
57 Temm, Waitangi Tribunal,p.47.
58 'Manukau Maori wronged - tribunal' ,Tlrc Evening, Pttst,3l July 1985' p. 10.
59 Manukau Maori wronged - tribunal' .The Evening, Post,Sl July 1985'p. 10.
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The last of the four cornerstone decisions, which is not considered in any detail here,
was the Te Reo Mdori claim which was regarded by the Tribunal as potentially the
rnost difficult issue to resolve due to its political, social and financial ramifications.
Lodged on behalf of Ng[ Kaiwhakapumau i te Reo Inc (the Wellington Board of
Mdori Language) the claim asked that Mfrori be made an official language in New
Zealand.fl Recommendations by the Tribunal were again made to individual ministers
rather than 'the Crown', although the Tribunal made frequent reference to 'the Crown'
in its report as in the statement, 'the Treaty of Waitangi obliges the Crown to recognise
and protect the Maori language.'61
This brief review of the Waitangi Tribunal and its four cornerstone decisions provides
some evidence of the development of the Crown symbol (as opposed to it being
consciously generated by government) from the context of the Tribunal's legislative
responsibility to investigate and make recommendations to 'the Crown', and the
media's part in relaying the Tribunal's findings to the wider public also using the
Crown symbol. However, it would not be accurate to say that the Crown's revived
popularity in the 1980s was the result of these influences alone. As the next section of
the discussion demonstrates, there is also some evidence of a conscious effort by the
Fourth Labour Government to respond to the Tribunal's call for Crown action and, in
doing so, to identify government as the contemporary Crown fteaty partner.
The Fourtlt. Labour Governrnent (1984-89): The New Crown in Action
By the time the Labour Government came to power in 1984, the ground swell of
clebate and publicity for Maori rights which had begun publicly in 1975, showed little
sign of abating. Labour had to act on Treaty matters if further antagonism and
possible conflict over race relations in New Zealand were to be avoided. Labour's
efforts to address the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealandhave been acknowledged and
60 Sorrenson, 'Towarcls a Radical Interpretation of NZ History', p' 169'
6l Waitangi Tribunal, Te Reo Mcrori Reporr, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1986' p' 51'
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debated by many writers, one of whom commented that, '[o]n the surface, the Labour
Government did take unprecedented steps to redress the injustices of the past, and the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi ... '62 Another acknowledged that, 'Labour dealt
with the M[ori 'problem' with imagination, courage and finesse and it did not make
them popular in doing so.'63
Labour's policy on the Treaty of Waitangi had three objectives, which were announced
prior to Labour's election victory in July 1984. These were to incorporate the Treaty
of Waitangi into a new Bill of Rights in New Zealand, to review Waitangi Day
commemorations ancl to amend the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (as mentioned
previously). Geoffrey Palmer, Minister of Justice, Deputy Prime Minister and later
Prime Minister, was central to the Government's treaty policy. As earlier research
indicated, Palmer displayed a characteristic propensity to use the symbol of the Crown
in treaty debate. Palmer's announcement and discussion of Labour's treaty policy
were loaded with 'Crown' symbolism. For example, in discussing the first policy
objective (as the Leader of the Opposition) Palmer explained that, '[t]he Treaty of
Waitangi was an agreement between tangata whenua [indigenous people (of the land)]
and the Crown. Promises were made and the Crown gave certain undertakings. The
intentions were honourable, but some of the subsequent history was not.'64 Similarly,
with regard to the review of the Waitangi Day commemoration, Palmer explained, '[i]t
is important for New ZealanrJto have a national day. Labour believes that Waitangi
Day can be an irnportant reminder of the agreement between the Mdori people and the
Crown. It can be a symbol of the beginning of our nationhood.'65 Finally, on the
matter of an amendment to the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 (discussed earlier in the
chapter), Palmer stated, '[tlhe Crownclearly accepted the obligations of the Treaty at
62 
.lane Kelsey. A Questkttt of Honour? ktbour and tlrc Treaty: 1984 -1989' 1990' Allen and
Unwin, Wellington, p. 2.
63 Andrew Sharp.'The Problem Of Maori AlTairs 1984-1989', p.255.
64 Geoffrey Palmer, Dcputy Leader of the Opposition, 'Labour and the Treaty of Waitangi: Policy
Announcement', 2 Februiuy 1984.
65 Palmer, 'Labour and the Treaty of Waitangi', 2 February 1984.
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the time and its representatives have reasserted that acceptance regularly ever since. It
is the duty of the New ZealandGovernment to ensure that the obligations have been
met.'66
Palmer's use of the Crown symbol in this new manner, it is argued here, indicated the
emergence of a new political order, one which would deal with treaty issues' In
particular, it indicated the presence of the 'Crown' identity in New 7'ealand politics
which had both the authority and the obligation to resolve treaty grievances with
M6ori. From around 1984, the Crown treaty partner, which had previously only
inliequently been identified in mass communication, was to arise in treaty discourse
with increasing regularity (as demonstrated by the language of the mass media in
Chapter Two of this thesis). However, in addition to being a new symbol in treaty
discourse, 'the Crown' also represented the old order (pre-L975) in such a way as to
offer further reassurance to the New Zealand public. In this respect, the Crown
bridged the gap between the old and emerging political orders. However, despite the
impression given by the appearance of the Crown in the 1980s that significant change
had taken place in the process of addressing treaty gdevances, ministers such as
Geoffrey Palmer and Douglas Graham have themselves acknowledged that the
dift'erence between Crown and government is largely semantic - 'the Crown' is simply
the government (or some manifestation of the government) by another name' We are
lett to wonder, therefore, whether the 'Crown' symbol is not merely 'the fruits of
symbolic bedazzlement'67 intended to save the government from a crisis of legitimacy.
Therefore, during Labour's first term in office (1984-1987), the Crown became a
metonym for government as the unifying central decision maker in politics in New
Zealand,responsible not only for the rights of MEori people under the Treaty, but also
the rights of all New Zealanders. Political theorist, Andrew Sharp, has criticised
66 Palmer,'Labour and the Treaty of Waitangi'.
6? 
.lohn H. Schaar. 'Legirirnacy and the Modern State' in W. Connolly (ed.),Izgitimacy und the
Srdre, Basil Blackwell Publisher Ltd., Oxtbrd, 1984' p. 110'
158
politicians and government departments under Labour which, he believes, co-opted
Mdori concepts and phrases such as 'the principles of the Treaty' for their own
purposes in the 1980s in order to make them work in favour of Government rather
than Mdori objectives.6s In applying Sharp's criticism to the way Labour used the
'Crown' identity, it seems that, having spent many decades and much energy
searching for a Crown treaty partner, Mdori were presented with a Labour government
which not only adopted the identity of the Crown, but in doing so, took care to
emphasise that the contemporary Crown symbolises majoritarian, liberal-democratic
goveflrment. As a result, the new Crown was not only partner to Mdori (as explained
in the Treaty of Waitangi), but was responsible and accountable to the rest of New
Zealandas well. As earlier argued in Chapter Four (which investigated ministers' use
of the Crown symbol), from Labour's second term in office (from 1987) and beyond,
the Crown symbol allowed ministers to appease Miori concerns for demands for a
responsible treaty partner, while simultaneously reassuring PEkehf, that the Crown
would protect the interests of all New Zealanders and that ultimate sovereignty in New
Zealand remained in the hands of the government. As was also demonstrated in
Chapter Four, after the Labour Government was replaced by a National Government
in 1990, these patterns of use and meanings of the Crown were largely maintained.
However, while the Labour Government, and its successor govemments, were to co-
opt the Crown as a metonym for government in their discourse, the problem of both
inconsistency and evolution of the concept and scope of the Crown meant that other
groups in New Zealand, were continuing to identify with the Crown as something
other than government. As a review of the Muriwhenua claim demonstrates, in the
1980s, M6ori in particular harboured an alternative interpretation of the Crown which
was brewing beneath the surface of the claims process.
68 St urp, 'The Problem Of Maori Affairs 1984-1989" p. 255.
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The Muriwhenua Innd Clailn: The Crown 'Problem' Resudaces
The evolution of the Crown from Queen to settler government meant that by the 1980s
the Crown was being identified as more than just government by groups within the
negotiation process. Evidence presented at the Muriwhenua land claim, a substantial
North Island claim to the Tribunal still in progress at the time of writing, clearly
clemonstrates that there was substantial conlusion and contradiction in the Crown's
identity which hacl neither subdued with the passing of time, nor been resolved by the
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.
Research into the Muriwhenua land claim began in the mid 1980s. The claim was
originally divided into matters arising before and after 1865 (although subsequently it
has been decided by the Tribunal that the two aspects of the claim should be heard
together). In 1995, the claim was still in progress and the Tribunal was yet to hear all
evidence and make recgmmendations and findings. As one of the longest running and
most comprehensive claims in New Zealand to date, the evidence presented at
Muriwhenua hearings by 1995 provides valuable insights into the ways the Crown is
interpreted and used by Tribunal researchers, Muriwhenua claimants and the Crown
itself.
To briefly outline the nature of the Muriwhenua land claim, claimants have argued that
land transactions must be seen in terms of the Maori laws which governed them,
rneaning that Muriwhenua land was not 'sold' to the Crown in the European sense and
thus is still Muriwhenua land. Also, the claimants contend that the Crown kept
surplus land for itself, which is contrary to the Treaty's terns of sale. Finally, the
claimants have challengecl the validity of Crown purchases of Muriwhenua land from
l84l to 1865. The Crown contends in return that the Muriwhenua Maori clearly
understoocl the land transactions to be purchases and that the Crown was entitled to the
surplus land, having awarded only part to the settlers.
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The methodological problem of selecting evidence to use in analysing the language of
such a substantial claim in order to study the uses of the Crown was simplified by the
publication of a list of research and evidence relating to the Muriwhenua land claim
(before 1865) producecl by the Waitangi Tribunal.6e These twenty-two research
reports came from the Waitangi Tribunal, the claimants and the Crown. The objective,
as earlier stated, was to review this evidence in order to determine the use and meaning
of the Crown as demonstrated by these three groups. The results of this investigation
shows that concerns that, despite a cot1lmon use of the Crown as a metonym for
government by the mass media and ministers in the 1980s, the Tribunal and Mdori
claimants in particular, perceived of the Crown as something which could be distinctly
diff'erent from the government.
In looking at the meanings and uses of the Crown by Tribunal, Crown and claimants,
it was first observed that, as it had done in mass communication, the Crown symbol
often appeared in eviclence without claritication. References were made, for example'
ro 'the main lines of Crownpolicy towards Muriwhenua during the 19th century...'70
as well as the comment that, 'the Crown blundered ... the Crown chose to deal with
the two claimants separately. Not only did the Crown fail to define their fMuriwhenua
Mdori] respective interests, it created a great deal of suspicion all around.'71
However, the report ofl'ered no explanation as to who the Crown was in these cases'
In other instances the Crown was personified and capable of action, as in comments
which noted '[t]he Crown failed to fulfil a basic public responsibility'; 'the Crown's
obligation to honour ... agreements' and 'the role of the Crown' . Also 'the CrOwn
admitted' and 'the Crown was engaged in' as if the Crown were a single person or
entity capable of action, but again, the detail about the identity of the Crown was not
69 Waitangi Tribunal Division, Te Manutukuru*a, Newsletter Number 24t25, October to December
1993. pp. 3-4.
?0 B4rry Rigby and John Koning, 'Historical Evidence Retating to the Muriwhenua Claim' , Wai 45,
Doc. Al, p. 6.
7l Barry Rigby,'Oruru Report', Wai 45, Doc. Cl ,pp.25-26'
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forthcomin g.12 Itwill be recalled from Chapter Two that symbols such as the Crown
when used in this manner, can fulfil the public's understanding of issues despite the
fact that they lack sufficient detail. It will also be recalled that Tim McCreanor had
suggested that Doug Graharn's use of the Crown in this manner allowed him to avoid
actually naming the individuals who did the 'dirty work'.73 These are both possible
explanations for the lack of detail regarding the Crown here'
On other occasions, the Crown was identified as one of the trinity of the Queen, a
governor-general (or other political official) or 'government' generally. For example,
the Crown was identified as the Queen in the statement that, 'Crown pre-emption'
meant that 'the Queen would not interfere with native [Maori] lands'.7a Indeed, the
Queen was most often identified as the Crown by Muriwhenua claimants themselves
in recalling the words of their ancestors, as in this statement following the signing of
the Treaty by one Maori rangatira, 'I say yes,I say yes, for the Queen.'7s Similarly,
the famous words of another rangatira were recalled in evidence for the Muriwhenua
claim: '[o]nly the shaclow of the Land goes to the Queen but the substance remains
with us.'76 Other examples include the statement by Nopera Panakarea as he signed a
Iand deed, 'to make over to the Queen of England ... this piece of land and everything
thereinto belonging is accordingly made over to Her Majesty Victoria to the Queen of
England to the Kings or Queens after Her - for ever and ever.'77
72 garty Rigby, 'Muriwhenua North Report',Wai 45, Doc' B15' pp.5-38.
73 See Chapter Four for further discussion.
74 Rigby and Koning, 'Historical Evidence Relating to the Muriwhenua Claim', p. 55.
75 Rigby and Koning, 'Historical Evidence Relating to the Muriwhenua Claim" p. 54.
76 Rima Edwards, Submission, Wai 45,Doc. 82, The Chief later reversed his words (ust before
his death) saying 'Thc Queen has taken the substance of the land and only the 
-shad. 
glremains with
us.' Also qubt"6 in Rev-. D. Urquhart,'Summary of Kaitaia Treaty signing', WQi 45, Doc B12.
77 'Mangonui District Deeds', Wai 45,Doc. 4.26, p. 33. Again, lhere were also exceptions to the
way the bro*n was presentecl to Mdori. For example a letter written to Hemi Paera by a British
official, it was stated that. 'This land is in the hands of the Government, the lands that the
Parliament agreed that you were to havc, have been settled, the balance belongs to the Government.'
Wai 45, Doc. A52.
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While Muriwhenua M[ori recalled their ancestors' interpretations of the Queen as the
Crown (and previous chapters in this thesis also provided evidence of this
interpretation) the significance of the Queen as the Crown was also emphasised by the
Tribunal reports. For example, Anne Salmond recognised that the Maori preamble to
the Treaty said that Queen Victoria herself had a personal care for the Chiefs, and that
tlu-oughout the Treaty it was implied that the agreement was a personal transaction
between themselves and the Queen.zs Also, other Tribunal reports provided evidence
that British officials were aware that Maori interpreted the Crown as the Queen and
used this symbolism to simplify their explanations of transactions to Mdori rangatira.
For example, one report noted that one British official, 'went to great lengths to
explain the intent of Crown pre-emption. He told the assembled chiefs, 'the Queen
would not interfere with their native laws " ' that Her MajesD' was ready to purchase
such as they did not require for their own use.'?9 In another Tribunal report it was
similarly noted that, '[o]n the day the [and] deeds were signed in Kaitaia,the Crown
notified Pakeha residents of Mangonui that 'the Lands of Mangonui have been
purchased for Her Maiesty.'80
In addition to identifying the Queen, the Crown was also seen to represent British or
government officials in evidence presented in the Muriwhenua claim. For example it
was observed that,'Colonel Edward Godfrey, the Crown Land Claims Commissioner
investigating [a] claim during 1843, provided the Crown's definition of the nature of
[the land holders] property rights in Muriwhenua North.'8l It was also noted that:
to tbrm an alliance with the Crown... [one private land buyer] befriended the most
powerful Crown agent in the ... area, Donald Mcl.ean. .., [The land buyer] cooperated
78 Anne Salmond, 'Treaty Meanings', Wai 45,Doc. Fl9, pp. 5-6-
79 Rigby aml Koning, 'Historical Evidence Relating to the Muriwhenua Claim" p. 55.
tt{) 6rtt Rigby, 'Mangonui Area and the Taemaro Claim', Wai 45,Doc. A21, p. 13.
El Rigby,'Muriwhenua North Report', p. 24.
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actively with Mcl*an and [Governor] Grey in negotiating Crown land purchases in the
Wanganui area.82
This brief review of some evidence presented in the Muriwhenua land hearings has
demonstrated that the problem of inconsistency and evolution in identity of the Crown
was once again resurfacing in the contemporary claims process.
In conclusion to this chapter, three arguments are restated. First, 'the Crown' symbol
was revived by the 1975 Act and the work by the Waitangi Tribunal' In popular use
(as previous chapters have indicated) the Crown was being interpreted and used,
admittedly with some inconsistency, as a metonym for government. It was suggested
that the symbol was used both consciously and unconsciously to make rapid policy
change more acceptable. Second, within the claims process' as the Muriwhenua
evidence indicated, the Crown had a much broader range of uses. In particular, the
Queen was still an important representation of the treaty partner for M6ori. Finally,
despite the ambiguity and confusion generated by the Crown in a contemporary
context, the problem of the identity of the Crown was neither publicly acknowledged
nor reconciled in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. The next two chapters indicate that
as the process of resolving treaty gdevances continued to unfold in the late 1980s and
early 1990s, the problem of the evolution of the Crown was to become even more
extensive and result in further serious implications for M6ori.
SEVEN
THE CONTRACTING PROBLEM OF THE CROWN:
A CASE STUDY OF THE MORIORI CLAIM
In the previous chapter the question was raised as to whether the identity of 'the
Crown' in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 adequately acknowledged and reconciled
the ambiguities and complexities inherent in the symbol of the Crown revealed and
discussed in Chapter Five and also demonstrated in evidence presented in the
Muriwhenua claim in the previous chapter. It is now argued that the problem of the
iclentity of the Crown in the 1975 legislation was not clarified and, as a result' has
created difficulties for Maori in the negotiation of some treaty disputes. The case
study used to demonstrate this is the Moriori claim before the Waitangi Tribunal
relating to the Chatham Islands. In particular, the case study investigates a claim by a
third party that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to examine the actions of the
Native Innd Court (NLC) as required by Moriori claimants because the Tribunal is
only allowed to consider actions or ornissions by the Crown,or Crown agents. T\is
question forced the Tribunal to consicler the meaning and iclentiry of the Crown under
the 1975 Act. Its findings, as well as the arguments of Moriori claimants and Crown
Counsel, are reviewed.
The issue of Crown agency becomes something of a focus in this chapter and requires
some explanation. The Crown has, on occasion, been recognised as a 'complex and
highly organised corporation aggregate of which the King is the head" l Philip
Joseph, constitutional lawyer, argues that this corporate identity conveys to the Crown
an alter ego of the Crown's ministers or their departments as its servants or agents
I efritip Joseph, Constitutional antl Adnitistrative Law, The Law Book Co', Sydney' 1993' p'
496.
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through which the Crown may act. Also, through the concept of 'persona designata' a
person or group of people chosen or designated by the Crown can act on behalf of the
Crown for a particular purpose. In such cases, certain Crown rights and privileges can
be extended to 'persona designata'. However, this relationship between Crown and
agent has proven problematic with regard to the law. 'The Crown' can be identified in
such a manner as to separate it suddenly from the actions of an 'agent'. For example
Joseph comments, '[w]hy the Crown should benignly lose its alter ego at the
courthouse door makes it a mysterious creature, a sometimes corporate institution
acting through its Ministers or servants and sometimes not.'2 Joseph cites several
examples which indicate that the Crown may be anything (or anyone) that Parliament
chooses.3 In the Education Act 1964, every education board and teachers' college was
said to be an agent of the Crown. Joseph concludes that 'the ... Crown is a
multitarious creature, with sometimes chameleon qualities.'a
The problem of agency with regard to the Treaty of Waitangi and the claim of the
Moriori iwi to the Waitangi Tribunal, raises the significant question as to whether the
Native Land Court was acting 'by or on behalf of the Crown', which in turn
determines the Tribunal's authority to examine the actions and policies of the Native
Land Court. The ruling is one based on a broader principle of the identity of the
Crown in the 1975 Act, an issue which has also been investigated in cases other than
the Moriori claim (for example, the Waitangi Fisheries Commission case discussed at
the end of this chapter).
2 Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative ktw,p. 499 '
3 Joseph, Constitutional and Administative Law,p.502.
4 
.Ioseph, Constitutional and Administrative law, p. 505. Sir Kenneth Keith, Head of the Law
Commission in New T,ealand,addressed other matteri in relation to the issue of Crown agents in a
report on the 'Crown Agencies Issue' which arose from the Public Finance Act 1989. In the Act, the
Ciown is defined as 'in*essence Ministers and Departments.' Keith identifies a difficulty with the
phrase 'Crown agencies', asking whether the expression was apt for the bodies which are concerned.
i{e asks '[c]an it really be saidlhat they 'represint' and 'act on behalf of the Crown' (that being the
standard relevant definition of 'agent')i end nat the Crown is their principal with all that implies for
control and responsibility?' Seeif-1. Keith,'Crown Agencies', a paPer presenled at the Institute of
Policy Studies Meetrng, Constitutional Restradnrs, 5 July 1990, pp' 3-4'
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The History of the MorinriClaim
Before examining the facts of the claim brought to theWaitangi Tribunal by Moriori, it
is essential to understand the history and some of the detail of the claim in order to
appreciate the significance of the ruling on whether the Native Land Court can be
considered agent to the Crown for the purposes of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.
Michael King, an authority on the Moriori people, contends that Moriori history has
long been shrouded in myths and lies.s According to King, Moriori are of Polynesian
origin and share their ancestry with New Zealand MEori, evidenced by the languages
and development of the two peoples.6 Moriori arrived in the Chatham Islands through
accidental or deliberate migration from New Zealandaround the fourteenth century.7
They traditionally called the islands 'Rekohu' meaning 'misty sky' or'misty sun'.
The name Moriori itself comes from the Moriori phrase 'tchakat moriori' meaning
'ordinary' or 'normal'.
Rekohu provided Moriori with abundant natural resources including fish, mutton birds
and fertile soils. Moriori cultural and social development was finely tuned by this
productive but insular environment.8 One important consequence of the isolated
conditions on Rekohu was the development of the Moriori philosophy of 'nunuku"
'Nunuku-whenua' was a famous Moriori ancestor who grew tired of bloodshed and
ordered the warring parties on Rekohu to retire. Moriori consequently developed the
unusual tradition of abolishing lethal contact between tribal and kin groups and
ostracising those who resorted to warfare or violence. In practical terms the
5 Michael King, Moriori. A People Retliscoverecl, Viking Press, Auckland, 1989. King's book is
the source for all information reiating to the history of the Moriori people in this thesis, and was
used as evidence in the Waitangi Trilunal claim. See Wai 64, 'Record of Documents" Cl3(L)'
Also, for further discussion of th-e myths which have historicaly surrounded the Moriori people' see
'Whence of the Morioi' .Wai 64,Doc.A5 and 'The Myth of the Moriori',Wai 64,Doc. 46'
6 King, Moriori. p.26.
7 King, Moriori,p.22.
8 King, Moriori, pp. 25-26.
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philosophy provided a valuable means of ensuring the survival of a viable population
on the islands.e As King says, 'Moriori had found a way of living in a state of
equilibrium with ... available resources.'10 Like other Polynesian cultures, Moriori
developed an elaborate system of spiritual beliefs and practices and a strong sense of
place, evidenced in myths and ancestral knowledge. King describes Moriori as 'a very
tapu people'.ll
The Moriori lived unaware of other peoples and the wider world until the British
vessel 'Chatham' cirme across Rekohu by mistake in l79l.r2 With the passing of this
incident, King observes:
[t]he membrane of distance which had protected the Chatham Islanders from conlact
wirh peoples who thought and behaved differently from themselves, which had allowed
the unintemrpted evolution of their culture and the successful observance of Nunuku's
law, was about to be perforated; the Moriori wer€ to discover they were not alone in
the world.l3
Moriori established a tenuously amicable relationship with early European arrivals.
Mdori also came to the islands (which they called 'Wharekauri') on European vessels
and lived fairly harmoniously in predominantly Moriori settlements.la While the
exchange of some goods with these immigrants was beneficial to Moriori, Europeans
introduced disease and exploited Rekohu's natural resources in ways which were
9 Kirrg, Moriori, pp. 26-28.
l0 King, Moriori, p. 28. Also, King comments that Moriori endured a high population density;
anout Z-|OO p"opl" on 108 000 hectares which would endanger resources unless conservation was
observed, p. 33.
I I King, Morictri, pp. 35-36. 'Tapuo meaning sacred. King notes that Moriori culture was not
studied until it had been shattered by trauma. Consequently, the Moriori are often misunderstood as
a simple and backward society; p. 38.
l2 King, Moriori,p.39.
l3 King, Moriori,p.40.
14 Wharekauri 
- 
allegedly named after a house built by on the island M6ori out of salvaged Kauri
timber. Maori apparently-found this easier to pronounce than 'Rekohu'; King, Moriori,p'52'
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devastating for the Moriori inhabitants.ls King recounts, '[b]y 1835, the Moriori at
Rekohu ... had undergone some irreversible changes. ... [T]hey were now aware of
... British people with a King, who in some mysterious way was also their King as a
result of [the European] visit.'16 Despite this upheaval, the Moriori remained
essentially in control of their lives and customs and their traditional views on life were
remarkably unchanged. I 7
However, this state of affairs was inevocably altered in early 1835 by an invasion of
around nine hundred M6ori from Ngdti Mutunga and Ng[ti Tama tribes (collectively
known as Te Ati Awa) who had eadier been driven out of Taranaki in the 1830s and
had travelled down to the Wellington/Port Nicholson atea.ls In the haditional manner
of supporting new land claims, the MEori invaders killed huge numbers of Moriori
who, in supporting their own philosophy of nunuku, are said not to have killed a
single M6ori in defence of their land and their lives - to do so would compromise their
mana. Europeans apparently offered no intervention in the invasion and ensuing
massacre.le The invading Mdori asserted ownership over the lands they chose to
settle on and those Moriori who survived the invasion were apparently forced into
slavery. King explains that surviving Moriori 'faced a world in which everything in
which they had believed spiritually and culturally was shown to be leached of fertility
and value: their gods did not protect them from these horrors; their gods were dad.'2n
l5 King, Moriori,p. 49. The impact of European hunting of seals and whales was devastaling to the
,".oori Op. a8a9). Also, there ls some debite over the-ctrop in population of Moriori between 1828
and 183C,- some commentators quoting up to fifty per cent reduction, while others more
conservatively refer to a twenty per ient decline in the Moriori population, pp' 49-50'
l6 King, Moriori,p. 56. Earlier, King had stated that despite provocation, there is no record of
Moriori-breaking thi law of nunuku Uy tilting European or M6ori immigrants, p' 51.
l7 King, Moriori,p.57.
18 Later, King explains that Te Ati Awa had been displaced from their ancestral home and thersfore
forced to search for new land 
- 
though he does not idJntify the cause of displacement, p' 76'
le King, Moriori,pp. 58-66.
20 11int, Moriori, p. 67 .
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Afrer the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840, Mdori on Rekohu claimed to
embrace British laws, although conditions improved little for Moriori. Soon, the
recent Mdori arrivals grew restless and fought amongst themselves.2l When
European surveyors arrived with plans to purchase the Chatham Islands they
intervened in warfare between NgAti Tama and Ngdti Mutunga in order to settle the
question of ownership and complete the purchases. These purchases were ovemrled
in 1842 when the Chatham Islands became part of New Zealand by proclamation,
hence subject to British rule and a target for British settlement.22 In neither transaction
was Moriori ownership considered.23 As King explains:
[tlheir mana whenua ... had been ignored by the Maori, but had not been extinguished.
They had not been defeated in fair contest because they had not engaged in a contest.
They had been dealt with neither as owners of the land, nor as the Partners they had
been prepared to be. Their offer to share the resources of Rekohu with those who were,
after all, distant Polynesian kin, had been hurled back in their faces. They had been
ignored, insulted, slaughtered and enslaved - brought to their knees physically,
culturally and spiritually. But because they had neither broken Nunuku's injunction or
vacated their island, their own mana was in tact.24
As the British struggled to maintain law and order on the islands, the Moriori began to
hold meetings to petition the Governor.25 The earliest surviving example of such a
petition was a letter sent in April 1859 to Governor Grey. It contained historical and
genealogical information about the Moriori intended to distinguish Tchakat Moriori
from Chatham Island Maori in order to demonstrate Moriori rights of ownership to
land on Rekohu. Again in 1861, Moriori met with and sent letters to the Governor
2l This 'restlessness' is later cited as the reason for 'The Maungahuka Experiment' - the temPorary
settlement of the Auckland Islands by M6ori and Moriori slaves - which will not be discussed in this
thesis, but which is the basis for a Moriori claim to the Tribunal (Wai 64, #1'7' 3'0 - 3'1)' See:
King, M oriori, pp. 77 -88.
22 King, Moriori,p.89.
23 King, Moriori,p.73.
24 King, Moriori,pp.75-16. 'Mana whenua' can be explained as the.sense of self the Moriori drew
from their lands on Rekohu, after at least half a millennium of occupation.
25 King, Moriori,p. 98, and p. I18.
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attempting to convince him to address the issue of land ownership and acknowledge
Moriori rights. Moriori petitions to the govemment increased after the abolition of
slavery in 1863. King says that no response from Governor Grey to any of these
communications has survived.26
In 1868, great numbers of Ngati Mutunga and Ng[ti Tama, restless and disheartened
by dwindling prosperity on Wharekauri, were attracted back to life in Taranaki where
Native Land Court sittings required their presence to ensure their claims to land would
be heard. With the resulting mass exodus, the Moriori population exceeded that of the
M[ori for the first time in almost thirty years, although the number of Europeans now
exceeded them both.27
In 1867 Henry Halse, Under-secretary for Native Affairs, was instructed to gather the
opinions of the Chatham Islanders on the possibility of extending the Native Land
Court to the Chatham Islands. The Native Land Court had been established in New
Zealand in 1865 and charged with the task of establishing who 'owned' tribal M6ori
land (a concept foreign to Mdori) in order to grant European title so land could be
bought and sold without dispute.zs In his instructions regarding the Native Land
Court in the Chatham Islands, Halse was also instructed (less officially it would seem)
to encourage the establishment of the Court and discourage the return of Te Ati Awa
Mdori to Taranaki. Halse, a humanitarian, believed justice would be served through
the Court, but quickly discovered that the Native Land Court was facing a complex
web of land ownership issues on the Chatham Islands. Moriori claimed ownership as
the original land occupants while Mdori claimed the land by right of conquest and
were divided amongst themselves on ownership issues. Following extensive hui
26 King, Moriori,pp. 114-120.
27 King, Moriori,p. 109.
28 J.B. Ringer, An Introtluction to New Txalantl Government,Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1991' pp'
33-34. ttrJLanA Court has been described as an 'effective mechanism of subtle conquest', see James
Belich, 'The Governors and the Maori', inThe Oxjbrtt lllustated History of New Tzaland,Keith
Sinclair (ed.), Oxford University hess, Oxford, 1993' p. 94.
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(meetings) and consultation with the people on the Islands, Halse announced the Court
would be established and that the first pre-hearing meeting would take place on the
Island in 1868. He also advised that Te Ati Awa people must remain on, or return to,
the islands to secure their Chatham Island holdings.ze
By 1870, the Moriori population was scattered around settlements throughout Rekohu
and numbered just under one hundred. Poorly organised and unaccustomed to judicial
procedure, the Moriori claimants in the 1870 Chatham Island Native Land Court
hearings were unable to compete with M6ori who had returned from Taranaki with
knowledge of the court procedure, to secure their own land title on Wharekauri.30
King also argues that the judge had been encouraged by Native Affairs to award land
to Taranaki Mlori to discourage them from returning to Taranaki where strong anti-
British sentiment was already developing. Consequently, following ten days of
hearings, the judge ruled that:
The Court ... is of the opinion that [the Mdori claimants] have clearly shown that the
original inhabirants of these Islands were conquered by them and the lands were taken
by force of arms and the Moriori people were made subject to their rule and also that
they maintained their conquest by actual occupation ... lthe M[ori claimants] are the
rightful owners of this block according to Native custom. But ... as the original
inhabitants have had a permissive right hitherto of cultivating certain portions of their
land for their maintenance, an order will be made in favour of ... the Moriori pcople ...
without any restrictions being placed thereon.3l
Accordingly, the first section under examination was divided by the Native Land
Court 
- 
15, 520 hectares were awarded to M6ori claimants and 240 hectares to
Moriori.32 The case set a dangerous precedent followed by later claims. In all, the
29 King, Moriori, pp. I2O-122.
30 16nr, Moriori, p. 125 . King provides transcripts of Moriori and Mdori evidence presented at the
first Land Court hearing, pp. 125-131.
3l King, Moriori,p.56.
32 King, Moriori,pp. l3l-132.
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Court awarded 58,516 hectares to M6ori, and 1,640 hectares, only 2.7 percentof the
land to Moriori.33 The initial judgment destroyed Moriori faith in the British system
of justice and revealed to Moriori that they were honibly under-prepared and under-
resourced for the legal procedure required of them by the NLC. To Moriori it
appeared that M6ori were not to be punished by the justice system for their treatrnent
of the Moriori. but rather rewarded for it. Mdori themselves were encouraged by the
Native Land Court's findings and many more Taranaki Mdori returned to the
Chathams to endorse land claims or collect rents.34
These actions by the Native Land Court in ruling on Chatham Islands land ownership
in the 1870s have recently been explained and criticised as an application of the '1840
rule'.' The '1840 rule' can be interpreted in a number of ways in different contexts. In
the case of the Moriori claim, the '1840 rule' meant the courts would recognise land
gained by violence or conquest up to 1840 (when British sovereignty was arguably
introduced) but not after that time. As one judge has since explained, the 1840 rule
allowed forcible conquest or raupatu to be regarded as a legitimate basis for a land
claim provided it occurred before 1840.3s The Court's application of the'1840 rule'
seriously disadvantaged Moriori because it excused the Native Land Court from
recognising the traditional ownership rights of the Moriori people who had been
invaded by Taranaki M6ori in 1835.36
Consequently, in 1885 when Moriori took their grievances back to the Native Land
Court claiming ownership of an island not considered in earlier claims, they were told
by the presiding judge that 'the Chatham Islands were adjudged to the Maori in 1870,
[in accordance with the 1840 rule] and the Court is of the opinion that the adjacent
islands were included in that judgement.' This was, according to King, the last
33 Brian Gilling,'The Native Land Court in the Chatham Islands', Wai 64,Doc' Al0'p' 91'
34 King, Moriori, p. 132.
35 'Record of the High Court Proceedings on Jurisdiction', Wai 64,Doc.2.42,p.8.
36 Cilfing, 'The Native Land Court in the Chatham Islands" p. 29'
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Moriori claim lodged with the Native Land Court, and certainly the last affempt to use
the legal system to rectify grievances arising out of the Taranaki invasion.3T
The Native Land Court's findings were devastating for Moriori still living on Rekohu,
whose population had dropped to just twelve by 1900. This rapid decline in
population was parallelled by the speed with which traditional Moriori knowledge was
evaporating.3s By 1904, only six of those twelve Moriori were still alive. Problems
of securing the limited land title allowed to Moriori were prolific.3e With the death of
the last known 'full blooded' Moriori, Tame Horomona Rehe, known later as Tommy
Solomon, the Moriori people were believed to be extinct.4 In reality, many hundred
Moriori descendants living in New Zealand were too ashamed to acknowledge their
Moriori ancestry because of pervasive myths that the Moriori were a distinct and
inferior race of people who had been conquered by the New 7*aland Mdori and driven
to the Chatham Islands. In 1980, a documentary was screened in New Z'ealandwhich
dispelled many of these myths and lies about the Moriori and prompted the reunion of
Tommy Solomon's family in 1983. This was a turning point in Moriori history
because it meant that membership of the Moriori iwi looked set to be become more of
a matter of honour than a source of disgrace.al A Rekohu claims committee was
established to regain control of the resources of the islands, and get compensation for
the Moriori losses of the nineteenth cennrry. King states that,'[m]ore than money and
land was at stake, however. The committee's general objective was recognition of the
Moriori people as the indigenous owners and spiritual guardians of Rekohu''42
37 Kitg, Moriori,pp. 140-141.
38 King, Moriori, pp. 136-137.
39 King provides detailed accounts of the claims to several Moriori land holdings following the
death of the owner; King, Moriorr, pp. 150-154.
40 .And then there was one?'; an account of Tommy Solomon's life in King, Moriori, pp. 156-198'
4l King, Moriori,pp. 190-192.
42 King, Moriori,pp. 193-194.
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The Claim Before the WaitangiTribanal
The claim relating to Rekohu and outlying islands by Te Iwi Moriori and the Moriori
Tchakat Henu Association was first brought before the Waitangi Tribunal in 1987.
The Moriori claimants claimed first that they had been prejudicially affected by the
omission of the Crown to act in such a manner as to protect Moriori customary rights
to their lands following petitions by Moriori to Crown representatives in the 1850s
and 1860s. Furthermore, the claimants believed this failing was inconsistent with the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.a3 Secondly, the claimants argued that a number
of acts or omissions of the Crown, by or through its statutory agent the Native Land
Court had also prejudicially affected the rights of Moriori claimants. It was these
claims in particular which were later challenged by a third Party, Te Runanga o
Wharekauri o Rekohu, on the basis that the Native Land Court was not a part of the
Crown, and thus the claims were beyond the judsdiction of the Tribunal. The claims
made by Moriori which are relevant to this discussion were as follows:4
I.Z.l .l The omission of the Crown to provide adequate legislative machinery to guide the
work of the Native Land Court in its investigation of claims on Rekohu despite the
Crown having prior knowledge of the unique circumstances pertaining to claims
between Moriori and T:uanaki Maori;
| .2.1.2 The application of the so-called " 1840 rule " on Rekohu effectively depriving the
claimants of 97Vo of their customary lands;
I.Z.l .3 The intervention of the Crown and/or its agents in actively discouraging the rehrrn
of Taranaki Maori to their home in Taranaki in the 1860s;
43 The acts, policies and omissions of the Crown which the claimants believe to be contrary to the
principles of ihe Treaty of Wairangi are listed in 'Te iwi Moriori Trust Board and Moriori Tchakat
i{enu'Association, re: iands and fiJtreries', Wai 64,Doc. 1.7. Refer to sections 1.0-3.0 inclusive for
discussion.
4 These come from 'Te iwi Moriori Trust Board and Moriori Tchakat Henu Association, re: lands
and fisheries',Wai 64,Doc. 1.7, and the paragraph numbers used here are those used in the original
document.
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l.Z.l .4 The Crown and/or its agents intervening to encourage re-migration of Taranaki
Maori back to Rekohu to lessen the potential conflict with the colonial militia and
European settlers in Taranaki:
| .2.1.5 The active intervention of the Crown to keep Taranaki MEori on Rekohu and to
encourage their return, together with circumstances surrounding the establishment of
the Native Land Court on Rekohu, indicate a desire by the Crown to have land
tifle 's [sic] conferred on Taranaki Maori claimants, as against the ancestral claims of
Moriori:
l.Z.l .6 The failure of the Court to ensure that Moriori had available to them such persons
with necessary skills to ensure that Moriori were not unduly disadvantaged during
the Court hearings as a result of their lack of expericnce and to ensure that natural
justice prevailed;
1.2.1.7 The failure of the Native Land court to correctly apply the customary lore of
Moriori in making their determinations both in respect of the main island of
Rekohu and the outlying islands of the group;
1.2.1.8 The failure of the Crown to respond to or action direct requests from Moriori in or
about 1879, seeking from the Crown redress for the injustices perpetrated by the
Native Land Court in denying their lands [sic] rights to Rekohu and outlying
islands:
1.2.1.10 Ttre failure of the Crown to protect Moriori from enslavement between the years
1840 and 1963 in breach of Articles II and III of the Treafy of Waitangi.
Other grievances levelled at the Crown included Crown denial of Moriori birding and
sealing rights as well as harvesting rights, and a Crown failure to protect Moriori wdhi
tapu (sacred sites) and other taonga. Remedies and redress sought by the claimants
included an apology from the Crown and 'compensation for the unfair and unequal
treatment of Moriori by the Crown and its statutory agent, the Native Land Court,in
depriving Moriori of their righffirl lands.'45
45 
'Te lwi Moriori Trust Board and Moriori Tchakat Henu Association', Wai 64,Doc. 1J, sections
4.0-4.10.
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The Native Land. Court: " By or on behalf of the Crown't ?
Moriori were not the only group to present a claim to the Tribunal relating to the
Chatham Islands. Te Runanga Wharekauri o Rekohu Inc, representing Taranaki
Maori, also lodged a claim. When the first hearing for the Moriori claim had been set
for 9 May lgg4,Te Runanga requested interim relief and challenged the Tribunal's
jurisdiction to inquire into the Native Land Court (NLC) hearings and rulings as
required by the Moriori claimants.a6 The request was unsuccessful. The judge
hearing the challenge ruled that 'the applicant does not succeed in its application for
interim relief and the hearing should continue in the form contemplated by the Tribunal
for the week of 9 May in the Chathams.'47 Prior to the next hearing in August L994,
Te Runanga once again made application for the issue of the Tribunal's jurisdiction to
be determined. In this instance the Tribunal agreed that submissions on the question
of jurisdiction should be heard before the next substantive hearing which was
scheduled for October Lgg4. The ruling would turn on the matter as to whether the
Native Land Court was acting by or on behalf of the Crown in terms of section 6(l)
Treary of Waitangi Act 1975 (section 3 Treaty of Waitangi Act 1985). In two separate
hearings, both the Tribunal and the High Court examined the matter of the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal in relation to the Crown and the Native Land Court. For the purposes
of this discussion the arguments presented in both will be discussed concurrently,
although the findings will be discussed separately'48
Section 6(l) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, states the Tribunal can consider
claims 
-
46 'Runanga request for clarification',Wai 64, Doc.2'25'
47 
'Record of High Court Proceedings', p, 2.
48 Only aspects of the hearings considered relevant to this thesis are discussed here' Readers looking
for a more detailed discussion should go back to the original sources cited here'
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(l) Where any Maori claims that he or she, or any group of Maoris of which he or she
is a member, is or is likely to be prejudicially affected49 -
By any ordinance of the General Legislative Council of New Tnaland, or any
ordinance of the Provincial Legislative Council of New Munster, or any
provincial ordinance, or any Act (whether or not still in force), passed at any
time on or after the 6tb day of February 1840; or
By any regulations, order, proclamation, notice, or other statutory instnrment
made, issued, or given at any time on or after the 6th day of February 1840
under any ordinance or Act referred to in paragraph (a) of this subsection; or
By any policy or practice (whether or not still in force) adopted by or on behalf
of the crown, or by any policy or practice proposed to be adopted by or on
behalf of the Crown: or
By any act done or omitted at any time on or after the 6th day of February
1840, or proposed to be done or omitted by or on behalf of the Crown,
and that the ordinance or Act, or the regulations, order, proclamation, notice, or other
statutory instrument, or the policy or practice, or other act or omission, was or is
inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty, he or she may submit that claim to the
Tribunal under this section.
The challenge to the Moriori claim had raised the question as to whether the NLC
could be identified as the Crown or acting by or on behalf of the Crown' More
specifically, could the NLC's application of the '1840 rule' be considered within the
jurisdiction of the Waitangi Tribunal. The 'rule' itself was judge-made, that is, it was
not prescribed by the NLC Acts or other legislation which would make it the direct
responsibility of the Crown. Therefore, was the adoption of the '1840 rule' by the
NLC judges in any way a policy, practice or act adopted or done on behalf of the
Crown as prescribed in the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975?
For the sake of clarity, the groups involved in the hearing must be clearly identified'
First, there were the Moriori claimants who brought the original claim before the
49 Another matter of identiry is the relationship between Moriori and M6ori. For the purposes of
this claim, and in a much bioader sense Moriori contend that they are a Mdori iwi, distinct from
other iwi but inclusively Mdori. See Heron J.'s ruling on this matter: 'Record of High Court
Proceedings', pp.4-5.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
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Tribunal who are referred to in this discussion as 'the claimants'. Second, there were
the Mdori claimants (referred to here as Te Rtinanga) who also brought a claim
regarding the Chatham Islands, and requested the Tribunal's investigation of its
jurisdiction regarding the Native Land Court and the Moriori claim. Finally, there was
the Waitangi Tribunal, which conducted the investigation into the meaning of 'the
Crown' in the 1975 Act, and the High Court which first considered the matter and
decided it was appropriate that the Tribunal should resolve the question ofjurisdiction
before proceeding with the Moriori claim.
The arguments presented by each group also require clarification. While the claimants
contended that the term 'the Crown' in the 1975 Act included the Native Land Court,
council for the Crown and Te Rfinanga maintained that it did not.50 The argument
turned on two points in particular which revisit aspects of 'the Crown' discussed
previously.Sl First, there was some debate over the meaning of 'the Crown' as drawn
from the context of the Treaty, reminiscent of the discussion in Chapter Five which
identified two possible interpretations for the Crown after the Treaty was signed as
either the Queen or British/settler government. The second point, investigated most
rigorously by the Tribunal itself, was the evolution of the Crown identity and its
relationship with other political institutions. These arguments are now examined in
turn.
i.The Treaty Context
One of the claimants' arguments was that the meaning of 'the Crown' in the 1975 Act
wasbestdeterminedwithinthecontextof theTreatyof Waitangiin 1840. Similarto
rhe argument raised in Chapter Five, the claimants recognised that Mdori and PEkehd
understood 'the Crown' to mean different things in 1840. They argued that, through
5o .1r16unu1 finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', Wai 64,Doc.2.67,p.2.
5l The arguments presented here are not in the order they were prtsented to the High Court or the
Tribunal,lut havebeen reorganised to fit better the developments of my own earlier arguments'
Consequently, the emphasit oi th" original arguments may differ from that conveyed here'
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the Treaty, Mdori transferred to the Crown as the Queen the very broad right to
exercise 'kdwanatanga'52 in New Zealand. Through this action, the Crown or Queen
became the embodiment of the right to make and maintain law and order in Aotearoa.
At no point in the Treaty was there mention of the separation of powers between
legislature, executive and judiciary.
In considering this argument, the Waitangi Tribunal agreed that there was nothing in
the Treaty to suggest that Mdori were aware of the legal separation of powers under
'k6wanatanga', or for that matter were they aware of the refined legal meaning of the
Crown developed by the British. The Tribunal also acknowledged that the compact
was 'sold' by the missionaries as a personal one between the Queen and the chiefs.53
The comment was made that:
[t]he Treaty itself is silent as to the manner of exercise of the Crown's powers of
sovereignty or kawanatanga. It is clear that the compact was sold by the missionaries
as a personal one between the Queen and the Chiefs. There was no suggestion that the
eueen was constitutionally unable to exercise the kawanatanga the Chiefs conferred
upon her. Separation of powers is not mentioned.54
The claimants also argued that Mdori were encouraged to sign the Treaty by a
European promise to settle the lawlessness resulting from European settlement (a fact
also made explicit in the preamble to the Treaty). The claimants contended that
circumstances such as these render the Crown's right to make laws an absolute
priorityintheschemeoftheTreaty.ssThepointwasmadethatitwasonlyafterlS52
that law-making authority was delegated to a representative assembly in the New
52 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. l2-!3. AIso sce Chapter Two for
discussion of kdwanatania and tino rangatiratanga in the Treaty of Waitangi, as interprcted by the
Waitangi Tribunal.
53 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 13. See also Chapter Three' 'The
Arrival and Subseqtient Iiisappearance of the Crown' (this thesis) for further discussion of the Queen
as the Crown.
54 .Mo.iori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', Wai 64,Doc El , p. 3.
55 'Mo.iori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 3-
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ZealandConstitution Act 1852.s6 It would therefore follow, the claimants reasoned,
that any act of government or kf,wanatanga, by any arm of govemment including the
Native Land Court (as a creature of statute) would constitute an Act of the Queen, or
the Crown, at least (and most importantly perhaps) in the eyes of Mdori' In
conclusion, the claimants submitted:
[w]hat the Crown stands for, for the purposes of section 6 of the Treaty of Waitangi
Act 1975, falls to be determined in the context of the Treafy itself and what powers
passed to the Crown by it which are now exercised by the Crown as incidents of
kawanatanga. It is the case for the claimants that policy or action adopted pursuant to
the kawanatanga ceded by the Treaty is adopted "by or on behalf of the Crown" within
the meaning of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975.57
According to this logic the subsequent separation of powers does not alter the fact that
the power to do justice was appropriated by the Crown through kdwanatanga ceded by
M6ori in 1840. Consequently, all actions pertaining to law-making and justice must be
weighed against the principles of the Treaty on the part of the Crown, including the
actions of the Native Land Court.s8
In further defending their argument, the claimants cited a finding in Halsbury's Laws
of England that judicial decisions were a source of government power which indicated
that, despite a separation of powers, the source of all justice originally emanated from
the Crown. It was stated that, 'all Judges and Magistrates are appointed by and derive
their authority, either mediately or immediately, from the Crown' and; 'Courts are
created by the authority of the Sovereign' and 'the Courts are the Queen's Courts
administering justice in Her name.'Se The source also stated that, 'the greater part of
56 'Moriori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 3.
57 'Moriori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court" p. 2.
58 'Mo.iori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court" pp. 3-4'
59 'Moriori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 47.
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the machinery of cenfral govemment may be regarded, historically and substantially, as
an emanation from the Crown.'fl
In response to these arguments by the claimants, Crown counsel argued that when the
Treaty was signed by chiefs in 1840, the courts in Britain had been independent of the
sovereign for some one hundred and forty years. Therefore, the chiefs were not
ceding their sovereignty to the British courts or legislature, but to the Queen herself.
Counsel went on to argue:
[w]hile an independent court structure was soon set up by the Crown, and indeed was
necessary in order for the Crown to fulfil its Treaty duties to provide Maori with the
rights of British subjects, this was a distinct and separate development from the
transfer of sovereignty itself. . .. Therefore, whilst it can be said that the signing of the
Treaty led to the establishment of courts in New Z.ealand styled on the British Model,
this does not mean that the courts were part of the Crown, either in 1840 or
subsequently ...61
In drawing its own conclusions on the place of the Treaty and 1840 conceptions of the
Crown in the 1975 Act, the Tribunal acknowledged that M6ori were not aware of the
separation of powers between the Crown and the judiciary. However, it also
suggested there was nothing in the preamble of the Treaty to suggest the Queen had a
different constitutional relationship in mind for New Zealand than that which was
already established in Britain, that is, with a judiciary independent from the Crown'
Furthermore, the Tribunal stated that the meaning of 'the Crown' in the 1975 Act
should not be determined by the possible understandings of the Treaty participants in
1840, but rather the meaning intended by the legislature in choosing to use the phrase
in the 1975 Act.6z This point is discussed in more detail in the third section
concerning interpretations of the Tribunal' s jurisdiction.
60 Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th ed., Constitutional ktw, refer sections 806-807, quoted in
'Moriori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court" p. 4'
6l 'Cro*n submissions on jurisdiction' ,Wai 64'Doc.E2,pp.4'5.
62 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 14.
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ii.The Evolution of the Crown
While the Tribunal observed that 'the Crown' was not defined in the Treaty of
Waitangi Act 1975, it suggested that in the sections of the Act 'the Crown' only refers
to the executive or the government, not the judiciary or the Courts. However, before
the Tribunal was willing to explore the meaning of the Crown in the Act, it fhst
considered the evolution of the Crown, noting its development from a 'piece of
jewelled headgear' to a collection of powers confirmed by statute on 'the Crown.'63
Consideration was also given by the Tribunal to possible historic meanings of the
Crown and its more recent range of identities and associations. For example, the
Tribunal noted that when the House of Lords had occasion to wonder at the
complexity of the Crown, one Lord had stated:
.'the Crown" was no doubt a convenient way of denoting and distinguishing the
monarch when doing acts of government in his political capacity from the monarch
when doing private acts in his personal capacity, at a period when legislative and
executive powers were exercised by him in accordance with his own will' But to
continue nowadays to speak of "the Crown" as doing legislative or executivc acts of
govemment ... involves risk of confusion. . .. [fleatures of the debate ... could have
been eliminated if instead of speaking of "the Crown" we were to speak of "the
government".6{
In interpreting the Crown in New Zealand, the Tribunal also acknowledged Philip
Joseph's argument that Parliament wrested sovereignty from the Crown at a relatively
early stage in New Zealand,resulting in the 'somewhat fictional sense in which the
term "the Crown" is now used' in New Zealand.65
63 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 4.
64 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court" p' 4'
65 Joseph, Constitutionat and A(tministrative Law in New kuland, pp.507-508 nFl see Chapter
One (this thesis) for further discussion of the Crown in the law and Joseph's work in this area.
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The Tribunal then considered the relationship of the Crown with other institutions in
New Zealand in order to determine what the Crown was not. The Tribunal concluded
that it was straining credibility to characterise the House of Representatives as the
Crown. It stated,'[t]he term "the Crown" ... appeals inapt to describe the New
ZealandParliament. No case or statute was cited to us which indicated that Parliament
is included in "the Crown".'66 Furthermore, in examining the relationship between the
judiciary and the Crown, the Tribunal stated that, 'the relationship between the
Sovereign and Ministers of the Crown is essentially different from that between the
Sovereign and the judiciary who functions completely independently of the Sovereign
and of the Ministers of the Crown and Parliament.'67 With regard specifically to the
NLC, the Tribunal asserted that the Court had been established through the Native
Lands Act 1865 as a Court of Record and was a part of the judicial arrn of government
much the same as the Magistrates and Supreme Courts, The Tribunal further
emphasised that the power of the Courts has been 'irrevocably delegated to judges and
magistrates, so that the Sovereign may take no part in the proceedings of a court of
justice.'6s
However, Grant Phillipson, researcher for the Tribunal, extensively investigated the
relationship between Courts and the Crown and came to very different conclusions
from those presented by the Tribunal. Phillipson argued that the relationship between
the NLC and the government of the day was historically much closer than the
theoretical separation of powers would indicate. Phillipson contended that the NLC,
more perhaps than most couts, operated in an intensely political atmosphere and he
demonstrated with an abundance of examples of instances where the Crown had
actively intervened in both the general process and the individual decisions of the
MSori Land Court (contemporary counterpart to the NLC). He said, '[a]s a result of
66 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court' , p. 5.
67 
'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Nalive Land Court', p. 9.
68 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', pp 8-9, quoting: Courts of Record 10
Halsbury,4th ed., p. 535, para 812.
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the court's semi-political nature, Parliament frequently altered the legislation governing
the constitution of the court, and the laws which the court was supposed to administer,
and frequently gave the government statutory powers to intervene in the process of
court hearilgs.'69
On consideration of the evidence presented, the Tribunal concluded that, had it been
the intention of the Treaty of Waitangi Act to include all Courts in the term 'the
Crown' it would have been so stated in clear and unambiguous language as was done
in clarifying other aspects of the legislation.T0 Crown Counsel similarly argued that
for the Courts to be implicated as 'agents of the Crown' 'it would be necessary for
specific provision to have been made in the statute. The absence of any provision in
relation to the Courts, and the insertion of a specific provision in relation to the
Legislature in the 1975 Act weighs against an interpretation that actions of the courts
can be equated with 'acts or omissions of the Crown.'7l
The Tribunal concluded through this process of determining what the Crown was not,
that the most accurate interpretation of the Crown in the 1975 Act would be 'the
Executive'. It submined that, 'a contemporary reference to the Crown will prima facie
refer to the Executive or the Government or the administration.'72 In substantiating
this ruling, the Tribunal gave many examples of legislation in which the Crown had
been defined as the Executive, without including the courts in that definition.T3 The
Tribunal concluded, on the strength of the evidence presented, that 'the Crown when
used in contemporary statutes, in the absence of express provision or necessary
69 Grant Phillipson, "Government awareness of Chatham's situation', Wai 64, Doc 416' p. 37'
70 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 9.
7l 'Crown submissions of jurisdiction', p.3.
72 
'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 10.
73 Examples include: section 2 (1) of the Puhlic Finance Act (as amended), section 2 of the Crown
Forest Assets Act /989, also, section 2 of the State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986.
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intendment refers to the executive or government or their servants and agents and not
to Parliament or the courts or judiciary.'74
iii.The Jurisdiction of the Tribunal
A third argument presented by Moriori claimants to demonstrate that the NLC was
indeed part of the Crown, focused specifically on an interpretation of the Tribunal's
jurisdiction in the t975 Act. The claimants called for a 'purposive interpretation' of
the 1975 Act, arguing that the principle and practice of the Act had been to provide a
forum for investigation of grievances under the Treaty, and that the Waitangi Tribunal
had been established to hear such grievances. The claimants considered it highly
irregular, given the scope of the Tribunal to investigate Acts of Parliament, that the
Tribunal might not be allowed to examine judge-made law also thought to be
inconsistent with the treaty principles.T5 The Tribunal, the claimants argued, would
not be asked to judge the legality of court rulings, but rather their consistency with the
principles of the Treaty. In other words, it was possible for the Tribunal to consider a
ruling legal in the eyes of the court, but at the same time, find it to be inconsistent with
the principles of the Treaty in the eyes of the Tribunal. In response' the Tribunal
agreed that it has had occasion to examine court decisions with regard to the principles
of the Treaty, but warned that it does not follow that such decisions can be understood
to be made by, or on behalf of the Crown. That, according to the Tribunal, is quite
another matter.76 The claimants asserted that if the Tribunal lacks the jurisdiction to
examine the actions of the Court, then the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 fails to provide
a remedy for serious treaty breach which indicates a significant hiatus in the operation
of the TribunalJT
74 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. I I '
75 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 11'
76 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 12'
77 'Mo.ioti Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', pp' l3-14'
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ln extending this argument further, the claimants secondly argued that a restricted
interpretation of 'the Crown' as it appears in section 6 is fundamentally inconsistent
with the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975. The claimants identified other aspects of the
legislation which indicated a broader interpretation of the Act would be more
appropriate. These included the scope of section 6 (stated earlier in the chapter) and
more specifically the width of the expression by or on belnlf of the Crown' Also the
long title to the Act allowed for the establishment of a Tribunal to observe and confirm
the principles of the Treaty; and section 7 allows Tribunal discretion and does not
suggest that judicial decisions are beyond the scrutiny of the Tribunal.T8 This reading
of the Act, the claimants argued, indicates that the legislation was intended to be
generally permissive and inclusive, and would not have intended to limit the meaning
of the Crown to the point that some grievances could not be heard because of the
questionable relationship between, in this case, the courts and the Crown.
An additional argument raised by the claimants was that the Tribunal's purpose is to
inquire into acts or practices adopted by or on betnlf of the Crown. Therefore, it is not
necessafy that the Coun be characterised as an "agenf' of the Crown, as '[a]gency is a
term of art; whether an action is on behalf of the Crown is an inquiry of effect.'1e
According to the claimants, the Native Land Court is wholly a creahre of statute, used
to convert native customary title into a form approximating English land tenure. There
can be no doubt, the claimants concluded, that the Native Land Court was acting on
belnlf of the Crown in devising the tenure system.s
In acknowledging that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to consider claims relating to any
Act of Parliament, Counsel for the Crown accepted that the Native Land Court Act and
successive Mdori Land Court legislation are within the Tribunal's jurisdiction and a
78 'Moriori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', pp' 8-9'
79 'Moriori Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court" p' 12'
8o 'Morio ' Counsel on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', pp' 12-13'
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proper matter for inquiry. However, on the matter of the phrase 'by or on behalf of
the Crown', Counsel for the Crown submitted that the policies and practices of the
NLC are not those of the Crown 'as the Courts are an entity distinct and independent
from the Crqwn'. Furthermore, the NLC was not acting 'on behalf of' or as 'an
agent' of the CrownSl because 'it is clearly evident by statute, coflrmon law and
general constitutional convention that the courts are an independent arm of
Government and are neither part of the Crown, nor an agent or acting on behalf of
it.'82
In originally appealing to the High Court to investigate the matter of the Tribunal's
jurisdiction with regard to the Moriori claim, Te Rflnanga had stated:
Presumably it will be argued on behalf of the Moriori interests that the Crown was at
fault within rhe rerms of s. 6(l) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 in failing to
provide redress for the injustices perpetrated by the Native Land Court in the context of
the chatham [sic] Islands hearing. ... Such an argument presupposes and requires an
investigation into the conduct of the Native Land Court and alleged injustices on its
part 
- 
which is not permitted because it was an independent superior Court of record
and not an agent of the Crown in doing what is now complained of'83
Te Rfinanga argued that the Crown should be regarded as the embodiment of executive
government, and should not apply to the decisions of courts of record such as the
NLC whose actions could not be considered 'by or on behalf of the Crown.'84
In response to Te Rtinanga's original request, Heron J. of the High Court, accepted a
'strongly arguable case that [the Native Land] Court's decision could not be regarded
as the actions of the Crown.' However, he warned that Te Riinanga was not
8l 
'Crowr submissions of jurisdiction', p. 2.
82 'Cro*n subrnissions of jurisdiction', p. 18.
83 
'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', pp' 19-20'
84 
'Runanga submission on jurisdiction' , Wai 64,Doc' 2.18, pp. 2-3 '
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necessarily correct in saying that the Tribunal had no jurisdiction to 'inquire into or
make recommendations in connection with the hearings of the Native Land Court.' He
explained that 'a proper investigation of the claims of Moriori here can not avoid a
consideration of what the Court did.'85
Also, Crown Counsel presented earlier Waitangi Tribunal reports which argued that
the NLC is not the Crown, nor is it an agent of the Crown, demonstrating that the
NLC has traditionally fallen outside the jurisdiction of the Tribunal' For example, the
Orakei Report 1987 stated that the Courts are not part of the executive arm of
Government and are in fact required to 'function independently of it [the courts] are
not the Crown nor are they agents of the Crown.'86 Similarly, in the Ngai Tahu
Report lggl,the Tribunal observed, '[i]n any event it was the Native Land Court, not
the Crown, which was conducting the proceedings to which the Crown was party'
Any defects on the court proceedings were the responsibility not of the Crown, but of
the court.'87 Finally, in the Mohaka River Report 1992 theTribunal made a significant
finding with regard to the Planning Tribunal, that,'the Planning Tribunal is neither the
Crown nor the agent of the Crown. Therefore, although we have the power to review
the legislation under which the Planning Tribunal operates, we do not have the power
to review its actions under that legislation.'88 Counsel for the Crown cited these
previous findings in submitting that the Tribunal was correct in its approach to the
actions of the NLC.8e However, Crown Counsel acknowledged one Tribunal report
which teated the mafter differently. InTe Roroa Report 1992,the Tribunal stated that
for the purposes of Te Roroa claim the NLC would be regarded as an agent of the
tl5 'Tribunal finding on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court" p' 20'
86 Waitangi Tribunal, Orakei Report,Department of Justice, Wellington, 1987, p' 136, section
n.7.2.
8? Waitangi Tribunal, Ng,ui Tuhu Report,Departrnent of Justice, Wellington, 1991' p. 510, section
8. t0.10.
88 Waitangi Tribunal, Mohaka River Report, Depar$uent of Justice, Wellington, 1992.
89 'Crown submissions on jurisdiction', p. 10.
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Crown by reason of the Court's powers and authority being confened by statute.90
Crown counsel explained that it was the particular facts of the case which induced the
Tribunal's findings in respect of the NLC in this claim and in fact challenged the
Tribunal's ruling saying the Tribunal's argument was insufficient on certain
grounds.9l
In the case of the NLC/Crown relationship in the Moriori claim, the Tribunal was
consistent with its earlier findings regarding this relationship. The Tribunal considered
it 'significanr' that the 1975 Act explicitly included Acts of Parliament (which might
normally not be considered acts by or on behalf of the Crown as part of 'the Crown'),
but had excluded any reference to the Courts, whose decisions similarly are not
normally considered to be acts by or on behalf of the Crown. The Tribunal considered
this to be more than oversight or coincidence. Furthermore, the Tribunal pointed out
that, for the term 'the Crown' to be consistently meaning the same thing throughout
the 1975 Act, it could only be referring to the executive or goverlment. While not an
impossibility, the Tribunal considered it unlikely that Parliament intended 'the Crown'
to mean two different things in the same Act.e2 Crown counsel similarly submined:
[t]o infer that the phrase "agents of the Crown" could impliedly include the Courts
would be to ignore the clear intentions of the Parliament and the accepted tenets of
statutory interpretation. ... The absence of any provision in relation to the Courts, and
the insertion of a specific provision in relation to the L,egislature weighs against an
interpretation that actions of the courts can be equated with acts or omissions of the
Crown.93
90 yyuig-ri Tribunal, Te Roroa Report, Department of Justice, Wellington, 1992, in: 'Crown
submissions on jurisdiction', pp. 10-11
9l See: 'Crown submissions on jurisdiction', pp. 13-17 for an explanation of Crown Counsel's
criticisms of the Tribunal's findings in Te Roroa Report 1992.
92 Tribunal findings of jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', pp. 14-15'
'Tribunal findings on jurisdiction re: Native Land Court', p. 15.
93 'Crown submissions on jurisdiction', P. 3.
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In concluding its evidence, Crown Counsel similarly advised:
The Crown therefore submits that the Tribunal does not have the jurisdiction to
consider the actions of the Native Land Court with a view to making recommendations
based on its orders. Ir does however acc€pt that the Tribunal may examine both the
legislation which sets up the Court and the actions or omissions of the Crown once the
results of the Native Land Court orders were brought to its attention.94
Having heard the evidence during the request for interim relief, Heron J. noted that the
claims brought to the Tribunal by Moriori largely circumvented the workings of the
Court (see earlier list), except for clauses relating to the application of the so-called
"1840 rule" on Rekohu which deprived the claimants of 97 per cent of their land
(clause 1.2.1.2) and the failure of the NLC to correctly apply the customary lore of the
Moriori (clause I.2.1.7). Both these grievances would require the Tribunal to
scrutinise the NLC sitting as a court rather than the actions or failings of the Crown.
Heron J. explained that while the Tribunal may consider the actions of the Court in an
historical narrative, it does not have the jurisdiction to consider whether the Court's
actions were in breach of the treaty principles because such actions are not those of the
Crown. However, the judge qualified the decisions by finding that the Crown's
response to the actions of the NLC may be considered by the Tribunal'e5 Heron J'
finally ruled that:
What is set out in the lMoriori] statement of claim is a series of complaints or
grievances as to the treatment of an individual group who are entitled to bring if they
can, a case which suggests that the principles of the Treaty have not been honoured.
Simply because a court may have intervened does not in my view preclude the finding
that overall injustices remain.96
94 
'Crown submissions on jurisdiction', p. 18.
95 'Cro*n submissions on jurisdiction', pp. 8-9'
96 
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ln subsequently considering the matter itself, the Tribunal found that there was not
satisfactory evidence that the term 'the Crown', where it appears in sections 6( 1) (c)
and (d) of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 includes the Native Land Court or any
other court. It found on the basis of, amongst other things, the evolution of the
independence of the judiciary and the manner of the identification of the Crown in that
and other legislation, that the adoption of the '1840 rule' by judges of the Native Land
Court was not a policy, practice or act adopted by or on behalf of the Crown'e7
However, the Tribunal quatified its finding with the ruling that it may:
properly give consideration to whether the Native Land Court has acted inconsistently
with Treaty principles and, if it so finds, to determine whether the Crown omitted to
take appropriate action to remedy the situation to the extent such action was
practicable. In ascertaining what the court did does not involve the Tribunal in
questioning or impugning the legality of the court's decision'98
The Implications: Reduced Accountability for the Crown?
In considering the implications of the Tribunal's ruling on the identity of the Crown
with respect to the Moriori claim before the Tribunal, it is important to note that this is
not an isolated case. In 1995, a similar principle was tested when the Waitangi
Tribunal was asked by urban Mdori to investigate the policies of the Waitangi Tribunal
Fisheries Commission which, urban Mdori asserted, contravened the principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi. The Commission itself stated that the Tribunal had no legal power
of inquiry into the Commission's policies because the Commission was not part of the
Crown, nor was it acting on behalf of the Crown. In explaining this position, the
Commission's lawyer contested that 'the Waitangi Tribunal only has power to
examine the policy or proposed policies of the Crown,but the Fisheries Commission
is not a Crown body and as yet, it doesn't have a fixed policy about how the fisheries
97 
'Tribunal findings on jurisdiction', p. 21.
98 
'Tribunal findings on jurisdiction',p.22-
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benefits should be allocated.'9e The Commission's lawyer also argued that the
commissioners themselves are not subject to government control and that for tax
purposes the Commission was treated as a M6ori authority, which also clearly
demonstrated that it was not 'the 6rs1yn.'100 The Commission requested that the
High Court conduct a judicial review of the Tribunal's plans. While restrictions in
time and space in this thesis do not allow for a detailed review of the hearing, the
principal relevant rulings should be noted. In ruling on the matter of the Waitangi
Tribunal Fisheries Commission and the Crown, the High Court advised that:
the Tribunal is empowered to enquire into a claim by any Maori that he or she is likely
to be prejudicially affected by any policy or practice adopted by or on behalf of the
Crown. ... I think it is beyond doubt that the Commission in its functions acts on
behalf of Maori and on behalf of the Crown.l0l
One can assume that the Native Land Court and Fisheries Commission rulings will not
be the last of such cases. They demonstrate that significantly different interpretations
of the meaning and identity of the Crown co-exist in contempofary New Zealand
society and that these were not reconciled by the 1975 legislation or subsequent
amendments.
In respect of which institutions and entities such as the Native Land Court and
Waitangi Fisheries Commission are or are not the Crown, Maui Solomon, Wellington
Barrister, advises that he would 'throw the cloak over the whole lot'. He describes
what he calls 'the legal fictions which the Crown has created to compartrnentalise
itself' and states that while it had the authority to do so, 'by the same token, Maori
99 .Waitangi Tribunal Challenged by Treaty of Waitangi', Radio New Zealand, Midday Report,
t2: 17 pm, 24 July 1995.
l(X) 
'3u111" in Court over Crown ldentity', Radio New Zealand, Mana News, 6:17 pm' 24 laly
1995.
ltll 7r"osy of Waitangi Fisheries Commission v Waitang,i Tribunal, Judgement of Ellis J' 31 July,
1995.
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have the right to protect themselves and not be affected by the differences the Crown
has created.'102 According to this logic, the judiciary, the Fisheries Commission and
any other body with authority under the Treaty of Waitangi is implicated in the identity
of the Crown. Solomon's comment highlights a certain degree of tension between two
possible interpretations of the Crown. One of those is the historical interpretation of
the Crown largely supported by M6ori, that all authority in New Zealand is 'Crown'
authority as the source from which it originally emanated.It is argued that, in evolving,
the Crown can recreate itself, but it cannot divest itself of its origind Ueaty obligations
and its responsibility to hand those obligations on to the authorities it creates- The
other interpretation is the more constitutional,legal perspective which identifies the
Crown as the Queen and the executive, and then grapples with problems of Crown
agency in relation to this. While both approaches are arguably problematic in
themselves, in composite they are not easily reconciled. The issue comes down to a
matter of which interpretation will prevail.
On the mafter of whether Mdori will be prejudicially affected by interpretations of the
Crown which are contrary to their own in these, or other court rulings, the evidence is
inconclusive. In the case of the Moriori claim in particular, the findings had not been
made on the claim before this research was completed. However, every indication was
that, while the ruling might have been unfavourable to Moriori, in practical terms the
Tribunal had retained the authority to investigate the Native Land Court.
However, at the same time the Crown identity is able to contract in order to exclude
entities which it is not, the Crown is also actively expanding in other ways' The next
chapter moves on to discuss the process which extends Crown authority under the
Treaty to local and regional government in New Zealand and once again considers the
implications of this for the Mdori treaty partner.
102 1n1"*i",p', Maui Solomon, Molesworth Chambers, Wellington,29 August 1995.
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THE EXPANDING PROBLEM OF THE CROWN: LOCAL GOVERNMENT
REFORM AND THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT
In Chapter Five it was demonstrated that the Crown was identified in the Treaty of
Waitangi as Her Majesty the Queen of England. Subsequent to the signing of the
Treaty the Queen's authority was transt'errecl to settler government despite resistance
from Mdori on the grounds that this was an inappropriate interpretation of the treaty
partnership. In Chapter Six, the Treaty of Waitangi Act was shown to revive the
symbol of the Crown although the syrnbol was still to be interpreted in different ways
by various groups in contemporary society. Chapter Seven subsequently
demonstrated that the contemporary iclentity of the Crown was able to contract and
exclude the Native Land Court when its identity in the 1975 Act was brought into
question. In this chapter it is argued that the Crown identity was also expanding to
include local and regional authorities, ciespite protest by Mlori that this was an
inappropriate expression of the origintrl treaty partnership'
This discussion focuses on two of the Labour Government's policies and subsequent
legislation in the late 1980s: the reform of local government and the Local Government
Amendment Act(s); and resource management law retorm and the Resource
Management Act 1991. It demonstrates that in both cases the changes these policies
brought to the identity of the Crown treaty partner were resisted by MEori' The
discussion concludes with a case sturiy of the Moutoa Gardens occupation by Mdori in
March 1995. This protest and the public clebate which surrounded it illustrate the
implications of the Government's policies and legislation fbr Mdori by demonstrating
that as a result of reforms, accountability tbr the Treaty within the negotiation process
t'ell between central and local govemment to the disadvantage of Mdori.
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One important point which requires clarification before discussion begins is that both
the local government reforms and the Resource Management Act 1991 transferred,
amongst other things, aspects of central government's (or the Crown's) treaty
obligations and authority regarding resource management to local and regional
authorities.l This shift was part of a general trend at the time to minimise central
goverrrment authority and increase public responsibility and participation in decision
making processes. Also, some of the sources discussed later in this chapter provide
evidence that the Labour Government was under considerable pressure from some
sections of the public to increase local participation by devolving functions away from
cenfral agencies.
It is equally important to realise, however, that this transfer of authority was met with
strong resistance from representatives from both Mdori and local authorities. Those
Mlori who rejected a relationship with local authorities on treaty matters asserted that
the Treaty was signed by the Crown (which later became central govemment) not local
government.2 Many local authorities have also protested at their involvement in treaty
management matters which they regarded as an issue for central government to
resolve. This chapter follows the progress of this debate through local government
and resource management law reform by reviewing submissions made by M6ori and
local authorities at various stages in the reform process. It demonstrates first, that
while both groups expressed concern over the role of local government in treaty
issues, this matter was barely acknowledged in either reform and was certainly was not
resolved. Second, it argues that the reforms redefined the Crown treaty partner in a
way which had serious implications for the Mdori treaty partner similar to those
lFor the purposes of this discussion, the term 'local authorities' is a generic term for all types of sub-
national boai"rr local government, territorial and regional authorities and special provider boards both
before and after the reforms.
2 Both local government reforms and the resource management law reform process have been
criticised withiegard to the lack of M6ori opinion attracted by the submission process. More is said
on this later in the chapter.
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suffered by M6ori following earlier evolution of the Crown after the signing of the
Treaty of Waitangi in 1840.
Mdori, Local Government and the Crown: Lacal Government Refonn
The history of Mdori and local government relations in New Zealand through the
1970s and 1980s provides a vital context for analysis of the local government reform
process from the perspective of the Treaty of Waitangi. It also helps to explain the
traditional mistrust of local government by Mdori as well as their preference for
dealing directly with the central government as 'Crown' authority. Finally, it
highlights a tension between central and local government. As J.B. Ringer explains'
'[t]he history of local government in New Tnaland is one of fierce parochialism and
suspicion of cental government.'3 When seen within this context the implications for
Mdori of central government further empowering local government may be better
understood.
Prior to colonisation, Mfiori organised themselves as hapii (extended family
groupings) and tribal or iwi groupings. The Europeans who drafted and promoted the
Treaty acknowledged this fundamental social structure by travelling the length of the
country to secure the signatures of well over five hundred chiefs from almost all iwi in
Aotearoa. While Mdori authority was decentralised and tribally based at this time,
European authority in the settler colony, at least according to the terms of the Treaty,
was focused on the centralised rule of 'the Crown'. As shown earlier, M6ori saw this
Crown treaty partner as the Queen, who subsequently became a focus for their
grievances. However, the M6ori conception of a single governing 'Crown' was first
disrupted by the New Zealand Constitution Act 1852 which established a General
Assembly in New Zealandand electoral districts for the election of members of the
House. Section 71 of the Act allowed for the, '[s]etting apart of districts in which the
3 l. S. Ringer, An Introduction to New Zealand Government, Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1991' p'
237.
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laws, customs and usages of the Aboriginal or Maori inhabitants of New Zealand
should for the present be maintained for the government of themselves, in all their
relations to and dealings with each other' which provided the potential for local
authorities to encourage Mdori development under the Treaty. However, this potential
was not borne out as the provisions of this section of the Act were never implemented.
Writing on the matter of Mdori and local govenrment in 1989, Hirini Matunga argued
that all local government legislation since the 1852 Act has subordinated the place of
Mdori in local government.4 Other writers have supported Matunga's contention by
providing examples of 'constant and frequently deliberate, violations of the Treaty' by
provincial and later regional / local govemment, including the seizure of Mdori land for
public works, the granting of mining licenses on Mdori land and the levying of taxes
on Maori land.s When questioned on this matter, Matunga explained that local
govemment has historically violated M6ori rights, not only in its neglect of the Treaty,
but in failing to accept its responsibilities under the Treaty. Through time, Mdori have
developed an aversion to local authorities and have come to view the Crown as a
necessary 'backstop' for local government authority.o
Despite this history of poor relations between Maori and local government, some
progress in the area of local government and the Treaty began in the 1970s. In keeping
with general developments in treaty issues at this time (discussed in Chapter Six)'
relations between M6ori and local govemment moved into a new phase with the Town
and Country Planning Act 1977 which required local government to recognise Mdori
interests and values (although the Act made no direct reference to the Treaty of
Waitangi). By the time of the Labour Party's victory in 1984, local government
constituted three distinct strands of regional and territorial authorities and special
4 Hirini Matunga, krcal Government: A Muori Perspective, A Report for the Maori Consultative
Group on l,ocal Government Reform, January 1989,p.2.
5 Jane Kelsey, 'The Treaty of Waitangi, Local Government and Resource Management Law \eform"
paper presented at the Niw kalarulinstitute of Planning Conference,Waikato University, 1989' p'
^
l'o"rr. comm., Hirini Matunga, 13 February, 1995.
198
purpose boards with varying size, capacity and calibre between the units and between
regions. It was a system which Graham Bush described as having 'multiple
fragmentation.'7 Following amendments to the Town and Country Planning Act by
Labour in 1987 local government was further compelled to acknowledge Mlori values
in resource management decision making by allowing provision for MEori traditional
and cultural uses, including fishing grounds (section 33 2A) though still without
reference to the Treaty. It was considered more appropriate that treaty issues be
addressecl at the level of central government within the context of Mdori and Crown
relations as the treaty partners (as later discussion demonstrates). Subsequently, and
soon after regaining office in 1987, Labour announced radical reform to the structure
and function of local and regional government based on the principles of greater
autonomy and improved accountability.8 These reforms would produce a regional tier
of government for natural resource management and environmental planning
(absorbing most special purpose bodies); a reduced number of territorial local bodies;
corporatised local government trading activities; and new instruments of
accountability.l 'p"*er, leaner and meaner' is the description of the reformed local
bodies offered by Bu5l.ltt
As the reform process progressed the concept of devolution was starting to 'punctuate
ministers' speeches'll and the idea was met with mixed responses. 'Devolution' has
been widely debated by writers and commentators of both local government and
resource management law reform. There continues to be considerable disagteement
over not only the merits of devolution, but also what constitutes 'real' devolution. In
7 Graham Bush, 'The Historic Reorganisation of Local Government', in The Fourth I'abour
Government. Potitics and Policy in'New kalantl,2nd Edn., M. Holland and J Boston (eds')'
Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1990, p'232'
8 Bush, 'The Historic Reorganisation of Local Government' 'p.233'
9 g.tvt. Mcleay, 'Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back: Maori Devolution, Maori Advisory
Committees and Maori ReprJsentation' , Political Siience,Vol. 43 No.l, July 1991,p.32'
l0 3ut6, 'The Historic Reorganisation of Local Government" p' 238'
I I Bush, 'The Historic Reorganisation of l-ocal Government' ,p.236'
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this context of this chapter, the debate about real devolution is important because it
addressed the question of whether ultimate authority for the Treaty remained with the
Crown (as central government) or was wholly transferred to other authorities such as
local government as a result of the reforms. To summarise this debate, on the one
hand devolution is said to be the complete transfer of power, authority and
responsibility from a national to sub-national level, while on the other hand it was said
to be more like the decentralisation or delegation of these things while ultimate
responsibility remained at the national level.l2 ln addition to debate about the nanre of
devolution, there has also been disagreement over the merits of devolving authority
from central government to sub-national bodies. The merits of devolution are said to
include greater public participation, greater focus on the needs of local communities
and more efficient and cost effective management and organisation, while the
disadvantages include a loss of central administration and national perspective, a
marginalising of community needs and the fragmentation of issues which are best
understood and co-ordinated from a national office.l3 Having acknowledged both
these debates it should be noted that, from the perspective of the Treaty of Waitangi,
the devolution of Crown authority from central government to local authorities can be
seen as being inconsistent with the Crown/Ir,ldori parErership established by the Treaty
and contary to the treaty obligation for central goveflrment to protect M6ori interests.
In addition to these concerns, the speed of the local government reforms has been
criticised. When the reforms were first introduced in early 1988 the process was
intended to be completed in time for local authorities to be elected in 1989.14 This
rigid time frame cast some doubts over the impact of public participation and
submissions on the reform process. As one writer commented, '[e]ven though several
12 John Martin,'Dovolution and Decentralisation' in Reshaping the State: New Zealand's
Bureaucrtttic Revolution,J. Boston et al. (eds.), Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1991, p-268'
l3 See discussion in, Martin, 'Devolution and Decentralisation', pp.269-271'
14 Ton Buhrs and Robert Bartlett, Environmentat Potitics in New Zealand: The Politics of Clean
untl Green? ,Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1993' p. 119.
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rounds of submissions were solicited during the work of the Local Government
Commission ... the tight timetable imposed by the government limited the extent and
meaningfulness of the formalities of consultation.'15 The submissions presented at
various stages of the reform process support the claim that fundamental issues were
raised which could not have been addressed or resolved in such a restricted timetable.
In particular, there were criticisms from Mdori and local authorities that sub-national
bodies were not legitimate 'Crown' authorities under the Treaty of Waitangi, discussed
in this chapter.
The reform of local government officially began with the release of the flrst report by
the Officials Co-ordinating Committee on Local Government (OCCLG) in February
1988 which invited public submissions on the government's policies. It emphasised
that reforms were'[t]aking place in the context of increased awareness of, and
emphasis on the place of the Treaty of Waitangi in Government.'16 However, the
report did not address the question of local Government and Mdoridom until the final
chapter, 'Constitutional Issues', which offered the 'vague and unsubstantial FUsing'17
that Mdori had not historically enjoyed any special place in local government as tangata
whenua. The report acknowledged that such a place for Mdori should exist and
suggestions were made for Mdori representation in local authorities.l8 The discussion
document prompted a reply of nearly 500 submissions from many sources including
local authorities (6lvo) and Maori (Zvo\Jo Many of these submissions raised
fundamental issues and serious criticisms. Also, as Bush noted, '[t]he notion that the
Treaty of Waitangi might give Mdori aspirations a special and privileged status in local
l5 Burhs and Bartlett, Environmentat Potitics in New kalantl,p' I22'
16 The Officials Co-ordinaring Committee on Local Government (OCCLG), Reform of llcal antl
Regktnal Government. Di.scusiion Document,Department of Internal Affairs, Wellington, February
1988, pp.2-3.
17 Robert Mahuta,'Reform of Local and Regional Government. A Tainui Perspective', New fualand
Geographer, Vol. 44, No. l, 1989, P. 84.
l8 OCCLG, Re.form of Incal and Regional Government, pp' 59-60.
l9 Bush,'The Historic Reorganisation of Local Government',p.239.
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govemment drew linle support.'20 Indeed,local authorities expressed the general view
that '[the Treaty] has no place in local government'.2l Mdori similarly expressed
concern that a relationship with local goverrrment was not an appropriate expression of
the teaty partnership.22
Despite the serious nature of these and other issues raised in the submissions, Labour
introduced the Local Government Amendment (No.3) Act to Parliament before the
submissions on the Discussion Document had closed.23 The Act directed the Local
Government Commission to prepare final schemes for regional and local units of
government in one year. Once again the Commission solicited several rounds of
submissions and then published indicative reorganisational schemes. The final
proposals on new regional and local authorities were issued early in 1989. Soon after'
further measures implementing local government festructuring were passed in the
Local Government (No.2) Act 1989.2a By November, 1989 the new system was in
full operation and new units of local goveflrment were established.s
The Local Government (No.2) Act was heavily criticised for its 'indefensible silence
on treaty matters.'26 In particular, despite the Government's promises and the
concerns raised in submissions, the Act was criticised because it neither legislated on
how Mdori were to be involved in the consultation process nor said how M6ori could
be incorporated into the process of decision making at the local govemment level. This
sort of criticism, which came largely from Mdori, prompted further government action'
20 Bush, 'The Historic Reorganisation of [,ocal Government' ,p.239 '
2t The Bridgeport Group, Synopsis of Suhmissions rn Reform of I'ocal and Regional Gouernment,
Reporr to Thi bftciuts io^toiti"" onLocal Govemment,bept of Internal Affairs' June 1988, p' 43'
22 ^Ihe Bridgeport Group, Synopsis of Submissittn'r, p' 45.
23 Bush, 'The Historic Reorganisation of Local Government" p.239'
24 Burhs and Bartlett, Environmental Politics in New Tzalancl,p' 120'
25 For detail of these events see: Bush, 'The Historic Reorganisation of Local Government' ,pp'240'
243.
26 Sir Graham Latimer, Chair of the New ZealandMaori Council, quoted in Jane Kelsey, A Question
Of Honour? Labour anl the Treaty Ig84 - IgSg,Allen and Unwin, Wellington' 1990, p' 181'
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Mdori participation in local government was already being considered by three
different groups during the reform process. The work of the OCCLG has already
been discussed. A second group, the Mlori Local Government Reform Consultative
Group (MCG), was established by the Minister of Local Government in May 1988 to
work in association with the OCCLG to ensure that M[ori issues affected by the
reforms would be considered. In reviewing the work of the MCG there is evidence of
concern by some members of the group about the relationship benveen Mdori and local
govenrment with regard to the Crown's responsibilities under the Treaty. The minutes
of one meeting record a comment by Caren Wickliffe (Maori Legal Services'
Wellington) that 'all the functions undertaken by local authorities ... impinge on the
rights of the Mdori people under the Treaty of Waitangi-'77 Atthe same meeting, the
Deputy Secretary of the Department of Mlori Affairs said, 'the Treaty of Waitangi
must be honoured and that there needs to be commitment from the Crown and from
local government, by way of statutory provisions and direction, as you can't rely on
goodwill alone.'28 In keeping with this sentiment, the MCG recornmended that the
principles of the Treaty of Waitangi be incorporated into amended local government
legislation. However, having heard these recommendations the amendment prepared
by the OCCLG stated a limited obligation to 'consult such persons and organisations,
including Maori tribal authorities and other Maori authorities as it thinks frt.'Ze
In addition to this work by the group, Hirini Matunga wrote an independent report for
the MCG which reiterated the essential principle established by the Court of Appeal
and the Waitangi Tribunal, also raised in the previous chapter. That principle was that,
.[t]he Crown can't divest itself of Treaty obligations or confer an inconsistent
jurisdiction on others. The Crown should provide for its treaty promises when vesting
27 Maori Local Government Reform Consultative Group (MCG),'Minutes of the Second Meeting of
the MCG', State Insurance Building, Wellington, June 9 1988, p' 4'
2s UCG, 'Minutes of the Second Meeting of the MCG', June 9 1988' p' a'
29 Nga Kaiwhakamarama in Ngi Ture (M6ori Legal-services, Wellington), Paper on lncal
Govelnment Reform.for Maori I lwi Authorities, 1988' p'5'
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responsibilities in local authorities.'3O As Matunga explained, 'simply stated lthe
principle means that] local and regional government need clear statutory guidelines
outlining their treaty obligations, and how these obligations are to be met when making
decisions about land and resources.'3l He emphasised:
While there may be moral, and certainly cultural imperatives which compel local
govemment to recognise the significance of the Treaty, there is currently no legislative
imperative. Some local authorities have attempted to address their obligations under
the treaty but usually failed. Most have left the issue for central government to deal
with.32
A third group addressing the issue of Maori participation in local government, the
Cabinet Committee on Reform of Local Government and Resource Management
Statutes, responded to Mdori concerns about local government reforms by asking the
Minister of Local Government to prepare a draft Bill and discussion paper recognising
the Treaty of Waitangi and to provide an appropriate consultative means to ensure
Mdori input into local government decision making. The result was the Local
Government Amendment (No.8) Bill to establish Mlori Advisory Committees
(MACs) to facilitate consultation and discussion between tangata whenua and regional
councils/territorial authorities. These proposals were recognised as 'very much
addenda to the extensive changes made to the local government system by the Labour
government', and were not passed before Labour was voted out of office in 1990.33
However, the discussion which surrounded the proposed Bill again illustrates a point
of tension over the relationship between Mdori and local government' The
'Explanatory Statement' which was released with the Bill and which called for
submissions also asked whether the Treaty applied to local government' A synopsis
of the submissions indicated that the point was repeatedly made across the range of
30 Matunga, Local Government: A Maori Perspective,p.6.
3l Matunga, Local Governrnent: A Maori Perspective,p'9'
32 Matunga, Incal Government: A Maori Perspective'p' 13.
33 Mcleay, 'Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back', p. 32'
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submissions that 'the Treaty is an agreement between the Crown and Maori. Many of
its undertakings tue outside the jurisdiction of local government.' Furthermore it stated
that 'the application of the Treaty to local govemment is open to question.'34 Many of
the submissions from Mdori expressed the viewpoint that local government was not
the Crown and would be an inappropriate partner for M6ori in consultation or
negotiation of treaty issues. For example, a Mf,ori Youth Advisory Committee
commented:
[the restructuring of local and regional government] is a dilution of the ability of the
Crown to act in accordance with the Treaty of Waitangi toward iwi Mdori' The
obligations put upon both partners of the Treary cannot be complied with if in effect
iwi M6ori have to consult with a series of local goveming regimes rather than with
their singular Treaty partner 
- 
the Crown. twith this draft Billl the distance between
Crown and iwi will be increased.3S
Another submission insisted that the Bill include the proviso that regional councils and
territorial authorities may not act in a manner which is inconsistent with the Treaty of
Waitangi or any other special arrangement that iwi may have with the Crown. 'To
provide less is to delegate Crown responsibility without Crown treaty obligations.'36
Another Maori council encapsulated the focus of Mf,ori concern about local
govenment reform by emphasising the historic relationship between iwi and Crown in
its submission on the Bill. According to this council, the Government's proposals to
restructure local government would:
result in a fragmentation of power from the Crown to its sub-national bodies and away
from iwi, consequently weakening the status and position of the M6ori as one of the
34 The Bridgeport Group. Reform of ktcat and Regional Governme.nt, Synopsis of Submiss.ions on
Biy.fbr the-Eitablisn^int ni ttooii Artuitory Coimittees in Local Government and Explanatory
Staiment,Report ro the Ofiicials Co-ordinating Committee on Local Government, April 1990' p'
16.
35 youth Advisory Committee Maniapoto Trust Board in The Bridgeport Group, Reform of lncal
and Reg,ional Government, P. 17 .
36 ntil Jb, the Establishrnent o.f Maori Attvisory Committees in Incal Government and Explanatory
Statement.R. J. Te Heu Heu, Submission No.48' p' 2'
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Treaty partners, who are, in fact, the iwi Mdori and the Crown (represented by central
government) not the iwi Miori and the local government authorities. We find this
situation [of the Bill and proposed local govemment reforms] unacceptable and contrary
to both the spirit and mana of the Treaty provisions and their principles.3T
The council also claimed that it spoke for all MEori in stating that the Crown - iwi
relationship must be preserved.38 Concern over the proposed role for local
government was evident in other sources also. For example, Robert Mahuta of the
Tainui Trust Board wrote, 'the Trust Board recognises that local govemment draws its
authority from the Crown and is therefore an agent to it. In terms of the Treaty it will
do no good to confuse which party is who.'3e
However, Mdori were not the only group to reject or question the role of local
government involvement in treaty issues. While many local authorities and other
individuals accepted the need for effective consultation with Mdori, they also
demonstrated clear reservations about the Treaty's application to local government.4
One individual advising on the appropriate phrasing for the Bill, commented that:
[a]ny strengthening of the words ['have regard to the Treaty of Waitangi'] would not be
appropriate in terms of local governmenl responsibilities under the Treaty - the Treaty
is a contract between the Crown and Maori, not between local government and
M6ori.4l
Another individual submission stated, 'Maori claims under the Treaty of Waitangi are
with the Crown and Ministers of the Crown, not with government (or local
3'l gUtJbr the Establishment of Maori Atlvisory Committees, Te Runanga o Turanganui a Kiwa.
Submission No. 153, p. 3.
38 Ail.for the Establishment of Maori Advisory Committees, Te Runanga o Turanganui a Kiwa'
Submission No. 153, p. 3.
39 Robert Mahuta, 'Reform of Local and Regional Government. A Tainui Perspective', p. 84.
4() The Bridgeport Group, Reform of Incal and Regional Government, p. 61.
4l gilt for the Establishment of Maori Advisory Committees, Pieter Burghout, lrgal Adviser'
Submission No. 57, p. 2.
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government) agencies.a2 Yet another more strongly asserted that '[t]he Treaty should
have no bearing whatsoever on present day local body affairs.' The respondent went
on to ask '[w]hat right has any member of any govemment to demand these conditions
from any local council?'a3 Finally, another group condemned the Bill, saying that it
was a 'simple denial of Rangatiratanga' and that it attempted to replace the
'constitutional relationship between Iwi and Crown provided for in the Treaty.'4
Overall, the submissions in response to the Labour Government's policy for reform of
regional and local government, which have been discussed here, illustrate resistance by
both M6ori and local authorities to a change in the identity of the Crown, similar to the
kind of resistance identified amongst Mdori with the shift in Crown identity following
the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. However, the devolution of Crown
responsibilities to local authorities was to become all the more significant with resource
management law reform and the passing of the Resource Management Act 1991.
Mdori, Local Govemment and the Crown: Resource Management Law Reform
During the reform of local goverrrment, a parallel review of resource management law
relating to town planning, water and soil, mining, clean air, energy, noise control and
the environment was proceeding. The reports and submissions made during the
Resource Management Law Reform (RMLR) process (the most extensive in New
Zealand's history) indicate that the debate over the appropriate role of local government
in treaty matters was again of considerable concern. Through RMLR, the Labour
42 Bitt.Sor the Establishment of Maori Advisory Committees,Ian Andrews, Submission No.20'
a3 Bitt fo, the Estcblishment ofMaori Advisory Committees, Mrs J M Revill, Submission No' 14'
p.2.
4 Iwi Transition Agency , Report of the lwi Transition Agency Working Group t!.llrr-Runanga lwi
Bil,Incal Governient e,meia^"it (No.8) Bitt and the Resource Management Bill,lYi Transition
Agency, January 30, 1990. The centrat debate over the Bitl was the issue of representation, whether
M5ori have a constitutional right to guaranteed representation in local government, or- whether it was
anti-democratic for government to ui" anything oiher than the one-person, one-vote philosophy' The
government's failure to implement the recommendations of the MCG in the Bill would indicate that
Ih" gou"*-ent favoured the latter argument. See Mcleay, 'Two Steps Forward, Two Steps Back"
pp. 3l-37 for further discussion of Maori representation and local government'
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Government proposed to empower local government further with critical authority in
resource management and regional planning. Once again there was some disagreement
as to whether RMLR constituted 'real devolution' of cental government's authority.
For example, Martin argued that the government was willing to devolve functions in
resource management through mechanisms established in the local government
reforms.45 However, Buhrs and Bartlett disagreed, stating that front-line
responsibility for environmental policy would be largely delegated and decenftalised,
not devolved, and that ultimate responsibility would remain with cenfial government.6
In either case, concern was expressed about primary responsibilities being assigned to
local and regional govemment. For example, Martin said:
[i]t can simply be noted that the opportunities for confused accountability are
considerable. There must also be an element of concem about the capacity of local
government to assume responsibilities ... where central government agencies are the
repositories of technical expertise and 'case-law'.47
A further concern, according to other sources, was the appropriateness of local
govemment dealing with treaty issues, given the poor history of local governmenV
Maori relations in New Zealand, and the nature of the original Crown/Idaori
partnership.aB
As with the local government reform process, members of the public were invited to
make submissions on the RMLR policy proposals. In August 1988, 'Directions for
Change. A Discussion Paper' introduced the public to the Government's proposed
reform of resource management laws and structures. The paper posed the fundamental
question; '[i]n what circumstances should government play a role in resource
45 Martin comments that there is some disagreement as to whether this is 'real' devolution- See:
Martin,'Devolution and Decentralisation', p. 277 .
46 Buhrs and Bartlett, Environmentat Poticy in New 7zalarul,p' l2l '
47 Martin, 'Devolution and Decentralisation', p.277 '
48 This opinion was repeatedly expressed in the submissions made on the Resource Management
Bill, discussed later.
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management, and in what circumstances can it leave choices about resource use and
preservation to individuals?'ae The Treaty of Waitangi was afforded only token
recognition in the discussion document which provided the framework for the RMLR
debate. The document stated that the Treaty of Waitangi was of special significance to
the review and acknowledged that '[t]he Crown has particular responsibilities to the
Maori people under the Treaty of Waitangi.' It said that 'Maori could expect the
Crown not to establish new tiers of government or resource management procedures in
a way that is inconsistent with the principles of the Treaty.'50 Despite the
Government's reassurances, treaty considerations looked set to once again come head-
to-head with the decentralisation of central government (as it represents Crown)
authority.
In December 1988 the Government published its proposals for resource management
law reform. These made no mention of Crown responsibilities to M6ori under the
Treaty of Waitangi. They did, however, discuss the 'indivisibility of the Crown'
which was causing complications in the reform process. The proposal stated that
under the new resoluce management system'the Crown would have to speak with one
voice in terms of the outcome sought. However, the range of views or information
held by the Crown could be revealed in the course of the proceedings''51 The problem
of the 'divisibility' of the Crown (similar, it will be recalled from Chapter One, to the
problem which once plagued the Commonwealth) arose from the reform of resource
management because it was envisaged that under the new System, two government
departments 
- 
the Ministry for the Environment and the Deparfrnent of Conservation -
would be involved in the new decision making process and might present two
incompatible 'Crown' views on resource issues. This was not a new concern in the
49 Directions for Change. A Discussion Paper, Ministry for the Environment' Wellington, August
1988, p. 13.
5(l Directions Jbr Change . A Discussion Paper. p. 23 .
5l People, Environment and Decision Making: The 
_Go-uernmen,t's Proposals for-Resource
t tanagLmint Inw Re.form,Ministry for the Envirdnment, Wellington, December 1988' p' 23'
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area of resource management. In 198? the divisible Crown had also concerned A.
Hearn Q.C., in The Review of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 (which the
Resource Management Act replaced). Hearn advised that, under the Town and
Country Planning Act 1977,a minister speaks for the Crown. However, he asked, 'is
it reasonable that different officers of different Departrnents of State, at different levels
in different districts are entitled to participate in the planning process as the Crown?'52
Hearn evidently feared a loss of central control and consequently suggested that the
Crown should remain 'indivisible in respect of resource management statutes.'S3 He
was concerned that 'a lowly conservation officer in a remote part of the country could
not purport to speak for the Crown'.5a Hearn was clearly expressing concern that the
divisibility of the Crown would lead to a dispersion of Crown or central authority
which would result in a breakdown in the hierarchy of decision making. In later
acknowledging this dilemma, the authors of the management law reform proposal
emphasised that RMLR must remedy this situation by making it clear that individual
departments are not 'the Crown'.55 However, the authors of one RMLR working
paper challenged the real significance of the 'indivisibility of the Crown', suggesting
that departments should be able to operate individually as long as only one minister
speaks authoritatively for the Crown on a matter such as the national interest.
Experience shows, the report stated, that the 'fiction of the Crown speaking with one
voice was difficult to maintain.'s6 Consequently, it concluded that, '[i]t is not possible
to rnaintain the fiction that the Crown speaks with one voice. Why try?'s1
52 A H"urn. Review of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977,Report commissioned by the New
TnalandGovernment, Department of Trade and Industry, August 1987' p. 108'
53 Hearn, Review of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977,p. 109.
54 K. Edmonds et al., Resource Management Law Reform. The Various Roles of the Crown: As
Resource Developer antl as a Participant in Resource Managlement, Working Paper No' 16,
December 1988,p. 18.
55 Edmond's et aL, RMLR. The Various Roles of the Crown,p.l8
56 Edmond's et al., RMLR. The Various Roles of the Crown, p. 19.
57 Edmond's etal.,RMLR. TheVarious Roles of the Crown,p.20.
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Quite apart from demonstrating further complications in the Crown's identity, the
indivisibility of the Crown has serious implications for the role of the Crown as the
treaty partner. For example, if departments and officers are able to operate
independently as the Crown, Mdori and other groups in negotiation or consultation
with the Crown face potentially serious difficulties in isolating and identifying a single,
reliable and constant soufce of Crown authority under the Treaty.58
While the Government's policy proposals initially demonstrated considerable neglect
of the Treaty in the reform of resource management procedures and institutions, a
number of working papers produced in 1988 were more insightful and forthcoming in
their discussion of RMLR from a freaty perspective. For example, Working Paper No'
3 reviewed the submissions of the future role of local and regional government in
response to local government reform proposals (discussed earlier)' The paper
observed that:
lm]any authorities take a different view [on the relationship between the Treaty and
local governmentl. They feel that the whole area of the relationship of the Treaty to
resource management and planning rests with central Sovernment and that local
authorities should have no responsibility in this area.59
In fact, a review of the submissions from local authorities indicates that in 1988 a
majority of local bodies rejected responsibilities under the Treaty. They did so in tfuee
ways. Some, while commenting extensively on all other aspects of the reform
proposal, simply failed to address constitutional matters which dealt directly with local
government and Mdoridom. For example the Waimate Plains Disfict Council gave no
response to questions regarding the principles of the Treaty and responded to all other
58 It i, important to recognise at this point that criticism against local government is levelled at its
role in ,"pfu"ing the Crown as the treaty partner. L,ocal government and M6ori must reasonably find a
productive relafionship but, it is *gu"d here, that relatiJnship would most appropriately be expressed
under the authority of the Crown as the formal treafy partner with Maori.
59 The Bridgeport Group, Resource Management Inw Reform. Review of the Suhmissions-of the
Future RoIi -of Locsl'and Regional dovernment, Working Paper No' 3, Ministry for the
Environment, Wellington, July 1988' p. 19.
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questions with 'non-applicable' or 'rejected'.fl Other authorities addressed the issues
but rejected the idea of 'special treatment' for M6ori by the Council' Taup6 City
Council stated, '[w]e see no room in local government for any different treatment
between individuals and groups.'61 Similarly,the Tuapeka County Council stated that
only matters of council land control were effected by the Treaty of Waitangi and no
special constitutional arrangements were necessary in local government under the
Treafy because New Zealand was an equal society.62 The third level of comment was
a fundamental rejection of local government as a treaty partner. The Ashburton
Borough Council demonstrated this when it said,'[t]he Treaty of Waitangi issue is one
of equity between the Crown and the Maori people and not an issue for resolution at
the local government level.'63 Similarly, the Queenstown-Lakes District Council
agreed that '[t]his issue [the Treaty of Waitangi and Maori] needs to be addressed by
Central Govemment.'ff
Working Paper No. 8, a report by the Centre for Resource Management at Lincoln
University, did not address the issue of the Crown and local government, but argued
more directly that matters of identity must be resolved before treaty issues could be
dealt with in any meaningful way. The paper stated,'[a]ccording the Treaty
constitutional status will require that clear specification be given to the identity of the
treaty partners. The terms Maori and Crown need to be better defined.'65 The paper's
recommendation was based largely on the findings of a hui at Taumutu (in May 1988)
6$ Rrfor^ of Loccil anrl Regknal Government, Submission by Waimate Plains District Council, No'
4l4,refer section 8.5.
6l Rr.Sor* of Incat and Regional Government; Submission by Taup6 City Council' No' 365' p' 6'
62 The Bridgeport Group, Reform of Locat arul Regional Govemmenr; Submission by Tuapeka
Counry Council, No. 345, P. 13'
63 Rr?,rr^ of Incat arul Regional Gttvernment; Submission by Ashburron Borough Council' No'
391 , p. 15.
64 R"Jor* tf ktcal and Regional Government; Submission by Queenstown-Lakes District Council'
No.406.
65 Cent e for Resource Management in Association with the Centre for Maaori Studies and Research'
Waikato, Resource Management Law Reform.The Treaty of Waitangi and its Significance.for the
Resource Management /-crw,l, Working Paper No' 8, Ministry for the Environment' August 1988' p'
22.
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where much debate had surrounded the appropriate definition for 'the Crown' treaty
partner. The sentiment was expressed in the paper that the Crown's identity was
problematic because current institutional and constitutional arangements had obscured
the definition of the Crown.tr
Finally, Working Paper No. 27 investigated a Treaty-based model for RMLR and
stated that the policy of devolution to local authorities reduces the role and
accountability of the Crown while increasing the role and power of the private sector'
It said, '[t[he vital role of the state in protecting national interests and its ability to
perform government duties is severely eroded.' The report later stated:
The reduced power of the Crown, and the fragmentation of decision making amongst
local and regional bodies, will seriously hinder delivery and enforcement of tangata
whenua rights. This will become even worse if scparate iwi are requted to negotiate at
the regional level, with regional government bodies acting as organs of central
government.6T
It went on to argue that '[a]ny system of resource management which treats this
strucnlre of local and regional government as pivotal will therefore also breach the
Crown's duty of active protection of Maori rights and deny the right to te tino
rangatiratalga.'68
From these working papers it is evident that RMLR proposals for a more shategic role
for local government in resource management ran counter to a vision Of the treaty
partnership in much the same manner as the reforrn of local govemment had' Once the
Resource Management Bill had been introduced to Parliament, however, it became
66 Assessment of proceedings at Hui Taumutu'27-29 May 1988' in Appendix 2 o-fi Resource
Management lttw Reform.-The Treaty o.f Waitangi and its Significance .for the Resource
Management Laws,p.47.
67 Mike Barns, RMLR. A Treaty Bqsed Model - The Principle of Active Protection, Working Paper
No 27, Minisry for the Environment, Wellington, October 1988' section 3.310.
68 Barns, RMLR. A Treaty Based Model' section 3.320'
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increasingly evident that the treaty relationship was particularly critical in the area of
resource management, which lies at the heart of treaty negotiations.
In December 1989 the Resource Management Draft Bill was introduced to the House.
public consultation on the Bill was extensive, with over 1300 written submissions
received. A review of written submissions by Mxori group$ and local authorities
reveals a level of concern about MEori/local government relations similar to that
expressed in the RMLR Working Papers. For example, Te Rtinanga a iwi o NgApuhi
stated that the Resource Management Bill 'limits the ability of the Runanga to have "te
tino rangatiratanga" over resources claimed by Ngapuhi and it will determine the
relationship the iwi will have with government at a local, regional and national level in
terms of resource management planning.'69 Te Rtinanga emphasised that the most
important clauses in the Bill were the ones which outlined the proposed relationship
between iwi,local and regional government. They felt the wording had to be changed
to make iwi management plans an integral part of district planning'70 Also, the
Department of Mdori Studies at Victoria University declared, '[w]e do not support the
Resource Management Bill because the Bill does not acknowledge the Treaty of
Waitangi as establishing the constitutional relationship existing between the Crown and
Maori of New Znaland'.7l In a similar vein, Te Whdnau-A-Haunui argued that, '[t]he
Bill ransfers management powers to Local Government without adequately ensuring
that the Crown's obligations under the Treaty of Waitangi are able to be fulfilled.'1z
Te Whdnau also stated, '[u]nder the Bill, many of the resource management
responsibilities have been delegated to local authorities. It is arguable whether local
govemment is an 'agent' of the Crown and therefore subject to the Treaty' However'
69 Resource Management Bill, Submission by Te Runanga a Iwi o Ngapuhi, No. 12w, p' l '
7(l Resource Management Bil/, Submission by Te Runanga a iwi o Ngapuhi, No. 12w, p' 4'
7l Rerourc" Munagement Bill, Submission by Department of MEori Studies, Victoria University'
No.424w.
12 Resource Management Bill, Submission by Te Whanau-A-Haunui of the Hauraki Gulf' No' 426w'
p.2.
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that point is incidental to the issue of the Crown's responsibilities under the Treaty.'73
Te Whdnau went on to saY:
The Crown has demonstrably failed to ensure that its Treaty obligations can be met in
transferring responsibilities to Local Government and therefore it has conferred an
inconsistent jurisdiction in a manner which the tribunal said not to. It has done this
by not grving a clear direction to Local Government as to what effect the Treaty has on
their functions and by not affording M6ori interests an appropriate place under the
Bill.74
The Whakat6ne Association for Racial Understanding similady expressed concern that
'[t]here is no obligation on local bodies to enstue the Treaty is honoured, nor on any
other government personnel.'7s And the Moana District Maori Council in Tauranga
warned the select committee that,
[i]t would be advisable for a Treaty reference to affirrn the importance of the Crown's
continuing obligations to Mdori. In the transfer of decision making powers to sub-
national units of government, it is important that the Crown protect the Treaty interests
of Maori.76
When the Resource Management Act 1991 was passed it contained a number of
sections relating to Mdori and the Treaty (as compared to its original version) including
the following sections relating to the Treaty of Waitangi: section 6 (e) refening to the
relationship of Mdori and their culture and traditions with their ancestral lands, water,
sites, waahi tapu and other taonga as a matter of national importance; section 7 (a)
which requires particular regard to Kaitiakitanga [guardianship]; and section 8 which
1J Resource Management Bill, Submission by Te Whanau-A-Haunui, No. 426w 'p.3.
74 Resource Management Bil/, Submission by Te Whanau-A-Haunui, No.426w' p. 4.
75 R"source Manag,ement Bill, Submission by Whakatine Association for Racial Understanding, No'
752w,p.l.
76 Resourr" Management Bill, Submission by Moana District Maori Council, Tauranga, No. 655w'
p. l.
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states a requirement to take into account the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi.
Section 8 states that,'[i]n achieving the purpose of this Act, all persons exercising
functions and powers under it, in relation to managing the use, development and
protection of natural resources shall take into account the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi (Te Tiriti o Waitangi).'?7 Despite the concerns expressed in submissions and
the recommendations made in the working papers for the Government to address the
question of Crown responsibilities, the Act did not deal with the question of
partnership under the Treaty of Waitangi. Some years after the passing of the Act, the
relationship between Crown and local government with regard to the extent of local
govenrment responsibility and authority under the Treaty of Waitangi is still largely an
unresolved issue. In 1993, Diane Crengle, discussing Section 8 of the Act, asked,
'[s]hould local authorities be regarded as agents of the Crown?' She remarked that
'the precise legal situation is uncertain and the present debate may not be resolved for
some time.'78
While it is beyond the scope of this inquiry to provide a detailed account of iwi/local
government relations in New Zealandsince the passing of the Local Government (No
2) Act 1989 and rhe Resource Management Act 1991 the principle behind the
criticisms of the reforms discussed here deserved to be reiterated. As Jane Kelsey
explains, despite the often repeated warning that 'the Crown cannot divest itself of its
Treaty obligations', the refbrm of local government and resource management has
done precisely that.79 She argues that with the local government and resource
management reforms 'significant powers exercised by the Crown are transferred to
?7 Consultation with Mdori was another requirement of the Act under Section 8. Subsequent to the
passing of rhe Act, the Ministry for the Environment published reports advising MSori and Local
gou"-?r"nt of the importance oi consultation on Treaty issues, and suggesting ways for both. groups
io consult widely andappropriately. See: The Resourie Manag,ement Act' Kia Matiratia- A Guide
.fitr Maori,Ministry foittre 
^Environment, June, 1992 and Proposed Guidetines .for Incul Authoriry
'Consultatksn 
with Tangata Whenua, Ministry for the Environment, June, 1992.
78 Diane Crengle, Taking Into Account the Principles tf the Treaty of Waitangi' Ideas for the
Implementatioi of Sectiitn I Resource Management Act I99l , Ministry for the Environment'
Wellington, January 1993, p. 10.
79 Kelsey, 'The Treaty of Waitangi, Local Government Reform and Resource Management [,aw
Reform, p. l.
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Pakeha interests who dominate local bodies . ... The Crown is effectively divesting
itself of its treaty obligations'8O and furthermore has 'distanced itself further from its
ability to perform its treaty obligations"8l
The Government's actions in divesting treaty responsibility to local authorities and,
more importantly, the implications of this for Mdori were well demonstrated by the
Mdori occupation of Moutoa Gardens in Wanganui in 1995. This case study, which is
the focus of the final section of this chapter, demonstrates the implications of the
expanding identity of the Crown for M6ori seeking negotiation with their treaty
partner. The case study shows interesting parallels to Mdori attempts to seek audience
with the Queen treaty partnel following the signing of the Treaty in 1840.
Moatoa GardenslPakaitore Marae: A Case Study of Crown, Mfuori and I'ocal
Govemment Relations
The aims in reviewing the protest action at Moutoa Gardens in 1995 and the events
and debate which surrounded it are threefold. First, the purpose is to demonstrate that
further evolution in the identity of the Crown (whereby the Crown has been expanded
to incorporate local authorities) proved detrimental to Maori protesters seeking
audience with 'the Crown' as central govemment in an attempt to negotiate and resolve
treaty and land related grievances. Secondly, this discussion also draws attention to a
certain parallel between the evolution of the Crown in the 1840s and subsequent
evolution in the 1980s 
- 
an evolution which in both cases was not agreed to by M6ori
and furthermore, created significant complications for Mdori in trying to identify and
address an appropriate and responsive treaty partner. Finally it demonstrates that,
through breakdowns in the communication process between 'Crownn (who or
whatever that might be) and Mdori, treaty grievances are resolved through the court
80 Kelsey, 'The Treaty of Waitangi, l,ocal Government Reform and Resource Management Law
Reform, p. 9.
8l Kelsey, A Quettion of Honour?,p' 209.
2r7
system 
- 
a result which, in the case of the Moutoa Gardens protest, was not entirely
satisfactory for M5ori.
To briefly summarise the events at Moutoa Gardens, on the frst of March, Wanganui
River Mdori began a peaceful celebration of their 'Wanganuitanga' (sovereignty as the
indigenous people of Wanganui) in Moutoa Gardens. The Gardens, which had often
been used in recent times as a marae (meeting house) for official occasions and which
were the taditional site of a Mdori marae, were 'renamed' 'Pakaitore Marae' by local
Mdori occupying the Gardens. Within the next two days it became clear that those
gathered at the Gardens had no intention of dispersing and were in fact setting a
'makeshift' marae. Reports began to emerge that the occupation was a protest by
Maori, who claimed the land belonged to them and not the Wanganui District Council.
The Council's response to this allegation was to begin researching the ownership of
the land. By 9 March, as the issue continued unresolved, pressure within the
Wanganui community had begun to mount. On 1? March, the Council presented a
five-point plansz to M[ori and called for an immediate response from the protesters.
When no response appeared forthcoming, the Council ordered an eviction notice'
allowing the protesters seven days to vacate the gardens.
As the eviction date loomed, Mf,ori and the District Council still appeared unable to
resolve the question of land ownership. Mdori insisted they were moved from their
land in 1845 by rhe army who used it as a parade ground. They claimed that in 1848'
the Crown purchased 82,000 acres of land from local Mdori at about threepence per
acre. The Gardens themselves were said to be part of a fishing village which had not
been intended for sale. 83 The District Council, on the other hand, argued that the land
82'Maori protesters demand'supreme authority'over land,' The Dominion, 17 March, 1995'p' l'
The five-point plan proposed thi establishmeni of a trust to manage the Gardens, to research the
historical evidence of thl Garaens' ownership, identify other contentious land in Wanganui, re-site
monuments offensive to Mdori, oversee the sharing of ihe Gardens by M6ori and Pdkehii' and resolve
the issue in the Wanganui community'
83 'The taking of Moutoa.' The Dominittn, l8 March 1995'p. 15'
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had been legally purchased from Maori and was now the property of the Wanganui
District Council, to be enjoyed by the whole community.
The wider debate about how the issue might be peacefully resolved was argued from
two perspectives deriving from contrary perceptions of the Treaty as a matter of either
local or national concern. Prior to the devolution or transfer of authority to local
authorities, responsibility for treaty related matters may have rested more firmly on the
shoulders of central government. However, with local authorities implicated in the
treaty partnership, the issue appeared more complicated. On the one hand, the Moutoa
Gardens' protest can be seen as a local issue, to be resolved by the Council and MEori'
while the other hand, the protest is an expression of Mdori rights under Article Two of
the Treaty, which is an issue most appropriately addressed and resolved at the national
level by central government acting on behalf of the Crown. The question which was
repeatedly raised during the 'reoccupation' of the Gardens was; who is responsible for
resolving the protest, the District Council or central government? In rephrasing the
question for the purposes of this thesis; who or what was the Crown treaty partner
under these circumstances? Finding an answer to this question requires consideration
of the relationship between the various parties and the wider debate about where
responsibility from this issue lay.
According to the Wanganui Chronicle, relations between the iwi and Council in
Wanganui prior to the protest appeal to have been uneasy. The paper advised that the
Council had established an iwi liaison working party prior to the protest action called
,Te Roopu Whakakotahi.'84 Despite this formal relationship, the Councillors' were
surprised by the depth of the protesters feeling and by their actions.85. Cr John
Medlicott said, 'I am disturbed though that I never knew Maori had any concerns over
the site and I am on the iwi liaison working party and would have liked to have
84 
'Moutoa Gardens occupied by river Maori,' Wanganui Chronicle,l March 1995' p' 1'
85 'Mayor backed down over handling of iwi occupatron,' Wanganui Chronicle, T March 1995'p'7 '
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known.' Similarly, Cr Pam Erni said, 'I have never been aware prior to this event that
ownership of Moutoa Gardens was an issue, nor as I understand it, did the Council.'
A spokesperson for the Wanganui Mf,ori, asserted that some Wanganui kaumatua
(elders) had discussed the issues with the local council in the past but had been
ignored. Wanganui Mayor, Charles (Chas) Poynter, challenged this statement arguing
that there was a good relationship established in Wanganui between iwi and Council.86
However, a few weeks into the protest, a press release was issued from the marae
which stated that 'the alleged relationship with iwi that Mayor Poynter continually
refers to is a myth.'8?
Regardless of criticisms of the Council's relations with Wanganui M6ori, Poynter
maintained a determination early in the event to resolve the dispute through iwi/
Council dialogue 'in a manner which could be a model for the rest of New Zealand.'88
On 9 March, Poynter said that the Council had not been told eadier of the stength of
feeling about the gardens, but he emphasised, 'I'm sure the kaumatua and ourselves
can work it out. I believe it's better to have direct contact.'89 On 13 March, the first
signs of the Mayor's doubts about the Council's involvement in the affair were
beginning to show. He advised that the Council had confirmed its ownership of the
gardens and that that fact would be conveyed to the hime Minister, the Minister of
Maori Affairs and the Minister of Treaty Negotiations. He said, 'I believe if there is
no compliance by Maori occupying Moutoa Gardens the situation becomes a
Government issue.'s The Distict Council made it clear also that it had no mandate to
negotiate the issue of M6ori sovereignty over land in Wanganui. According to the
tt6 .pM shies off direct involvement', Wanganui Chronicle,14 March 1995, p' I '
87 'Ptvt calls on Maori protesters to oppose protesters', Wanganui Chronicle,15 March 1995, p' 1'
8E 'Moutoa Gardens occupied by river Maori', Wanganui Chronicle,l March 1995' p' I'
89 'City determined to avoid another Bastion point', Wanganui Chronicle,g March 1995. p' 3'
90 .Ciry's people have Moutoa ownership, Council told',Wanganui Chronicle, 13 March 1995' p'
l.
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Council, '[t]hat must be negotiated between the partners of the Treaty of Waitangi, iwi
and the Crown.'9l
District Councillors themselves had earlier expressed concern over the role the Crown
should play in the matter. For example, Cr Randhir Dahya said that government
should have more to do with educating the public on the Treaty. Cr Mike Green
stated, 'I also think the Crown has created this problem and that the Crown must
recompense the Council somehow, sometimen for all the council has put into the area -
maintenance, planting and so on.'92 The Mayor himself expressed his concern when
he stated:
This is getting into a much wider arca now and it's something that I believe the
Government won't be able to back away from. ..' [Tlhey've got people in the Justice
Department ... that are quite conversant with all this sort of problem and maybe they
could help with some sort of personnel in that area. ... The Prime Minister's
Department said that they're keeping a close watching brief on the matter and that's the
sort of response I would have expected.93
On 23 March, the Mayor met with ministers and advised them that the Mdori at
Moutoa had stated that the issue of sovereignty was to be the basis for negotiations
with the Council. However, the Mayor was emphatic that sovereignty was not an
issue that could be dealt with by local authorities.ea He repeated this viewpoint on
National Radio, saying that local government had the authority and responsibility to
deal with the structures erected in the Gardens, but central government must be
responsible for issues of sovereignty in Wanganui. According to Poynter, the fact that
9l 'Meter ticks on Maori occupiers', New T,ealandPress Association,23 March' 1995'
92 'Mayor backed over handling of iwi occupari on' ,Wanganui Chronicle, T March 1995' p' 7'
93 Mayor Chas Poynter on Morning Report,National Radio, 14 March, 1995.
94 
'Maoris rally to fight eviction from gardens' ,The Dominion,Z3 March 1995, p' 1'
221
those issues had been raised by Mdori meant that the issue had wider ramifications
which must be dealt with by cennal government.es
Calls for government intervention also came from outside the District Council. Both
Helen Clark, Leader of the Opposition, and the Labour MP for Wanganui, Jill Pettis,
urged the Government to facilitate negotiations with the protesters at Moutoa Gardens.
Pettis urged,'[p]lease will you intervene as the governing party in this country so
constructive and meaningful dialogue can take Place?'e6 Koro Wdtere, l,abour MP for
Western M6ori, also sent a letter to the Minister of Mlori Affairs, John Luxton, urging
him to take action. The Alliance Leader, Sandra [re, supported W€tere's actions and
called for National Prime Minister, Jim Bolger, to provide informed leadership. Lee
said:
[i]t is not good enough for the Prime Minisler to wash his hands of this issue and turn
his back on both rhe local city council and the local Maori. ... The Crown has the
responsibility in this matter as it was the original benefactor of this public reserve, now
vested in rhe local council.9T
Lee also pointed out that because local government was not the ministers, the Waitangi
Tribunal or the Crown, it could not provide solutions required to resolve the issue
satisfactorily. She explained that the Government had the legislative provisions to find
an easy and immediate solution to the problem. Consequently, she insisted on
'Crown' involvement to allow MSori meaningful dialogue with their treaty parfirer.e8
The call for government intervention also came from angry Wanganui citizens who
believed the Government had abandoned the town and left Mayor Chas Poynter in the
95 Mayor Chas Poynter on Morning Report,National Radio,23 March, 1995.
96 'PM to Maori leaders: rein in protesters', The New kaland Herald,15 March 1995' p' 1'
97 
'Protester study peace plan' ,The Dominion,16 March 1995' p' 1'
98 Sandra Ire on Morning Report,National Radio, 24 March 1995' According to [re, the Reserves
Act and Te Ture Whenuaict would allow joint management of the land. See: 'Protester study peace
plan',The Dominion,March 16, 1995' p. l.
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lurch.99 Criticism over the Government's inaction flowed from media sources also.
One Evening Post editorial commented,'[i]n fact [the government] had a clear
obligation to act, since the Moutoa Gardens occupation carries implications for the
whole of the country.'lo0
Despite such criticism and the encouragement for government intervention in the
protest, the Government maintained that it would not get involved in what it insisted
was a local issue. Following the Mayor's insistence for government involvement, the
prime Minister apparently 'shied off direct involvement' repeating that the issue
.should be resolved at the local government level.'l0l Hsrwsver, it was later reported
that, '[t]he government is becoming increasingly wonied about the Mdori occupation
of Moutoa Gardens in Wanganui, although ministers are reluctant to get involved as
the tension mounts in the city.'toz On 15 March, the Government issued a statement
urging M6ori leaders to rein in protesters, but would not be drawn any further on the
m411s1.103 When challenged by Opposition MPs to resolve the crisis with mediation,
the Minister of Maori Affairs commented that it was not the government's
responsibility to appoint mediators.l04 However, the Prime Minister conceded on 20
March, '[c]learly if there were to be a rash of sit-ins the government would have a
different fesponse.'105 When pressed for further comment, he stated, '[w]e [the
Governmentl just simply are not involved. It is not our land, it is not our park" 106
political sources speculated that the Government was loath to get involved because of a
99 Editorial, Sunday Star Times,19 March 1995, p. A2.
It)t) pdiloriul 
,The Evening Post,27 March 1995' p. 4.
l0l .p14 shies off direct involvement', Wanganui Chronicle,14 March 1995' p' l.
102 'p1"u for help as Wanganui tension rises', The New Ttalattd Herald,14 March 1995' p' I'
lo3 
'p14 to Maori leaders: rein in protesters', The New Tzaland Herald,15 March 1995' p. l '
104'pss1e51ers study peace plan', The Dominion' 16 March 1995'p' l'
105 y"* TnalmdPress Association (NZPA), Press Announcement' 20 March 1995'
lo6 '11"rr*" on as activists head for Moutoa Gardens', NZPA,24 March, 1995'
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fear that it would give protesters 'a national stage on which to debate issues such as
Maori sovereignty rather than just ownership of the gardens.'107
M[ori opinion on the appropriate role of govemment in the matter proved difficult to
gauge through media reports. According to Koro W€tere, Mdori had stated that the
government should be involved.l0s Indeed, protesters had asked that communication
channels with the Wanganui District Council and the Government remain open.l0e
Furthermore, regulations drafted by Wanganui Mdori apparently outlined a framework
for discussing the sovereignty issue with the Government. Niko Tongariro, a
spokesperson for the M6ori protesters, emphasised that the Crown had to become
involved in the discussions over the gardens because of the sovereignty issue. He
said, '[w]hat's happened is that the Crown has sidestepped the issue and left the
Mayor on his own. We are talking about ... sovereignty [supreme authority for the
Wanganui iwi over their resources and taonga], the Crown has to be involved.l l0
One final comment also demonstrates the confusion over the identities involved in the
protest 
- 
this time with regard to the question of the relationship between the Crown
and government which was a backdrop to the more immediate question of the
relationship between local and central authorities, and M6ori. The comment was made
by an individual who threatened a law suit against the Council that both the Crown and
the Government were in breach of the Treaty of Waitangi and international law.l I I
At 5pm on Thursday 30 March, the deadline for eviction expired and the threat for
police intervention in the protest appeared inevitable. However, the eviction deadline
l0? 'pr"ttuo" on as activists head for Moutoa Gardens', NZPA,24 March, 1995'
lo8 Morning, Report,National Radio,23 March 1995.
l{)9 'g,1r*ranui tribe puts its case on land claims', The New 7*aland Hersld,2 March 1995' p' 1:3'
I l0 '14"oti respond with own rules', Evening Post,2l March 1995' p' 3'
I I I 16, comment came from the President of the Confederation of United Tribes, and was reported
in 'Confederation of tribes says it plans to sue Wanganui Council', NZPA' 25 March, 1995'
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passed without incident or confrontation between the police and the protesters. The
District Council advised the following morning that it would take the protesters' claim
to the High Court to resolve the question of land ownership. The Government was
silent on the maner, maintaining a policy of non-involvement.
Finally, following seventy-seven days of occupation, the High Court ruled (despite the
absence of the protesters for the hearing) that the land was Council land, gifted
previously by the Crown, and should be vacated by the protesters. Having been gifted
by the Crown, the land should be regarded as private land. The Judge considered it 'a
matter of regret' that as such, it would be excluded from the recommendatory function
of the Waitangi Tribunal (which is not allowed to consider claims brought against
private land following the 1993 amendment.)l12 Following the High court's ruling
and once again faced with prospect of eviction, the protesters left before the police
were required to intervene. With the issue resolved and the question of land
ownership determined the Government announced that it would meet with the Mdori
protesters. I I 3
The final point to note in this chain of events is the ruling Judge's observations
regarding the role of the courts in resolving fieaty based matters' The Judge
acknowledged that the High Court (indeed any court) was restricted in what it may do
to prorect the Treaty while dispensing justice. He explained that the Treaty of Waitangi
was nor able to be fully considered (because it is not a legally binding agteement)
where it fell outside the parameters of the law. As McGechan J advised in his opening
statements in another High Court ruling:
lt]his case falls for decision under the cold legalism of administrative law, which looks
at process rather than result. For the benefit of non-lawyers, I emphasise I have no
t l2 Judgment of Heron J, High Court of New Zcaland, Wanganui Registry' ll & 12 May, 1995' p'
13
I t3 
'6ou"1r1r11ent to mect Moutoa protesters', The Dontinion, 19 May, 1995, p. 1 and p' 3'
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power simply to determine what the "right" decision would have been, and to order
that now be put into effect. ... The limitation is constitutional, and is not to be
brushed aside, however aggrieved M6ori may feel.l l4
In summary, the process of increasing the responsibilities of local authorities has, with
regard to the Treaty and in the instance of protest action at Moutoa Gardens, created
considerable confusion as to the appropriate dialogue partners in attempting to resolve
the dispute. Furthermore, it brings into question the appropriateness of local
government involvement in treaty matters, given the limited authority of local
govemment to address and resolve the sorts of issues likely to be raised by M6ori,
such as resource ownership and sovereignty. Finally, the Moutoa Gardens protest
demonstrates that, in creating a situation in which grievances cannot be resolved by
local authorities and will not be addressed by government, the issues are forced
through the courts which are limited in their ability to address and resolve issues of
justice under the Treaty. In light of this case study and its findings, the general
implications for M6ori of the further evolved Crown identity can be considered.
The Implications of the Evolving Crown for MAori
In Chapter Five, it was argued that, following the signing of the Treaty in 1840, the
Crown evolved from meaning the Queen, to identifying British and then settler
govemment in New Tl:aland. This evolution was seen to have serious implications for
Mlori because the settler govemment was both distanced from and ambivalent about
the terms of the Treaty. This created significant distress and confusion for Mdori in
identifying and addressing the treaty partner. As the theorists of political symbolism
have suggested, prevailing interpretations of symbols have helped determine the nature
I l4 Reserved Judgment of McGechan J., High Court of New Zealand, Wellington Register, 29-31
August and 3l September, p. 3. The limitaiions of the courts in acknowledging the Tre-aty were
siniitarty noted by Bill Oiiver, who said: lw]hile many arguments brought befgy the.Waitangi
Tribunal are concerned with illegal actions on the pari of Crown agents --in 
-effect,.the.Crown
breaking its own rules - **y otti"tr relate to essential justice ... of their perfectly legal .actions " '
Here, tJo, the conjunction oi legality and injustice is characteristic.' See: Bill Oliver, 'Pandora's
Enveiope: it's all ibout po*"t', in New Zealand Books, March 1995' p' l9'
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of fut111e events. In New 7-ealand,the interpretation and evolution of the Crown has
created serious obstacles for M6ori. This chapter has demonstrated that the pattern of
evolution was largely repeated in the 1980s whereby the Crown came to incorporate
local authorities also. The Moutoa Gardens protest indicated that the implications of
this evolution were as significant and distressing for Mdori as they had been some one
hundred and fifty years earlier in that they could not identify and approach an
appropriate partner with which to discuss and resolve their grievances. This problem
of the evolving Crown was well summarised in 1987 by the Royal Commission of
Social Policy which expressed concern that, 'the solemn pact made with the British
(the Queen in fact) could be delegated without consultation, to a new body motivated
by different interests and priorities.'I ls It has been demonstrated in this section of the
thesis that this is precisely what has occurred twice: in the transfer of authority from
the Queen to settler government; and, similarly, from central to sub-national
govemment.
The evolution of the Crown does not end here. In 1995, New Zealand finds itself on
the threshold of significant constitutional changes which will further involve and
evolve the nature, function and identity of 'the Crown' in New Zealand' As
constitutional issues are addressed M6ori must be consulted if further inappropriate
redefinition of the treaty partner is to be avoided. The purpose of the final two
chapters of this thesis is to address the question of the Crown and the constitution in
New Zealand in order to better understand the future of the Crown in New 7-ealand
from the perspective of the Treaty of Waitangi.
ll5 pspssl of the Royal Comnission on Social Policy, The April Report, Vol' II'Furure
Directions', April, 1988. p.51.
SECTION THREE
The Crown and the Constitution
NINE
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH: THE CROWN IN CANADA
In investigating the Crown in New Zealand,this thesis has demonstrated the problems
of consistency with and evolution of the Crown identity, both of which have had
implications for the Maori treaty partner. It has also argued that the Crown symbol is
fiequently used ancl widely applied in treaty discourse because of its ability to lend
authority and legitimacy to the actions and policies of individuals and institutions
involved in treaty negotiations. This chapter, which inffoduces the third section of the
thesis, adds additional evidence to the arguments presented in the previous two
sections by means of a comparative study. It observes that the Crown in Canada,
while equally significant in relation to Canadian treaties and the Canadian constitution'
is neither used as fiequently in political debate in Canada as it is in New Zealand, nor
is used to identify central government as it is in New Zealand. Factors and influences
peculiar to Canada have actively detened the development of the Crown symbol as
witnessed in New Zealand,. This chapter, then, re-emphasises the unique relationship
between MAori and the Crown and the unique function of the Crown symbol in New
Zealand. The future of the Crown with regard to New Zealand's developing
constitution will be examined in the following chapter.
This chapter is divided into three parts. The introductory section briefly establishes the
fact that the Crown does not enjoy the sort of currency in Canadian treaty discourse as
it has done in New Zealand. The question is subsequently raised, what might the
reasons be for this ditf'erence? The following two sections present a number of
possible explanations. The first of these relates to the relationship between Indian
people and their treaty partner in Canada. It is demonstrated that, while the Crown is
historically an irnportant symbolic identity for many Indian tribes, Native
spokespeople tencl to refer to the 'federal government' as their contemporary partner'
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not 'the Crown'. This is the result, it is argued, of the wording and timing of treaties
in Canada when compared to the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand. The second
section points out that the Crown is a significant constitutional construct in Canada
today, and argues that certain factors have complicated and influenced the meaning of
'the Crown' in Canada's history resulting in the fact that the Crown does not provide
symbolic reassurances for the Canadian public (or provincial governments) as it does
in New Zealand. Also, unlikeNew Zealand where the Crown became central to treaty
debate because of the Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975, the symbol did not have the same
opportunity to develop in Canadian treaty discourse because it was not a prominent
identity in either the language of the Canadian treaties or subsequent statutes relating to
Native rights in Canada.
Before beginning this discussion, it is important to understand how this comparative
investigation can result in a better understanding of the New Zealandexperience. The
advantages of comparative analysis have been widely acknowledged' New Zealand
specialists in public law have suggested that other nations' constitutions can tell us a
lot about our own constitutional arrangements because they can lead us to ask 'why
does New Zealand do one thing and other countries something else?'l Also'
comparative theorists Mattei Dogan and Domonique Pelassy have suggested that it is
natural for people to think comparatively, and that we do so in order to 'evaluate more
objectively our situation as individuals, a community or a nation.'2 A comparative
study of the Crown can show what might have happened in New Zealand if
circumstances had been different, and can also emphasise the unique blend of factors
and influences present in New Zealandwhich has resulted in the popularity of the
Crown symbol and the problem of its identity.
I Geoffrey Palmer and Mai Chen, Public Law in New fuatancl: Cases, Materials, Conunentary and
Questions,Oxford University Press, Auckland' 1993, p' 268.
2 Mattei Dogan and Domonique Pelassy, How to Compare Nations. Strategies in Comparative
Politics.Chatham House Publishers Inc., New Jersey, 1984' p' 3'
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However, while promoting the benefits of comparative thought, Dogan and Pelassy
warn also of the disadvantages and limitations of this approach. Students of
comparative politics are warned to recognise the influence of factors other than those
included in the study which may alter their results and findings.3 They are also
advised to make allowance for their limited familiarity with other countries relative to
their more comprehensive understanding of their own. Finally, Dogan and Pelassy
warn against a strictly theoretical approach to comparative study because of the risk of
distorting information or creating false perceptions. Instead, they encourage the (often
slow) development of generalisations, elaborations and even the induction of laws
from comparative material.4 Noting these cautionary words, this chapter limits its use
of Canadian material to providing general observations about the Canadian experience
which, when seen in conjunction with evidence presented earlier in the thesis, serves
to substantiate observations about the Crown in New Zealand. This discussion about
the Crown in Canada will naturally be less comprehensive than the New Zealand snrdy
undertaken in the fust two sections of this thesis.5
In addition to asking why we use comparative study, it is important to consider when
it is appropriate to think comparatively. Generally speaking, in order for comparative
analysis to be fruitful, some basic similarities, or 'functional equivalences', are
required between the things compared.6 For the purposes of this study, the functional
equivalences for Canada and New Zealand are the fact that both countries have: a
British colonial history (and therefore a relationship with the British Crown); a
constitutional monarchy (and therefore an on-going relationship with the British
Crown); a history of relations with indigenous peoples based to some extent on
treaties (signed with the British Crown); and finally a current national focus, to
3 Dogan and Pelassy, How to Compare Nations,p.14.
4 Dogan and Pelassy, How to Compare Nations'p' 14'
5 The sources for the Canadian material used in this discussion include books, journal articles and
newspaper reports. Where appropriate, indications are given to other points,of comparison not
lnvesiigateO in this chapter wtriitr migtrt be explored in future comparative research'
6 Dogan and Pelassy, How to Compare Nations'p'32'
231
varying degrees, on the rights of indigenous peoples. The differences between the
countries include: the geographical size of the counfies; federal versus unitary systems
of government; and the influence of French settlement on the relationship between
British and Native Canadians. In noting these equivalences and differences, the
question examined in this chapter is why the Crown symbol has enjoyed noticeably
higher currency in New Zealand's treaty discourse than it appears to have done in
similar debate in Canada.
CanadianTreaty Discourse: Noting the Absence of 'the Crown'
The first step in this comparative exercise is to briefly demonstrate the absence of the
Crown symbol in Canadian treaty debate with reference to newspaper reports and the
treaty discourse of Indian commentators. First, in briefly examining the language of
treaty discourse in the mass media, one particular protest reported in the Vancouver
San newspaper provides an interesting case study of the language of Canadian treaty
debate, especially when compared with the newspaper (and broader media) coverage
of the Moutoa Gardens protest discussed in the previous chapter. While the issues
and language of the Indian protest shows some remarkable similarities to the MEori
occupation at Wanganui, the Crown is not used by the mass media to identify central
government in Canada as it was in New 7-t'aland.
On 2 June 1995, the Vancouver Sunreported that a road block had been set up outside
the town of Menittt in British Colombia, as a protest by a local Indian band against
their loss of naditional hunting and fishing rights guaranteed in treaties signed with the
British Crown. In the same way as Maori protesters at Moutoa Gardens sought
audience with central government to address their grievances, the Indian band insisted
that the protest, and the issues it drew attention to, should be resolved by federal
government rather than provincial government. However, while Wanganui Mf,ori
often identified their treaty partner as 'the Crown', the Indian protesters identified
,federal government' as the partner with whom they sought negotiations. They said
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that while the dispute was causing local concern it was 'really about a much bigger
issue [ofl Indian claims to private land in treaty talks with the [federal] government.'
In the words of the protester, '[t]he real issues are that the government of this country
and the people who run this province have not to this point listened to us''?
In response to.the crisis the provincial government appointed a mediator who advised
that, 'we could really use the help of the/e deral governmentbeingpresent''8 It wiil be
recalled from the Moutoa Gardens incident that Wanganui's Mayor had similarly
expressed concern that central government, whom he often identified as 'tlte Crown'
should address the protesters' demands for Maori sovereignty. The Canadian
newspaper also reported that the Indians were disappointed by the federal
governmenf's lack of involvement, which again echoed the sentiment of protesters at
Moutoa Gardens. The provincial government in British Colombia advised that it
would not negotiate until the protesters' blockades had come down, just as the
Wanganui District Council had stated it would only negotiate once the protesters had
left the gardens. As the events unfolded, reports continued to identify the 'federal
govemment' in contexts where 'Crown' was used in the Moutoa Gardens articles- In
fact, no references to 'the Crown' could be found in a dozen reports on this particular
protest in Canada. Instead, reports mentioned, 'the government's chief negotiator"
governmenf officials, Sovernment obligations to Indians ,and government demands, all
of which might be acceptably alternatively presented as Crown obligations, Crown
demands a11d Crownofficials or representatives in New 7ealand.g
A tension similar to that in the relationship between Mdori and District Council in
Wanganui could be detected between the provincial government and the Indian
protesters in British Colombia. Indeed, many years before the protest at Merritt the
7 .Blockade: Repeat of Oka is worst fear',The Vancouver Sun,2 June 1995. Italics added for
ernphasis in all quotations in this chapter unless otherwise specified'
8 'Ranch has seen blockades before', The Vancouver Sun,2 June 1995 '
9 'trgat action threatened is Indians disrupt trafTic', The Vancouver Sun,28 July 1995.
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'statement of the Government of Canada on Indian Policy, 1969' ,better known as the
White Paper, raised protest from Indian groups very similar to Mdori protests against
local government reforms and the resource management law reform process
(discussed in Chapter Eight). The 'White Paper' was intended to ffansfer the
responsibility of Indian administation from the federal govemment to the provinces.l0
However,Indian grcups protested against the move, arguing that the White Paper was
not developed in good faith and was a denial of their special rights.t I Specifically,
Indians argued that the federal government should not turn responsibility for Indian
affairs over to the provincial government because 'provincial governments have no
obligations to fulfil our treaties. They never signed treaties with the Indians'.12
Evidently, despite the Crowrlfederal government difference, the principle of keeping
the responsibility for treaty rights at the level of central government has been
emphasised in Canada and New Tnaland.
The absence of the crown in the language of the mass media in canada, which can
only be briefly demonstrated here, was emphasised by a passing comment in a
Canadian newspaper report about the Queen's visit to New T,ealand in 1995. The
report discussed the Queen's role in signing an agreement with a Maori tribe which
had recently been negotiated with the New Zealand Government. In order to clarify
the identities involved in the treaty negotiation process in New Zealand (particularly
with regard to the Queen and the govemment) the newspaper told its Canadian readers
that in New Zealand,'the Crown' denotes the government, not the monarchy'l: ft't
statement clearly demonstrated a lack of familiarity within the Canadian public with
oCrown' being used to identify cenml government.
l0 g41y M. Weaver, Making Canadian lrulian Policy: The Hidden Agenda 1968-1970,University of
Toronto Press, Toronto, 1981, P.4.
I I Weaver, Making Canadian Indian Policy,p' 173.
12 Harrold Cardinal, The lJnjust Sociery: The Tragecly of Crtnada's lnclians, Hurtig Publishers'
Edmonton, 1969, pp.30-31. A similar sentiment ** 
"*pt".t"d 
about the involvement of local
government in treaiy affairs in New Zealand. See Chapter Eight for details.
l3 .Queen will approve Maori land deal, but not apologise' ,Vancouver Sln,2 November' 1995'
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The language of Indian cornmentators on treaty rights also demonstrates much less
frequent use of the Crown in Canadian discourse when compared to New Zealand's,
in addition to the difference that 'the Crown' does not denote central government in
Canada. Two sources are used here once again to briefly demonstrate that, while
concerns raised by Indians generally correspond to those of the M6ori people, the
Crown does not fulfil the same symbolic function in Canadian treaty discourse as it
has done in New Zealand. The first of these sources is the discourse of Harrold
Cardinal, long-standing vocal advocate of Indian rights in Canada.
Writing in the late 1960s, Cardinal provides further evidence of the many similarities
in the language and issues pervading indigenous rights debate in Canada and New
Zealand. His discourse also demonsfates the absence of the Crown in ueaty debate in
Canada. As an example of the similarities evident in Cardinal's writing when
compared to New 7*alandcommentators, he spoke of treaties which gave Indians the
right to hunt and fish and which guaranteed Indian access to traditional land.la He
talked about governmenr policy which he described as 'a thinly disguised program of
extermination through assimilation't5 similar to the assimilationist policies identified in
New Zealand in the early 1970s. He also referred to patterns of cultural renaissance
and renewed pride within Indian communities in the later 1960s, such as those
witnessed with the treaty renaissance in New 7-ealand since the 1970s' On a more
abstract level, Cardinal spoke of the 'spirit of the treaties'16 saying that a, '[s]imple,
literal reading of the treaties does not reflect the spirit in which they were signed'' 17
Furthermore, in recalling the signing of the treaties, Cardinal noted that Indians were
14 Cardinal, The (Jniust Society, p. 19. This can be compared with the wording of the English
version of rhe Treaty bf Waitangi provided in Appendix A of this thesis.
15 wCardinal, The Unjust Society,p. l, Government attempts to encourage the assimilation of the
Maori people into futop"* to"i"tyin New Zealand were discussed in Chapter Six of this thesis'
l6 Cardinal, The IJniust Srtciety,p. 101.
17 Cardinal, The lJnjust Society,p. 153. In a High Court ruJin-g in New Znaland, Bisson J'
delivered a ruling which similarly acknowledged that 'tie spirit of the treaty transcends-the sum total
of its component parts-anJp"tJ nalrow or iiteral interpretations-out of place" See' New 7*oland
Maori Coincil v Attorney-General, t19871 I I{ZLR 641 (CA)' p' 663'
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impressed by the pomp and ceremony of the treaty process. He explained that a
'father image' was advanced by the authorities to explain the relationship of the white
man to the Indian. The Indians, according to Cardinal, did not fully understand the
meaning or implications of the treaties they signed. He said promises were made,
which were subsequently broken,ls 'To the Indians of Canada, the treaties represent
an Indian Magna Carta. The treaties are important to us because we entered into these
negotiations with faith, with hope for a better life with honour.'le All of these ideas,
arguments and sentiments have been expressed in very similar ways in New Zealand.
However, despite these similarities, New Zealand has distinguished itself from
Canadian discourse such as Cardinal's with its use of the Crown symbol in treaty
debate. While M6ori and non-Maori alike in New Zealand frequently spoke of the
Crown when referring to a great variety of institutions and individuals in New Tnaland
(both historically and in contemporary society as was demonstrated in the evidence
presented by Mdori at the Muriwhenua claim in Chapter Six), Cardinal directly
identified the contemporary treaty partner for Indians as the 'federal govemment'. For
example, he said that, a 'major problem arises from the refusal of our present
Canadian government ... and of Canadian Sovernments in the past, to honour
commitments for treaties signed with the Indians.'il He stated most emphatically,
'[a]s far aS we are concerned, our treaty rights represent a sacred, honourable
agreement between ourselves and the Canadian 8overnment... .'2t He warned that
Indians will eventually refuse to deal with the govemment if 'the Sovernmcnl does not
intend to honour its earliest and most sacred obligations to the Indian people.'22 He
also spoke of 'hundreds of years of the Indian-government relationship.23 lVhile
l8 Cardinal, The lJniust Society,p.36.
l9 Cardinal, The unjusr Society, p.28. Also see: Paul McHugh, The Mdori Magna Carta: New
Tzuland Inw antl thi Treaty of Wiitangi,Oxford university Press, Auckland, 1991'
2o g*6inu1, The lJnjust Society,pp. 16-17.
2l Cardinal, The lJniust Soc:iery,p.30.
22 Cardinal, The lJ njust Sociery, p. 122.
23 Cardinal, The lJnjust Sociery,p.6.
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notions such as honour and obligation have often been used in relation to the Treaty of
Waitangi in New Znaland,they have been generally associated with the symbol of the
Crown, rather than government as was the case in Canada'
However, while the federal government dominated Cardinal's conception of the
contemporary treaty partner, he also often referred to 'the Queen' and Her
representatives in recalling treaty promises made in the past. It would appear,
therefore, that while the Crown has not been a popular symbol is contemporary txeaty
discourse in Canada, the Queen was an important historical identity, at least for
Cardinal. For example, he talked about the Queen and her government when he said,
'[flulfilment of Indian rights by the queen's govemment must come before there can
be any fuither cooperation between the Indians and the Sovernment.'% He also wrote
that:
The Indians entered into the treaty negotiations as honourable men who came !o deal as
equals with the queen's representatives. Our leaders of that time thought they were
dealing with an equally honourable people ... who would do no less than the Indians
were doing 
-bind themselves,bind theirpeople and bind their heirs to honourable
contracts.25
Other Indian commentators also demonshated patterns of use similar to Cardinal's.
For example, in 1989, a representative of the Innu people of Ungava discussed his
tribe's contemporary treaty claim. His language demonstrated that the tribe's claim or
grievance was with the Canadian government andmilitary institutions in Canada, and
he made no mention of 'the Crown'.26 Similarly, a spokesperson for the Mi'kmaq
24 C..dinal, The tJnjust Society.p.28.
25 Cardinal, The Unjust Society,p. 29. Claudia Orange and Anne Salmond have observed similar
expectations in New Zealand and have expressed the s-entiment in similar ways' See Chapters Five
and Six of this thesis for details.
26 Daniel Ashini, 'David confronts Goliath: The lnnu of Ungava versus the NATO Alliance', in
Boyce Richardson (ed.), Drumbeat; Anger and Renewal in Indian Country, Summerhill Press'
Toronto, 1989, p. 59.
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people argued that his tribe had a valid treaty with the'British Crown', but in
discussing the claim in a contemporary context he differentiated between the Imperial
Crown and the colonial and federal govemments in Canada. Reference to the Crown
in this narrative could be literally interpreted as meaning the Crown in England, as
opposed to the government in Canada. For example, the comment was made that'
,[r]epeated representations to the Crown lin Britain] regarding these ongoing breaches
of the terms of our treaties were either stalled or ignored.'27 Most importantly
perhaps, the distinction between British Crown and federal government in Canada, as
opposed to the ambiguity of the Crown in New Tnalandtreaty debate, provided greater
certainty in the identities in Canadian history than is possible in treaty debate in New
Zealandwhich uses the vague and often unsubstantiated Crown to identify a range of
entities.
An Arkwesasne-Mohawk commentator also made a number of references to 'the
Crown' specifically in reference to the British Crown as the original reaty partner. He
spoke of the'sacredness of the Crown'scommitments','the Crown's obligations' and
the Crown's promises. HoWever, in a contemporary context, and again in contrast to
New Zealand treaty discourse, the commentator replaced the Crown identity with the
federal government. The comment was made, for example, that 'in petitions to the
governmenr [in 1898 the Mowhawk people] recalled ancient obligations undertaken by
the British Crown ...'28
These examples of the language of treaty discourse in Canada in the language of the
mass media and Indian commentators, demonstrates that the Crown symbol is not
used to identify cental government in Canada, even in the context of treaty debate' In
considering what might account for this difference, it will be recalled that theorists of
2? Grand Chief Donald Marshall Sr., et al., 'The Mi'kmaq: The Covenant Chain', in Drumheat'p'
86.
28 Grand Chief Michael Mitchell, 'Akwesasne. An Unbroken Assertion of Sovereignty', in
Drumbeat, p. 116.
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symbols in political language suggest that a symbol will enjoy frequent use for one of
three reasons (or as a result of a combination of these reasons.) A symbol may
become popular: because the public accepts the symbol as a reassurance for collective
fears or as a part of their collective identity especially in times of political or social
tension; because a government finds it is able to use the symbol to its own advantage
in legitimating its authority; or finally, a symbol may naturally develop from the
political environment and the events which impact upon it (such as the passing of the
Treaty of Waitangi Act and the subsequent work of the Tribunal in New Zraland). In
New Zealand, all three of these factors were earlier argued to have had some influence
in encouraging the revival of the Crown symbol in the 1980s. In Canada on the other
hand, as the next two sections of this discussion argue' the federal govemment does
not identify itself as the Crown. The symbol does not provide reassurances, rather it
raises tensions between goups in Canada. Also, even if this antagonism did not exist,
the Crown would have been unlikely to develop naturally as a symbol in Canada
because of its omission from key legislation relating to Indian rights in Canada.
The Crown and. Mdort vs Federal Government and Indian
The language of Harold Cardinal and other Indian commentators indicated that the
eueen is an important historical identity for Indians. Earlier it was argued that Mdori
also traditionally related strongly with the identity of the Queen in envisaging their
partner under the Treaty of Waitangi. It was suggested that this was a result of the
wording of the Treaty, the language of the British officials who presented the Treaty to
Mdori and certain political principles which were central to traditional Mdori society'
It was also later demonstrated through the case study of the language of the evidence
presented in the Muriwhenua claim, that the Queen continues to be an important
identity in contemporary Mdori discourse about the Treaty and treaty rights' In
Canada, on the other hand, while the Crown as the Queen appears to be significant for
some Indian tribes who signed Eeaties with the British Crown, the Crown symbol has
been very rarely used in reference to the contemporary treaty partner who was instead
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identified as the federal government. The question is why, given the similarity of
Indian and Mdori relations with the Crown, and the similarity in the transfer of
authority from Queen to colonial government in the development of both countries'
constitutions. did this difference occur? Here it is argued that the timing and wording
of the Canadian treaties influenced Indian conceptions of the relationship they
esublished under the treaties and, subsequently, their language in later fieaty debate.
However, it is first important to more substantially acknowledge the significance of the
Crown for Indians with regard to Canada's treaties. Even as recently as the 1980s, a
national debate in Canada about the country's constitution forced the question of
whether the First Nation Treaties would be included in the amended Constitution Act'
First Nation representatives lobbied the Canadian govemment to protect their rights'
stating,'[i]n particular, we did not want our link to the Crown to be affected'' In
addition, and much to the surprise of the Canadian public and government, the lobby
aimed its campaign at the British Parliament and sovereign, once again demonstrating
that the relationship with Britain was still of significance to Indian communities' A
gathering of more than 500 chiefs descended onto London as an expression of their
historic relationship with Britain through treaties in Canada.2e As a result of the
campaign, the First Nations became a widely debated constitutional issue from which
resulted a 'remarkable statement of the responsibilities that the Canadian Sovernment
has undertaken by repatriating the constitution, and a ringing declaration of the
continuing validity of all the ancient undertakings given to lFirst Nations] by the
British Crown.'30
Looking fuither back, many Indians tribes historically attempted to maintain links with
the Queen, as Mlori did also. As in New Zealand,there are many accounts of Indian
deputations to the Queen to express a treaty partnership between Indian and Queen'
29 zuchardson, Drumheat, p. 21.
30 Richardson, Drumbeat, p. 22.
240
One writer explains that Indians traditionally felt it was important to maintain the
ceremonial renewal of their alliances with great,Britain each year and did so through
the distribution of gifts. As it became increasingly difficult for Indians to maintain
these ceremonial links with the British, the Indian people became increasingly
distressed.3l An attachment by some Indians to the Queen through what they
perceived as a'personal relationship', similar to the relationship many Mdori
understood growing from the Treaty of Waitangi, has also been well documented.3z
In New T,ealandalso, as will be recalled from earlier discussion, attempts were made
to seek audience with the Queen or the British government, in search of protection for
treaty rights, and with very little result. Similarly in Canada, the Metis33 people took a
petition to England in 184? to demand recognition of their special status as
Indian/whites which led to 'spirited exchanges in the British Parliament' but with no
results.34
Furthermore, in a report on lndian self-government, published in 1983, the 'trust
relationship' between Her Majesty the Queen and the Indians was identified' The
report said:
It was, and continues to be of fundamental importance to the Indian Nations that they
treated with the Royal Maiesry. The elders understood they were entering into a sacred
relationship of trust with another sovereign which would endure the passage of time
and governments.35
3t Olive p. Dickason, Canada's First Nations: A History ctf Fountling Peoples from the Earliest
Times,University of Oklahoma Press, Norman 
' 
1992'p'249'
32 For example, interviews with elders from of Treaty 6and 7 reveal-something of this nature of this
relationshipinrougtr their oral traditions. See: Richard Price (ed.), The Spirit of the Alherta Indian
Treaties,Pica Pica Press, Edmonton, 1987.
33 Metis are people of mixed French and Indian descent'
34 Dickason , Canatla's First Nations,p.264.
35 Intli.sn Sel.f-Government in Canada. The Report of the Special Committee, Second Report to the
House , House of Commons, Issue no' 40, 1983, p. 119.
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According to this report, the Royal Proclamation of 1863 in Canada established a
special relationship between Indian and Crown, with the Crown as the protector of the
smaller nations within its bounds.36 However, when the report spoke of
contemporary relations, the term 'Crown' almost completely disappeared' For
example, it was asserted that, 'the special relationship between thefederal government
and Indian First Nations must be renewed and enhanced' .31
Despite the symbolic and even practical significance of the Queen for Indian people in
relation to their treaty rights, the Crown was not used to identify the contemporary
treaty partner, in particular central government, as it has done in New Zealand' The
wording and timing of many of the treaties signed in Canada, when compared to the
Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand, may have been partly responsible for this
distinction.
First, it is important to note that not all Canadian Indians have a relationship with the
British Crown through a treaty. While not all M6ori in New Tnaland signed the Treaty
either, Canada, unlike New Zealand, draws a distinction between fteaty and non-treaty
Indians. A 'treaty' Indian in Canada is one whose ancestors signed a treaty with the
representatives of the Queen and ceded some land rights to the Crown in return for
specified rights. Examples of such treaties exist in Ontario, Manitoba, Saskatchewan,
Alberta and some North Western territories. A registered Indian on the other hand, is
one whose ancestors did not sign a treaty but who wants to be regarded (under the
Indian Act which is discussed later) as a legal or registered Indian' Examples of this
iurangement are found in the Maritimes, Quebec, some parts of the North-Western
territories and British Colombia.38 In practical terms this means not all Canadian
Indians would relate to the 'Crown' as a treaty partner as all Mdori in New Zealand
36 Indian Self-Government in Canada, p. 120.
37 Intlian Self-Government in Canada,p 147.
38 Cardinal, The lJnjust Society,p.2l.
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might. It would therefore be less appropriate for the federal govemment to represent
'the Crown' on tre&tv matters in Canada than it is in New Zealand,.
A second point to note in comparing the Treaty of Waitangi with treaties in Canada is
that the timing of the signing of treaties within the colonisation process in Canada and
New Zealand is significantly different. In New Tnaland,it will be recalled from earlier
discussion, the Treaty of Waitangi created a foundation for European/NtlEori relations
prior to the establishment of settler government in the country. As a result, while there
was reference to 'Civil Government' in the Treaty (to be established in the funffe) the
eueen was the primary treaty identity. In Canada, between 1763 and 1867 the early
treaties which were signed in the areas of Southern Ontario, Quebec and the Maritime
Provinces were similarly negotiated by the British government in the name of the
monarchy.3g These treaties focused primarily on land and gave secondary
consideration to issues of peace and friendship.4 However, following the passing of
the British North America Act 1867, the federal government in Canada was granted
responsibility for Indians and lands reserved for Indians. As a result, treaties with the
Indians which were negotiated after 1867 made reference to the Queen but were
negotiated by the already established federal government which was also identified in
the treaties. Between 1871 and Ig2l,the'numbered treaties' (one to eleven) which
were essentially land transfer agreements4l were signed, once again between the
federal goverunent (on behalf of the Queen) and Indian nations' Just over half of
Canada's Indians were involved in these treaty agreements with the settler
government.42 In addition, the language of the numbered teaties demonstrates a very
different relationship in Canada than that implied within the Treaty of Waitangi in New
39 So-" treaties were signed prior to the Royal Proclamation between the Indians and the British
(alrhough not often with ihe French). One of the first treaties signed in 1713 included the provision
that Indians were not to be 'molested in the territories where they lived.' See: Dickason , Canada's
First Nations, p. 1?8. Also see: Richard hice, Leg,acy: Indian Treaty Relationships, Plains
Publishing Inc., Alberta, 1991, p. 8.
40 Dickason , Canatla's First Nations, p. 189.
4l Dickason,Canuda's First Nations, p' 189'
42 Dickuron , Canada's First Nations.p.213.
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Zealand. For example, while Treaty Six stated that,'Her Majesty the Queen, hereby
agrees...' it went on to say that the treaty would be'administered and dealt with for
them by Her Majesty's Government of the Dominion of Canada'.43 Also, Treaty 8
declared that, 'her Majesty the Queen hereby agrees ... subject to such regulations as
may from time to time be made by the Soverntnenf of the country, acting under the
authority of Her Majesty. . .' and subsequently outlines the terms of the agreement.4'{
Therefore, it can be suggested that the relationship between lndian and federal
government was, in many cases, more clearly established and understood by the
Canadian Indian than the relationship between Mdori and settler govemment had been
understood by M6ori in New 7'eaJand.
It can also be argued that independence from Britain, which was more important to
colonial Canada than it was in been in New Zealand, was another factor behind the
different use of 'the Crown' in Canada as opposed to New Zealand. For example, in
the early 1920s Canadian leaders insisted on further autonomy from British
imperialism.a5 Almost immediately following the Westminster conference in 1930
(which proposed that the dominions be known as 'autonomous cofllmunities within
the British Empire, equal in status.'46;, Canada, unlike New Zealand, took the
opportunity to realise independence from Britain. Through the Statute of Westminster
1931, Canada became 'united mainly by allegiance to a single ceremonial monarch.'
As a result of this history of independence Canadian commentators, unlike their New
Zealandcounterparts, make a point of stressing the transfer of power from the British
Crown to federal govemment while New Zealand has traditionally down-played this
transfer of power by referring to both the Queen and the settler government as the
Crown.47 For example, one commentator on Indian claims stated that 'findians] assert
43 Cardinal, The unjust Society,p.32
4 Cardinal, The lJnjust Sociery, pp.40-41.
45 McNaught,The Penguin History of Canada'pp'249-250'
46 McNaught,The Penguin History oJ'Canadu, p. 251'
47 Theprocess by which British authority was transferred to the colony followed much the same
pattern in Canada as New Zealand. For example, until around 1860, the Lieutenant-Governor of
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... that their inherent and historical right to self government was explicitly recognised
by the Crownin the fteaty agreements with Indians.'48 He goes on to explain that this
right was 'usurped surreptitiously by successive British and Canadian Sovernments,
in contravention of international law.'49 Similarly, a Canadian political scientist
explained that:
The Aboriginal peoples thus understand the political identity of canada to be a
federation of Aboriginal nations andthefederal government based on Treaty relations
negotiated from time to time in accordance with the conventions of recognition'
continuity and consent.S0
A final distinction between the treaties in Canada and New Zealand which may be
worth exploring with the advantage of more time and resotuces is the difference
between M6ori and Indian conceptions of leadership and authority in traditional
society. Earlier in the thesis (Chapter Five) it was demonstrated that the image of the
Queen was important in securing Mdori agreement to the Treaty because she
represented the personal and constant leadership and authority which was familiar to
pre-European M6ori society. In Canada, on the other hand, many writers have noted
quite a different conception of authority and leadership amongst Indian communities
which might suggest that the nature and function of representative govemment was
more familiar to Canadian Indians than it had been to Mdori in colonial New Zealand'
Upper Canada (now Ontario) administered British North America from London while also holding
the position of Superintendent of Indian Affairs. See: Dickason, Canada's First Nations'p'225'
This caused intemal tensions because the Lieutenant-Governor was expected to act both for the Crown
and the Indians, and the interests of the two were not entirely compatible. In 1860, the civil arm of
government was turnsd over to the colonies which resolved iension to some degfee' althgugh not to
ilre advantage of the Indian people. Again, see Dickason , Canada's First Nations'p'247 '
48 lrroy Little Bear et al., (eds.) , Pathways to Sel.f-tletermination: Canadiqn Indians and the
Cunadiin Srate, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, p' xiv'
49 Little Bear et al., (eds.), Pathways to Self-determination,p. xv '
50 James Tully,'The Crisis of ldentification: the Case of Canada', Politicat Studies' Volume 42'
Special Issue, 1994, p. 87.
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For example, while the traditional structure of M6ori leadership was a primogeniture
arrangement similar to the succession to the throne in monarchical society in England,
leadership amongst the plains Indians was based on merit. As one writer explains,
'qualified people were able to rise to influence through the family and clan, eventually
becoming members of a tribal council.'51 He explains that, since no institutionalised
office of leadership existed in traditional Indian society, leaders had to work hard to
keep their positions.s2 According to Long, any one tribe could have a multitude of
leaders, elected because of the skills they possessed which were in need at the time'
For example, in times of hostility, distinguished warriors would be promoted to
chieftainship, and would be reverted to the status of ordinary clan member when the
time of warring had passed.53 As Long explains,'[l]eadership was a temporary affair'
a service to the clan or tribe.'54 Temporary leadership was not so common amongst
M[ori tribes, which might have enhanced their sense of confusion when the Queen
later rejected her role as Eeaty parfirer.ss
An anthropologist who studied Canada's Indians and Inuit for over thirty years (until
Lg47) offered a more comprehensive discussion of Indian political organisation'
Jenness commented that in migratory tribes each family group or band had a nominal
leader, 'some man who through courage, force of character or skill in hunting, had
won for himself temporary pre-eminence.'56 Jenness emphasised that Indian leaders
varied from one season to another, depending on the needs of the clan or tribe' The
5l J. Anthony Long,'political Revitalisation in Native Indian Societies', Canadian Journal qf
Political Science,Vol 23, 1990, p. 759.
52 Long, 'Political Rcvitalisation in Native Indian Societies', p' 759'
53 LonB, 'Politicat Revitalisation in Native Indian Societies', p' 760'
54 Long, 'Political Revitalisation in Native Indian Societies', p' 760'
55 While Long,s broad brush discussion of the Canadian Indian suits the purpos€s of analysis at this
level of generalisation, a more detailed investigation of Indian conceptions of authority would have to
<lifferentiate between the triks and their truditions. For example, see, G' Friesen, The canadian
Prairies: A History,University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, 1984'
56 Diamond Jenness, Irulians of Canada,Tth Edn., University of Toronto Press, Toronto' 1977 'p'
r20.
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leader would hold his position only as long as he could win popular support's7
According to him, the typical plains chief was 'all too aware that his rank [hung] by a
frail thread, which may quite easily be broken.'58
While inconclusive, this observation draws attention to the unique situation in New
zealandwhereby M[ori perceptions of leadership, in combination with the emphasis
placed on the person of the Queen by those drafting and promoting the Treaty'
encouraged M6ori to resist the transfer of power from Queen to settler government in
New Zealand.
To revise the points made in this section of the discussion, it was demonstrated that fte
Queen, who continues to be an important figure in treaty discourse in Canada' is
identified as the Crown while the contemporary treaty partner is identified as the
federal government, unlike New Zealand where cengal government can be similarly
identified as 'the Crown'. It was argued that the timing and language of the treaties in
Canada has meant that the federal govemment was involved in the treaty process to a
much greater extent than the government in New Zealand was in the Treaty of
Waitangi. Canada did not, therefore face the same dfficulty in legitimating a transfer
of power from monarch to government as occulred in New Tnalandand, as it has been
earlier argued, this encouraged the conception of the govenrment as an extension of the
Crown. Also, it was pointed out that not all lndians signed treaties with the British
Crown (and thus are not involved in a relationship with 'the Crown' as such) therefore
making the Crown a symbol which cannot speak to all Canadian Indians as it does for
Maori in New Zealand. Finally, it was also suggested that Indian conceptions of
authority were notably different from those of the Mdori people, a point which may
reveal other more interesting possibilities with the benefit of more detailed research'
57 Jenness, lndiurts of Canada,p. 120.
58 Jenness, Indians of Canada,p. 128.
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The next section of the discussion argues that certain events and characteristics in the
Canadian constitution would actively deter government and other speakers from
identifying the federal government as the Crown in treaty debate.
Explaining the Crown's Absence: The Problem(s) of the Crown(s) in Canada
As in New Zealand, the Crown is a fundamental concept in the Canadian constitution'
However, unlike New Zealand, the Crown is not a frequently used metonym for
government. There are two possible reasons for this difference. First, Canadian
history is based on a struggle between several 'Crowns' (in particular the French and
English Crowns). Therefore, the Crown in Canada is both ambiguous (unlike New
Zealand where it can only refer to the British Crown) and, furthermore, it caries
associations of oppression for the French population in Canada (whom the British
Crown conquered in the later 1700s). In New Zealandon the other hand, the Crown
symbol was seen to unite goups otherwise divided by the treaty debate' Second' it is
argued that Canada has a 'hybrid' political culture which consists of central
government and an equally strong provincial government which may resent federal
government calling itself 'the Crown' because of the image of dominant central
authority this creates.
The first point to establish is the significance of the Crown in the Canadian
constitution. This has been noted by many writers. For example, Frank Mackinnon
says, . [t]he Crown is a fundamental source of power in the Canadian constitution' ' "
The Crown is an elusive phenomenon and a practical instinrtion of government''S9 He
explains that the concept allows Canadians to 'put [executive power] outside the
govefirmental structwe, not in sOmeone'S hands, bUt in an abstraction', namelY, 'the
Crown'.fl Using the analogy of an estate, Mackinnon explains further that the trustee
(as the Crown) controls the estate (as political power) but does not possess it: while
59 Frank Mackinnon, The Crown in Canada'McClelland and Stewart West, Calgary '1976'p'9'
60 146"1g1nnqn,The Crown in Canada,p.15.
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the children (as the govefirment) possess it, but do not control it'61 Therefore'
according to Mackinnon, an essential separation of powers is achieved if only in
theory. A similar separation of powers can be identified in New Zealand's
constitution with its important philosophical distinction between government and
Crown, the first representing immediate authority while the latter represents the notion
of perpetual succession (see Chapter Two). However, it was noted that this difference
has largely been undermined by the use of the term 'Crown' as a metonym for
govenrment in New 7*aland.
Jacques Monet also explains that 'the Crown' is the key to democratic government in
Canada because it separates powers between the sovereign and the government; one
with the formal power and the other with the tools to use it' He quotes John A'
MacDonald, former Canadian premier, as saying:
By adhering to the monarchical principle, we avoid one defect inherent in the
constitution of the United Stales ... we shall have a sovereign who is placed above the
region of the party - to whom all parties look up - who is not elevated by the action
of one party nor depressed by the action of another, who is the common head and
sovereign of all.62
According to Mackinnon, the fathers of the canadian confederation carefully
examined the Crown in the late nineteenth century and decided that it would continue
to work in Canada. He adds that the concept of the Crown was also valuable in
strengthening the union of 1867 because it was the only symbol the separate provinces
in Canada had in common.63 Monet adds that while the position of Governor-General
in Canada, as the Crown's representative, has had various titles and responsibilities
through the ages, it has served as an 'unintemrpted link with the beginnings of
6l Mackinnon,The Crown in Canada,p- 17.
62 Jacques Monet, The Canadian Crown, Clarke, Irwin and Company Ltd., TorontoAy'ancouver'
1979, p. 20.
63 Mackinnon.The Crown in Canada, pp' 30-31.
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Canada's recorded history'.64 David E' Smith agrees that' 'the Crown's unbroken
continuity is often cited as a fundamental ingredient of peaceful change' in Canada's
constitutional development'.65 The Crown has further been identified as a
constitutional and psychological safeguard,66 and a symbol of government which
remains throughout any difficulty'oz Ot one writer notes' the Crown is 'a symbol
[which] speaks to the imagination and the emotions.'68
In addition to these arguments, smith advances the theory that canada's 'imperial
origins' were the root of Canada's modern distinctiveness from the United States and
provide the basic explanation for the nature of modern federal and provincial
governments.6e He argues that the impact of monarchical government in Canada had
been internalised in Canada's federal system and was perpetuated at both levels of the
federal system.To Smith saYs:
But where once [the monarchy] was a symbol of allegiance external to Canada, today
the loyalties it embodies are 'indigenous'. The function of the monarchy is far from
apparent to many canadians, because in the absence of an hereditary aristocracy or an
established church, monarchy in Canada is essentially a political arrangement without
social consequences. For this reason, the use of the term'Crqwn' .-. carries a less
personal connotation. ... The organisational principle remains the same .'. monarchy
in Canada is mainly about politics.'71
64 Monet, The Canadian Crown,pp.24-25.
65 David E. Smith, 'Empire, Crown and Canadian Federalism', Canadian Journal of Political
Science, Vol 24, 1991, P.459.
66 Mackinnon,The Crown in Canada'p.34.
67 Mackinnon,The Crown in Canada.p- 51.
68 Monet. The Canadian Crown,p. 76. Monet's comment echoes Bagehot's observations about the
Crown as early at 1867. See Chapter One of this thesis'
69 Smith, 'Empire, Crown and Canadian Federalism', p' 451'
7{) 566, 'Empire, Crown and Canadian Federalism', pp' 45L'452'
7l Smittr, 'Empire , Crown and Canadian Federalism', p' 452'
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Smith goes on to explain that proposals to abolish the Crown have never attracted
popular support even when Canada was advancing from colony to nation primarily
because the concept of the Crown is a central organising concept in politics' and
because the Crown sets Canada apart from the United States.72
In accepting the constitutional significance of the Crown, it is equally important to
identify tensions and difficulties associated with the Crown in Canada' According to
Mackinnon for example, Canadians generally perceive the symbol as demonstrating
subservience to Britain. He also claims that the notion of 'the Crown' fuels federal-
provincial antagonisms and leads to an 'over concentration on the symbolism of the
Crown at the expense of an appreciation of its practical role in all governments of
Canada, including that of Quebec.'73 Smith similarly observes that in adopting the
notion of the Crown in establishing its political structures, central govemment was
trying to keep power away from the provinces, because 'the Crown' means
centralising power in the hands of the political executive.'74 He notes that at the time
of confederation, the formerly colonial governments re-emerged as provincial
governments with greatly reduced powers' subservient to the federal government' or
'the Crown'.75 Therefore, the tension in the relationship between federal and
provincial governments can be attributed for the most part to the altered relationship
between the two levels of government after confederation in 1867.
72 Smith, 'Empire, Crown and Canadian Federalism', p.468. Smith-observes that there have been
no studies, to his knowledge, substantiating British impact in Canada, which he considers
unfortunate, commenting, 'it-is'impossible to"know without study what lies behind the facade of
British institution and piactices that remain evident in Canadian life.' He specifically identifies
legislatures, where 'trad]tions die hard but where symbols may have elusive meanings" See, Smith'
:n-n pi.", Ciown and Canadian Federalism', p. a66 . Also it is worth noting that in 1985' the Law
Reform Commission of Canada released a working paper which proposed 'a new status for the federal
administration which would be better suited to tie cbntempottry iegal and social circumstances of
Canada.' It was suggested that the definition of the Crown 6vitege snould be narrowed in order that
the government is 'unable to not only say whether there's going to be a fight but lalso] set the rules
and have the last word on who gets the 
-pize.' 
The commission recommended that the concept of
,administration' replace that 6f the tCrown'. See: Philip A'-Joseph, Constitutional and
Administrative Lqw in New kaland,The Law Book Co., sydney, 1993, p' 516.
73 Mackinnon.The Crown in Canada, p' 156.
74 Smitt,'Empire , Crown and Canadian Federalism', p'471'
75 Smith,'Empire, Crown and Canadian Federalism', p' 458'
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Also, Mackinnon identifies the French influence in Canada in relation to the Crown,
pointing out that for two hundred years French-Canadians have been trying to free
themselves from the oppression of the British Crown. He explains that 'the Crown' is
perceived by French Canadians as a symbol of foreign domination'76 McDougall and
Valentine similarly observe that modern Canadian society encapsulates a struggle
between at least four Canadas for the realisation of their own vision of justice, freedom
and self-realisation, two of those groups being the French and the English'72 They
explain that while French/English dialogue is well established, the First Nations/
governmentdialogueisstilldeveloping.TsThiswouldsuggestthattheunpopularity
of .the Crown' in French/English negotiations has further dissuaded government from
using 'the Crown' symbol in Indian/government discourse'
Evidently, the Crown is an important part of the Canadian constitution but one which'
while allowing for continuity in Canadian politics, does not have the appropriate
symbolic qualities to unite canada as it does in New Zealand. A brief discussion of
Canada's constitutional development substantiates the argument that the Crown poses
problems in Canada which would deter the federal government from engaging in
Crown symbolism.
Chapter Five noted that while other countries expressed an interest in New Zealand
prior to British colonisation, the British Crown was the only 'Crown' to claim
sovereignty over the country. In a sense, 'the Crown' in colonial New Zealand could
only be the British Crown. Canada's political history, on the other hand, reveals that
pre-confederation Canada was influenced by multiple 'Crownso' Moreover, ongoing
76 Mackinnon,The Crown in Canada, p. 157.
77 R.K. McDougall and L.P. Valenrine, 'changing Players, cirycine.TiT"j' ciTll,Td 
'h"
Negotiation of its Futue', paper presented a] ttre 
-Coifer"n"" 
on Ethnbnadonal Conflict and Viable
constitutionalism, univeirlty or Hu*aii, Hawaii,5-8 January 1995, p' t. Th: other. ethnically
defined group identified were the First Nations and the forth was a group identified as culturally and
economically distinct; the prairie provinces'
78 McDougal and Pelassy, 'Canada and the Negotiation of its Future', p. 3.
252
tension between these 'Crowns' remains in contemporary Canada. The relationship of
the Crowns in Canada with each other and with the native Indian people begins with
the earliest contact between European and Britain arrivals and established settlements
of Indian people.
Indians arrived in North America many thousands of years before the frst Europeans'
The two main settlement groups of Algonkin and koquoian Indians settled in the north
eastern parts of North America.Te The earliest recorded contact between Indian and
European was in July 1543 by the Frenchman, Jacques Cartier, which began an
extensive history of French-Indian relations motivated and maintained by French
interest in fishing, fur trade, and exploration on the continent. For several centuries
mutual cooperation between two gloups was maintained by the compatibility of
French and Indian interests.80 Also, the French lacked the numbers and the
motivation to interfere with or attack Indian society, while the Indians are said to have
accepted French settlement because of the benefits the trade brought to many Indian
tribes. The Indian customs of speech making and gift giving were said to have
dominated relations, with the French traders learning and using various Indian
clialects.sl However, along with the advantages of contact came more Sinister
consequences for Indian tribes, including disease, destructive warfare' and
alcoholism.s2 Eventually, despite some success in frading relations between Indians
and the French (and for reasons due largely to political and religious affairs in Western
Europe), the French Crown was distracted from further exploration in North America
until the seventeenth century. During this time the English, who had also made their
way to the shores of the continent, increased trade and fishing, although actual
?9 J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens: A History of Indian-White Relations in Canada'
revised edition, Univeriity of Toronto Press, Toronto, 1991' p' 4'
80 Miller, Slqscrapers Hide the Heavens,pp.40 and 268'
8l Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens,pp.35-37 andp'269'
82 MiU"t, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens,p.270.
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settlement was discouraged by the British crown.83 With both the English and
French presence in Canada, the stage was set for a history of warfare between the two
nations for control of the Canada - a struggle into which the native Indian would also
inevitably be drawn.
Indeed, eighteenth century pre-confederation Canada is characterised by a rivalry
between the British and French crowns. one writer notes, '[t]he crown, be it
English, French or Scottish - was the source of the charters and grants upon which
early settlement was based.' Often, more than one grant was made for the same land
by different countries. These differences were usually settled by force'84 In
particular, increasing hostility between the British and French affected their relations
with the Indian peoples. Once trading partners for both nations,Indian tribes became
allies in a time of war, choosing allegiance with English or French depending on their
own interests.sS Generally, the Indians are said to have perceived 'the Englishman as
a farmer or town dweller' whose activities would inevitably drive the Indian people
deeper into the hinterland, while the Frenchman was considered a trader or a soldier
and much less of a threat to Indian land and cultural stability's6
Canada remained a French colony from 1608 to 1759.87 In 1663, New France, as it
was called, became a royal province under a system of French provincial government
and law.8s However, by l?58 the British were clearly in the ascendant in North
America and from 1759 to 1760, they gained control of the French province by
83 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens'pp. 29-30.
84 L M. Bumstead, The Peoples of Canatla: A Pre-Confederation History, Oxfgrd University Press'
Toronto, 1992,p.53. Bumsread's reference to the Scoitish Crown's inlluence in pre-confederation
Canada should be noted, although it is not discussed further here'
85 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens,p.27o.
86 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens,p.27l.
87 Gordon T. Stewart, The Origins of Canadian Politics: A Comparative Approach, University of
British Colombia press, Vancoiu"r, i986. lnformation found in the chronology at the front of the
edition.
88 Kennerh McNaught, The Penguin Hisnry of Cananla,Penguin, London, 1988' p' 27.
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military conquest. ln 1763,the Franco-American empire was ceded to the English in
the Treaty of Paris.89 In the Treaty, as an agreement between the two 'Crowns' it was
stated that, 'his Most Christian Majesty cedes and guarantees ... all rights acquired by
Treaty or otherwise, which the Most Christian King and the Crown of France have
had until now...'90
The territories acquired by the English in the Treaty of Paris were set down that same
year in the Royal Proclamation of 1763. The proclamation also established certain
guarantees for Indians, including an exclusive relationship between the British Crown
and the Indian peoples for the negotiation and purchase of hunting grounds'el The
proclamation required that all lands not ceded or purchased by the British be
considered 'reserved lands' for the indigenes while the British Crown retained the
right to extinguish Indian title.e2 Following the Proclamation, land could only be
acquired from the Indians through treaty with the British Crown.
In addition to demonstrating antagonism between French and English Crowns'
Canada's constitutional history is occupied with a tension between central and
provincial governments. According to one writer, it was during the late eighteenth
century that Canada's unique 'hybrid political culture' began to emerge' This
consisted of a British Crown colony (with the emphasis on the executive)
supplemented by the American model of strong provincial govemment'93 This factor
also needs to be considered in explaining the absence of the Crown symbol in Canada'
Prior to confederation in 1867,Canada had developed regionally with each region
exhibiting distinctive institutional arrangements. ln most provinces one council served
89 McNaught,The Peng,uin History of Canada,p.43-
90 Price, I*gacy,p.6.
9l Price, I*gacy,pp. 6-7.
92 Dickason,Canadu's First Nations, p. 188'
93 Srcwart, The Origins o.f Cunadian Politics,p.3.
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the purpose of the executive and the legislature, although in the colonies of Upper and
Lower Canada a distinction between the two was maintained.9a The colonies
generally operated on a principle of mixed or balanced government in which the
governof represented the monarchical element, the councils provided an historic
element and the elected assembly provided the democratic element of government'es
However, opposition to 'oligarchic government' was strong in L,ower Canada (now
Quebec) in the early 1800s because of the race and language differences between the
French and English in the area.e6 Also there was general pressure from colonial
political administrations for their representatives to be responsible to the provinces
rather than Britain.gT
This desire was acknowledged by Britain and in 1839 Lord Durham was dispatched
by the British Government to settle unrest in the colonies and instigate reform' His
solution was to establish responsible government in the provinces and unite the fwo
Canadas, with the further objective to assimilate the French into Anglo-Canadian
culture.es As a result, between 1840 and 1841 Upper and l,ower Canada became the
Union of the Canadas and were renamed West and East Canadarespectively.se 
q''*
this move, the desire within the colonies to achieve independence from Britain was
partly satisfied.lu)
Despite earlier reservations about Canadian independence, [.ondon also eventually
supported unification of the Canadian colonies in order to reduce British colonial
94 Bumstead,The Peoples of Canada,p.234.
95 Those near the top of the social pyramid were most suitable for political service in the elected
assemblies. Bumstead warns that popular election is not to be confused with democracy here'
Bumstead, The Peoples of Canada'p.235.
96 Bumstead , The Peoples of Canada ' p. 241 .
97 Bumstead ,The Peoples of Canada, pp.246-247 '
98 Bumstead,The Peoples of Canada,p.256'
99 Stewart, The Origins o.f'Canadian Politics, see the chronology'
l(!o gums1s36,The Peoplet o.f Canada,p.326.
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responsibility and expense.l0l At the same time, from 1841 to 1849, battles within the
provinces for responsible government had begun. These were largely conceded from
lg47 to 1854.102 For example, Nova Scotia was granted responsible government in
August 184T and Newfoundland later in 1855.103 Despite Canada's increasing
independence, the governorship remained a pivotal and enduring symbol of the British
connection as well as a guarantor of the monarchical system of government in
gunn64.l04
In 1867, the Union of the Canadas was dissolved when the British North America Act
created the Dominion of Canada, a confederation which included Quebec, Ontario,
Nova Scotia, and New Brunswick. In 1870, Manitoba joined the Union followed by
British Colombia in 1871 and Prince Edward Island in 1875. Under the 1867 Act and
for the first time in history, an historic monarchy, a young parliamentary democracy
and a new federal state were reconciled under one political system'I0s The unique
blend of ingredients in Canada's history had come together to create an entirely new
kind of plitical anangement.
In reflecting on the tensions created by 'the Crown' in Canada it has been argued here
that the French Canadian and provincial government associations with the Crown in
Canada might deter federal govemment from identifying itself as the Crown, as central
government has done in New Zealand. However, further to this, it is now argued that
the Crown symbol would not have naturally developed in Canadian treaty discourse
either (as it was seen to do in New Zealand) because of its absence from significant
legislation relating to treaty rights in Canada (when compared with the Crown in the
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 in New Zealand.)
l0f 3um51ss6,The Peoples of Canada'p.?29.
f 02 5pvv6, The Origins of Canadian Politics' see the chronology'
103 gun51s66,The Peoples ol Canada, p. 319.
f 04 Srcwart, The Origins oJ Canadian Politics'p.57.
f 05 yon"1, The Canadictn Crown,p'35.
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In New Zealand,the revival of the Crown symbol was thought to be partly due to the
Treaty of Waitangi Act 1975 and the subsequent work of the Waitangi Tribunal which
naturally drew heavily on the image of the Crown in its findings and
recofltmendations. Canadian legislation relating to Indian rights and treaties, on the
other hand, makes significantly fewer references to 'the Crown" For example' the
British North America Act 1867,'federally united lCanada] into one Dominion under
the Crown of the United Kingdom and Great Britain and Ireland "' with a
Constitution similar in principle to that of the UK.' The legislation stated, '[t]he
Executive Government and Authority of and over Canada is hereby declared to
continue and be vested in the Queen.' However, the responsibility for discharging the
provisions of the Indian treaties fell entirely to the dominion government by subsection
24 of section 91. The Act gave the'Parliament of Canada' the exclusive power to
deal with 'Indians and land reserved for Indians.'106 Similarly, the Indian Act 1876,
stated, .[t]his Act shall be administered by the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development'. It did not refer to the Crown.lo7 In other instances, an Indian Claims
Commission allowed Indians to bring claims against the 'federal government' unlike
the Waitangi Tribunal which inquires into the actions and policies of 'the 6tos7'n"l0E
Finally, in 1969 the Canadian Government proposed a mini-royal commission on
Lndian grievances to deal with breaches of Indian treaties' In the language of the
paper, the commission would then make recommendations to the'governlnsnl' ,to9
l{}6 gur4inn1, The lJnjust Society,p.43-
l0? 16" Indian Act has been heavily criticised in that it never at any time reflected the spirit or the
intent of the agreements between trre noans and the canadian government. Rather, it 'subjugated to
colonial rule the very people whose rights it was supposed to protect" See: Cardinal'The Uniust
Society,p. M.
t08 yg"sys1, Making Cctnutlian Indian Poticy,p. 38. Indians protested against this policy, resenting
the fact that provinces might not be included in the process of reviewing injustices'
1091ry"nvg1, Making Canadian Indiqn Policy,p' 154.
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The Canadian Experience 
-Lessons for New Zealand
New Zealand political scientist Les Cleveland provides a theory about the differences
in the symbolic language of various countries which summarises the distinction
demonstrated in this chapter between Canada and New Zealand's use of the Crown
symbol. Cleveland exPlained that:
[t]he symbols of the political culture are representations which express the customs'
emotions, beliefs, attitudes, traditions and values that are embodied in the particular
culture. ... They serve as representalions which can evoke emotions of identity and
acceptance on the part of large numbers of people, integrating them to the relevant
political system.l lo
For reasons explained in this chapter, while it is appropriate for 'the Crown' to be a
popular metonym for government and a frequently used symbol in treaty discourse in
New Zealand, it is not appropriate for the Crown to be used in this way in Canada'
While New Zealanders have traditionally identified strongly with the Crown symbol
and while the Crown carries positive and uniting associations for most New
Zealanders, in Canada, the Crown symbol was seen not to unite sections of Canadian
political culture, but rather represent tension and potential division' While this
discovery substantiates the argument in the first two sections of this thesis that the
frequently use of the Crown symbol (especially as a metonym for government) in
New Zealand is the result of the country's particular constitutional history, it serves
another purpose also. That is, this comparison with Canada has drawn attention to the
nature of the relationship between M[ori and Crown within the broader context of
constitutional evolution and reform. The next and final chapter of this thesis picks up
on this aspect of the Crown, and considers the future of the Crown in New Zezland
with regard to constitutional reforms facing the country in the mid 1990s' In
particular, it considers how these reforms might address or resolve the problem of the
I l0 1", Cleveland, The Politics of lJtopia: New Ttalarul and its Government, Methuen Publications
Ltd., Wellington, 1979, p. 23.
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Crown in New Tnalandand how they might affect the popularity of the Crown symbol
and impact on the Maori treaty partner.
TEN
THE CROWN,THE CONSTITUTION AND MAOru:
OPTIONS FOR NEW ZBAI.AND'S FATURE
Just as this thesis began with a discussion of the origins of the Crown within the
British constitution (see Chapter One), it concludes in this chapter with a discussion of
the place of the Crown in New Zealand's evolving constitution. As the final stage in
this examination of 'who or what is the Crown treaty partner', the purpose of this
chapter is to investigate constitutional retbrms in New Zealand,both imminent and
possible, which could impact on the role, function and even survival of 'the Crown' in
New Zealand. In particular, and in keeping with the objectives throughout this thesis,
the purpose is to consicler how constitutional reform might impact on the identity of
the Crown as the treaty partner and the possible implications of reform for the Mdori
treaty partner. The discussion is divided into two sections. The first section considers
three constitutional developments which might reform the Crown, namely: the
introduction of mixed member proportional representation; the possibility of a written
constitution in New Zealand which incorporates the Treaty of Waitangi; and the
possible abolition of the Judicial Cornmittee of the Privy Council in New Zealand.
The second section acldresses the constitutional reform which would remove the
Crown from the constitution cornpletely: republicanism. Given the limited nature of
the republican clebate in New Zealand, this discussion considers the issues
surrounding republicanism in Australian, a well advanced debate, although still
unresolved, by the rnid 1990s.
Reforrning the Crown: Constitutional Developments in New Zealand
Three constitutional retbrms which have the potential to impact on the Crown in New
Zealandare at various stages in their developrnent in the mid 1990s. The first of these,
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Mixed Member Proportional (MMP) representation, might impact on the Crown in
New Zealand as it represents both the Governor-General and the Executive. This
could force a re-examination of the composition and identity of the Crown treaty
partner in New Zealand. However, it has been suggested that the problem of the
Crown (for Mdori) could be avoided in the future if New 7-ealand were to legislate a
written constitution which incorporated the Treaty of Waitangi. This would allow
Mdori to turn to the courts rather than 'the Crown' for the fulfilment and protection of
their treaty rights. The third constitutional issue which implicates the Crown is the
question of the future of the right of appeal to the Privy Council in New Zealand as a
'last link with the Crown'. It is argued that the debate sunounding the proposal to
abolish the right of appeal further demonstrates the general trend towards cutting links
with the Crown as it represents the Queen despite M6ori insistence that the
relationship be maintained.
i. Mixed Member Proportional Representation
In 1993, New Zealand voted in a national referendum to replace the First-Past-the-Post
(FPP) voting system traditionally used in New Zealand with a Mixed Member
Proportional (MMP) system for electing the country's Members of Parliament. Prior
to the first MMP election, debate about the possible impacts this change would have
on the function, composition and role of the New Zealand Parliament was widespread.
Discussion here focuses specifically on the effect MMP was predicted as having on
the Crown in New 7*aland. In doing so, a distinction is drawn between the Crown as
the Governor-General and the Crown as the Executive in relation to MMP and its
implications for MEori.
In order to briefly explain why the head of state (as the Crown) is implicated in the
change to MMP it is necessary to recognise the differences anticipated between
govemment under FPP and MMP, and in particular the events thought possible
following an MMP election with respect to the role of Governor-General. While FPP
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most often produced a clear (although disproportionate) 'winner' as govemment, New
Znalandis unlikely to get single party majority government because there will be multi-
party Parliaments. Consequently, the increased possibility that the Governor-General
will be required to exercise certain powers under MMP has also been recognised. In
particular, the Governor-General may be required to exercise his or her independent
discretion and judgement in order to establish govemment if the MMP election does
not clear a clear winner, whereas in the past, the Governor-General has conventionally
acted on the advice of his or her minsters. The Governor-General's discretionary or
reserve powers which might be critical under MMP include the authority to appoint a
prime minister and to dissolve Parliament.l While independent action of this natue by
the Governor-General is unusual in a country of New Zealand's constitutional
makeup, it was considered increasingly possible that the Governor-General would
have act in this manner if, for example, the Prime Minister did not appear to have the
hrll support of the party, if no party held a majority of the seats after a general election,
or if an incumbent government lost the confidence of the House at any time.2
According to Harris and Mcleay, under MMP the Governor-General will be required
to be 'scrupulously non-partisan' in using his or her reserve powers, '[flor it to be
otherwise would deny the electorate's democratic right to choose its own
government.'3 In other words, the neutrality of the Crown (as represented by the
Governor-General) was predicted to be more significant under MMP than ever before'
However, as Harris and Mcleay also pointed out, the Crown's 'neutrality' is
immediately called into question by the practice of the Queen appointing the Governor-
General as her representative in New Zealand on the advice of the goveflrment of the
I paul Harris and Elizabeth Mclray, 'The lrgislature' in Gary Hawke (ed.), Changing Politics? The
Electoral Referendum /993, Institute of Policy Studies, lilelling-ton, 1993, p' 108' For further
information about the powers of the Governor-General see: Working, lJnder- P.roportional
Representation: A Referlnce.fttr the Pubtic Service,state Services Commission' Wellington' 1995
sections, 1.4, 1.5, 1.11,8.2-8.4 and 8.8.
2 Harris and Mclray, 'The lrgislature', p. 109.
3 Harris and Mcleay,'The Legislature', p. 109. Also, for more discussion of the advice to the
governor-general, see: Working-llnder Proportional Representarion, sections, 1.8, 1.12, 1.15' 5'63'
7.1.8.8 and 8.29-8.36.
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day.a Despite this concern, Hanis and Mcleay concluded that MMP may result in a
more important role for the Governor-General who offers New Zealand a much
needed flexibility to deal with a wide variety of political situations under MMP.5
While perhaps not directly affecting the relationship between the Crown and Mdori,
the introduction of MMP could increase the profile of the Governor-General as the
eueen's representative in New Zealand because the authority to appoint and dismiss
prime ministers and governments could find new application under this system of
voting. In this respect, it is possible that the profile of the Crown's role as Governor-
General would increase.
In addition to the changes predicted in the role of the Governor-General as the Crown,
the role of the Executive as the Crown also displays some interesting characteristics
with regard to the introduction of MMP. In assuming (as writers have done6) that
through MMP the composition of the Executive has the potential to become more
proportional to the composition of the nation as a whole, Mdori may come to constitute
a greater proportion of the Executive. When the Executive is identified as the Crown
treaty partner (as it has been on many occasions throughout this thesis) Mdori will
therefore be in a partnership with themselves, to a certain extent. This argument
demonstrates the irony of Maori Cabinet ministers representing the Crown (as the
Executive) which existed in New Zealand prior to MMP also. Mdori Ministers in
Cabinet such as Koro Wetere, Matiu Rata and Winston PetersT have ironically had
membership to both parties identified in the Treaty. Even when Mdori have not been
represented in Cabinet, Cabinet constitutionally represents Mf,ori through its
accountability to Parliament and therefore also to the people. While this argument is
a Harris and Mclray, 'The l,egislarure', pP. 109-l10.
5 Haois and Mclray, 'The Legislature', p. 112.
6 Harris and Mclray, 'The lrgislature', p. 103.
7 See Appendix B for ministerial portfolios.
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not pursued here in any detail, it does emphasise the difficulties inherent in
determining membership of identities such as 'Mdori' and 'the Crown'. MMP, which
may further exaggerate this problem of identity, could force a revision of the meaning
of 'the Crown' as the contemporary treaty partner.
Also, in relation to the problem of identity, a suggestion may be recalled from Chapter
One of this thesis that it would be appropriate to reconstitute the contemporary treary
partners as M6ori and Pdkehd. However, such a suggestion, it is argued here, makes
assumptions about the nature of the heaty partners which fail to appreciate the essential
component of the Crown identity which is that the Crown must have the ability to hold
the government in New Zealand accountable under the Treaty of Waitangi and' in
a6dition to this, must have both the authority and motivation to protect and promote
Mdori rights under the Treaty. It is highly questionable whether Pdkehd in New
Zealand,as 'the Crown', would have either the ability or the motivation to do so. In
therefore rejecting the possibility that 'Pdkeh6' could perform these necessary Crown
functions it is argued that while the meaning of the Crown might not be easily
reconciled in contemporary New 7-ealand society, the problem of the Crown (at least
for Miori) could be avoided if a better mechanism was put in place to fulfil the
Crown's functions under the Treaty of Waitangi to uphold and protect Mdori treaty
rights. Such a mechanism could be a written constitution for New Zealand which
incorporates the Treaty of Waitangi.
ii. AWrinen Constitution and the Treaty of Waitangi
If the Treaty of Waitangi were incorporated in a written constitution in New Zealand
the courts would be awarded the authority to strike down government legislation and
policy which was inconsistent with the terms of the Treaty. The question is whether
this constitutional development would protect Mdori from further evolution of the
Crown.
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Unlike many other nations such as Australia and Canada, New Zealand's constitution
was not created at a given point in time, but rather evolved as the country developed-
By the mid 1990s New Zealand did not have a fully written constitution. Instead, the
rules which establish the major institutions of government, state their powers and
broadly regulate the exercise of those powers in New Zealand were located within
various pieces of legislation or operated by convention.8 However, the possibility of
legislating a written constitution for New Zealandwas an increasingly popular topic of
debate in the early 1990s. In particular, it was suggested that the Treaty of Waitangi
should be incorporated within a written constitution.
Opinion on this matter was divided. Arguments against incorporating the Treaty in an
entrenched constitution pointed to a number of concerns, including a reluctance by
Mdori to incorporate the Treaty in a legal structure over which they have little control
and the fear within Maoridom that the mana of the Treaty might be diminished once it
was formally incorporated in New Zealand's judicial system.e However' others
stressed the absolute urgency of this constitutional reform. For example, Margaret
Wilson pointed out that treaty jurisprudence in New Zealand is tenuous because it is
reliant on the Treaty of Waitangi being recognised within New Zealand statutes.
Wilson argued that 'the legal recognition of the constitutional status of the Treaty of
Waitangi is necessary if Mdori are to attain not only reparative justice, in the guise of
appropriate compensation for past wrongs, but, just as important, social and political
justice.'10 Wilson later argued that M6ori struggles in the past to have the Treaty
honoured demonstated that legal recognition of the Treaty would first, provide Maori
with a legitimacy which would be difficult to ignore and second, enable access to
essential political power.l I She explained that the undesirable aspect of New
8 Geoffrey palmer, New Zealand's Constitution in Crisis: Reforming our Political System, John
Mclndoe, 1992,pp.3-5.
9 Margaret Wilson, 'Constitutional Recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi',!1 M.Wilsonand A'
Yeatman (eds.), Juntic e and Antipodean P-ractices, Bridget Williams Books, Wellington' 1995' p' 6'
l0 Wilson, 'Constitutional Recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi', p' 4'
I I Wilson, 'Constitutional Recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi', p' 8'
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Zealand's constitutional arrangements is that the government is currently able to
control and dictate aspects of Mdori policy so as to avoid adverse effects to the
institution of government regardless of obligations under the Treaty. Accordingly, the
courts should be the referee of the appropriateness or otherwise of the government's
actions when held up against the original obligation of the Crown.l2
Eddie Durie, Chief Judge of the Waitangi Tribunal and another supporter of the Treaty
in a constitution, has argued that '[u]ltimate justice for indigenous peoples depends on
political power-sharing through constitutional reform.13 He noted that in Canada,
indigenous rights have been provided for in an enfienched constitution that can restrict
the state's power, although it is left to the largely monocultural courts to determine
'aboriginal interest'. However, this possibility for New Zealand is restricted by the
fundamental limitation that Parliament is supreme, and treaties are realised only to the
point that Parliament has provided. Hence, in Durie's words, principle is subordinate
to legislative will.la
The principal purpose therefore of inclucling the Treaty in a written constitution would
be to fulfil the original function of the Crown under the Treaty to uphold Maori rights
and protect them from unconstitutional government. It will be recalled from Chapter
Five that, in 1840, M6ori understood that their relationship with the Queen would
protect them against both colonists and government in New Zealand. In addition it
should be noted that missionaries conveyed this idea to Mf,ori by extolling the Queen
as upholding a similar position to God, as the source of all justice and authority. This
protective theme comes through very strongly in the preamble to the Treaty, which
says that Her Majesty Queen Victoria was 'anxious to protect [Maori] just Rights and
Properry' (see appendix A). Chapter Five of this thesis evidenced this perception of
12 Wilson, 'Constitutional Recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi" p. 15.
l3 E.T. Durie, 'Justice, Biculturalism and the Politics of Law', in Justice and Antipodean Practices,
P. 33.
14 Durie, 'Justice, Biculturalism and the Politics of Law', p. 42.
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the Queen by M6ori with discussion of the deputations to the Queen requesting her to
assert her authority over colonial govemment and fulfil her original treaty obligations.
In recognising how important it is to contemporary treaty negotiations also that the
government be held accountable to the Treaty, it is argued here that including the
Treaty in a written constitution would give the courts in New 7-ealandthe authority to
strike down legislation passed in the House which was inconsistent with the Treaty'
This mechanism would also change the relationship between M6ori and the Crown in
that it would deflect the focus of treaty negotiations away from the Crown and even
possibly protect Mdori from future evolution of the Crown. However, such a
proposition also inhoduces an increased possibility that it would be left to the courts to
determine who is 'the Crown' treaty partner under the Treaty which may not always
advantage Mdori (as was the case with the Moriori claim before the Tribunal). The
role of the courts generally under the new system will need to be considered. The
future of the judicial system in New Zealand, in particular the right of appeal to the
privy Council, has already been the focus of another proposed constitutional reform
which challenges M6ori relations with the'Crown' treaty parher.
iiiThe Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
In looking to identify an authority which would have the power to hold government
accountable to the terms of the Treaty (and indeed determine the application of the
Treaty in contemporary society), one possible candidate is the judicial system. While
not enjoying the discretion of the Queen's role as identified within the Treaty of
Waitangi and while being limited by the laws already in place, the courts in New
Zealandhave on occasion ruled in favour of the Treaty in such a way as to force a
revision of government policy.ls
l5 tn particular see: The judgement of Cooke J., New 7*alantl Maori Council vs Attorney'General'
Hight Court, Wellington, April 1987.
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However, the function of New Zealand's highest source of judicial authority, the Privy
Council in England, has come under scrutiny in the 1990s. Its function is discussed
here because it has historically held (and arguably holds) hemendous appeal for many
Mdori for the very reason that it demonstrates many of the qualities exhibited by the
Queen which had appealed to Mdori in the nineteenth century. Not only does the
Privy Council have the authority to instruct govemment in its conduct (as the Mdori
assumed the Queen had, as revealed in Chapter Five) but it is also an off-shore
independent judge and one which represents a link with the sovereign in England.
Therefore, the Privy Council is a mechanism through which M6ori symbolically
recognise and express the original partnership with the Queen.
The future of the right of appeal in New Zealand to the Privy Council was under
review in the mid 1990s. The debate surrounding the move demonstrated that New
Zealandis still breaking its ties with the Crown (as it represents the Queen) in ways
that could have significant implications for Mdori.
First, it is important to explain how the Privy Council is a link with the Queen for
M6ori. The jurisdiction of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council originally
stemmed from a conception of the sovereign as the source of all justice. Traditionally'
the Privy Council allowed for petition to the sovereign for redress.l6 The Council was
nor formally established until 1833 by the United Kingdom Judicial Committee Act.
Under the Statute of Westminster Act 1931, British colonies were allowed the option
of abolishing the right of appeal to the Privy Council. Most countries have eventually
done so on the grounds that appeal to the Privy Council was inconsistent with national
independence and reflected adversely on their nation's confidence in its judiciary.tT
16 Report of the Solicitor-General to the Cabinet Strategy Coqmrttee on issues of Termination and
Court Structure , Appeuls to the Privy Council,Crown Law Office, Wellington' 1995' p. 6'
l7 Appeats to the Privy Council,pp. 4 and 7. The arguments for and-against abolishing the. right of
upp"ui in New T.ealand are not diicussed in detail here but can be found in Appeals to the Privy
Council,pp.11-18.
269
In New 7*aland,prominent people began publicly questioning the right of appeal to
the Privy Council in the 1980s. Between 1989 and l994,the Privy Council heard
thirty-eight cases from New Zealand, of which twenty-one were dismissed and
seventeen were upheld.l8 The committee is technically speaking not a court. It does
not deliver judgements, but submits opinions to the sovereign, which are put into
effect by Order-in Council.te While Mdori have not always been successful in the
cases they have taken to the Privy Council, it is generally well supported by Mdori
because of those qualities discussed earlier which make it an appropriate forum for the
discussion of teaty issues.2o
The debate in New 7*aland about whether to retain the right of appeal to the Privy
Council acknowledged the connection Mdori appeared to have made with the Council,
but equally clearly demonstrated that New Zealand is generally moving towards
breaking its links with the Crown in England. For example, when the National
Government took the first steps towards abolition of the right of appeal to the Privy
Council in the early 1990s the Attorney-General, Paul East, emphasised that the Privy
Council and the right of appeal were quite distinct from Treaty rights'2l Furthermore,
in outlining the arguments for the retention and abolition of the Privy Council, the
Office of the Attorney-General said, ['t]he Government recognises the value that in the
past M6ori have placed on the right of appeal from the Court of Appeal to the Privy
Council. ... Some see these rights as a form of access to the Sovereign in her capactty
as a party to the Treaty of Waitangi.' He concluded:
18 National Radio, Monring Report, 'Paul East and Austin Forbes - Privy Council',7:l5am, 5 May'
1995.
l9 J. B. Ringer, An Introtluction to New fualand Government, Hazard Press, Christchurch, 1991'
pp. 195-196.
20 1n 1991, for example, an application for appeal from the Miiori Appellate Court was refused by the
Privy Council. For more discussion of cases taken to the Privy Council by Mdori, and their result,
see, Appeals to the Privy Cttuncil.
2l Radio New Zealand , Morning Report, 'Paul East and Austin Forbes - Privy Council',7:15am, 5
May, 1995.
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it is clear that the retention or abolition of appeal rights to tbe Privy Council would
neither improve nor diminish opportunities for M6ori to pursue settlement of Treaty
claims with rhe Crown. At the same time the ending of appeal rights to the Privy
Council would not have any impact on the Crown's obligations as a party with MEori
to the Treaty of Waitangi.2z
In his report to Cabinet, the Solicitor-General acknowledged that while he had not
formally consulted with interests outside the law, such as those of the Mdori people'
he understood that the Ministers would later determine the scope of more extensive
consultation.23 However, he advised from 'the M6ori perspective', as the Attorney
General had done, that the right of appeal by Mdori is seen by Mdori as a 'form of
access to the Sovereign in her capacity as a pilty to the Treaty' .z+ While
acknowledging that Mdori must be consulted on the decision, the Solicitor-General
remarked:
there is nothing about the function or powers of the Privy Council, or its relationship
with the Sovereign, that gives it any special legal status or role in relation to Treaty of
Waitangi matters. ... Moreover ... there is no access to the Sovereign in right of New
Znalandin any sense that might imply she has real powers of decision.25
On the basis of his opinion and without the benefit of appropriate formal consultation
with MEori, the Solicitor-General concluded:
Therefore, the retention or abolition of appeal rights to the hivy Council can neither
enhance nor diminish opportunities for Mdori to pursue settlement of Treaty claims
with the Crownnor as a matter of law, would the ending of appeal rights to the Privy
22 Appeals to the Privy Council,p.9.
23 Appeals to the Privy Council,p.4.
24 Appeats to the Privy Council,p.9.
25 Appeals to the Privy Council,p.9.
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Council have any impact upon the Crown's obligations as a party with M6ori to the
Treaty of Waitangi.26
The Solicitor-General was not alone in his sentiment. Sir Robin Cooke, High Court
Judge, similarly stated that the position of the monarchy was quite distinct from the
privy Council and he identified Australia and Canada as examples where the right of
appeal to the Privy Council had long since been abolished although the monarchy
remained.2T
While the future of the right of appeal to the Privy Council in New Tnaland had not
been decided by the end of 1995 (the time of writing), the debate surrounding the
possible abolition of the Privy Council demonstrates that New Zealand's constitution
was still shifting its focus away from Britain in ways which would impact on the
treaty negotiation process. The question this debate also raises is how far New
Zealandwill go in reviewing its relationship with Britain and in particular the Crown
in Britain. In other words, would New Zealanders ever consider becoming a republic?
This constitutional reform, which would remove the Crown from New 7-'ealand society
altogether, is the focus of the next section of the discussion.
Life Without the Crown? Republicanistnfrom the Australian Perspective
The issue of republicanism had only very occasionally been raised in New 7*alandby
the mid 1990s, most often by National Prime Minister James Bolger who was known
for his republican leanings, although the issue has so far found little support in the
broader context of public debate. However by 1995, the question of the future of the
26 Appeals to the Privy Council,p.9. Emphasis added'
27 R. Cooke, 'The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown' in P. A. Joseph (ed.), Essuy.r on the
Constitution, Broot<erilWellingron, 1995, p. 39. If this discussion were to be carried further, it
would be useful to consider alternatives to replace the Privy Council which would require
consideration of an appropriate replacement for Niw Znaland's highcst court of appeal. While it is
not possible to pursuc mir tin" of thought here, it is suggested that an appropriatereplacement would
be one which would satisfy Maori misgivings about thJpresent mechanisms available to protect and
uphold their treaty rights. Key elemenis would be court's ability to demonstrate independence from
and authority over govemment in New 7'ealmd.
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country as a constitutional monarchy had been under intense scrutiny and public
debate in Australia for some years. The purpose here is to review the key issues in the
Australian republic debate in order to better understand those issues which confront a
Commonwealth nation considering the move to republicanism. In particular, this
exercise demonstrates a need for New T:rualandto determine the real significance of the
Crown in New Zealand,consider the role of indigenous people under a republic, and
finally, address republicanism within the context of other constitutional reforms.
While there are many differences between New Zealand and Austalia which must be
considered when applying the Australian experience to New Zealand, there are some
valuable lessons to be learned by New Znaland from the Ausfralian debate.
The question of republicanism focuses on the office of the Head of State (which in
turn is very closely linked to the earlier MMP discussion). A republic is a state in
which 'sovereignry is derived from the people and all public offices are filled by
persons ultimately deriving their authority from the people.'28 Republicanism in
Australia or New T,e,aland,therefore, would be about replacing the monarch as head of
state with an autochthonous representative. The debate surrounding this issue in
Australia has been divided between those who believed republicanism would be an
appropriate, inevitable and uncomplicated change to Australia's constitution and those
who argued that the removal of 'the Crown' would have a significant and damaging
effect on Australian society and government. In this brief review of the argument, the
former viewpoint is considered first.
Australia, as many of its republicans point out, has a long history of republican
sentiment which began with the arrival of the first settlers in Australia.2e Following
28 The Report of the Republic Advisory Committee, An Austalian Republic. The Options, Vol. I'
Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1993, p. 39.
29 Discussion of this nature is found in David Headon et al. (eds.), Crown or Country. The
Traclitions of Australian Repuhlicani.va, Allen and Unwin, New South Wales, 1994 and in John
Arnold 
"t ui'. 
("a*.), Out of Empire: The British Dominion of Australia, Mandarin Australia,
Victoria, 1993. Also ,"", 'io- Keneally, Our Republir:, William Hienemann Australia, Victoria'
1993, pp. 155-182. Finally, Mark McKenna identified four phases in Australian republicanism.
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the federation of the Australian Commonwealth in 1901, (a federation which itself has
been credited to the unifying concept of 'the Crown'30) the republican sentiment died
down and Australian colonists appeared less antagonistic toward the presence of the
British Monarchy in Australia.3l From 1901 to 1963 little was heard of the
republicanism in Australia. Then, in 1963, the publication of an article by Australian
writer and ardent republican, Geoffrey Dutton, triggered the revival of the debate-32 ln
lg75,a constitutional crisis involving the Governor-General encouraged further public
criticism of the political system and in particular the role of the Crown's representative
in Australia.33 By 1995, republicanism was one of the leading debates on Australia's
political agenda.
Advocates of an Australian republic have argued it to be a natural progression in the
country's political development and they have claimed that Australia is already a
republic in everything but name. Replacing the monarch, they stated, would be a final
but inconsequential step in the nation's independence from Great Britain.34 In
substantiating these claims, republicans have argued that the language surrounding the
See: McKenna,'Tracking the Republic', in D. Headon, et al' (eds.)' Crown or Country' The
Tratlition o.f Australian Ripublicaiism, Allen and Unwin, New South Wales, p. 87'
30 ;o5n Hirst,'The Conservative Case for an Australian Republic', in Arnold et al. (eds.), Out of
Empire,p.293. It will be recalled from Chapter Nine of this thesis that unification was credited in
p-i to tlle Uona between provinces symbolised in the Crown. Hirst argues that the same factor was
present in Australian federation in 1901.
3l More ironically,once the colonists had achieved internal self-government, their attachment to
Britain appeared to strengthen. See: Hirst, 'The Conservative Case for an Australian Republic" p.
293.
32 See the editors' comment,'How Modem Australian Republicanism Began', in Donald Horne et
al'The Coming Republic,Pan McMillan Publishers, Sydney, 1992'p' 5'
33 The crisis in question concerned the Govemor General's dismissal of the Prime Minister and the
dissolution of hii government in reaction to a supply crisis when the opposition-dominated Senate
ref'used to pass thE Government's Supply Bills. The opinions of both John Kerr, the Govemor-
General in lSlS and Gough Whitlam, il\i dismissed Prime Minister, can be found in Arnold et al.
(eds.), Out of Empire, Chipters 20 and 21 respectively. Some commentators have argued that the
crisis could not have been averted if Australia was a republic, arguing that the fault lay in the rules
governing the Senate's right not to supply government rather than the function of the Governor-
6eneral.-For example, sei: Hirst, A Repubtican Manifesto, Oxford University Press, Melbourne,
1994. p. 67 .
34 The argument that is it simply offensive that Australia maintains a British head of state is very
popular. See,Donald Horne,'A New Common Sense for Austalia', inThe Coning Republic,pp.
26 and28-29.
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monarchy changed irrevocably in Australia in the space of the last few decades so that
one no longer heard reference to 'Australian subjects' or 'Her Majesty's Kingdom of
Australia'.3s They argued further that the words and symbols associated with the
Crown had lost their magic in Australia since the early 1980s.36 As a result, the
creation of an Australian republic would be no more significant than a change in the
wording of the constitution while all other aspects of Australian govemment would
remained unaltered. This type of argument has been identified generally as the
'minimalist' argument.3T For example, George Winterton as a minimalist republican
argued that 'an Australian republic could be implemented while leaving intact all
essential features of Australian government except the monarchy.'38 Similarly,
Malcolm Turnbull, minimalist republican and Chair of the Australian Republican
Movement in 1993, suggested that constitutional amendment was not especially
difficult, adding that constitutional lawyers tend to make the process appear
unnecessarily complicated for their own self-interested reasons.39
One of the more significant pieces of minimalist writing to contribute to the republican
debate in Australia was the Report of the Republic Advisory Committee. The Report
did not debate the issue of republicanism, so much as provide pragmatic analysis of
the minimal constitutional changes necessary to achieve an Aushalian republic- In
typically minimalist fashion, the Committee advised that the only change required to
ffeate a republic would be to replace the monarch while other elements of government
35 Peter Speanitt, 'Royal Progress: The Queen and Her Australian Subjects', in Out of Empire'p'
237.
36 Geoffrey Dutton, 'Republican Australia?', in Arnold et al. (eds.), Out of Empire'pp.24l-243'
37 For further discussion of the minimalist argument see: Hirst, A Republican Manifesto.
38 George Winteron, 'A Republican Constitution', in George Winterton (ed,), We, the People.
Austratiin Repuhlican Government,Allen & Unwin, New South Wales, 1994, pp. 38-48.
39 Malcolm Turnbull, The Reluctant Republic, William Heinemann Australia, Victoria, 1993' p.
161. In addition, kofessor Brian Galligan argued that Australia was already a republic 'only barely
disguised by monarchic symbols and iormsl He believed that republicanism meant regularising
Auitralia's institutions, not creating them. See, Brian Galligan, 'Regularising the Australian
Republic', Austalian Journal of Politicat Science, Vol' 28, 1993 pp. 56-66.
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would be unchanged.a However, the Committee expressed the view that the office of
Head of State should not be dispensed with as 'there is much to be said for a national
figure who can represent the nation as a whole, both to AusEalians and the rest of the
world.' Also, in supporting the traditional role of the monarchy, the Committee
aclvised that the new representative should be above politics and that the occupant
should be seen to be impartial.al The Committee appeared satisfied on the basis of its
investigation that it would be both legally and practically possible to amend the
Constitution to achieve a republic.a2 The report concluded:
Fear that [republicanism] must involve substantial or unwelcome change to our
political system is not well founded. The establishment of an Australian republic is
essentially a symbolic change, with the main arguments, both for and against, turning
on questions of national identity rather than questions of substantive change [o our
political system.43
Aside from the formal constitutional changes such as those identified by the
Republican Committee, outspoken republican, Donald Horne argued that'the Crown'
would be easily replaced in other aspects of Australian life also. He explained that the
Crown logo, where is appears, could be replaced with the Australian Commonwealth
or the individual state crests. Criminal offenders, according to Horne, could be
charged by 'the people' instead of 'the Crown' for their offences. Similarly, the
Queen's Counsel could be replaced by State or Senior Counsel, Crown Prosecutors
could become State Prosecutors, and Royal Commissions could be called Special
Commissions. Most interestingly, Horne observed that, '[t]he mystifying use of 'the
Crown' as a metonym for 'the government' can be replaced simply by saying 'the
government'.44 Horne's argument, when viewed in relation to New Zealand,
4) Republic Advisory Committee, An Australian Republic,p.I'
4l Republic Advisory Committee, An Austalian Republic,pp.l'2.
42 Republic Advisory Committee, An Australian Republic'p.lO.
43 Republic Advisory Committee, An Austalian Republic,p' 151.
4 Horne, 'symbols of a Nation', in The Coming Republic, pp. 99-101.
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emphasises the need to establish the practical and symbolic significance of the Crown
in New Txalandbefore deciding the fate of the institution. In particular, the suggestion
that the metonym of 'the Crown' for government could be easily replaced in Ausftalia
should be regarded with some scepticism for New Zealand,particularly in light of the
evidence in this thesis of the prolific use of the Crown in treaty debate as well as its
wider application with regard to Crown resources and, more recently, the trend of
identifying govemment institutions as Crown entities. On the other hand, it has been
suggested that younger generations of MEori and Pakehd in New Zealand do not
harbour the attachments to the Queen of earlier generations.as This indicates that it
could be possible to rename such entities as Crown health enterprises and Crown land'
and remove the symbol. However, this does not solve the problem of what would
replace the Crown symbol as the identity of the treaty partner which, as this thesis has
also extensively demonstrated, is a complex and conhoversial issue. The way around
this, as suggested earlier, would possibly be to reduce the significance of the Crown
identity by focusing attention elsewhere, for example, on the Treaty in an enhenched
constitution. But at this point the argument becomes circular because the courts would
then at some point have to determine who was responsible under the Treaty in
contemporary society, in other words, who or what the Crown would be.
Returning to the Australian debate, opposition to the republican movement is found in
the argument that republicanism would be a much more radical departure from the
status quo than the pragmatist minimalists have supposed.a6 For example Alan
Atkinson, a strong supporter of Australia remaining a constitutional monarchy,
believed the Crown is still an integral part of contemporary Australia's political and
45 Ranginui Walker, Marue,Television New Znaland,S November 1995'
46 This is one of the assertions made by Alan Atkinson inThe Mutldle'Headed Republic,-Oxford
University Press, Melbourne, 1993 repeated also in 'The Australian Monarchy: Imperfect But
Important', Australian Journal of Potiiicat Science, Vol. 28, 1993' pp. 67-82' Similar-sentiments
are expressed by rhe Republic Advisory Committee, An Ausyalian Republic,.p-.41; and byGraham
Maddox, .The Fossible impact of RepuUlicanism on Australian Government', in George Winterton
(ed.),We, the People. Australian Republicun Government, Allen and Unwin, New South Wales'
1994, pp. 125-139.
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social fabric. He explained that 'the Australian monarch, however alien it might
sometimes appear to Australian culture, is in fact central to our whole traditional
approach to government.'41 In his widely debated The Muddle-Headed Republic,
Atkinson sought to re-energise the significance of the Crown by reminding readers of
the Crown's influence in Australia's colonial history. He argued, for example, that
'the Crown' was the basis for universal health care not found in republics such as the
United States. He also stated that the Crown played an extremely important part in
early race relations in this country. He said that official dealings between the white
setrlers and the Aborigines were largely shaped by the Aborigines' perceived place
under the Crown. For example, in l77O,when Captain Cook annexed Australia the
land automatically became the property of the Crown. Unlike New Zealand, no freaty
was signed between the British and the incligenous people although by the 1830s the
Aborigines were regarded as British subjects. The Crown accordingly took
responsibility for their protection and welfare.'48 Atkinson also pointed out that the
Crown symbol brought the separate states together through federation.
In identifying all these important roles for the Crown, Atkinson asserted that the nature
of Australian society in the 1990s was due to the presence of the Crown and in spite
of the absence of the monarchy (who did not reside in Australia). He argued that it
would not be possible for Australia to rid itself of the Empire without destroying the
'essence of order and community in Australian life.'a9 Australia, according to
Atkinson, 'is a monalchy at a more fundamental level than most people seem to
imagine. Monarchy is more than merely royalty ... [it is] a living and active conscience
at the cenfe of the state.'50 What's more, as a representation of 'the moral purpose of
government' and the 'perpetual and universal trustee for the people' the suggestion to
47 Alan Atkinson, 'The Australian Monarchy: Imperfect but Important', Australian Journal o.f
Political Science, p. 7O.
48 Atkinson, The Mwldle-H eaded Re public, p. 36.
49 Atkinson, The Mu&lte-Headed Republic,pp' 43 and 46.
50 Atkinson, The M uddle -He adetl Re puhlic, p. 29 .
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remove the monarchy, according to Atkinson, indicated govenrments' recent belief that
it need not have any long-term or deep moral purpose. He warned that:
[r]he abolition of the Crown [would] drive home a fundamental shift of legitimacy
which is already underway. In this sense the republican movement is part of the
softening up of the state, its abdication of old responsibilities, its privatisation and its
reshaping by market forces.Sl
Other writers have rejected the minimalist republican viewpoint (as opposed to
republicanism per se) on the basis that the minimalists, more than misunderstanding
the significance of the changes they were advocating, had failed to see that
republicanism could not occur in a constitutional void. Republicanism, these
proponents argued, could not be considered in the absence of other constitutional
reforms because the Crown is so deeply and intricately worked into all aspects of the
constitution. John Uhr, for example, argued that, 'as an analytical exercise, republican
,remodelling' [could] help define with greater clarity the political identity of our
parliamentary institutions, even in the absence of an immediate overhaul of Australian
constitutionalism.'S2 Uhr said that 'genuine republicanism requires at some stage a
quite fundamental rethink of the institutions of government.'53 Graham Maddox took
a similar line in addressing a network of constitutional issues which he considered
concomitant to republicanism, including the structure of federal government and
amendments to the Constitution Act.Sa Australian political scientist, Elaine
Thompson, used the republican debate as a plaform for the constitutional issue of the
place of indigenous peoples in Australia within the new republic in saying:
Australia could grasp the opportunity of the new millennium not only by becoming a
republic but by opening up for discussion all aspects of our constifutional system' "'
5 I Atkinson, The M uddle-H eaded Re public, p' 64.
52 John Uhr, 'Instituting Republicanism: Parliamentary Vices, Republican Virtues?', Australian
Journal of Political Science, Vol. 28, 1993,p'27.
53 Uhr, 'Instituting Republicanism: Parliamentary Vices, Republican Virtues?', p' 3l '
54 Maddox, 'The Possible Impact of Republicanism on Australian Government', pp. 125-138'
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Finally we could do something about the stain of our treatment of the Aboriginal
population, by embedding in the Constitution a formal treaty with the Aboriginal
people, acknowledging the [sic] place as their [sic] first civilisers of Australia and
recognising their claims to the land.55
In addition to her reference to using a written constitution to protect indigenous rights,
Thompson raised another issue relevant to the possibility of republicanism in New
Zealand. Her criticism of the neglect of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
peoples' relationship with the republic of the future should alert New Zealanders to the
need to consider the implications of republicanism for Mdori in New Zealand,
particularly in view of the Treaty of Waitangi between Crown and Mdori. In
Australia, few writers addressed the implications of republicanism for Australia's
indigenous people. Those who did, were highly critical of the republican movement,
emphasising the significance of 'the Crown' to the indigenous peoples, and the
immediate need for consultation with indigenous $oups on the matter. For example,
as Wendy Brady explained, Australia was an indigenous republic prior to British
colonisation. Claims that republicanism in Aushalia is new and radical demonstrate
that the history of struggle by Austalia's native occupants to retain their independence
within their own republic is not well understand in Australia.56 Brady called
contemporary republican movement 'second wave republicanism', and criticised it
saying that, by and large, it did not include Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander
people as partners. Instead, the debate had assumed, according to Brady, that 'the
Crown' incorporates these peoples and consequently is able to make decisions about
the nation's future which have implications for the two indigenous groups without
their consultation or consent.ST
55 Elaine Thompson, 'Giving Ourselves Better Govemment', in The Coming Repubtic,p. 160.
56 Wendy Brady, 'Republicanism: An Aboriginal View', in Wayne Hudson et al. (eds.), T/re
Republicanism Debate,New South Wales University Press, Kensington, 1993, pp. 145-146.
57 Brady, 'Republicanism: An Aboriginal View', p.146.
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Ironically perhaps, as Brady has pointed out, indigenous people best understand the
consequences of British domination. As a result, their history of resistance to the
British presence in Australia could be a model for the development of a republic in the
future.58 Questions of minority representation and legal and judicial systems must be
addressed as a part ofthe debate, rather than addressing them once a republic has been
established.se Brady asserted that republicanism provides an opportunity to address
indigenous issues which should have been resolved long ago. She said, '[w]hen a
republic does become a reality it would be a great advantage to start from a position
which took account of the politics of indigenous peoples, rather than leaving the issue
of indigenous rights and power to be settled afterwards.'tr On this matter in respect
of New Zealand,Justice Cooke, hesident of the Court of Appeal in New Zealand, has
stated that 'the permanent significance of the Treaty as the principal source of the
national partnership ... cannot be ignored in contemplating any major constitutional
change.'61 In acknowledging the symbolic and philosophical significance of the
Crown treaty partner, it is essential also to accept that the process of constitutional
reform, republican or otherwise, must only happen with Mdori consultation and
concurrence. Chapters Five and Eight demonstrated that the Treaty partner has been
unilaterally defined in the past without Mdori agreement, and Mdori teaty partner was
seen to suffer in negotiations as a result. Other commentators have identified the need
for consultation. For example, Sir Robin Cooke observed that the annexation of New
Zealand by the British was subject to sufficient Mdori concurrence. He stated that
'[a]s a matter of elementary fairness, good faith and national honour, it is hard to see
how we could cut our links to the Crown without similar concurrence.'62
58 Brady,'Republicanism: An Aboriginal View', pp. 146-147 .
59 Brady,'Republicanism: An Aboriginal View', pp. 147 - 148.
60 Brady, 'Republicanism: An Aboriginal Vicw', p. 148.
6l Cooke, 'The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown' pp. 3940.
62 Cooke,'The Suggested Revolution Against the Crown' p. 38.
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In finally reviewing the constitutional reforms discussed in this chapter which relate to
the Crown, it has been argued that MMP could increase the significance of the role of
the Crown as the Governor-General and emphasise the difficulties in distinguishing
between 'Mdori' and 'the Crown' as the Crown is represented by the Executive. With
regard to suggestions that the treaty partners should be renamed M6ori and Pdkehd in
an attempt to avoid the confusion of the Crown, it was argued that this failed to
appreciate the original and vital function of the Crown under the Treaty of Waitangi as
the authority which could hold government accountable to the terms of the Treaty. It
was considered questionable at best whether 'Pdkeh6' as an expression of the Crown
could fulfil this function, Instead the possibility was explored that the problem of the
Crown for M6ori might be avoided altogether in the future if the Treaty of Waitangi
were to be awarded legal recognition within a written constitution in New Zealand-
While this strategy was seen to have both merits and disadvantages it drew attention to
the role of the cowts in New Zealand which introduced the significance of a third
constitutional debate concerning the future of the right of appeal to the Privy Council.
This debate demonstated that New Zealand was still attempting, through constitutional
reform, to break its traditional links with Britain and that this process was creating
concern for Mdori. The possibility that New Zealand might ultimately reject the
monarchy altogether and establish a republican charter was considered through a
comparative investigation of the republican debate in Australia in the mid 1990s. This
revealed that New Zealand, if and when it considers republicanism, will have to
established a firm understanding of the role of the Crown in New Zealand politics and
society. It also warned of a need to see the Crown as a integral part of the constitution
and furthermore, to consult widely with Mdori, as the treaty partner, on the future of
the monarchy in New Zealand.
CONCLUSION
On the fourth of November 1995 Queen Elizabeth II, while visiting New Zealand,
signed the deed of settlement between the National Government and the Tainui iwi (a
North Island tribe) for the retum of almost 16,000 hectares of land and the payment of
$170 million to Tainui as redress fbr grievances suffered in the nineteenth century.l In
addition to these terms of settlernent, Tainui had requested a direct apology from 'the
Crown' who, Tainui leaders htrd advised, was not to be a Crown agent such as the
Government, but the original Crown pru'tner, the person who wore the crown 
- Queen
Elizabeth II.2
Tainui's interpretation of the Crown from the settlement deed and the Queen's
function as a signatory to the deed, illustrate the two problems with respect to the
identity of the Crown as the Treaty partner in New Zealand which have been the focus
of this thesis. The irony of the Queen being reintroduced to the ffeaty process at this
late stage in the negotiations. brings into fbcus both the shift in the Crown's identity
through tirne and its many possible meanings in contemporary society. Analysis in
this thesis has revealed that the Crown title, rather than consistently naming the same
treaty partner has been applied to r range of institutions and individuals who are
involved in the treaty negotiation process. In addition, it was argued that this wide
application for the Crown wits due to its capacity as a symbol to bring legitimacy to the
authority and actions of those identities with which it is associated in treaty discourse.
Furthermore, the Crown's characteristics ns a key symbol in treaty discourse were
seen to create obstacles to the resolution of treaty grievances from the perspective of
the M6ori treaty partner. In partic:ular, inconsistency with regard to whether ttte
Crown was the same as or dit'l'erent ltom the government of the day has forced Mdori
to negotiate with a treaty partner who is able to be both flexible and elusive; one
l'RoyalApologytoTainui 
-Qucensi-rlnshistorictleal'.inTheEveningPost,3November, 1995,p'
I . and 'Queen puts signature to historic land dcal ' in The Dominion, 4 November, 1995, p. I .
2 
'Tainui wants apology liorn Quccn', Nttional Ra<lio, I[urut News,24 February, 1995.
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moment asserting its powers and authority as 'the Crown' and the next distancing
itself from immediate responsibilities and obligations as 'the government'.
Closely related to the problem of inconsistency is the problem of the evolution of the
Crown. This has meant that since 1840 the Crown has been identified as the Queen,
the government of the day, and most recently, local and regional govemment as well as
central government. The concern is that, through evolution, the responsibility and
authority first given by M6ori to the Queen has been handed on in part or in full to
different bodies motivated by different priorities without consultation with M6ori and
that this process may continue in the future. The evolution of the Crown has been
resisted by M6ori, as submissions to the local government and resource law reforms
analysed here have indicated. Also, the implications of the evolution of the Crown for
Maori, as demonstrated by the Moutoa Gardens protest, have been that there is
considerable disagreement as to exactly who holds responsibility for the Treaty and
Mdori rights in contemporary New Tnaland society.
The consistency and endurance of the Crown symbol has distracted attention away
from the reality of the turmoil, uncertainty and flexibility which has surrounded the
Crown's identity as the freaty partner historically and in the present day. Despite signs
that the Crown is increasingly coming under public scrutiny and attack from many
quarters, the identity of the Crown must become a matter of public concern and debate
in New Zealand. A brief study of the Crown in Canada emphasised that the Crown's
position in New Zealand is a product of the country's particular constitutional
development. The identity of the Crown (seen here with regard to the Treaty) must not
be isolated from wider constitutional issues. Constitutional developments and reforms
such as electoral reform (MMP), the future of the Privy Council and a written
constitution which incorporates the Treaty of Waitangi, confront New Zraland at the
end of the twentieth century. These reforms will inevitably have some impact on the
identity and profile of Crown in New Zealand (its many forms) and will also have
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implications for M[ori in their continued negotiations with the Crown treaty partner.
Perhaps most importantly, the question of New Z,ealand's future as a constitutional
monarchy poses the greatest challenge to the Crown's future as well as the greatest
opportunity for New Zealand to publicly consider and debate the Crown's
contemporary identity and function in New Zealand. Most critical is the need to
consult widely with Mdori on any constitutional issues which will impact on the
Crown, particularly the question of republicanism, in order to avoid the kinds of
injustices illustrated in this paper from recurring in the funre.
However, while a complex and significant matter, the identity of the Crown as the
treaty partner is just one of the complexities surrounding the Treaty of Waitangi which
presently challenge Mhori and government negotiations. A great deal remains to be
investigated and better understood by all participants in the fteaty process and indeed
the general public. Several important issues beyond the scope of this work, require
attention. First, as acknowledged at the start of this thesis, there is a need to
investigate the identity of 'Mdori' as the treaty partner and the problems which
surround it in a contemporary context. Also, questions need to be addressed from a
M6ori perspective regarding the acceptable evolution of the Crown and, moreover, an
appropriate alternative to the Crown as the contemporary treaty partner.
The resolution of the problem of 'Who or What is the Crown' must begin with
common recognition and consciousness of the problem of the Crown. As Maitland
was se€n to suggest in the first chapter of this thesis, this would mean that politicians,
lawyers and the public alike would neither use nor accept 'the Crown' in treaty
discourse without looking behind the symbol to reveal the important details which the
symbol obscures.3 Treaty discourse, especially, deserves consideration and conscious
redevelopment if we are to begin to resolve the problem of the Crown.
3 See Footnote 1, Chapter One of this thesis.
APPENDIX A I
Te Tiriti o Waitangi (Mdori Tert)
Ko Wikitoria te Kuini o Ingarani i tana mahara atawai ki nga Rangatira me nga Hapu o
Nu Tirani i tana hiahia hoki kia tohungia ki a ratou o ratou rangatiratanga me to ratou
wenua, a kia mau tonu hoki te Rongo ki a ratou me te Atanoho hoki kua wakaaro ia he
mea tika kia tukua mai tetahi Rangatira - hei kai wakarite ki nga Tangata maori o Nu
Tirani kia wakaaetia e nga Rangatira maori te Kawanatanga o te Kuini ki nga
wahikatoa o te wenua nei me nga motu - na te mea hoki he tokomaha ke nga tangata o
tona Iwi Kua noho ki tenei wenua, a e haere mai nei.
Na ko te Kuini e hiahia ana kia wakaritea te Kawanatanga kia kaua ai nga kino
e puta mai ki te tangata maori ki te Pakeha e noho ture kore ana.
Na kua pai te Kuini kia tukua a hau a Wiremu Hopihona he Kapitana i te
Roiara Nawi hei Kawana mo nga wahi katoa o Nu Tirani e tukua aianei amua atu ki te
Kuini, e mea atu ana ia ki nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani me
era Rangatka atu enei ture ka korerotia nei.
Ko te tuatahi
Ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa hoki ki hai i uru ki taua
wakaminenga ka tuku rawa atu ki te Kuini o Ingarani ake tonu aru - te Kawanatanga
katoaooratouwenua.
Ko te ruarua
Ko te Kuini o Ingarani ka wakarite ka wakaae ki nga Rangatira ki nga hapu - ki nga
tangata katoa o Nu Tirani te tino langatiratanga o o latou wenua o ratou kainga me o
ratou taonga katoa. Otiia ko nga Rangatira o te wakaminenga me nga Rangatira katoa
atu ka tuku ki te Kuini te hokonga o era wahi wenua e pai ai te tangata nona te Wenua -
ki te ritenga o te uru e wakaritea ai e ratou ko te kai hoko e meatia nei e te Kuini hei kai
hoko mona.
Ko te tuatoru
.Hei wakaritenga mai hoki tenei mo te wakaaetanga ki te Kawanatanga 
o te Kuini - Ka
tiakina e te Kuini o Ingarani nga tangatn maori katoa o Nu Tirani ka tukua ki a ratou
nga tikanga katoa rite tahi ki ana mea ki nga tangata o lngarani.
[signed] W. Hobson Consul & Lieutenant Governor
I This Appendix comes t'rom Chudia Orange. Tlte Treun' o.f ll'aitangi, Allen & Unwin. Wellington'
1987, pp.255-266.
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Na ko matou ko nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga o nga hapu o Nu Tirani ka huihui
nei ki Waitangi ko matou hoki ko nga Rangatira o Nu Tirani ka kite nei i te ritenga o
enei kupu. Ka tangohia ka wakaaetia katoatia e matou, koia ka tohungia ai o matou
ingoa o matou tohu.
Ka meatia tenei ki Waitangi i te ono o nga ra o Pepueri i te tau kotahi mano, e
waru rau e wa te kau o to tatou Ariki.
Note: This treaty text was signed at Waitangi,6 February 1840, and thereafter in the
north and, at Auckland.It is reproduced as itwas written, exceptfor the heading above
the chiefs' rufines: ka nga Rangatira o te Wakaminenga.
A Literal Translation into English, made in New Zealand,
of the Mdori Version of the TreatY
Victoria, the Queen of England, in her gracious remembrance of the Chiefs and Tribes
of New Zealand,and through her desire to preserve to them their chieftainship and
their land, and to preserve peace and quietness to them, has thought it right to send
them a gentleman to be her representative to the natives of New Tsaland. Let the native
Chiefs in all parts of the land and in the islands consent to the Queen's Government.
Now, because there are numbers of the people living in this land, and more will be
coming, the Queen wishes to appoint a Government, that there may be no cause for
strife between the Natives and the Pakeha, who are now without law: It has therefore
pleased the Queen to appoint me, WILLIAM HOBSON, a Captain in the Royal Navy,
Governor of all parts of New Zealandwhich shall be ceded now and at a future period
to rhe Queen. She offers to the Chiefs of the Assembly of the Tribes of New Zealand
and to the other Chiefs, the following laws:
i. The Chiefs of (ie. constituting) the Assembly, and all the Chiefs who are absent from
the Assembly, shall cede to the Queen of England for ever the government of all their
lands.
ii. The Queen of England acknowledges and guarantees to the Chiefs, the Tribes, and
all the people of New T,ealand,the entire supremacy of their lands, of their settlements,
and of all their personal property. But the Chiefs of the Assembly, and all other Chiefs,
make over to the Queen the purchasing of such lands, which the man who possesses
the land is willing to sell, according to prices agreed upon by him, and the purchaser
appointed by the Queen to purchase for her.
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iii. In return for their acknowledging the Government of the Queen, the Queen of
England will protect all the natives of New Zealand, and will allow them the same
rights as the people of England
(Signed) WILLIAM HOBSON
Consul, and Lieutenant-Governor
We, the Chiefs of this Assembly of the tribes of New Zealand, now assembled at
Waitangi, perceiving the meaning of these words, take and consent to them all'
Therefore we sign our names and our marks.
This is done at Waitangi, on the sixth day of February, in the one thousand
eight hundred and fortieth year of our Lord.
Note: Text from J. Noble Coleman, A Memoir of the Rev. Richard Davis, London,
1865, pp.455-56.
The Treaty of Wairangi (English turt)
Her Majesty Victoria Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland
regarding with Her Royal Favor the Native Chiefs and Tribes of New Zealand and
anxious to protect their just Rights and Property and to secure to them the enjoyment
of Peace and Good Order has deemed it necessary in consequence of the great number
of Her Majesty's Subjects who have already settled in New Zealand and the rapid
exrension of Emigration both from Europe and Australia which is still in progress to
consdtute and appoint a functionary properly authorised to teat with the Aborigines of
New Zealand for the recognition of Her Majesty's sovereign authority over the whole
or any part of those islands - Her Majesty therefore being desirous to establish a
settled form of Civil Government with a view to avert the evil consequences which
must result from the absence of the necessary Laws and Institutions alike to the native
population and to Her subjects has been graciously pleased to empower and to
authorise me William Hobson a Captain in Her Majesty's Royal Navy Consul and
Lieutenant Governor of such parts of New Zealand as may be or hereafter shall be
ceded to Her Majesty to invite the confederated and independent Chiefs of New
7-nalandto concur in the following Articles and Conditions'
Article the first
The Chiefs of the Confederation of the UnitedTribes of New Znaland and the separate
and independent Chiefs who have not become members of the Confederation cede to
Her Majesty the Queen of England absolutely and without reservation all the rights
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and powers of Sovereignty which the said Confederation or Individual Chiefs
respectively exercise or possess, or may be supposed to exercise or to possess over
their respective Territories as the sole sovereigns thereof.
Article the second
Her Majesty the Queen of England confirms and guarantces to the Chiefs and Tribes
of New Znaland,and to the respective families and individuals thereof the full exclusive
and undisturbed possession of their Lands and Estates Forests Fisheries and other
properties which they may collectively or Individually possess so long as it is their
wish and desire to retain the same in their possession; but the Chiefs of the United
Tribes and the individual Chiefs yield to Her Majesty the exclusive right of Preemption
over such lands as the proprietors thereof may be disposed to alienate at such prices as
may be agreed upon between the respective Proprietors and persons appointed by Her
Majesty to teat with them h that behalf.
Article the third
In consideration thereof Her Majesty the Queen of England extends to the Natives of
New Zealand Her royal protection and imparts to them all the Rights and Privileges of
British Subjects.
Now therefore We the Chiefs of the Confederation of the United Tribes of New
Z,ealarfibeing assembled in Congress at Victoria in Waitangi and We the Separate and
Inclependent Chiefs of New Zealandclaiming authority over the Tribes and Territories
which are specified after our respective names, having been made fully to understand
the provisions of the foregoing Treaty, accept and enter into the same in the full spirit
and meaning thereof in witness of which we have attached our signatures or marks at
the places and the dates respectively specified.
Done at Waitangi this Sixth day of February in the year of Our Lord one thousand
eight hundred and forty.
Note: This English text was signed at Waikato Heads in March or April 1840 and at
Manul<au on26 April by thirty-nine chiefs only.The text became the'fficial' version'
APPENDIX B
Ministries in New Zealandl
Date of General Election 15-8-1987
Labour Administration 24.8-1987 - 148'1989
Rt.Hon.DavidLange Prime Ministet, Minister of Education, Minister in
Charge of the Security Intelligence Service
Rt. Hon. G.W.R. Pahner Deputy Prime Minister, Attorney General, Minister of
Justice, Minister tbr the Environment.
Hon. Mike Moore Minister of Overseas Trade and Marketing, Minister in
Charge of PublicitY
Hon. R.O. Douglas Minister of Finance
Hon.RichardPrebble Minister for State owned Enterprises, Postmaster-
general, Minister of Works and Development, Minister
of Broadcttsting, Minister in Charge of Public Trust
Office, Ministel of Railways, Minister in Charge of
Rural Banking and Finance Corporation'
Hon. K.T. Wetere Minister of Maori Affairs
Hon. David Caygill Minister of Hellth, Minister of Trade and Industry
Hon. Russell Marshall Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister for Disarmament
and Arms Control.
Hon. Dr M.E.R. Bassett Minister of Internal Affairs, Minister of Local
Government, Minister of Civil Defence, Minister of
Arts and Cultule.
Hon. Jonathan Hunt Minister of State, Leader of the House'
Rt. Hon. R.J. Tizard Minister ot Defence, Minister of Science and
TechnologY.
Hon. Colin Moyle Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Fisheries
Hon. Stan Rodger Minister ol'Lttbour, Minister of Immigration, Minister
of State Services.
I C.a. Wood, (ed.) Sttpplement to Mini.:tters tmd fr(embers in the New Zealand Parliament'
Mipisters IgBT - I99l; Aietnlrers of'Pttrlinnrctrr t9t I - /990, Tarkwode Press, Dunedin, l992,pp' I-
13. Note also:The lists providei h"r" clo nor include Ministers not in Cabinet or some changes
which were not relevant ro the research. The l9tt7 and 1990 administrations were chosen to coincide
with the data researchcd in Chapter Trvo.
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Hon. P.B Goff
Hon. Margaret Shields
Hon. Peter Tapsell
Hon. Helen Clark
Hon. Dr. M. Cullen
Hon. W.P. Jeffries
Hon. David Butcher
Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer
Hon. Helen Clarke
Hon. Mike Moore
Hon. David Caygill
Hon. Stan Rodger
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Minister of Employment, Minister of Youth Affairs,
Minister of Tourism, Associate Minister of Education'
Minister of Women's Affairs, Minister of Consumer
Affairs, Minister of Statistics
Minister of Police, Minister of Forestry, Minister of
Lands, Minister of Recreation and Sport, Minister of
Survey and Land Information, Minister in Charge of
Valuation Departrnent.
Minister of Housing, Minister of Conservation'
Minister of Social Welfare, Associate Minister of
Finance, Minister in Charge of War Pensions'
Minister of Transport, Minister of Civil Aviation and
Meteorological Services.
Minister of Energy, Minister of Regional Development,
Associate Minister of Finance.
Labour Ahninistration 14.8 J989' 02.1 I J990
Prime Minister, Minister for the Environment, Minister
in Charge of the New Zealand Security Intelligence
Service and Minister of Education 08.08.89-14'08'89'
(Appointed as Prime Minister on 08'8'89 until
04.09.1990 when he was replaced by Mike Moore')
Deputy Prime Minister (appointed on 08'08'89)'
Minister of Health, Minister of Labour.
Minister of Overseas Trade and Marketing, Minister of
External Relations and Trade, Deputy Minister of
Finance, Minister for the America's Cup, Member N'Z'
Planning Council. Also, Prime Minister on M'09'90)
Minister of Finance, Minister of Revenue, Minister in
Charge of Earthquake and War Damages Commission'
Minister for State-owned Enterprises, Deputy Minister
of Finance, Minister of State Services, Minister of
Railways.
Minister of Maori Affairs, Minister in Charge of Iwi
Transition AuthoritY.
Hon. K.TWetere
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Hon. Dr M. Cullen Minister of Social Welfare, Minister in Charge of War
Pensions, Associate Minister of Health, Associate
Minister of l,abour.
Hon. Phil. Goff Minister of Education (until 14.08.89), Minister in
Charge of Education Review and Audit Agency'
Hon. Jonathan Hunt Minister of Housing, Minister of Broadcasting, Leader
oftheHouse,MinisterresponsiblefortheNewZealand
SymphonY Orchesfra.
Hon. Dr. Michael Bassett Minister of Internal Affairs' Minister of Arts and
Culture' Minister of Civil Defence, Minister of Local
Government.
Hon. W.p. Jeffries Minister of Justice, Minister of Transport, Minister of
Civil Aviation and Meteorological Services'
Hon. R.O. Douglas Minister of Police, Minister of Immigration, Minister
responsible for the Audit Department, Minister
responsible for Special Projects.
Hon. Margaret Shields Minister of Consumer Affairs, Minister of Statistics,
MinisterofWomen'sAffairs,AssociateMinisterof
Education.
Rt. Hon. R.J. Tizard Minister of Defence, Minister of Research, Science'
Technology.
Hon.PeterTapsell Minister of Science (DSIR), Minister of Forestry'
Minister of Lands, Minister of Recreation and Sport'
Minister of Survey and Land Information, Minister in
Charge of the Valuation Depaffinent.
Hon. Russell Marshall Minister of Foreign Affairs, Minister of Pacific Island
Affairs.
Hon. Colin Moyle Minister of Agriculnse, Minister of Fisheries'
Hon. David Butcher Minister of Commerce, Minister of Energy, Minister of
Regional DeveloPment-
Hon. Annette King Minister of Employment, Minister of Youth Affairs,
Minister assisting the Prime Minister'
Date of General Election
Hon. J.B. Bolger
Hon. Don. McKinnon
Hon. W.F. Birch
Hon. Ruth Richardson
Hon. Paul East
Hon. John Falloon
Hon. Doug Kidd
Hon. Philip Burdon
Hon. Simon Upton
Hon. John Banks
Hon. Jenny Shipley
Hon. Warren Cooper
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Bolger Administration 2 J I J990
Prime Minister, Minister in Charge of the New Zealand
Security Intelli gence Service.
Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of External Relations
and Trade, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
Minister of Labour, Minister of Immigration, Minister
of State Services, Minister of Pacific Island Affairs,
Minister responsible for Accident Compensation
Corporation.
Minister of Finance, Minister Responsible for
Earthquake and War Damage Commission, National
Provident Fund.
Attorney General, Minister responsible for Serious
Fraud Office, Leader of the House, Minister
Responsible for Audit Department.
Minister of Agriculture, Minister of Forestry, Minister
of Racing.
Minister for State-owned Enterprises, Minister of
Fisheries, Minister of Railways, Minister of Works and
Development, Associate Minister of Finance, and
Minister Responsible for Airways Corporation of NZ
Ltd., Coal Corporation of New Zealand Ltd"
Government Property Services Ltd', Government
Supply Brokerage Corp.NZ, Ltd', NZ Forestry Corp',
NZ Post Ltd., NZ Rail Ltd.' and Works and
Development Services CorP. Ltd.
Minister of Commerce, Minister of Trad Negotiations'
Minister for Industry, Associate Minister for External
Relations and Trade, Member of NZ Planning Council'
Minister of Health, Minister for the Environment'
Minister of Research, Science and Technology'
Minister of Police, Minister of Tourism, Minister of
Recreation and SPort.
Minister of Social Welfare, Minister of Women's
Affairs.
Minister of Defence, Minister of Local Government'
Minister in Charge of War Pensions, Minister
Responsible for TV NZ Ltd. and Radio NZ Ltd'
Hon. Doug Graham
Hon. Dr. Lockwood Smith
Hon. Maurice McTigue
Hon. Rob Storey
Hon. Winston Peters
Hon. Denis Marshall
Hon. John Luxton
Hon. Wyatt Creech
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Minister of Justice, Minister for Disarmament and Arms
Conhol, Minister of Arts and Culrure.
Minister of Education, Minister responsible for
Rlucational Review Office andNational Library'
Minister of Employment, Associate Minister of Finance'
Minister of Transport, Minister of Statistics, Minister of
Lands, Minister of Survey and Land Information,
Minister in Charge of Valuation Department.
Minister of Maori Affairs, Minister in Charge of the Iwi
Transition Agency.
Minister of Conservation, Minister of Science (DSIR)'
Associate Minister of Agriculnue.
Minister of Housing, Minister of Energy, Associate
Minister of Education.
Minister of Revenue, Minister of Customs, Government
Superannuation Fund, Minister in Charge of the Public
Trust Office.
APPENDIX C
Tribal Locations in New Zealand
Major tribes are indicated and some locations
reflect movements which took place between
1800 and 1850. Original source is Oxford
History of New fualand, ed. W'H Oliver with
B.R. Williams (OUP, 1981). The map is
derived largely from AJHR, 1870, D'23.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10,
11.
t2.
13.
Te Aupouri
Te Rarawa
Ngdpuhi
Ngati Whatua
Ngdti Paoa
14,
15.
16.
11.
18.
19.
Nged Maru, Ngati Tamatera
Ngati Haua
Waikato
Ngdti Toa
Ngati Maniapoto
Ngdta Raukawa
Ngdi Te Rangi
Te Arawa
Ngeti Awa
Whakatohea
Whanau a Apanui
This map comes from Claudia arange,The
p.267.
20. Ngati Kahungunu
21. Ngeti Tuwharetoa
22. Ngeti Tama
23. TeAtiawa
24. Taranaki
25. Ngati Raunui
26. Ngarauru
27. Wanganui
28. Muaupoko, Ng6ti Raukawa, Ngati
Apa, Rangitane
29. Ngati Toa, Te Atiawa, Ngati Ira
30. Ngdti Kuia
31. Ngai [Kai] Tahu, Ng1ti Mamoe
32. Poutini Ngai Tahu
! I .. 13 ltf --15 1?I 10^' 19 {e_
zzpao
Ngdti Porou
Rongowhakdta
Tuhoe
Treary of Waitangi, Allen and Unwin, Wellington, 1989'
APPENDIX D
List of Intemicws
Mr David Bradshaw, State Services Commission, June 21 1993
Chief Judge ET.J Durie, Waitangi Tribunal/Maori Land Court,2l August 1995
Right Honourable Douglas Graham, Minister in Charge of Treaty Negotiations' l0
August 1995
Mrs Helen Hughes, Parliamentary commissioner for the Environment,6 July 1993
Mr Colin James, Journalist, 28 June 1993
Sir Kenneth Keith, President of the Law Commission, I July 1993
Judge Shonagh Kenderdine,24 June 1993
Dr Claudia Orange, Historian, I July 1993
Mr Tipene O'Regan, Kai Tahu,7 July 1993
Professor Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Former Prime Minister,2g June 1993
professor James Ritchie, Waikato University (Maaori Studies and Research),4 June
t993
hofessor Andrew Sharp, Political Theorist,5 June 1993
Mr Maui Solomon, Barister,29 August 1995
Ms Mary-Anne Thompson, Treaty Unit, Treastry,2 July 1993
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Gf,OSSANY OF UAOru TBRMSI
Hapii Section of a large tribe, clan, secondary tribe
Hokonga Exchanging, buying, selling
Hui Congregate, come together
Iwi Nation, people, lalso tribe in some contextsl
Kaimoana Seafood
Kaitiakitanga GuardianshiP
Kanohi Face
# Kawanatanga Governance, trusteeship
Kaumatua Adult, old man or woman
MaraeEnclosedspaceinfrontofhouse,courtyard,village
common
Mana Authority, contol, influence, prestige, power
*Nunuku Moriori philosophy which supported and promoted a
peaceful existence and outlawed bloodshed'
Rangatira Chief (male or female), person of good breeding
Raupatu Conquer, overcome
* Rekohu Literally 'misty sky ' or 'misU sun' - a name given to the
Chathams Islands by the Moriori people'
Rfinanga AssemblY, council
Taonga hoperty, anything highly prized
Tapu Under religious or superstitious restriction
#Tangata whenua Person or people of a given place
*Tchakat Moriori Literally 'ordinary' or 'normal' - the name Moriori gave
themselves after contact with PEkehS and Mdori from
New Zealand
Tikanga Custom, habit
#Tino rangatiratanga Unqualified exercise of (their) chieftainship, highest
chieftainshiP
Tiriti Treaty
WAhi Part, Portion
#Whai kdrero SPeeches, oratory
I Most of thsse translations come from H.W.William s, Dictionary of the Maori Language' (7th
gdn.), GP Publications Ltd., Wellington' 1992.
# fni, sign indicates translations taken from I.H. Kawharu (ed-)' Waitangi: Maori and Pakeha
perspectiies of the Treaty of Waitangi,Oxford University Press, Auckland, 1989.
* This sign indicates translations taken from Michael King, Moriori: A People Rediscovered' Viking
Press" Auckland, 1989.
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Wh6nau Family (although according to Williams it is questionable
whether M6ori had any real concept of the family unit')
*Wharekauri Literally 'House made of Kauri' - the name given to the
Chatham lslands by M6ori in the early 1800s
Whenua Ilnd,Counnry
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
CHE Crown Health EnterPrises
CRI Crown Research Institutes
DSIR Departnent of Scientific and Industial Research
FPP First-Past-the-Post
MAC Maori Advisory Committees
MCG Maori local Government Reform Consultative Group
MMP Mixed Member Proportional Representation
NLC Native Land Court
NZPA New Zealand Press Association
ocCLGofficialsCo-ordinatingCommitteeonLocal
Government Reform
RMLR Resource Management Law Reform
SOE State Owned EnterPrises
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